Greenhouse Gas Emission Controls and Firm Locations in North-South Trade

本論文では企業の生産活動の移転を通じた国際間の汚染回避をどう政策的にコントロールしていくかを分析した。空間経済のフレームワークを用いて、先進国のみで温室効果ガスを規制している状況を考える。貿易自由化のもとで、排出割当、排出税、排出基準の効果を比較した。基本的には輸送費が低いとき、輸送費のさらなる低下は世界全体の排出を増やすが、排出割当は空間的なSortingをもたらす。これにより他の2つの政策よりも全体の排出量を減らすことができる。

This paper studies greenhouse gas (GHG) emission controls in the presence of international carbon leakage through international firm relocation. In a trade and geography framework with two countries ("North" and "South"), only North sets a target for GHG emissions. We compare the consequences of emission quotas, emission taxes, and emission standards under trade liberalization for the location of pollution-intensive and less pollution-intensive sectors and the degree of carbon leakage. With low trade costs, further trade liberalization increases global emissions by facilitating carbon leakage. Regulation by quotas leads to spatial sorting with less carbon leakage and less global emissions than regulation by taxes and standards.

Published: Ishikawa, Jota, and Toshihiro Okubo, 2017. "Greenhouse-gas emission controls and firm locations in North-South trade," Environmental and Resource Economics Vol. 67(4), pp. 637-660
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-015-9991-0