Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics: The United States and China in an Age of Indo-Pacific Transformation

The Strategic Geography of Eurasian Sea Lanes

My presentation emphasizes the fundamental importance of bringing geography back into strategic and economic analysis, particularly regarding how technological change transforms the functional role of maritime spaces. While the physical geography of mountains, land, and seas remains relatively immutable compared to human existence, the functional significance of these geographic features does in fact evolve dramatically through technological innovation and shifts in the global political economy. This perspective proves especially relevant for understanding maritime geopolitics, where changing technology including robotics and AI fundamentally alters humanity's ability to reach into and understand undersea environments.

The seas have historically been overlooked in strategic analysis because humans naturally focus on terrestrial concerns as that is where we live and conduct most activities. However, advanced technology is revolutionizing maritime capabilities and highlighting the critical importance of undersea domains. This technological transformation makes maritime geography particularly significant for Japan, an island nation with deep existential understanding of sea-based dependencies, and for the U.S., which has historically relied on ocean barriers for defense and strategic advantages across its two and a half centuries of existence.

The research I have conducted focuses specifically on the sea lanes connecting Yokohama to Southampton, England. While these Eurasian sea lanes receive less attention than Atlantic or Pacific routes where most global trade occurs, they represent critical arteries for energy security. Japan imports approximately 99% of its energy requirements, with roughly 85% originating from the Persian Gulf region, highlighting the geoeconomic importance of these sea lanes.

Importantly, the U.S. conducts less trade across these Eurasian sea lanes compared to Japan or China, despite American adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept originally proposed by Prime Minister Abe. The fundamental economic and geopolitical interests in the sea lanes are more significant to Japan than they are for the U.S.; however, they are becoming more important, particularly under the current Trump administration's different approach to international engagement.

Geographic Chokepoints and Strategic Infrastructure

The geographic analysis reveals multiple critical chokepoints and strategic positions along the Eurasian maritime routes that highlight the importance of allied cooperation and strategic partnerships. The first island chain stretches from Japan south through the South China Sea and traditionally represented the initial line of strategic control, while the second island chain including Guam and Palau is gaining increasing prominence due to advancing missile technology and evolving deterrence requirements. Guam and Palau's strategic position between the most direct route to Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits exemplifies the geographic importance of these islands in contemporary security planning.

At the western entrances to the Strait of Malacca, the geographic distribution of key islands highlights the strategic value of Quad organization partnerships. India controls the Andaman Islands directly at the mouth of the Malacca Strait. Australia possesses the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island at the southern approaches, while Britain maintains Diego Garcia, which also houses one of the most important U.S. military bases.

The Indian Ocean itself contains numerous strategically significant positions including Sri Lanka and the Maldives, while the Bay of Bengal serves as a crucial "back door" to China, providing proximity to Yunnan Province and access routes toward Shanghai.

The Arctic Ocean represents an emerging strategic domain as global warming causes ice coverage to recede, opening new maritime possibilities. Russian territorial control along Arctic coastlines creates new challenges, including icebreakers which have become subjects of U.S.-Japan negotiations.

The Red Sea corridor demonstrates how technological and geopolitical changes enhance the strategic importance of specific water bodies. Recent conflicts in Yemen and Gaza highlighted the military significance of the Red Sea, while technological dependencies add importance and vulnerability. Many people find it surprising that approximately 20% of global internet traffic flows through Egypt, making the Red Sea a critical conduit for global communication, and in fact 95% of global internet traffic takes place under the oceans and those fiber optics are very vulnerable. The Red Sea is also an important energy and trade linkage between the Gulf and Europe, and these relationships have only increased in significance due to the Ukraine War.

Historical Evolution and Technological Transformation

Throughout history, technological and geopolitical changes have continuously altered the strategic significance of maritime spaces. In earlier eras, imperial control and basic commerce represented the primary maritime functions, but these have expanded dramatically to encompass energy supply chains, communications infrastructure, information society catalysts, and critical materials supply networks.

Historical travel required seasonal coordination with monsoon winds, forcing voyagers to wait months in Arabian or Indian ports before continuing eastward journeys. However, modern travel has changed dramatically since then. Energy flows between the Gulf and Northeast Asia have increased more than threefold since the 1990s, reflecting rising energy importance.

The British Empire historically relied on Eurasian sea lanes connected strategic positions from Australia through Hong Kong to Japan, demonstrating the enduring importance of these maritime corridors for the British. Even today, these sea lanes provide significant leverage capabilities for Quad nations over China, which has become increasingly dependent on Gulf energy supplies, despite efforts to reduce this vulnerability through electric vehicle adoption, solar power development, and other renewable energy initiatives.

In terms of vulnerabilities facing the U.S. and other allies, the container shipping revolution, beginning during the Vietnam War through American innovation, transformed shipping and created dramatic economies of scale advantages for shipping vehicles. However, analysis of major shipping companies reveals concerning patterns for U.S. strategic interests and highlights growing Chinese dominance in this critical sector. While European companies like Maersk maintain global operations, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and Compagnie Maritime d'affrètement - Compagnie Générale Maritime (CMA CGM) owe their success to their operation primarily within regional markets. China's COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited (COSCO) has emerged as a dominant force in Eurasian sea lanes, particularly the Shanghai-Southampton route.

U.S. Maritime Vulnerabilities and Chinese Dominance

The largest American shipping firm, Matson Lines, ranks only 28th globally, and its position represents an enormous gap between U.S. maritime capabilities and those of major competitors including Chinese, European, and other Asian shipping companies. This weakness becomes particularly concerning when examined alongside Chinese dominance in container port operations, where Chinese-controlled ports occupy most of the world's top positions in terms of container throughput. China's dominance in container shipping reflects its successful capitalization of its rapidly expanding trade volumes and changing container shipping economics. This advantage provides China with strong competitiveness in shipping. The geographic distribution of major powers along sea lanes creates multiple leverage opportunities. Treasury holdings represent one broad form of economic leverage that countries can exercise over maritime-dependent economies.

The Trump Era and Changing Strategic Calculations

Geography continues to be important for strategy and economics, however, its functional role is changing. Technological development—such as the internet, robotics, AI—and the need for critical minerals are raising the importance of geography, particularly the seas. It is especially important for the U.S. under the Trump administration, the U.S.-Japan relationship, and the other relationships of Japan.

Tariff policies naturally cause other countries to reconsider broader relationships and contemplate alternative trade patterns. For European nations, this rings true, and it will affect the Ukraine War as these considerations begin to change strategic calculations. Chinese calculations also face significant changes as tariff pressures build up. These pressures increase the importance of Eurasian sea lanes beyond reasons of energy flows and commercial relationships mentioned earlier. The leverage that comes from Chinese dependence on Gulf energy imports may be declining slightly due to electric vehicle adoption and solar power development, but their overall demand remains much more substantial than two decades ago.

Although the Eurasian sea lanes do not directly involve the U.S., during the first Trump administration under Prime Minister Abe's influence, discussions began regarding fundamental American interests in the Indo-Pacific, which benefits the U.S. and continued work on strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship in this regard is desirable. However, these changing calculations will affect the strategic balance throughout the Indo-Pacific region and create both opportunities and challenges for traditional alliance relationships. While the volume of trade occurring along Eurasian sea lanes and the energy dependencies involved remain fundamentally different from those affecting U.S. interests, the broader geopolitical implications of changing relationships around the Indian Ocean basin will have global consequences that extend far beyond regional concerns.

Comment

NISHIKAWA Kazumi:
The Japanese economic security policy focuses on strengthening economic and technological capabilities as fundamental components of national power, recognizing that national security is comprised of DIMET (Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military capabilities, Economic strength and Technology) in an integrated framework where comparative power relationships between nations determines their capability of maintaining sovereignty.

Throughout the 20th century following World War II, Japan invested heavily in developing economic and technological strengths to enhance overall national power, achieving remarkable success in building industrial capabilities. By the century's end, Japan had achieved remarkable capabilities in electronics and semiconductor technology, but also in maritime-related industries including shipbuilding and port operations, liquefied natural gas transportation systems, submarine cable technology, and numerous other maritime-enabling technologies that allowed Japan to utilize the sea.

However, Japanese capabilities in sea lane utilization have declined over the past two decades, particularly since the 21st century began, in parallel with similar declines in U.S. maritime capabilities. Now Japan, perhaps along with the U.S., is once again interested in strengthening its industrial and technological power to utilize the sea lanes and maritime capabilities.

The interconnection between maritime infrastructure, AI, and critical minerals creates complex dependency chains that cannot be addressed through isolated policy approaches or single-sector solutions. AI systems require submarine cables for utilization, distributed data centers throughout the Indo-Pacific region, and enormous energy resources that must be imported through sea lanes to power AI systems.

Critical minerals present particularly challenging dependencies because, unlike semiconductor components that are small and lightweight, these materials are heavy and require ship transportation for economical movement across ocean distances. This physical reality makes maritime security inseparable from critical minerals supply chain resilience and highlights the importance of maintaining secure sea lanes for advanced technology supply chains. Therefore, these three domains—maritime capabilities, AI infrastructure, and critical minerals—represent interconnected challenges.

Kent E. CALDER:
I really agree with Mr. Nishikawa’s perspective. The sea represents a critical element of a much larger but equally fundamental set of geoeconomic concerns affecting both Japan and the U.S. Critical minerals are essential for the automobile industry and electronics manufacturing, but they are also fundamentally related to maritime transportation capabilities and sea lane security. Similarly, AI systems are becoming fundamental to a broad range of emerging economic and security concerns, but precisely because they require high-speed, interactive communications operating at nearly the speed of light, undersea cable networks provide both more economical and faster solutions compared to satellite alternatives.

Additionally, energy demands are rising exponentially. This likely indicates a resurgence in nuclear and other forms of power, but also imports, especially for Japan. The sea lanes to the Gulf, Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and Indonesia continue to be strategically important The changes in the role of the sea are powered by the revolutionary developments in technology, making the highlighted issues increasingly urgent. Consequently, sea lanes and maritime capabilities are likely to start appearing on policy agendas around the world in the near future.

Q&A

Q:
As a Japanese citizen who cannot forget the Nixon administration and the Tanaka Kakuei cabinet of the 1970s, I am concerned about the sufficiency of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea alliance as a deterrence to the high risk of a China-Russia-North Korea alliance in the security of the Far East. What should be done?

Kent E. CALDER:
Focusing on economic and dual-use aspects rather than purely security, there are several promising areas for enhanced cooperation among the three allied nations that could strengthen overall deterrence capabilities if the political relationship is managed effectively. Shipbuilding represents one particularly promising area for trilateral cooperation, especially for specialized vessels like icebreakers that combine advanced electronics, precision machinery, and high-quality raw materials. These ships are hybrid systems that require complex technologies, creating opportunities for collaborative development and production arrangements that could strengthen both economic ties and defense industrial cooperation. Additionally, industrial policy cooperation on supply chain resilience offers another significant avenue for enhanced partnership.

While maintaining stable relationships with major global stakeholders including China remains important for human security and political power, the tightening relationships among Russia, China, and North Korea do create strategic challenges requiring coordinated responses from allied nations. Focusing on deterrence, strategic islands, particularly within the second island chain including locations like Palau, have rising strategic importance primarily as a bilateral U.S.-Japan issue, though Korea could potentially share such broader security considerations and participate in collective defense arrangements.

Q:
Now, Russia and China have taken over our idea of development of the Dawei Deep Sea Port in order to dominate Myanmar and Indian sea power. Myanmar's sea power balance is highly concerning. Regarding this situation, why do you think the U.S. and Japan's commitment is so weak in this region? What are your thoughts?

Kent E. CALDER:
Although not seen or experienced on land, the undersea dimension remains highly dynamic and historically represents considerable strategic strength for the U.S., particularly in deep ocean areas of the Indian Ocean where American technological advantages remain substantial. While these capabilities may not be obvious to outside observers or easily visible from coastal vantage points, the Quad nations maintain formidable monitoring abilities throughout the Indian Ocean that provide significant strategic advantages.

India controls the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca, equipped with sophisticated sensing capabilities for monitoring maritime traffic that passes through the area, including both surface vessels and submarine activities. Australia controls the Cocos and Christmas Islands at the Sunda Strait's southern end, providing monitoring positions for ships using alternative routes. These positions enable comprehensive surveillance of maritime traffic flowing between the Pacific and Indian Oceans through cooperative arrangements among allied nations.

Diego Garcia provides a cost-effective central Indian Ocean base for U.S. operations that enables rapid deployment and sustained operations throughout the region. The recent agreement between Britain and Mauritius regarding sovereignty, while transferring Diego Garcia and surrounding island formal control to Mauritius, maintains a 99-year lease arrangement with substantial annual payments that preserves operational continuity. This arrangement demonstrates how diplomatic solutions can maintain strategic capabilities while addressing legitimate sovereignty concerns.

Combined with submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities, aircraft carrier deployments that frequently include two or more vessels in the Indian Ocean region, and the AUKUS agreement strengthening submarine capabilities among the U.S., Australia, and Britain, Western capabilities in the Indian Ocean remain substantial despite China's growing presence in the South China Sea. China’s sophisticated undersea monitoring network and development of several islands not recognized by the international community create a strong presence in the South China Sea, but west of Malacca they do not have the same capabilities.

Lastly, the AUKUS agreement with the U.S., Australia, and Britain is not directly located in the Indian Ocean but is a major security ally. The agreement enhances long-term capabilities through technology sharing and industrial cooperation, particularly in submarine capability, that will strengthen all three participating nations.

Q:
How is the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, Indo-Pacific, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) or the Indo-Pacific concept important for the national defense of the U.S.? How should we understand it?

It is important for Japan to make a Japanese sea lane for defense, supply chain, and business expansion in India, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. However, the U.S. has two big oceans, East and West. So therefore, it acts like a deterrent in terms of its defense capabilities. How has the Indo-Pacific function changed for the U.S. as well?

Kent E. CALDER:
This question is extremely important and is implicit in my research while also motivating it. The Eurasian sea lanes are becoming more globally significant primarily due to Asian rather than U.S. economic interests. Asia's growing dependence on Middle Eastern energy over the past 20 years contrasts sharply with declining U.S. Gulf dependence. Japan specifically has become more dependent since the 1950s. After the Suez crisis, Japan began to import substantially more energy from the Middle East rather than Southeast Asia. The U.S. is now less reliant on this area than previously, but its importance to their allies is significant and needs to be addressed.

U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean initially developed during the Cold War as Britain withdrew under Wilson's East of Suez policies and the Soviet Union began developing naval capabilities that could threaten America's nuclear submarine deterrent capabilities. The Indian Ocean's strategic significance for nuclear deterrence stems from its position as the least monitored ocean basin, making it ideal for maintaining submarine-based deterrent capabilities that form the most secure component of America's nuclear triad.

The nuclear strategic equation during the Cold War made the Indian Ocean particularly important because submarines could remain submerged for months in waters that were largely unmonitored except at key entrance and exit points. As the Soviet Union developed its own naval capabilities in the region, particularly during the 1980s, this created a strategic competition that led to major U.S. investments in regional capabilities including the development of Diego Garcia as a major strategic base.

While some strategic considerations have evolved since the Cold War—including reduced U.S. energy dependence on the Gulf, enhanced Israeli defensive capabilities, and reduced Iranian proxy network effectiveness following recent conflicts—other factors continue to support U.S. engagement. The rising importance of India as a strategic partner creates new opportunities for cooperation and shared responsibility, while the AUKUS agreement demonstrates continued U.S. strategic interest in maintaining capabilities and partnerships throughout the region.

The fundamental question remains whether the U.S. will maintain its role as a preeminent global power, which significantly affects the importance assigned to Indian Ocean strategic positions and the resources devoted to maintaining capabilities in regions where the interests of allies may be greater than direct American stakes. While these maritime domains may be relatively more important for Japan and China than in the past, given their energy dependencies and trade flows, American global leadership aspirations require sustained engagement with the Indian Ocean.