“The essential point is that 70% of voters in this election did not choose extreme right or extreme left parties. In other words, they voted for centrist parties. The more centrist parties solve problems, the greater the support they will receive. This is especially necessary to prevent the strengthening of far-right parties, which are a source of concern both domestically and internationally." (Professor Karl-Rudolf Korte, Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen)
In the German federal election held in February 2025, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) made significant gains, becoming the second-largest party. There are growing global concerns about the rise of populism, including in neighboring France and across the Atlantic in the United States. How should the political situation in Germany be interpreted under such circumstances?
Prof. Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte (Note 1), who has studied German politics for many years at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, visited Japan after the election. Despite his busy schedule, which included meetings with members of the Japanese parliament and speeches at events hosted by the German Embassy in Japan, he visited the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) on February 28. During his visit, he shared many insightful perspectives that impressed the attendees, as mentioned at the beginning of this report.
This opportunity allowed me to deepen my understanding of his objective, fact-based, and neutral views as well as the future direction of Japan-Germany relations.
In this report, I will present Prof. Korte's insights by examining the results of the German federal election and the future course of German politics, organized by theme.
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Korte and the Japan Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for providing this valuable opportunity.
1. Electoral System as a Premise
Let us begin by briefly outlining the electoral system of the German Bundestag (Note 2). Since this is only a general premise for the report, those who are already familiar with the system or find it burdensome to follow the detailed content may skip this section.
The German Bundestag is composed of 630 seats. The electoral system is a mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) system, with up to 299 seats allocated to single-member districts and the remaining 331 seats allocated to proportional representation. The up to 299 single-member district seats are awarded to candidates who win the most votes in each electoral district. The remaining 331 proportional representation seats are allocated based on the vote share of each party.
Unlike the mixed-member parallel system used in Japan, the German system places greater importance on the vote share obtained through proportional representation, as it is considered the true reflection of the electorate’s will. Specifically, the following measures are applied to adjust the single-member district seats to the proportional representation seats, which may result in the total number of proportional representation seats exceeding 331.
First, the number of successful candidates from each party in single-member districts is compared with the number of successful candidates from the same party in the proportional representation vote. If a party’s number of successful candidates in single-member districts exceeds the number of seats it is entitled to based on the proportional representation vote, the seats of the lowest-vote-winning candidates from the single-member districts are revoked. The electoral districts where these cancellations occur are treated as “unfilled seats,” and the surplus seats are redistributed to the next candidates on the party list under the proportional representation system.
Another distinctive feature of the German electoral system is the “5% Clause” (Fünf-Prozent-Hürde), also known as the “Blocking Clause.” During the Weimar Republic era, a fully proportional representation system allowed a proliferation of small parties, which weakened the parliamentary and governmental foundation and ultimately paved the way for the rise of the Nazi Party. In response to this historical experience, Germany introduced a rule whereby any party that fails to secure at least 5% of the proportional vote and fails to win at least three single-member district seats is excluded from the seat distribution calculation and loses eligibility to hold seats in the Bundestag (Note 3).
As discussed later, in the 2025 election, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) failed to meet this threshold and therefore were unable to secure seats in the Bundestag.
2. Results of the Most Recent German Federal Election
Now, let us turn to the main topic.
The German federal election was held on February 23, 2025. As predicted by pre-election polls, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz since 2021, suffered a loss of seats. Meanwhile, the largest opposition force, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), which form a joint parliamentary group, became the largest political force in the Bundestag.
At the same time, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD), led by Alice Weidel, secured 20.8% of the vote, surpassing the SPD and becoming the second-largest party. This outcome left a strong impression on the political landscape.
The election results are summarized in Figures 1 and 2 below.
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As shown in Figure 2, the CDU/CSU increased its vote share compared to the previous election, securing a total of 28.6% of the votes to become the largest party. The Green Party (Note 6) secured 11.6% of the vote, representing a decrease of approximately 3% from the previous election. The Free Democratic Party (FDP), led by former Finance Minister Christian Lindner, suffered a sharp decline in support, securing only 4.3% of the votes. It failed to meet the 5% threshold and did not secure any seats in the Bundestag. Similarly, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), despite gaining momentum by forming a coalition government in the eastern state of Thuringia, narrowly missed the 5% threshold with 4.97% of the votes, thereby failing to secure any Bundestag seats. On the other hand, the Left Party (Note 7) increased its vote share to 8.8%.
Let us now analyze the election results.
Pre-election polls indicated that the CDU/CSU had the advantage, and the outcome largely aligned with these pre-election expectations. A key point to note is the rise of the AfD as the second-largest party. As shown in Figure 3, support for the AfD increased significantly in the former East Germany, highlighting a clear difference compared to the western part of the country.
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As shown in Figure 4, the primary concerns of voters in the election were influenced by the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with "Peace/Security" ranking the highest. Concerns about "Economic Issues" also ranked high, driven by rising energy costs and challenges facing the automotive industry. Interest in "Social Justice" and "Immigration" follows closely behind. Given that more than 40% of German voters are aged 60 and older (Note 9), issues such as pensions and elderly care have also garnered significant attention. Environmental issues, however, ranked lower than these other concerns.
As shown in Figure 5, older voters tended to vote for established parties such as the CDU/CSU and the SPD, whereas younger voters showed a tendency to support more extreme parties on both ends of the spectrum, such as the AfD and the Left Party.
Key Points Regarding the Election Results for Each Party are below.
One of the most notable points is that the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which had been part of the governing coalition under the Scholz regime, failed to secure sufficient support and lost its seats in the Bundestag. The party had promoted liberal economic policies, focusing on maintaining fiscal discipline through measures such as corporate tax cuts and the "debt brake" (Schuldenbremse) (Note 12). However, in the face of economic hardship caused by rising prices, it appears that German voters preferred policies that offered greater social security rather than deregulation.
Another significant trend is that while the Green Party lost seats, the Left Party gained.
Both parties are positioned within the liberal spectrum, but the Green Party tends to perform better when environmental issues dominate the election agenda. For example, after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011, the Green Party's approval rating reached a record high of 28% (Note 13), and the party entered the state government in the traditionally conservative state of Baden-Württemberg following the regional elections. This surge was attributed to the Green Party's anti-nuclear stance resonating with the public (Note 14). However, in 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting surge in energy prices, a survey showed that more than half of the Green Party supporters favored extending the operation of nuclear power plants (Note 15). Furthermore, the Green Party suffered heavy losses in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, which was attributed to the fact that environmental protection was no longer a central issue for voters (Note 16).
Instead, as tensions with Russia increased, leading to a cutoff in gas supplies and rising energy prices, voters began looking toward parties like the BSW and the Left Party, which were not necessarily hardliners against Russia, for solutions. In other words, environmental issues had lost their prominence as key election themes, and dissatisfaction with rising prices benefited the Left Party as a political outlet.
The BSW gained momentum in the eastern elections in 2024 but ultimately failed to secure seats in the Bundestag due to the Left Party gaining more support.
The underlying reasons for this contrasting outcome appear to be differences in voter interest in policies and media strategies.
The Left Party focused on "social justice" (Sozialgerechtigkeit) as a core issue (Note 17), addressing practical concerns such as energy prices, housing costs, food prices, and wages. Additionally, the party effectively used social media platforms like TikTok to attract support from younger voters (Note 18).
In contrast, the BSW's leadership pointed out that their unique position on "ending the war and understanding Russia" was overshadowed by the rapprochement between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Note 19). Furthermore, the BSW leader Sahra Wagenknecht cited the party's unstable support base and an inadequate process for selecting official candidates as factors to the outcome (Note 20). She also expressed frustration with negative portrayals of the BSW on social media and hinted at taking legal action (Note 21), even calling for a recount of the votes (Note 22).
As mentioned earlier, the issue that drew the most attention in this election was peace and security. However, for the Left Party's core supporters and younger voters, social policies that directly affected their daily lives were the main points of interest.
Similarly, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) leveraged social media effectively in its campaign and successfully gained support from young voters. This underscores the importance for all parties of adopting effective media strategies in modern electoral politics.
Prof. Korte provided deep insights into the structural issues behind the rise of support for the AfD and similar parties, including the historical context, voter demographics, and the skills needed to govern Germany. His observations highlight the need to carefully analyze election results and how governing coalitions are formed:
- As is well known, following the reunification of East and West Germany, a massive flow of investment moved from West to East. However, in rural areas of East Germany—particularly outside major cities like Dresden and Leipzig—housing shortages remain a problem. In addition, these areas tend to have more elderly men and fewer women, which results in voting behavior that differs significantly from other regions.
- The average age of German voters is 58, and 40% of voters are pension recipients. Naturally, politicians tend to focus on this demographic. Young people, feeling underrepresented, have increasingly shown their frustration at the polls by rejecting mainstream parties. Ten years ago, young voters seeking alternatives turned to the Left Party, which promoted social justice (Sozialgerechtigkeit) and similar policies. Now, that role has been largely replaced by the AfD.
- Both the AfD and the Left Party have mastered the use of social media platforms such as TikTok, which appeal to younger audiences. This has helped them attract substantial support from young voters.
- In the 2021 elections, the Green Party and the FDP—both positioned similarly to the Left Party in terms of liberal policies—were particularly popular among young voters. The FDP, in particular, capitalized on the strict social distancing measures imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic by advocating for their relaxation. This resonated with younger voters eager to resume social activities like parties and gatherings.
- Unlike Austria, Germany does not have a system where the president is directly elected by the people, nor does the president have the authority to directly appoint the chancellor. In other words, German voters do not directly decide who will lead the government. While the AfD emerged as the second-largest party in this election, none of the other major parties have expressed a willingness to form a coalition with them. Therefore, the future chancellor and ruling coalition will likely be decided through political negotiations and consensus within the Bundestag.
3. Future Political Outlook (Federal Chancellor and Coalition Government)
In the Bundestag, it has historically been rare for a single party to secure a majority. Therefore, the largest party usually forms a coalition with other parties to establish a majority and pass budgets and legislation. This election was no exception. While the CDU/CSU emerged as the largest party, it failed to secure an outright majority, making a coalition with other parties necessary for effective governance.
The prospects for the next federal chancellor and the ruling coalition will depend largely on public opinion toward the leading candidates: Olaf Scholz (SPD), Friedrich Merz (CDU), Robert Habeck (the Green Party), and Alice Weidel (AfD).
Figure 6. Friedrich Merz, the CDU party leader, has emerged as the frontrunner for the next chancellor, overtaking Scholz, who has held the position since 2021.
What aspects of the four candidates are being evaluated?
As shown in Figure 7, the results of the public opinion survey regarding the personal image of the candidates reveal that Habeck of the Green Party ranks highest in terms of "likable," followed by Weidel of the AfD. However, in terms of "trustworthy," “expert," and the ability to lead the country, Merz outperforms the other three candidates and enjoys greater public support. It is also noteworthy that Scholz, who has been in power since 2021, ranks below Weidel of the AfD in all categories.
Merz originally specialized in corporate law. After losing a political power struggle with former Chancellor Angela Merkel within the CDU in 2009, he temporarily left politics and practiced law. Merz is perceived as having the capability to address issues such as soaring energy prices and the competitiveness of the automotive industry and other sectors. He also maintains a strict stance on immigration policy. This combination of expertise and experience places him ahead of Weidel in terms of overall evaluation.
At the same time, even with Merz leading the CDU/CSU as the central pillar, it is unlikely that he will secure majority support.
The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition remains the most supported option. However, as shown in Figure 8, nearly half of the public opposes this coalition. On the other hand, a coalition between the Green Party and the CDU/CSU is even less popular than the CDU/CSU-SPD combination. Similarly, a coalition between the SPD, the Green Party, and the Left Party to secure a parliamentary majority also enjoys limited support.
Furthermore, while the CDU/CSU and the AfD share common ground on strict immigration policies, approximately 70% of the public opposes the idea of the CDU/CSU forming a coalition with the AfD, indicating significant resistance to the AfD entering the government.
In a democratic state, it is difficult for any political party to garner universal support from the entire population. At the same time, when no single party can secure a majority, it becomes challenging to form a coalition government that effectively reflects the will of the people and governs efficiently on key political issues. Delivering tangible results through complex political negotiations while establishing a clear and convincing narrative for the public is essential for any future coalition government to gain public trust and support.
Actually, the CDU/CSU has already started moving toward forming a coalition with the SPD since the election, and several preliminary talks have been held.
During the election campaign and immediately afterward, attention was focused on whether a three-party coalition, including the Green Party (referred to as the "Kenya Coalition" based on the party colors of the CDU (black), the SPD (red), and the Green Party (green)), or a two-party coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD (called the "Black-Red Coalition" based on their party colors) would be formed. Given that Markus Söder, the head of the CSU, had previously ruled out cooperation with the Green Party and that the CDU/CSU and the SPD together can secure a parliamentary majority, the latter "Black-Red Coalition" is expected to be formed.
Prof. Korte shared the following insights, expressing that the starting conditions for the next coalition government are favorable. He hopes that the coordination for forming the coalition will proceed smoothly:
- The next coalition government will be a two-party coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. In the past, when the CDU/CSU and the SPD have formed a coalition, it has been referred to as a "Grand Coalition" (Große Koalition). However, since the SPD won fewer seats this time, it may be considered a "Small Coalition." Nevertheless, since it will be a two-party coalition rather than a three-party coalition like the Scholz government, things should proceed more smoothly. The challenge will be whether the new government can function effectively, but the starting conditions seem good.
4. Future Policies (1): Economy and Energy
Unlike in Japan, in Germany, it is customary for the parties forming a coalition to negotiate the policy directions to be pursued by the government and document them in a coalition agreement (Koalitionsvertrag) (Note 26). The coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD has not yet been finalized following the recent election. However, the CDU/CSU and the SPD have agreed on a comprehensive financial package for the coalition, and on March 18, 2025, the Bundestag passed an amendment to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany to provide for a new special fund of 500 billion euros for infrastructure and defense, excluding them from the debt brake (Note 27).
Further details of specific policies will need to wait for the completion of the coalition agreement. However, the CDU/CSU’s election manifesto has been published (Note 28), so it’s worth reviewing the key points, particularly concerning economic and diplomatic policies. In addition, I will share insights from Prof. Korte and public opinion on specific topics.
◆The Economy
The CDU/CSU has proposed policy measures aimed at addressing long-standing issues such as tax burdens and bureaucratic inefficiencies (e.g., complex administrative procedures) and reducing the burden on businesses. At the same time, the party plans to strengthen support for technological advancement, focusing on the promotion of digital and high-tech industries.
[Excerpts from the CDU/CSU Election Manifesto: The Economy] (Note 29)
- Corporate tax reduction: Lower the corporate tax rate to a maximum of 25% and completely abolish the solidarity surcharge (Note 30). Improve depreciation and loss carryforward rules.
- Reduction of bureaucracy (Bürokratie): Introduce a Deregulation Act and "Bureaucracy Check" to eliminate unnecessary administrative work. Reduce reporting obligations and overlapping administrative functions.
- Relief for businesses: Abolish the German Supply Chain Act (Note 31) and restrain the introduction of new regulatory burdens.
- Correction of excessive regulations: Eliminate additional German-specific regulations based on EU law and prevent the imposition of further regulations in the future.
- Digitalization and industrial revitalization: Promote digital technologies, AI, and cloud solutions to accelerate Germany’s reindustrialization. Establish a clear digital strategy and create a "Federal Digital Ministry."
- Strengthening research and development (R&D): Promote investment in R&D to reach 3.5% of GDP by 2030.
- High-tech strategy: Implement policies to make Germany a hub for future technologies, such as aerospace and quantum computing. Develop an ambitious space development strategy.
- Support for startups: Establish "Entrepreneur Protection Zones" and significantly ease regulations for early-stage startups.
- Promoting data utilization: Shift from a "data protection policy" to a "data opportunity policy" to maximize the potential of open data, fostering innovation and growth (Note 32).
Prof. Korte shared the following insights on the structural reforms that Germany needs to implement and also highlighted the strengths of Japan. It made me realize that aspects of daily life in Japan that are often taken for granted are, in fact, essential for political stability.
- Germany should have undertaken structural reforms 10 to 15 years ago. However, party platforms do not detail how to proceed with specific reforms, and Germany is undeniably lagging behind. For instance, 20 to 25 years ago, the U.S. economy was driven by companies like General Electric (GE), but now it is led by emerging companies such as Apple and Amazon.
- Unlike Japan, Germany is not an island country; therefore, it must consider its industries in the context of the broader European continent within the EU. From the perspective of investors in the U.S. or Japan, whether the destination is the Netherlands or Denmark makes no difference. If Germany lacks competitive labor costs and investment attractiveness, no one will invest in Germany's declining economy. Moreover, bureaucratic procedures remain complicated and need to be streamlined.
- The key to being attractive as an investment destination is infrastructure. Simply put, it matters whether buses run on time and whether a bank account can be easily opened in a city. Japan’s strength lies in its functioning infrastructure. Trains arrive on time, and cars move efficiently on the roads. In contrast, Germany is facing significant infrastructure deterioration, including road networks. When infrastructure fails to function, it creates political isolation, which in turn fuels support for extremist parties.
◆Energy
The CDU/CSU also indicated that they intend to tackle the rise in energy prices, which has been a critical issue since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They plan to reduce electricity costs by expanding transmission networks and renewable energy sources. They also plan to reverse the decision made during Chancellor Merkel’s CDU/CSU-led coalition government to shut down nuclear power plants and instead consider restarting closed nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the CDU/CSU has announced plans to repeal the controversial heating law within Germany.
[Excerpt from the CDU/CSU Election Manifesto: Energy] (Note 33)
- Reduction of electricity costs: Reduce electricity taxes and transmission network usage fees to promptly and significantly lower energy costs.
- Stabilization of energy supply: Ensure stable energy supply by expanding transmission networks, storage facilities, and renewable energy sources to control costs.
- Utilization of nuclear energy: Promote research on fourth- and fifth-generation nuclear technology, small modular reactors (SMRs), and nuclear fusion technology. Consider restarting closed nuclear power plants.
- Abolition of heating equipment regulations: Repeal the current heating law (Note 34) to ensure technological freedom while supporting heating technologies with low greenhouse gas emissions.
- Utilization of emissions trading: Use market mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve the most efficient climate protection.
Prof. Korte also shared the following perspectives on Germany’s energy sector. Energy-related issues are at the center of public and governmental concerns in Germany.
- When the Scholz administration was launched in 2021, it was called a "progressive coalition" (Fortschrittskoalition) because it pledged to carry out an economic transformation (wirtschaftliche Umgestaltung). The administration took on various policy challenges. However, within 100 days of taking office, Russia invaded Ukraine. People had forgotten over the past decade that the cheap gas they relied on came from Russia.
- The rise in support for the AfD is driven not only by immigration issues but also by inflation and the sharp increase in energy prices, which have heightened public dissatisfaction. The AfD is skilled at addressing such grievances.
- The new Merz administration, which is expected to take office, will need funding to reduce energy costs while also advancing carbon neutrality. The Merz administration is likely to focus on reducing energy costs, and energy prices are expected to steadily decrease in the future.
5. Future Policies (2): Foreign Affairs, Immigration, and the Indo-Pacific
◆Foreign Affairs
The CDU/CSU, like the Scholz administration, has announced its intention to strengthen support for Ukraine and tighten sanctions against Russia.
[Excerpt from the CDU/CSU's Election Manifesto: Ukraine Policy] (Note 35)
- Pursuing peace, freedom, and security for Ukraine by formulating a joint strategy with France, Poland, and the United Kingdom while maintaining close cooperation with the United States. As part of this effort, the CDU/CSU will also consider reliable security guarantees for Ukraine and NATO’s role in this context. Their goal is to establish a peace process that Ukraine can negotiate from a position of strength and equal footing.
- Strengthening targeted sanctions against Russia: Intensify and refine sanctions on Russia to impose a high economic cost for its war of aggression, with the ultimate goal of forcing Putin to reconsider and end hostilities.
While many German citizens still perceive Russia as a threat amidst the ongoing Ukraine war, support for continued military assistance to Ukraine is gradually declining, particularly in Eastern Germany. In the U.S., voices opposing support for the Ukraine war effort have emerged, especially among supporters of President Trump. In February 2025, following a meeting between President Trump and Ukraine's President Zelensky, the U.S. temporarily halted military and intelligence support for Ukraine, further intensifying the challenges surrounding Ukraine.
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Shortly after the election, Mr. Merz held meetings with French President Macron and NATO Secretary General Rutte to exchange views on European security (Note 38). Even before being officially appointed as chancellor, he had already begun taking swift steps to strengthen relationships. It seems that his priority was to first secure European unity as a foundation for building future relations with U.S. President Trump.
Prof. Korte shared the following insights, suggesting that Merz’s new administration would adopt a more pro-EU stance:
- I believe that the new Merz administration will take a more pro-EU approach. Expectations for the Merz administration are high among EU member states, as evidenced by French President Macron welcoming Mr. Merz in Paris recently.
Since the beginning of 2025, the U.S. has intensified its tough stance toward the EU on issues such as tariffs and defense spending.
A March 2025 public opinion poll conducted in Germany revealed growing concerns about the future of transatlantic relations. However, more than half of respondents did not believe that the partnership between the U.S. and Europe would end immediately.
In this context, the CDU/CSU has shown its intention to maintain its relationship with the United States.
[Excerpt from the CDU/CSU Election Manifesto: Relations with the United States] (Note 40)
- The United States has been, is, and will remain the most important ally outside of Europe. Our two nations are bound by a long-standing friendship. Germany and the United States share common values and interests and are united by a common defense commitment as NATO member states. We will approach our partnership with major world powers from a position of equality while preserving our values.
- Strengthening transatlantic partnership: We aim not only to maintain but also to deepen our transatlantic partnership with the United States and work together for global security, freedom, and peace. To achieve this, we plan to initiate a high-level strategic dialogue to enhance cooperation.
- Deepening comprehensive economic, trade, and future-oriented partnerships with the U.S.: We will strengthen our comprehensive transatlantic partnerships in economic, trade, and future-oriented fields.
The key point is that the CDU/CSU explicitly emphasizes its shared commitment with the U.S. as a NATO member state while aligning itself with the U.S. on the goal of maintaining global peace. At the same time, the CDU/CSU also aims to pursue practical benefits through economic cooperation. Just as UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer successfully held talks with U.S. President Trump at the end of February 2025 on both Ukraine and a UK-U.S. trade agreement (Note 41), it is expected that Merz will also face similarly complex diplomatic negotiations that will require a balanced approach of both firmness and flexibility.
◆Immigration
The most difficult issue expected to arise during coalition agreement negotiations between the CDU/CSU and the SPD—and one that will likely continue to be a contentious issue after the new administration is formed—is immigration policy. In January 2025, the CDU/CSU introduced a Bundestag resolution on border control, which was passed with the support of the AfD. In response, Olaf Scholz sharply criticized the CDU/CSU, stating that the party had broken Germany's post-war principle of maintaining a "firewall" ("Brandmauer") against cooperation with far-right forces. Even after the election, Scholz maintained that Merz's claim of drawing a line with the AfD was "not trustworthy."
Meanwhile, during the election campaign, several terror attacks carried out by suspects with Middle Eastern backgrounds occurred in cities such as Magdeburg, Aschaffenburg, and Munich, heightening public insecurity (Note 42).
The CDU/CSU and the SPD have fundamentally different approaches and perspectives on immigration policy. The table below outlines these differences: the CDU/CSU tends to advocate for stricter immigration and border controls, whereas the SPD supports handling illegal immigration while continuing to prioritize human rights and other values in its immigration policies.
Regardless of the type of coalition agreement that is ultimately signed, immigration will likely remain a destabilizing issue for the new the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition unless comprehensive and well-balanced policies are effectively implemented.
Prof. Korte also shared the following insights regarding immigration. His view that immigrants should not simply be seen as a source of social unrest, but as a necessary element for the German economy, and that improving daily administrative processes could also help resolve immigration issues, provided me with a new perspective.
- During the election campaign, there were multiple incidents of attacks carried out by suspects of immigrant backgrounds in various cities. There are two key issues when considering immigration: one is how to handle illegal immigration itself, and the other is the issue of "anxiety." People tend to link incidents of attacks with "security concerns caused by immigrants."
- However, immigrant laborers are essential for the German economy, and politicians need to communicate this point more clearly. From an administrative perspective, immigration-related tasks differ between the federal and state levels, creating a complex and difficult-to-understand system. Furthermore, administrative offices are overwhelmed by the workload related to immigration. A centrist government’s policy should aim to resolve these issues.
◆Indo-Pacific
Regarding the situation in Asia, the CDU/CSU has also stated its intention to mitigate risks by reducing economic dependency on China while strengthening cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Japan and India.
[Excerpt from the CDU/CSU Election Manifesto: Trade and Indo-Pacific] (Note 44)
- "De-Risking" is the right approach.
While maintaining close economic ties with China, this relationship must be based on the principle of reciprocity. At the same time, efforts will be made to reduce excessive economic dependence by diversifying sales markets, sources of raw materials, and supply chains, as well as protecting critical infrastructure and security-related technologies. - We will work with partner countries to restrain China’s influence in all areas involving strategic interests. To this end, we will promote an independent European policy toward China while working closely with the United States.
- We will further deepen relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific region who share our values, such as Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. We will also strengthen Germany's economic and diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific region through partnerships with regional allies.
Germany and China maintain a cooperative relationship in the economic sector, particularly in the automotive industry. However, the two countries differ in political systems, and Russia and China have developed a close relationship over the Ukraine invasion, making it difficult to describe the relationship between Germany and China as a full-fledged partnership. In fact, in early 2024, a staff member of Maximilian Krah, an AfD member of the European Parliament, was arrested on suspicion of spying for China.
Germany's Federation of German Industries (BDI), which is equivalent to Japan's Keidanren, also supports the "De-Risking" approach rather than full "Decoupling" from China. This position aligns with the CDU/CSU's election manifesto (Note 45).
Public opinion also reflects this sentiment—most Germans consider China an economic threat and believe that Germany should reduce its economic dependence on China, even at the cost of economic and labor market losses.
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Prof. Korte also shared his insights on how to engage with China, highlighting the weight of the concept of "De-Risking" rather than seeing China through a binary lens of ally or adversary.
- Regarding China, there are both cooperative and confrontational aspects in the relationship. For example, there have likely been considerations (Überlegungen gibt es) about relocating the Chinese bases of German companies to Southeast Asia or Japan, but executing such a shift would not be easy. As stated in the CDU/CSU election manifesto, policies will be aligned with the concept of "De-Risking."
Furthermore, Japan is recognized as a partner that shares common values along with other Indo-Pacific countries, and the CDU/CSU manifesto clearly states the intention to strengthen Germany's diplomatic and economic presence in the region.
Petra Sigmund, the German Ambassador to Japan, stated at a press conference at the Japan National Press Club after the federal election that there is significant potential for German-Japanese cooperation, particularly in cutting-edge fields such as AI, connected cars, and quantum technology. She noted that collaboration in these areas requires both technological expertise and mutual trust, which makes Japan an ideal partner for Germany (Note 47).
The geopolitical landscape surrounding technology is becoming increasingly complex, as demonstrated by the joint development of fighter jets by Japan, the UK, and Italy. Sigmund's remarks underscore that isolationism is not necessarily a solution to these challenges. As the ambassador suggested, combining solid technological capabilities with shared values and mutual trust can contribute to enhancing the prosperity of citizens and maintaining a strong international presence.
6. Opinion
After reviewing the election results and future directions that the administration is aiming for while introducing Prof. Korte’s insights, I would like to conclude with three personal perspectives:
1) Germany as a nation has not shifted to the right
Even after this election, I believe that Germany as a whole has not shifted to the right. As Prof. Korte pointed out at the beginning, 70% of the electorate did not vote for the AfD. Moreover, due to the structure of Germany’s electoral system, the ability to cooperate with other parties is essential for gaining and maintaining political power. Additionally, the AfD’s appeal is based on specific issues, such as immigration policy, rather than promoting the kind of eugenic ideology associated with the Nazi Party. Just as the Green Party saw a surge in support when nuclear power became a hot issue, the rise of the AfD should be seen as the result of the immigration issue aligning with the party's core platform, rather than a general shift to the right.
2) Deliver concrete policy results and communicate them effectively
When operating as a coalition government rather than a single-party administration, policy coordination is naturally required. However, if the so-called "small coalition" that Prof. Korte described becomes a reality, it is likely that the policies outlined in the CDU/CSU’s election platform, rather than those of the SPD, will take precedence. For SPD supporters, this may be difficult to accept. Nevertheless, it is important to avoid misjudging political priorities when making decisions. While opposition from the SPD on budget proposals or legislation could damage the CDU/CSU, political instability would lead to the rise of far-right and far-left factions.
What matters most is achieving satisfactory, if not perfect, outcomes on pressing issues. Both the SPD and CDU/CSU must avoid short-term political conflict and instead focus on delivering tangible results.
At the same time, effective public relations regarding the outcomes of these policies are crucial. In a democratic society, there will never be policies that satisfy everyone completely. Dissatisfaction and uncertainty toward the current government are inevitable to some extent. The key is to craft a compelling narrative around the proposed policies and their results, and to communicate it clearly to the public. Even when policies are unpopular, the government must listen sincerely to public feedback without becoming defensive, and consistently explain why the policy is necessary and what could happen if it is not implemented.
By diligently focusing on delivering and communicating policy results, moderate parties can position themselves as an appealing and credible alternative to the AfD, which is regarded as a far-right party.
3) Deepen policy coordination among political parties in Japan and take action before problems emerge
In Japan, immigration issues are not yet a major focus in national elections, although there are some social concerns in certain regions. However, similarly to Germany, Japan faces challenges such as rising energy costs and inflation. Moreover, the ruling coalition does not hold a parliamentary majority, making policy coordination even more necessary than in Germany.
Just as the CDU/CSU and the SPD have been negotiating coalition agreements since the German federal election, Germany has a well-established process for forming a coalition government after elections. The coalition agreement under the Scholz administration covered a wide range of policy issues—including housing, the environment, industry, pensions, families, and healthcare—clearly setting out policy directions. In terms of comprehensiveness and level of detail, the coalition agreement is comparable to Japan’s party platforms and the Cabinet-approved "Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform" (commonly known as the "Basic Policy").
Since the 2024 House of Representatives election in Japan, the ruling and opposition parties have signed agreements on individual issues such as tuition-free education and tax reform. Such developments are commendable. However, is it truly beneficial for the opposition to refuse to cooperate on parliamentary deliberations over an isolated scandal, or to oppose an entire budget simply because they disagree on one issue?
To build a better future, it is important for the ruling party to demonstrate the ability to reflect diverse public opinions through effective policy coordination. At the same time, the opposition should also be willing to fully support budgets and legislation through broad policy agreements. One approach would be to establish a comprehensive policy agreement between parties.
Potential opportunities to conclude such agreements could include:
- The period between the end of an election and the convening of a special session of the Diet;
- The period between the conclusion of the extraordinary Diet session (which often runs from autumn to December) and the opening of the ordinary Diet session in January;
- The period after the ordinary Diet session ends and after bureaucratic personnel changes in July and August.
Since political activities at the local level would need to continue during these periods, policy secretaries could be tasked with handling the detailed negotiations. Moreover, the coalition agreement does not necessarily require compromises on every issue. It would be acceptable to categorize issues into those where the opposing party's position is accepted and those where one’s own position is upheld.
Such efforts would help prevent the media from portraying Japan’s politics as "indecisive" and reduce the risk of unexpected shifts toward far-right or far-left positions in public opinion.
Prof. Korte noted that Japan’s infrastructure is well-developed. However, the sinkhole incident in Yashio City, Saitama Prefecture, has highlighted the aging of infrastructure, while the Noto Peninsula earthquake exposed long-standing structural challenges in non-metropolitan areas. Society is full of themes and problems that, like the liver and pancreas in the human body, are very difficult to recover from when they manifest themselves. The only solution is for every citizen to remain vigilant to these hidden structural issues, to accept that politics is inherently complex, and to take steady steps toward resolving these problems.
At a press conference, German Ambassador to Japan Petra Sigmund emphasized that Japan and Germany have enjoyed 80 years of postwar peace, and that now is the time to return to the foundational diplomatic rules that shaped the postwar order (Note 48). Although various sources of discord are emerging in the field of diplomacy, Japan and Germany share common interests. By working together in both principle and practice, the two countries can contribute to the stability of the international order.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Korte and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Japan Office for inspiring the writing of this report.
March 19, 2025
>> Original text in Japanese
