2009 - 2010
A firm is an incentive mechanism among those indispensable capital providers, i.e., shareholders and creditors as monetary capital providers, and management and employees as human capital providers. Markets and laws are two significant aspects of the infrastructure of the incentive bargaining of a firm. It is important to note that the law does not by itself affect the incentive bargaining among those four players, but rather affects it complementarily through markets. Also a specific law in many cases would not affect incentive bargaining independently, but rather complementarily through laws. The objectives of this project are to reconstruct legal systems such as the enterprise law, which affect the incentive bargaining of a firm, and to stimulate efficient incentive bargaining at the firm level.
2007 - 2008
We have frequently discussed the question, "To whom does the company belong" in corporate governance theories. However, henceforth, it will be necessary to engage in this discussion from a different perspective: that is, what is the optimal incentive mechanism for the providers of the essential resources needed in corporate activities (managers and employees as human capital providers and shareholders and creditors as monetary capital providers. The legal system is a key part of the infrastructure that affects the outcome of incentive bargaining. However, because the legal system consists of numerous sub-divisions, no attempt has been made in the past to deal with "enterprise law" as an integrated incentive structure. In this project, Japanese and foreign experts are brought together to undertake a restatement of enterprise law, covering corporate law, insolvency law, securities law, labor law and tax law.
April 11, 2007 - November 30, 2010
Major Research Results
RIETI Discussion Papers
RIETI International Seminar
- June 25, 2008
"Enterprise Law as a Structure for Incentives"