France’s Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategy: Priorities, challenges and adaptation

Why an Indo-Pacific strategy?

France was the first European country to adopt an Indo-Pacific strategy, formally published in 2019, though the foundational speech was delivered by President Emmanuel Macron at the Garden Island Naval Base in Sydney in 2018. Japan was identified from the outset as a key strategic partner. The strategy is rooted in France’s status as a resident nation of the Indo-Pacific. France maintains overseas territories across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and its EEZ is the second largest in the world, with 90% located in the Indo-Pacific. Approximately 1.6 million French citizens live on these territories, with an additional 200,000 residing in other countries in the region. To protect these territories, France maintains sovereignty forces pre-positioned in La Réunion in the Indian Ocean, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia, comprising approximately 7,000 troops, about 12 vessels, and 40 aircraft permanently deployed. France is the only European nation with permanent military forces in the region. France’s geographic definition of the Indo-Pacific is notably broad, encompassing the eastern coast of Africa all the way to the Pacific, a definition shared by Japan, enabling cooperation across a wide arc from Djibouti to the South Pacific.

Beyond sovereign territories, France views the Indo-Pacific as a new center of the world combining economic growth and significant strategic risks. The region accounts for 60% of global gross domestic product (GDP), some of the world’s fastest-growing middle classes, is home to key maritime corridors, 50% of the world’s container traffic, and 70% of energy raw materials transiting through the Indian Ocean. The current crisis in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz exemplify the interdependence and the vital role of maritime lanes of communication running from the Middle East and Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Interdependence is growing, with 40% of European trade passing through the South China Sea and between 15% and 20% of France’s global imports and exports directed to the Indo-Pacific. The region is also a critical provider of semiconductors for Europe, with approximately 60% of European dependence concentrated on Taiwan’s semiconductor production, meaning for trade reasons, the Indo-Pacific is very important, and for global value chains, it is absolutely critical.

The security environment presents a variety of threats as viewed from France. China’s growing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, including maritime expansion challenging the Law of the Sea, repeated Chinese Coast Guard incursions around the Senkaku Islands, and China’s claims on more than 80% of the South China Sea area having created reclaimed islands and military bases, raises serious concern, particularly as it puts at risk the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation. A significant wake-up call was China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, given Djibouti’s importance as a key French stronghold. The Taiwan Strait represents a key concern not only for government and rule-of-law considerations but also for private sector interests, with hybrid warfare already underway alongside talk of a window of risk for Chinese kinetic action. North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs also remain destabilizing, compounded by its rapprochement with Russia and a security pact that raises concern regarding further escalation of the DPRK’s nuclear program. The deployment of North Korean soldiers fighting on European soil alongside Russia is concerning for both Europeans and Asian players, as combat experience gained there will translate into greater threats in the Indo-Pacific region as well. South Asia is also under risk with the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict underway and India-Pakistan frictions, while the northwestern Indian Ocean remains an everyday concern. Non-traditional security issues including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, narcotraffic, and climate change effects that constitute the number one security threat for Pacific Island Countries further complicate the landscape. Environmental security is also a significant concern, as climate change constitutes the number one security threat for Pacific Island Countries. There is also growing demand for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. As a key takeaway, any crisis in the Indo-Pacific would severely impact maritime transportation, energy supply, and digital infrastructure, posing a huge challenge for France and Europe.

France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific

France's interest in the Indo-Pacific extends beyond economy and territory to encompass power interests. As a permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council member, France pursues an active contribution to strategic stability in hotspot zones, the counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the upholding of international law, especially the law of the sea. France has been a key player in monitoring UN sanctions on North Korea in recent years. France's strategy is organized around three objectives: protecting sovereign interests including territories, nationals, and EEZs; reducing instability risks from both interstate tensions and transnational threats; and influencing the regional strategic balance by providing an additional option between the United States and China.

Three broad principles guide the strategy. First, independence and inclusiveness, distinguishing France's approach from the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy by avoiding explicit containment of China and insisting on an open, multilateral, rules-based approach that can include Beijing when and where possible, with the condition that common principles are agreed. Second, a principles-based approach emphasizing rules-based order, supported since 2014 by annual deployments of French military vessels through the South China Sea to assert the law of the sea and push back on excessive claims. This included the deployment of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and its carrier group to the Pacific, which also patrolled the South China Sea and sailed to the eastern part of the Philippines. Third, a partnership-based approach recognizing France's limited resources and relying on strategic partners including India, Japan, Australia, the United States, and increasingly Southeast Asian nations such as Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. These partnerships are supported by defense equipment sales, particularly with India and Indonesia in recent years, and capacity-building cooperation focused on maritime security. European nations are also partners in the Indo-Pacific, with the EU maintaining its own Indo-Pacific strategy that includes deployments by Germany, Italy, and other European countries. France seeks to coordinate its strategy with these European partners.

France's engagement operates across four pillars. The first pillar is security and defense, which is the most remarkable and most well-known dimension of France's strategy in the region. The second pillar is economy, connectivity, and innovation, including trade promotion, undersea cable projects, R&D partnerships, sustainable development, and connectivity infrastructure, all of which is coordinated with EU initiatives in the region, especially the Global Gateway initiative, which provides significant funding for infrastructure. The third pillar is multilateralism and the rule of law, sustaining existing regional organizations such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum as well as broader UN institutions, a distinguishing feature now that the United States is challenging this dimension. The fourth pillar is climate, biodiversity, and ocean governance, which derives from the fact that France's overseas territories face significant challenges on these issues.

Assets and challenges

France’s assets in the Indo-Pacific begin with its regional presence and pre-positioned forces, which participate in regional mechanisms for maritime surveillance and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in the Pacific Island nations. This presence lends legitimacy and is well-known and well-appreciated in the region. A second asset is the multiple military deployments that France is able to make. These have grown in recent years, with the Charles de Gaulle carrier group deploying to the Pacific, as well as nuclear attack submarines and high-end first-class frigates deploying regularly. When France deploys to the region, it also holds exercises with partners including Japan. The Mission Clemenceau last year featured several exercises, notably Pacific Steller with Japan and the United States, and La Pérouse as a more multilateral, multinational exercise. These deployments increasingly include a European dimension, with French forces working alongside Italian, British, and Dutch counterparts. A third asset is France’s strategic partnerships. Among key partners, India stands out for the very strong defense industrial cooperation that structures the partnership. Japan has been a key partner because of its shared focus on maritime security and its capacity as a security provider. Australia remains an important partner despite the AUKUS shock, which represented a brutal loss for France’s defense exports and a crisis of confidence, though the relationship has since been resumed. The United States is of course a key ally in both the Euro-Atlantic theater and the Indo-Pacific. Other partners include Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and European partners.

However, France faces notable challenges. The first is an ambiguous diplomatic position. France’s concept of being a balancing power is frequently misunderstood. When France talks about balancing power, it may seem to suggest equidistance from the United States and China, but this is not the case. The United States is a key and long-term ally, while China is increasingly viewed as a competitor and rival. What France means is that it rejects block-to-block confrontation and wants to maintain its ability to autonomously decide for its own interests. France is allied with the United States but not always aligned and will maintain independence in that respect. The second challenge is insufficient military means. France has considerable ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, but the region is vast and military resources, even with the permanent presence, are limited. The tyranny of distance compounds this problem, with lengthy transit times required to deploy assets from mainland France to the region. France does not have the ambition to match the military power of the countries of the region, the United States, or China, but its forces have been modernized and their capacities upgraded to be better partners. The third challenge is a crisis of credibility linked to France’s colonial past. Independence movements have gained momentum in New Caledonia, where the situation degraded into violent unrest in 2024, and in French Polynesia. These movements provide opportunities for external interference and influence operations by actors including Azerbaijan and China to undermine French presence and legitimacy in the region.

In response to these challenges, an updated strategy published in July last year adopted a more realistic and pragmatic approach. This revised strategy places French sovereignty interests and overseas territories as the central focus, with emphasis on consultation, cooperation, and local ownership by the overseas territories, a departure from the first strategy which was designed in Paris and imposed on them. The strategy expands beyond the well-known security dimension to include more economic, climate, and technological cooperation, with an appeal to the private sector to engage more proactively in the region. The balancing stance and promotion of strategic autonomy continues, but with more explicit criticism of China’s actions and ambitions in the region, including several mentions of Taiwan and the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait, which were absent from the first strategy. Partnerships remain central, with a stronger alignment with the EU to leverage collective economic and political weight, including free trade agreements (FTAs) signed with India, Australia, and Mercosur to diversify partners and enhance economic security.

The France-Japan partnership

France and Japan have maintained an “Exceptional Partnership” since 2013, with progressive institutionalization including a 2+2 defense and foreign affairs dialogue at the ministerial level since 2014. The relationship has shifted from one based on mutual cultural fascination and economic cooperation to a more strategic partnership, with the Indo-Pacific serving as a springboard for cooperation. France views Japan as a democratic and stable pillar in the Indo-Pacific. Economically, France is the fifth largest foreign investor in Japan and Japan is the tenth largest foreign investor in France.

Despite growing strategic depth, the partnership suffers from persistent misperceptions that should be clarified to advance the relationship. Japan sometimes views France as too distant from or too critical of the United States because of its strategic autonomy posture, and as too lenient on China. France sometimes views Japan as too closely aligned with the United States and too confrontational toward China. In reality, both positions are much closer than assumed. France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while not explicitly targeting any specific country, is largely driven by concerns over China’s rise and regional destabilization risks, as evidenced by French naval activities in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. The balancing posture does not mean equidistance. The Franco-American alliance is older and operationally deeper in certain respects than the U.S.-Japan alliance, with extensive joint combat experience, especially in Africa. Japan, similarly, is a pragmatic actor that seeks to defend its interests and preserve a degree of autonomy, especially in economic security.

The current turning point in international order, with both external and internal crises of the rules-based order, provides a window of opportunity to collectively rethink a more realistic, sustainable engagement based on building strategic autonomy. This means working together on critical areas including global value chains, especially in semiconductors and critical minerals, with a joint rare-earth refining plant already under way in southern France jointly supported by both countries. Economic and energy security are key, especially with the crisis in the Middle East, and civil nuclear energy cooperation is ongoing and set to be reinforced. Space cooperation is also important for maintaining the capacity to monitor and act autonomously. President Macron’s upcoming state visit to Japan, described as long overdue, is expected to provide a new top-level dynamic with announcements on expanded cooperation in critical minerals, new-generation nuclear reactors, artificial intelligence (AI) for defense and governance, and space cooperation including situational awareness and satellite information sharing. The G7 summit in Évian under France’s chairmanship represents another strategic opportunity, with France keen to engage with Japan on Indo-Pacific affairs and the engagement of external partners including from the Global South, to rethink the rules-based order together.

Q&A

Q:
How can France overcome the difficulties of the “European dimension” in order to further engage in the Indo-Pacific, given that the EU lacks direct competence over military and security matters, that Member States hold divergent views on strategic autonomy and relations with the United States, and that competition exists alongside cooperation, as illustrated by tensions over the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project between France and Germany?

Céline PAJON:
European engagement should be understood as multi-layered. The EU serves as the key actor for trade, investment, and infrastructure through initiatives such as the Global Gateway, and is increasingly developing its security dimension through programs such as Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia (ESIWA), which builds cooperation with Japan on cyber threats, disinformation, hybrid threats, maritime security, and counterterrorism. Growing investment in the European defense industry includes funding schemes open to EU security and defense partners, including Japan, creating opportunities for joint defense industrial development. For defense and military matters, however, the bilateral level remains the most practical approach. A tension persists between cooperation and competition among European countries, particularly as deployments to the Indo-Pacific also serve to support national exports and industry, but building cohesion and unity is essential to exerting regional influence. NATO’s Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) cooperation framework, which brings together Europeans and the AP4 members including Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand, also provides an additional avenue for consultation and collaboration.

Q:
Given that France’s overseas territories in the Pacific are concentrated in the southern Pacific, how much is France willing and able to engage in security matters in the northern Pacific, where Japan’s interests are more directly at stake?

Céline PAJON:
The geographic concentration of French territories in the southern Pacific does not present a significant challenge for cooperation, since France conducts extensive deployments from both overseas territories and mainland France. France annually deploys to the South China Sea and holds exercises with Japan both on Japanese territory and, for instance, in joint drills with Japanese forces in New Caledonia. France also remains part of the United Nations (UN) Command for Korea, which provides access to bases in the region, including in Japan, to support its presence and operations.

Q:
How should President Macron’s 2023 remarks that Europe should not follow the United States on the Taiwan issue be interpreted, and how much priority does Paris place on a Taiwan contingency?

Céline PAJON:
The 2023 remarks caused considerable concern because they suggested France was not interested in Taiwan, which is not the case. At the same time that President Macron made those remarks, a French frigate was actually sailing through the Taiwan Strait, illustrating the kind of confusing mixed signals that can emerge. The remarks were clumsy and were subsequently misinterpreted, requiring considerable diplomatic effort to clarify that France’s position on Taiwan has not changed and that France continues to advocate for stability in the Taiwan Strait and opposes any use of force or coercion in the Strait.

Q:
Is the reported 20% cut in sovereignty forces between 2008 and 2021 related to France’s fiscal consolidation?

Céline PAJON:
The budgetary cut was made for fiscal reasons during a period when there was less awareness of imminent threats or risks to the territories, and the policy at the time was to maintain a minimal forces posture. However, this trend has since been reversed, with greater investment in defense and modernized capacities for the overseas territories.

Q:
How might the right-leaning trend in European politics, including in France itself, affect France’s and Europe’s position toward the Indo-Pacific region?

Céline PAJON:
Even within France, the foreign policy of a potential far-right government remains unclear. However, the fundamentals are likely to endure. France’s territories in the region, its economic interdependence through trade and sea lanes of communication, and its basic strategic interests will remain regardless of domestic political shifts. For those reasons, a major change or turning point in France’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is not anticipated.