Japan and the Second Trump Administration

Understanding the "America First" worldview of Donald Trump

Amid the uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration, as key appointments are still being decided, this moment presents a valuable opportunity for fruitful discussions. What can we expect from the incoming U.S. administration and what does it mean for Japan?

Before thinking about scenarios, it is worthwhile to start by assessing what we know about Trump and his "America First" worldview. This time, we can expect the President-elect to be much more confident as he is backed by people who have years of experience articulating what Trumpism is. Trump enters his second term with a view of America's place in the world that is fundamentally different from any administration since 1945. Therefore, there is the potential for meaningful change in how the United States engages with the world.

In Trump's view of the world, the United States should not pay greater costs than its allies for maintaining international order by preserving international institutions, building multilateral and bilateral security alliances to prevent the outbreak of conflict, promoting global economic integration, and upholding global norms to ensure that the U.S. and its partners can prosper together. While there have been U.S. administrations that have acted unilaterally to advance U.S. interests from a similar mindset, Trump goes further than any of his predecessors. His opposition to the idea of positive sum cooperation is clear, and in his worldview all relations with the world are zero sum, meaning that if other countries gain, then the United States loses. In his view, post-1945 U.S. foreign policy is essentially a series of bad deals allowing especially U.S. allies to take advantage of the United States. Ultimately, he views all interactions as deals that involve transactions and bargaining, and this worldview has been largely consistent.

A more empowered second presidential term

The second Trump administration will likely differ significantly from the first in its ability to implement this vision. During his first term, Trump was constrained by a lack of preparedness and by traditional Republican foreign policy elites who wound up in his administration and acted as “guardrails.” This time, he will face fewer constraints in pursuing an America First foreign policy. His administration will likely be staffed by officials who are fully committed to his vision and personally loyal to him. Plans are in place to weaken the civil service, foreign service, intelligence community and the military's ability to oppose policy shifts. Institutionally, all of these parts of the U.S. government are committed to the bipartisan internationalist foreign policy. This time, Trump enters office more confidently after winning both the Electoral College and popular vote and overcoming legal challenges.

Nevertheless, there are different factions within the Republican Party which means Trump is not necessarily going to be able to get everything he wants. Some may pursue a purely isolationist stance, while others argue that focusing exclusively on China and maybe even abandoning Europe is a viable possibility. There will be debate within the administration about what goals to prioritize. While we cannot accurately predict exactly what the policy is going to look like, the mindset and way of thinking are going to be fundamentally different. Under these circumstances, the range of potential outcomes for Japan is significantly greater than with preceding U.S. administrations.

Japan’s position and strategic aspects to consider

During the first term, there were China hawks in the Trump administration. As a result, there was an appreciation within the Trump administration of a strong alliance with Japan being essential to counter China. This makes it likely that the Trump administration will ultimately look to Japan as a partner that is beneficial to the U.S., which means there is room for Japan to make itself useful to the United States. This mindset may be crucial for Japan's government moving forward. It cannot be assumed that the cooperation seen between Biden and Kishida, which focused on global partnership, will continue. Instead, Japan has to position itself as indispensable for the U.S. in meeting its goals to fend off challenges from China.

As Mike Waltz, the incoming National Security Advisor, stated, "50% of global GDP is sitting in [Asia]. If China manages to control or coerce that GDP, that is a huge step towards Xi's stated goal of replacing the United States as a global leader." Therefore, the U.S. will look to Japan as an indispensable partner, but they will be looking to implement Trump's views about allies contributing more. Most likely there will be greater demands to contribute more towards hosting U.S. forces in Japan, demands for further trade negotiations to further open the market to U.S. imports, for reducing economic engagement with China, or requests for Japan to raise its defense spending to at least 3% instead of just 2% of GDP. The cost of preserving the U.S. commitment to Japan's security will likely be higher in an America First era. Other U.S. allies in the region will have to make similar calculations about their security relationships with the United States.

Alternative scenarios and their implications

There are other scenarios which are less likely, but plausible. First of all, there is “the dealmaker scenario.” Trump is clearly comfortable negotiating and bargaining with other strongmen. There is certainly a possibility of the United States moving into an era of dividing up spheres of influence with other great powers. Trump views the world transactionally, aiming to secure the best possible deal for the United States. He may believe this will come from working with other great powers, rather than focusing on U.S. allies. Countries like Japan have relatively limited leverage over the outcome of those negotiations, as we saw during the first Trump administration when Prime Minister Abe called Trump repeatedly trying to get him to take Japan's interest into consideration in the negotiations with Kim Jong-un. From this perspective, U.S. allies, particularly in Asia, need to continue talking amongst themselves to deepen their bilateral and mini-lateral security relationships in preparation for the possibility of a sort of grand bargain between the U.S. and other great powers.

Another scenario is one in which the second Trump administration is distracted by its domestic agenda. This has been a very narrow electoral victory, and the president will only have slight majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Depending on what the president does, Congress could push back. Some of his policies could also result in domestic pushback; for example, his plans concerning mass deportations. Some Democratic governors have already stated that they are not going to cooperate with the administration and would find ways of resisting if Trump tried to use National Guard troops from other states to round up migrants in Democratic-governed states. If that happens, there could be violent protests. Depending on the performance of the U.S. economy, particularly with the tariffs that the administration is planning to introduce early on, the potential for domestic opposition and domestic pushback is very real. The U.S. response to overseas crises depends largely on what is happening domestically.

Strategic approach for Japanese leadership

As the second Trump administration is likely to be different from the first one, using the same approach that Abe employed may not be the best option. First of all, last time Trump himself was less experienced and probably appreciated Abe's willingness to meet with him quickly, which provided Abe with a lot of credit with President Trump. However, as Trump got more confident during his first term, there were diminishing returns to that personal relationship. It helped in 2017 to ensure that the United States and Japan were cooperating as North Korea launched its escalating series of missile tests and it helped Japan push back on demands for a bilateral FTA for some time. But by 2018 and by 2019, that personal relationship did not seem to have the same impact.

Having Ishiba forge a similar kind of personal relationship with Trump is not the right answer for Japan. In that sense, it might not necessarily be a bad thing that Ishiba will not meet with Trump before his inauguration in January. Also, Ishiba is not the same kind of leader as Abe was. In 2016 Abe was a strong leader with a stable government at home, good approval ratings, and solid majorities in both houses of the diet.

Ishiba is very new to the premiership and, after last month's election, does not have a majority in the lower house. And of course, he also has less public support, so he is in a more difficult position than Abe was. Of course, it has been difficult enough figuring out how to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP, so getting to 3% of GDP will be extraordinarily difficult. Given these constraints, it is important not to risk everything on personal diplomacy. Japan should prepare to be more reactive and observe Trump’s actions closely.

While overinvestment in a personal relationship between the leaders may not prove adequately beneficial, investing in relationships with Republicans in different places in the administration, such as in Congress, can be greatly beneficial. Those relationships will be very important in ensuring that there is understanding in Washington of what Japan can realistically do in response to some of the demands that are likely to come from the Trump administration. In some ways, being a little more defensive, preparing for some of the demands that might come and hoping that the attention is on other U.S. allies or other problems may be the wisest strategy at this point.

Even if a Make America Great Again foreign policy is harder to deal with, Japan should continue its relationship building with partners in the region, invest in closer ties with Europe, and find ways to stabilize relations with China. Japan has an interest in a stable international order, and it needs partners to support that. Of course, it should not work adversarially to the United States as it pursues these goals. Japan needs to work on both tracks, finding ways to work with the United States to satisfy demands for a more equitable partnership, but avoid being isolated in the region. It must continue to find ways to build relationships in the region and be ready to adapt.

The importance of maintaining bilateral ties

As we head into a more uncertain period, of course there is going to be a bigger focus on the relationships between the two governments. Ultimately, the strong ties between the people of the U.S. and Japan, as well as their business communities, remain crucial. That engagement is likely to continue and should continue. Efforts to strengthen those relationships, to strengthen Japanese FDI into the United States and encourage more U.S. investment in Japan as well, should be encouraged. Even if the President of the United States does not believe in positive sum cooperation, among both the American and the Japanese people there is a universal recognition that cooperation between both countries has value for its own sake. This era may in fact create new opportunities for cooperation between people, businesses, and universities. All of those efforts should continue to be supported by well-meaning people on both sides of the Pacific.

Comment

YAMAGUCHI Jin:
Following Trump’s election, as mentioned by Mr. Harris's presentation, uncertainty is the most fundamental issue. While we have knowledge of the events that occurred during the first Trump administration and the many policy ideas that have been laid out recently, questions surround the actual implementation of policies going forward. Furthermore, Trump himself wants to be seen as an unpredictable person and may use this preferred image of his to change the course of negotiations.

Regarding potential scenarios for Japan in managing Trump 2.0, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Japan remains important. While both bilateral relationships between countries and personal relationships between leaders are essential, recently many platforms have been created to ensure close communication. Japan has many connections with the U.S. government and the relationships and communication between government representatives of all relevant levels remains crucial. Furthermore, emphasizing Japan’s strategic importance for the U.S. in geopolitical and economic terms, as one of the top investors in the U.S. economy, is a critical point. Emphasizing these benefits should be the starting point of Japan’s approach to the new Trump administration. Finally, I have a question for Mr. Harris: how do you assess the potential role of Elon Musk in leading the so-called Department of Government Efficiency?

Tobias S. HARRIS:
Most likely this second administration will not be different from the first one in terms of the durability of any particular office holder. During the first administration Trump was quick with removing people when he was dissatisfied with their performance. While Musk does appear to be influential at the moment, I do not expect him to be a permanent fixture over the next four years. For one, Trump will not like the idea of Musk overshadowing him. But also, Musk has several companies to run, so Musk may need to shift priorities. At this point, Congress has yet to confirm the newly created government department. Therefore, a fundamental transformation of the federal government like Musk enacted at Twitter is unlikely as the bureaucracy is a large organization that is not easily transformed. Elon Musk may have a floating informal role being an envoy to certain leaders, but it is not expected that he will be as heavily engaged over the entire course of this administration as he is right now.

YAMAGUCHI Jin:
Which Japanese politician are you currently most interested in following?

Tobias S. HARRIS:
Obviously at the moment there is big interest in Tamaki Yuichiro and the role of the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP). Another point of interest is watching how the LDP deals with challenges such as the ongoing unpopularity and the challenges of running a minority government. The future development of the careers of Kobayashi Takayuki and Koizumi Shinjiro is also of interest. This is an important, transitional moment for Japanese politics with many domestic and international challenges.

Q&A

Q:
You wrote the book “The Iconoclast” about former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Why did you write it? What aspects of Japanese policy or Japan itself sparked your interest?

Tobias S. HARRIS:
Throughout my career I studied Japanese language and its history and relationship with the United States and significance to the world. Much like any other democracy, to understand Japan’s decisions in foreign policy, you must understand its politics, which are ultimately local. I had the opportunity to work for a diet member, the current Environment Minister Asao, to gain further insights about Japanese politics. I wrote about Prime Minister Abe because it was clear to me that this was an interesting story to tell. This occurred to me after watching his return to prominence after an unsuccessful first premiership, his performance in office, the invention of Abenomics and his foreign policy, all of which have had global impacts. During his tenure, he was an extremely important leader for Japan but also for the world.

Q:
What do you think will happen to the Democrats? Will they come back stronger?

Tobias S. HARRIS:
There is a lot of discussion among the Democrats about what happened and why. Some of the questions and answers are not even specific to the Democratic Party but are faced by parties around the globe. In some ways, the Democratic Party performed better than expected given the economic inflation and the dissatisfaction in the public. Unique lessons that the Democrats need to think about are the coalition that Trump assembled to win, with the class distinction of the Democrats being a party for college-educated white-collar professionals, while Trump's coalition includes very wealthy people but also large numbers of minorities, many of whom are risk takers and entrepreneurs who have built their own businesses. You could say American politics is divided between risk takers and risk avoiders. Is there a way for the Democrats to bring some of those members of Trump’s coalition back into their party or appeal to those types of voters? They don’t seem to know the answers now, but some deep thought is necessary.

Q:
In your opinion, who is the prime figure that will be tasked to deal with U.S.-China relations?

Tobias S. HARRIS:
It is too early to answer this question. A large part of foreign policy, in particular concerning China, will be run through the White House, as we saw during the first administration. Congressman Waltz will be greatly involved in running China policy. Because of the focus on economics and heavy tariffs, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and Treasury will also have their say. In short, there will not be only one single player who is the China czar. There may be competition between the economic-focused and the security-focused sides. Who has the upper hand could vary from day to day, or week to week.

Q:
What are specific Japanese industries that the Trump administration would have an impact on, other than the automotive industry? Also, do you have any specific recommendations for the Japanese government and Japanese companies?

Tobias S. HARRIS:
There will be an interest in Japan buying more energy from the United State so we can expect the Trump administration to particularly focus on increased energy exports from the U.S. to Japan. Another topic, which was already observed under the Biden administration, is foreign military sales along with more defense spending. Regarding specific recommendations, it is important to be prepared to emphasize how the U.S.-Japan relationship serves U.S. national interests. Japan must be able to show how it supports U.S. growth, security, and national interests across the board. Perhaps having a “can-do attitude” of willingness to aid Trump in his vision will be advantageous.

Moderator:
Mr. Yamaguchi and Mr. Harris, please provide some final remarks.

YAMAGUCHI Jin:
It was a great honor for me to participate today. I learned a lot from Mr. Harris’ insightful analysis and comments.

Tobias S. HARRIS:
In conclusion, this is another opportunity for Japan to be a regional and global leader. There is still a need for a rules-based order, globally and regionally. If there is going to be a vacuum in pursuing that, Japan needs to find a way to play that role itself and articulate what a new order should look like in cooperation with its partners. You have to be a shaper of international order and not just a recipient of it.