The Rise of Populist and Nationalist Parties in Europe: Electoral trends, public opinion, and foreign policy implications

Part I — Pawel Zerka: “Home Alone – Europeans are ready to defend themselves”

Mapping the nationalist right: electoral standing and fragmentation across Europe

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) conducts public opinion polling across Europe on a regular basis, typically at least twice a year. The most recent survey, conducted in May 2026, covered 15 countries, including all of the largest EU member states as well as the United Kingdom. While the terms “nationalist right” or “new right” are commonly used, the parties grouped under this label differ substantially from one country to the next: some are strongly anti-European while others are not, and some are pro-Russian while others show no such tendency, making individual analysis of countries essential rather than treating the group as a single political bloc. Current polling shows considerable variation in these parties’ electoral standing. In several countries they already lead national polls or hold power outright, including Bulgaria, where the nationalist party Progressive Bulgaria (PB) is in government; Austria, where the Freedom Party (FPÖ) leads polls despite being outside government; France, where Rassemblement National (RN) holds a clear lead ahead of the 2027 presidential election; Switzerland, where the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) sits in government; Italy, where Giorgia Meloni’s party Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) continues to lead; and the United Kingdom, where the strong lead of Reform UK raises the possibility of Nigel Farage becoming prime minister. Even though it is not part of the government, Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) leads national polling, which is a prospect that has unsettled much of the political establishment. Elsewhere, including Poland, where elections are due next year, and Sweden, nationalist-right parties trail in the polls but could nonetheless enter government through coalition arrangements, particularly given the fragmentation of the nationalist-right spectrum itself. A further dynamic observed across several countries is that as governing nationalist-right parties moderate their positions to remain palatable to a broader electorate, as seen with Giorgia Meloni softening her party’s original positioning, this tends to open political space for even more radical alternatives to emerge, illustrated by the rise of Futuro Nazionale (FN) in Italy and comparable dynamics in the United Kingdom and Poland.

Common ground among nationalist-right electorates in Europe

Despite their diversity, nationalist-right electorates across nearly all countries surveyed share three consistent attitudes that distinguish them from national averages. Understanding these shared traits is essential before examining where the parties diverge. Concern over a renewed migration crisis at the European Union’s borders is considerably higher among nationalist-right voters than among the general population in the same country; in Spain, for example, 39% of the overall population expresses strong concern about this prospect, with the figure rising further among the right-wing electorate, a pattern repeated with variation across most of the other countries surveyed. Conversely, concern about the effects of climate change is markedly lower among these electorates than national averages, reflecting a broader tendency to deprioritize issues more closely associated with the political left. At the same time, worry about economic conditions—particularly in countries such as Estonia, Germany, Portugal, and Spain—tends to be even more pronounced among nationalist-right voters than others, suggesting that these electorates should not be understood simply through the lens of cultural grievance or xenophobia. Instead, economic vulnerability and cultural anxiety around migration appear closely intertwined rather than separate phenomena, a pattern especially visible in regions such as southern France, where both forms of insecurity tend to reinforce one another among the same population.

Diverging views on the United States, Ukraine, the EU, defense, and Russia

Beyond this common ground, nationalist-right parties diverge significantly along five further dimensions, and only a minority simultaneously display all of these traits. Therefore, the political risk each party poses to European cohesion varies considerably depending on which combination applies. On attitudes toward the United States, among the 15 parties that were examined, only Fidesz in Hungary, Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, and Reform UK in the United Kingdom have electorates that remain distinctly pro-Trump and continue to view the U.S. as a reliable ally, even as confidence in the U.S. has fallen sharply across Europe overall to roughly a tenth of the population. Among PiS and Reform UK voters, by contrast, roughly one third to half of voters respectively still view the U.S. this way. These two electorates alone show positive net confidence that the U.S. would come to their country’s defense. This is a stance that could complicate efforts to build European strategic autonomy independent of Washington.

On Ukraine, electorates in countries such as Hungary and Germany show notable anti-Ukrainian tendencies, viewing Ukraine as a rival or adversary rather than a partner and opposing its EU membership, in contrast to broadly positive views of Ukraine elsewhere in Europe. Euroscepticism is widespread among nationalist-right electorates but far from universal. It is notably absent in Spain and Portugal, where pro-European sentiment remains strong, while it is far more pronounced in other parts of Western Europe, particularly Germany, Poland, and Austria, where resistance to common EU debt for joint defense financing reflects a preference for national sovereignty over deeper European integration. On defense spending, most European electorates support increases given reduced confidence in U.S. security guarantees, but nationalist-right electorates in Germany, Estonia, and Austria stand out for opposing such increases, positioning themselves as parties of peace rather than partners in rearmament. Finally, pro-Russian sentiment, including support for resuming Russian energy imports, is concentrated in a smaller subset of parties but includes significant players such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and Progressive Bulgaria (PB), some of which have documented links to Russian funding or support. By contrast, attitudes toward China show little difference between nationalist-right electorates and national averages, with most of Europe still viewing China relatively positively as an ally or partner, suggesting China has not yet become a defining fault line in these countries’ domestic politics.

Some parties, such as Fidesz, combine most or all of these characteristics, making them especially consequential, while others, including Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) and Chega in Portugal, exhibit few of them, though even these can still undermine European unity and impact foreign policy as soft Eurosceptics. Looking ahead, elections in France, Poland, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, together with the 2029 European Parliament elections, are the key contests to watch for further shifts in the nationalist right’s influence across the European continent.

Part II — Célia Belin: “If Bardella wins: Scenarios for a far-right presidency in France”

Rassemblement National’s worldview and leadership

France’s presidential election, with its first round scheduled for April 18, 2027, and second round for May 2, will mark the end of Emmanuel Macron’s decade in office, a period defined by an ambitious, pro-European presidency that sought to engage successive U.S. administrations while pushing Europe toward greater strategic autonomy. Rassemblement National (RN) is currently positioned as a leading contender for the presidency, despite having never held national power and having no members of its top leadership with prior ministerial experience, reflecting decades of exclusion from French politics and bureaucracy. The party’s worldview is organized around the principle of national priority or national preference, which stands in direct tension with European rules and regulations and includes asserting the primacy of French law over EU law, alongside a broader preoccupation with reasserting French identity against perceived cultural decline. Historically, fear of Rassemblement National’s radicalism helped sustain the so-called Republican Front, a cross-party coalition formed to block its path to power, but this dynamic may no longer hold given the party’s current standing. Marine Le Pen has led the party for the past 15 years and worked deliberately to de-demonize it and broaden its acceptability to French voters, before ceding the party presidency to Jordan Bardella, a 30-year-old skilled communicator who represents a younger generation of the movement. Le Pen currently faces an appeals trial for embezzling European funds, with a ruling expected shortly. If she is found ineligible to run, Bardella would become the party’s presidential candidate. While broadly aligned, these two political figures differ in emphasis. Le Pen remains more focused on national sovereignty and reengaging with Russia, while Bardella places greater weight on European and French identity, including the defense of Christian and European heritage, and frames support for Ukraine partly as a matter of European identity rather than sovereignty. Le Pen also retains an outsider mentality after decades outside of power, whereas Bardella has positioned himself closer to power and has begun speaking of uniting rightist parties both within France and beyond.

Implications of a potential Rassemblement National presidency for Europe

A Rassemblement National victory in 2027 would represent a systemic shock for European politics, opening a new era both domestically and across the continent given the considerable power of the French presidency and the party’s potential to become a model for the many nationalist movements already gaining ground elsewhere in Europe. Were Bardella to become president, he would likely attempt to unite France’s fragmented right by absorbing more traditional conservative parties such as Les Républicains (LR) in order to secure a governing majority, while also seeking cooperation at the European level with the continent’s conservative right, though the deep divisions over the United States, the European Union, and Russia identified across nationalist-right parties would complicate any such alliance. Rassemblement National’s governing agenda, organized around the principle of national sovereignty, includes reducing the influence of EU institutions, potentially cutting France’s contribution to the EU budget, prioritizing national approaches to defense and industrial policy over European ones, and rolling back recent agreements on migration, climate, and energy. This agenda would place France on a collision course with Brussels almost immediately upon taking office. Even under a Bardella presidency, however, the party would remain fundamentally shaped by Marine Le Pen, who founded the movement together with her father fifty years ago and retains substantial authority and loyalty within it. Therefore, Bardella would need to work closely with her rather than govern independently, unlike Macron’s experience in 2017 with a party built entirely around himself. Rassemblement National’s policy positions also remain underdeveloped and are typically pushed without full consideration of their consequences, with decision-making concentrated within a small circle around Le Pen and Bardella. This raises significant uncertainty about how the party would respond to an actual crisis, particularly one involving NATO, given Rassemblement National’s long history of anti-American and anti-NATO positions. The likely outcome is paradoxical: a more nationalist Europe that is simultaneously less united, since Rassemblement National’s anti-EU policies and proposed budget and reform rollbacks would likely provoke clashes even with fellow right-wing governments, potentially leaving France more isolated rather than at the head of a unified nationalist bloc. Such a scenario would weaken rather than strengthen Europe’s overall geopolitical standing at a moment of considerable external pressure from both the United States and Russia.

Recommendations for Japan and other international partners

Given the scale of disruption a potential Rassemblement National presidency could bring, there are a few guiding principles for how Japan and other international partners can approach this evolving landscape. First, all existing precedents should be abandoned when assessing Rassemblement National, since comparisons to other nationalist-right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni or Viktor Orbán do not hold, given Rassemblement National’s distinct ideological profile and the outsized influence France carries as a large, central European power. Second, partners should prepare for a wider but internally divided European right, since the same fault lines separating nationalist-right parties on topics such as the U.S., the EU, and Russia mean that a unified partner across the continent is unlikely to emerge, complicating efforts to identify consistent partners for cooperation. Third, expectations should be carefully managed when working with a Rassemblement National-led France, since a nationalistic government oriented around sovereignty is likely to encounter significant difficulty passing ambitious bilateral or multilateral agreements, particularly those requiring deeper institutional coordination. Finally, navigating this environment will require the careful and patient practice of international diplomacy, an approach in which Japan has considerable experience, even as opportunities for substantive cooperation may narrow and France potentially becomes a more difficult and less internationally engaged partner than in recent decades.

Q&A

Q:
Given that survey results suggest a fairly ambivalent European stance toward China, are issues such as China’s economic coercion and export practices not widely recognized across Europe? Beyond the economic dimension, has China’s role in enabling Russia’s war against Ukraine through their economic ties not generated negative sentiment among European voters?

Pawel ZERKA:
A serious public debate on China has not yet taken place in most European countries, since such debates unfold separately within each national public sphere. The need for discussion of Russia became unavoidable once war broke out in Ukraine, and likewise, discussions about the United States happened once President Trump took office, but nothing comparable has occurred with regard to China. While such discussions do exist to some degree, they remain largely confined to expert circles. For the broader public, the view of China stays relatively positive: while China is not seen as an ally, it is perceived as a necessary and useful trading partner, associated above all with affordable goods that can be purchased online. The more strategic costs, including growing European dependency, damage to the continent’s industrial base, and financial support for Russia, remain largely invisible to most citizens. This creates a communications challenge for political leaders who might wish to take a harder line, since doing so would require explaining to the public why China constitutes a serious problem in the first place. Such a discussion is still in the very early stages and only beginning to emerge in a few countries.

Q:
What has triggered the recent rise and spread of support for nationalist parties across Europe? Is this parallel development in the United States driven by a widening economic gap or recessions, or does it instead reflect an identity crisis linked to rising immigration, or some combination of these and other factors?

Pawel ZERKA:
The drivers differ considerably from country to country and party to party, but an explanation resting on economic factors alone would be insufficient. In Western Europe, the relevant dynamic is not migration as such but the fact that many societies have become multicultural, generating tensions that nationalist parties have exploited; citizens who hold the nationality of a given country are sometimes viewed by parts of the population as not being sufficiently representative of that nationality. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, part of the far right’s popularity stems from disappointment with the European Union, which these countries joined later than others. Some voters feel there is insufficient space to maintain Catholic identity or family values within a largely secular Europe, or feel that EU integration has produced winners and losers, with elites benefiting while they themselves lose out. Cultural factors, in short, appear to matter at least as much as economic ones.

Célia BELIN:
In the French case specifically, two additional traumas stand out. The first is the experience of the 2015 terrorist attacks, including the Charlie Hebdo shootings and the large-scale attack in November of that year, followed by a further attack in June 2016. These events reinforced a narrative that links multiculturalism, a perceived retreat from secularist principles, and insufficient toughness on crime and security. Rassemblement National leader Jordan Bardella has often recounted witnessing the arrest of the November 2015 attackers, who had sought refuge in a building next to his own. The second trauma is broader and deeper: France’s loss of international standing over the past decade, including diminished influence in Africa and difficulty managing relations with the United States. Some voters attribute this decline to excessive alignment with the rest of Europe, believing that a more independent France would be a stronger one.

Q:
Given that a Rassemblement National government would likely pursue a strong industrial policy, would there be room for collaboration between France and countries such as Japan in areas including nuclear energy, defense, and dual-use industry, which are increasingly strategically important sectors?

Célia BELIN:
Reindustrialization dominates Rassemblement National’s industrial agenda, pursued mainly through tax cuts and deregulation. Energy policy sits at the core of this platform: the party regards France’s long-standing commitment to nuclear power as an investment that should now deliver clean, cheap electricity, and it frequently attributes high energy prices to other European partners rather than to domestic policy choices. On this basis, there would in principle be considerable common ground for cooperation with Japan, particularly around economic security.

A Rassemblement National government would likely be interested in securing access to critical raw materials, potentially through cooperation with Japan in a G7 context, as well as in technological sovereignty and the development of dual-use technologies for defense purposes. One important caveat, however, is that Rassemblement National has very limited international experience and an explicit ambition to reduce reliance on imports and trade flows, meaning its instinct runs against working with international partners. Such a government would likely be preoccupied with a domestic political crisis of its own making, and a weaker European Union would in turn make Japan’s engagement with France more difficult overall. Pragmatic cooperation would therefore likely be possible only in a narrow sense, largely confined to economic security.

Additionally, in line with the previous comment on perceptions of China among the broader public, there is little genuine debate on China within Rassemblement National circles either. Taiwan, for its part, receives essentially no attention in the French political debate at present, which instead centers on Ukraine and, at times, Greenland, Venezuela, or U.S. policy more broadly. The response to a Taiwan crisis on the part of a Rassemblement National president would likely be passive, following the lead of other powers, including the U.S. president, and taking minimal risk in attempting to resolve the situation. Such a presidency would, overall, be more inward-looking and considerably less internationally active than that of President Emmanuel Macron.