On April 17 this year, the first round of the EU-Japan Defence Industry Dialogue was held in Brussels, Belgium under the co-sponsorship of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies (SJAC) and the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Following the dialogue, on June 17, a webinar titled “t Clone of Current State and Future Prospects of Japan-EU Defence Industry Cooperation” was held under the sponsorship of the EU Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation (EUJC).
Below, I offer my takeaways and thoughts after participating in those two events.
First, let us look at what the EU-Japan Defence Industry Dialogue itself.
A joint statement issued at the Japan-EU Summit held in July 2025 stated the following: “We recognise that strengthening the defence industry base is a common priority for Japan and the EU and look forward to launching the Japan-EU Defence Industry Dialogue, and to further cooperation in the defence industry field.”
In other words, Japanese and EU leaders welcomed and expressed anticipation for an industry-led initiative.
In response, the first round of the EU-Japan Defence Industry Dialogue was held in Brussels in April this year. The dialogue, launched by Japanese and EU industries, was attended by Mr. Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Mr. Ino Toshiro, Japanese State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, the representative from the Ministry of Defense, and representatives from the Japanese and EU defence contractors and defence industrial associations, and resulted in a series of lively discussions.
As an outcome of the event, the joint statement included the following remarks: “Both sides recognise that strengthening the defence industrial base is a shared priority for the EU and Japan, and that reinforcing security through partnership is essential in an increasingly challenging security environment. [We have] a strong shared interest in enhancing the resilience of defence supply chains—including dual-use sectors—between the EU and Japan, and confirm that [we] will continue to exchange views to advance various forms of cooperation related to defence industrial matters.”
According to explanations provided by President Takumi Fujino of the SJAC at the EUJC webinar, the dialogue was cemented after the SJAC called on the ASD to join its initiative toward cooperation. I would like to express my appreciation for the Japanese industry’s initiative in creating momentum toward Japan-EU defence industry cooperation by involving the leaders of the Japanese government and the European Commission.
My takeaways and thoughts on Japan-EU defence industry cooperation are as follows.
First, it is urgent for the EU to reinforce its arsenal of defence equipment by increasing defence spending despite its need to reduce its dependence on the United States in equipment procurement. Despite this need, the EU is facing some major challenges in strengthening its defence industrial base, including the development of self-sufficient supply chains.
The EU has keenly felt the need for a defence buildup after witnessing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 and the attitude that the United States has adopted toward Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in recent years. EU member states therefore aim to achieve the goal of increasing the ratio of defence spending-to-GDP to 5%, which they agreed to as NATO members in 2025 (on an EU-wide basis, defence spending in 2024 came to 343.0 billion euros, equivalent to 1.9% of GDP [European Defence Agency]).
To achieve the goal, in March 2025, under the ReArm Europe plan, the European Commission announced defence investment initiatives totaling 800 billion euros over four years.
Although EU defence spending is on an upward trend as described above, one major problem is the region’s high dependency on the U.S. in terms of defence procurement. According to the European defence industrial strategy which was unveiled in March 2024, 63% of the defence equipment acquisitions made by EU member countries from the middle of 2022 through the middle of 2023 were from U.S. companies.
Confronted with the United States’ recent attitude toward Europe, the EU recognizes the need to reduce its (currently heavy) dependency on the U.S. in defence equipment procurement.
However, the EU’s defence industry base is fragile in terms of supply chain resilience, human resources, technological prowess, and research and development because of its long-lasting dependency on the U.S. In order to overcome this weakness, the EU is aiming to urgently strengthen its defence industrial base by employing all available measures, including EU-wide joint procurements and fiscal support through the ReArm Europe plan, among other measures. Nevertheless, this is not an easy task.
Second, because of the abovementioned situation, the EU must forge cooperative relationships with partners outside the region in order to strengthen its defence industrial base. In that respect, the EU views Japan, which has shared values and a robust industrial base, as potentially the most suitable “trusted partner” for the region.
The EU’s tendency to regard Japan as a trusted partner has grown stronger year after year in light of the increasingly challenging global geopolitical situation. In fact, since the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) were put into effect in 2019, the Japan-EU relationship has continued to strengthen in various sectors through subsequent partnerships, such as the Japan-EU Green Alliance in 2021, the Japan-EU Digital Partnership in 2022, the Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership in 2024, and the Japan-EU Competitiveness Alliance in 2025.
In the recent round of the Japan-EU Defence Industry Dialogue, as well as during the processes leading up to it, the EU side often emphasized that Japan-EU defence industrial cooperation is a matter of “shared interests,” “common challenges” and “common initiatives.” This reflects the high level of expectations that the EU has for Japan.
The fact that European Commissioner Kubilius participated in this dialogue also indicates the strength of the EU side’s strong expectations for Japan.
Supply chain resilience may be the area of cooperation in which the EU’s expectations for Japan are the strongest.
The EU’s defence industry supply chain has weakened significantly because of its historical dependence on the U.S. and the effects of business restructuring carried out during the COVID-19 crisis. The EU lacks production capacity not only for military hardware like ordnance but also for many parts and materials, such as semiconductors and other electronic parts; specialized parts, including sensors and motors, castings, and special steel; and other materials.
Compared with the EU’s situation, as explained by SJAC President Fujino, the number of workers in the Japanese aircraft industry has generally remained stable despite the experience of the COVID-19 crisis, which means that the industry’s scale has been maintained at a certain level. Therefore, it natural for the EU to turn to Japan as a dependable partner, as it possesses such a stable industrial base.
Third, Japan should take advantage of the fact that the EU’s expectations are so high and construct a win-win relationship with the EU aimed at strengthening defence capabilities.
The security environment surrounding Japan has been becoming increasingly severe in recent years, as indicated by the warning voiced by former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida that “today's Ukraine could be tomorrow's East Asia.” Under these circumstances, strengthening Japan’s defence industrial capacity has become an imperative.
As reported during the webinar by Mr. Furuichi Shigeru, Director for Defence Affairs Aerospace and Defence Industry Division Manufacturing Industries Bureau, the environment surrounding the defence industry is undergoing significant and rapid changes. Specifically, as has become evident in the war in Ukraine, there is now an urgent need to address the following challenges: continuously maintaining production capacity for military hardware in anticipation of prolonged conflicts; utilizing dual-use technologies, including drone and aerospace technologies; and guarding against supply chain risks arising from export controls on critical minerals and derivative products.
A symbolic example of win-win defence industrial cooperation between Japan and the EU is the joint development of the next-generation fighter jet, known as GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme). That project involves co-development by Japanese, the United Kingdom and Italian companies, with funding estimated at a total of around 8 to 10 trillion yen provided under the oversight of a trilateral steering committee organized by the governments of Japan, the UK, and Italy.
The GCAP is a groundbreaking strategic project for both Japan and Europe in that it aims to develop a fighter jet independently without relying on procurement from the U.S.
In addition to large-scale military hardware development projects like GCAP, Japan could also benefit from Europe’s direct experience with the war in Ukraine in terms of utilization of dual-use technologies.
For example, in Ukraine and the rest of Europe, hundreds of companies, particularly startups, are presumed to be involved in areas such as drone manufacturing and operational software. Japan also has startups involved in those areas. Cooperation between Japanese and European dual-use technology startups will be mutually beneficial and could make them major players in the future defence industrial base.
European companies are also considered to be making advances in the development of surveillance and positioning capabilities utilizing commercial satellite constellations. Promoting cooperation with these companies is also expected to strengthen Japan’s defence capabilities.
In Japan, too, we have witnessed the arrival of many startups using dual-use technologies, such as the three companies whose representatives participated in the webinar (Oceanic Constellations Inc., Ookuma Diamond Device Co., Ltd., and Space Data Inc.) It is encouraging that all of them are pursuing collaboration with European companies.
Hopefully, major companies and startups in the defence industry in Japan will strive to develop win-win relationships with EU enterprises by capitalizing on the favorable environment in which the EU desires collaboration with Japanese companies.
Fourth, as Japan promotes defence industrial cooperation with Europe/the EU, continuous efforts by both public and private sectors will be necessary to gain public understanding and support.
The defence industry is necessary to both carry out or deter military conflict, and engaging in defence industrial cooperation with a foreign partner could therefore involve arms exports.
In Japan, arms exports, also known as international defence equipment transfers, have long been subject to strict restrictive regulations which only allowed exports for five designated purposes: rescue, transportation, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. However, in April this year, the government decided to abolish these five categories of restrictions, making international defence equipment transfers generally allowable in principle. Even so, export destinations are limited to countries that cooperate with Japan in the field of security. Importing countries are subject to requirements for prior consent from Japan when using the imported weapons for purposes other than those agreed upon in advance or when re-exporting imported weapons to a third-party country and are also required to appropriately manage imported weapons. Exports to countries engaged in active conflict are not permitted.
As strengthening the defence industry and related international cooperation are sensitive issues, there has been a tendency among the business community, and particularly the financial sector, and academia and the public to adopt a cautious attitude. For many years, the financial sector has avoided providing funding defence-related industries, as such investments violated the principles underlying the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The academic world has also maintained its distance from military research since the Science Council of Japan declared that it would not being involved in scientific research for the purpose of making war. Even within the defence sector itself there has been a tended not to publicize involvement in the arms business out of concern for reputational risk.
These attitudes have been changing in recent years. The change has become pronounced, especially since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022. In Europe, an argument has emerged that protecting one’s own country is a fundamental component of sustainability and a social responsibility of companies. Another major factor in this change is a growing awareness of the importance of dual-use technologies (which are applicable to both civilian and military uses), including aerospace, AI, and quantum technologies.
It is obvious that the security environment surrounding Japan and East Asia has become increasingly severe in recent years, so strengthening defence capabilities is an unavoidable challenge for Japan. The government and industry should therefore engage in proactive public awareness activities to create an environment in which the defence industry, which should play a leading role in this effort, is not subject to public disapproval.
(The opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the author.)
July 15, 2026
>> Original text in Japanese
