Current Iraq Situation

Date March 20, 2003
Speaker SAKAI Keiko(Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO)
Moderator SAEKI Hidetaka(RIETI Vice President / Senior Fellow)

Summary

My name is Sakai. As this speech comes at a delicate time, when I was asked the title of today's speech, I requested that RIETI set it so that it could be interpreted in a number of different ways. Here we are today, regrettably, at the start of war. Currently, an initial limited aerial bombardment is happening and full hostilities have yet to commence. We know that, as the time limit on the demand for President Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave for exile has expired, the US has gone ahead with military action to demonstrate its seriousness of purpose.

In contrast to the Gulf War, south of the 33rd parallel and north of the 36th no-fly-zones are already established and because large military positions in those zones have already been destroyed, this time, centering on Baghdad, the middle section of Iraq will be the subject of bombing, followed, it is thought, by a ground assault.

US objectives for the war in Iraq

According to media reports, having established Saddam Hussein's whereabouts, today's bombing was aimed at him. With that, one can say that the aim of this war has been clarified as one to remove Saddam Hussein and surrounding top members of his administration.

That said, despite the US's continuing insistence that it would remove the dangerous leader from Iraq, one can say that a true picture of the Iraqi regime has never emerged. The US sought the exile of President Hussein and his two sons, but the Iraqi regime consists not just of tens of Hussein relatives, but also the ruling Baath party, national technocrats and military leaders, including those from the Republican Guard. Therefore, if it is not clarified which section is regarded as the backbone of the Iraqi regime to be exiled, contrary to the intention, one may be inviting disorder and instability in Iraq by decapitating the regime. For the Iraqi people too, if they are not sure whether regime collapse will damage them or not, they will not be sure what position they should take. Given these facts, bombing by the US of a gathering of President Hussein and five or six of his leadership can be interpreted as message to the people of Iraq.

Doubts about America's policy

It is believed that today's bombing was based on CIA information about President Hussein's whereabouts. But I cannot but seriously doubt the reliability of such information. Firstly, President Hussein has become practiced in always discretely hiding himself. He has many doubles, always changes location, has no fixed place to sleep and so on. Judging from my experience living in Baghdad for three years, Iraqi people are told nothing of President Hussein's movements. Though he frequently appears on television, neither his location nor the date and time of his appearances are specified. When he travels, between 10 and 20 cars of the same model and color and with the same number plates are prepared so that one does not know which he is in.

In other words, a spy could not simply infiltrate and establish President Hussein's whereabouts. No matter what intelligence from inside Iraq the CIA is receiving, I have doubts. The US restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and only had 5 years through to 1988, before the Gulf War, for its agents to freely move in Iraq and conduct intelligence gathering operations, whilst developing eyes and ears on the ground. Just after the Gulf War, the US was in a position to vigorously engage in intelligence gathering but essentially because Iraq was not open to the extent that foreigners could carry out espionage activities, Iraqi exiles, people from neighboring countries and particularly Kurds were charged with the responsibility, but those networks now cease to exist. That is why I cannot believe that the US has been able to conduct intelligence activities that yield highly accurate information since just after the Gulf War. Even though it is said to be a 'pin-point' strike on the confirmed location of President Hussein and five or six other leaders, it is thought that the probability of success is extremely low. If the operation did not go well, it will be very troublesome.

Spanning a quarter of a century, President Hussein has built an ingenious domestic political system. The Iraqi public has a sense that that system must be maintained all the time President Hussein is alive. I do not think that under the circumstances of a continued lack of clarity about whether Hussein was dead or alive, Iraq could begin to smoothly progress towards a new administration.

Hussein's is not a military regime

The media often observes that if the Iraqi military is dismantled and President Hussein is completely stripped of power, then the regime will most likely collapse, but I do not agree. President Hussein is not from a military background. It appears that Hussein conciliates the military and is protected by it, but, originally, the basis of support for Hussein's regime came from the security police. The military, for President Hussein, was instead a political rival. President Hussein has to date exiled many military leaders and has been vigilant of a coup d'etat whilst maintaining his regime - Hussein is extremely wary of the military.

As for the Iraq issue, the focal point has always been a worry about the existence of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. Why, when under such criticism and driven to the very brink of war, is the Hussein regime so devoted to its weapons of mass destruction, refusing to give them up? According to analysis by one of the most authoritative Israeli experts on Iraq, the purpose in retaining weapons of mass destruction is not for the military but instead for use by the special security forces to stifle potential rebellion. At the very least, President Hussein is certainly trying to protect the security forces over and above the military.

As was said, under US-UK attack successive surrenders have occurred, one can describe the morale of the regular Iraqi military as very low. If there is anything to prevent the soldiers from surrendering, it will not be fear of the US and UK military, but the existence of a political organization watching over them from behind. As a matter of fact, the leaders of military organizations, including the Republican Guard, are not career soldiers by chosen profession, but instead many are from security organizations and Baath party military sections whose job it is to monitor the military. For President Hussein, the concern is not how the military will resist the US and UK forces, but whether the Iraqi military will take the opportunity to revolt. In particular, abandoning forces arranged at the Kuwaiti border will be not be problematic for President Hussein as he is not concerned whether or not they surrender. President Hussein's greatest worries will be a fatal collapse of the intelligence agencies which control information to the special security forces and the general public, the US and UK propaganda capability surpassing that of Iraq's and becoming unable to extend his authority to the Iraqi people. Just after bombing, Hussein appeared on television, it will be necessary for him to continue demonstrating his existence to the general public.

Chart : The structure of the Iraqi regime
Chart : The structure of the Iraqi regime

Outline of the structure of the Hussein regime

At the center of the regime is President Hussein and his family, no more than a few dozen people. Principal supporters of this arrangement are others born in the same place as President Hussein, a town called Tikrit. Tikrit was formerly the birthplace of the hero Saladin who President Hussein compares himself to. But because Tikrit is a small town, with a total adult male population of no more than a few thousand, others from Mosul to the North, the upper reaches of the Euphrates River to the East and areas adjacent to Tikrit also support President Hussein's inner circle. One could compare these people's existence with that of the Satsuma and Choshu clans in Japan, a kind of prominent tribal alliance.

These tribes form the main clique that has seized the backbone of the army and belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. But not only Sunnis are included in the influential clique, there are also many who come from unrelated tribes and live in different towns. The Hussein regime is described as a Sunni regime, but as a proportion, Sunnis make up between 25 and 35% of the population, with Shia Muslims making up between 50 and 55%.

It is not necessarily the case that the majority population Shias are excluded from the administration, Shia Muslims are included in the ruling Baath party itself. The regular army encompasses both Sunni and Shia Islam. However, the Republican Guard is composed of those three tribes which support the Hussein regime. That said, the Republican Guard's sense of loyalty to President Hussein is not absolute, there have been frequent coup d'etat and other such plans emanating from the Republican Guard. So the issue is, which elements of this chart will be removed via the war in Iraq this time. If only the central Hussein family and the special security forces can be effectively removed, and the military and Baath party remain, the state structure will not greatly change and Iraq will be able to switch smoothly to a new administration. On the other hand, if the present ruling administration is considered to be the Baath party and attempts are made to completely remove it and create a new administration, then it is expected to take an enormous amount of time and effort and be extremely difficult. The US has not yet come forward with its policy line on this issue.

For example, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who is representative of the 'neo-conservatives', insists that Iraq should be democratized and that the administration run by military leaders and socialist Baath party should be removed. If that happens, all of the current administrative framework will have to be removed and be replaced by opposition groups currently living in exile in the US, UK and other countries, those who have studied abroad, particularly in advanced countries, and intellectuals with business experience.

On the other hand, groups centered around the State Department and the CIA insist that only the central core around President Hussein should be removed and that the Baath party, military and other elements of the administrative framework should be kept intact.

It also anticipated that anti-Hussein commissioned ranks of the Republican Guard will enact coup d'etat plans and that although a military one, the administration will be pro-American. Since last year, the US has been collecting together overseas-based Iraqi opposition groups but it seems to have no intention to put them in the core of the new administration, judging from the developments since last December. Instead, the policy seems to be, after having removed the backbone of the present Iraqi regime, supplementing the regime with members organized from those opposition parties and the military, and to maintain stability for the time being. But if a strong presence cannot be established from just those elements, then eventually the US plans to rule directly.

Indeed, presently, the situation is fluid, it is thought that the policy will change depending on whether or not President Hussein is killed, or the war heads in urban-based street fighting.

Questions and Answers

Q: How are the administration structure and the bureaucrats related to the power structure?

A: The power structure largely overlaps with that of the Baath party. The Baath party is a socialist party that advocates Arab nationalism, but its ideology is not that strong, there is also a social side to the party, for example, there are many bureaucrats who join to achieve rapid promotion. Therefore, there are many who are both bureaucrats and members of the Baath party. The Baath party leadership is not appointed on a tribal basis, the Hussein regime has a ruling structure not just a tribal alliance. The Baath party leadership and that of the bureaucracy can be called urban elites, and the Hussein regime has come to rule with a balance of those urban elites and local elites that support the tribal alliance.

Q: By just removing the President Hussein's core of power, will honestly anything really change? By simply replacing Hussein with someone else, won't the predisposition of the country remain the same?

A: That is maybe the case. If there is a military administration, there is a chance that those military leaders familiar with how President Hussein operated, will rule in the same way. If the US takes the approach of accepting the Baath party, removes the military and permits the Baath party and the bureaucracy to administer, then it is thought that things will change significantly. However, the US anticipates that the military will provide a more stable administration.

Q: You just referred to the military - is that the regular army or the Republican Guard? If you mean the Republican Guard, a tribal influence will remain, but for the regular army, there doesn't seem to be a relationship with tribes or sects.

A: The regular army includes both Sunni and Shia sects, but since monarchical times has been commanded by the Sunnis. Because there are certainly security officers in the Republican Guard, it would be safer if it were the regular army but without formation of a coordinated Shia military group that opposes the Sunni military factions, it is not thought that the military itself could align behind a leader from the Shias. The US hopes that a Sunni with the backing of a strong military faction will emerge from the regular army.

Q: Japan supports the US policy, but how should it manifest this support?

A: I think that Japan can play two roles. In this war, Iraq's neighbors will be greatly affected. In particular, Iran and Syria will badly affected, but despite this, because the US has been seen to be saying "you are next", it will not be able to receive support. And if both those countries are cornered, there is a chance of the US inviting negative feeling and opposition from the whole of the Middle East. I believe that Japan can co-operate with Iran and Syria and play a role in the stability of the Middle East. Also, the US clearly lacks balance in dealing with is the Palestinian issue. Prime Minister Blair is suggesting that the Palestinian issue be debated but the Bush administration completely ignores that topic. Japan should, together with Prime Minister Blair, send a message that the Palestinian issue should not be forgotten.

Q: What is the relationship between the Hussein regime and terrorism?

A: Since the 9.11 terrorist attacks, it has been widely rumored in the US that there was a link between the terrorism and President Hussein, however President Bush denied such a link existed. I think, presently, the US is emphasizing a link between Iraq and terrorism because the UN resolution did not turn out as anticipated. Judging by the nature of the Hussein administration, it is difficult to think that President Hussein is directly related to terrorism. The CIA also states that Iraq is unlikely to conduct a pre-emptive attack or 9.11-style terrorism with chemical or biological weapons. Iraq's intelligence agencies are capable at domestic intelligence gathering and observing and conducting surveillance against its citizens abroad, but, it is believed, are lacking when it comes to gathering intelligence for an overseas attack and are not adapted to international terrorism.

Q: What is the scale and capability of the special security forces?

A: I don't know well. They probably consist of at least between 10000 and 20000 people. But just because they are described as protecting President Hussein, that protection is not just in a military sense. The special security forces' intelligence operations are also a strong protecting element. There are a number of separate security organizations which do not communicate laterally - each have their own characteristics and are controlled by either President Hussein or his son, Qusay. These public order networks are set-up in a multi-layered fashion and monitor one another. Furthermore, the system is arranged so that no-one knows who is a member of the security organizations. Therefore, should someone want to oppose President Hussein, he or she must be extremely discreet. This is the role of the security organizations.

Q: How will the Kurds be treated under the new administration?

A: No matter what happens, it is predicted that the Kurds will not be in a better position than they are now. The truth is that presently the Kurds live in an autonomous region with semi-independence but are well off rather than being entirely independent, having 30% of Iraq's oil revenue invested in them via the UN certificate scheme. Should any new administration officially recognize their independence, Turkey will not remain silent. Neither will the US, and the Kurds will then fall victim to conflicting interests among all three parties, Iraq, Turkey and the US.

Q: Those countries which opposed the use of military force, France and Russia, have interests in the future of the Iraqi administration, under a new regime what influence will they have?

A: The issue of France and Russia's vested interests in Iraq has been resolved; they will most likely not be carried forward to the new Iraqi administration. I believe that has already been settled. But even if France retains a relationship with the new administration, I think that Russia will be cut out. That is because Iraq's relationship with Russia was a political one so techno-bureaucrats with no political affiliation will not use Russian goods.

Q: How do Iraqi people feel about the US? Also - urban street combat is predicted, do the general public possess weapons?

A: Fundamentally, the Iraqi people do not think ill of the US. Neither do they hate American because of the Palestinian question. There is bad feeling because of damage inflicted during the Gulf War, but not to the extent that ill feeling has spread throughout the country. But whilst the US continued to say that it would remove the Hussein regime, in practice it could not do so and life became difficult under the economic sanctions. Rather than being anti-American, the Iraqis lack faith in the US. If, after the war the US imposes direct rule, and Iraqis' lives improve even a little compared with the Hussein era, they will probably accept the US, but if things do not improve, mistrust will grow and I think that ruling Iraq will become more difficult. For whatever reason, if during urban combat the Iraqi people's distrust of the US increases, then that street fighting will be troublesome. It is certain that a large number of Iraqis have weapons - not out of a sense of patriotism but since the time of the Iran-Iraq War, there has been a sense that one should defend oneself and one's family. If that feeling were to be connected with mistrust of the US then these weapons could be used in urban combat.

Q: What will the best way forward for Iraq be?

A: Certainly, the weight of the army in Iraqi affairs at present is excessive. Amongst the main body of bureaucrats and Baath party members, there are many who do not think well of the military. Fundamentally, President Hussein too was a civilized leader who, more than the military, enjoyed the support of this seam of society. France and Germany, in persisting for a peaceful solution, believed that if the balance could be restored, Saddam Hussein's regime would not be all that bad a one. Of course, one cannot think that just by President Hussein changing his policies, this war could be resolved. The war will continue until President Hussein is removed but it is desirable that the elite city bureaucrats and Baath party leaders lead a new administration, completely devoid of the influence of the military, I believe.

*This summary was compiled by RIETI Editorial staff.