Managerial Entrenchment and Anti-takeover Provisions in Japan

近年、日本においても敵対的買収防衛策を導入する企業が増えている。本論文では、2005年の買収防衛策に関する指針発表後4年間(2005年度-2008年度)に買収防衛策を導入した日本企業の特性について分析を行った。本論文で得られた主要な結果は以下の通りである。第一に、ROAやトービンのQなどで測った企業パフォーマンスと防衛策導入には有意な関係がない。第二に、社齢が長い企業、役員持ち株比率が低い企業、持合株式比率が高い企業ほど買収防衛策を導入する傾向が強く、経営保身や株主との利害対立が買収防衛策導入に影響を与えていることを示唆している。加えて、支配株主の比率が低い企業、機関投資家比率の高い企業ほど買収防衛策を導入しており、株式保有が流動的で買収されやすい企業ほど買収防衛策を導入している。

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of firms introducing anti-takeover provisions in Japan as well. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of Japanese firms that introduced anti-takeover provisions during the four year period from fiscal 2005 to fiscal 2008, following the release of the official guidelines for anti-takeover provisions in 2005. Our main results are the following. First, firms' operating performance or stock market valuations were not related to the adoption of takeover defense measures. Second, firms' age and their ownership structure were correlated with the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Specifically, companies that were older, had lower proportions of shares held by their directors, or higher cross-shareholding ratios were more likely to adopt takeover defense measures, which suggests that the adoption of such measures is motivated by self-protection on the part of corporate managers and influenced by the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. In addition, as controlling shareholders had lower shares of stocks and institutional investors had higher shares of stocks, firms were more inclined to adopt takeover defense measures, suggesting that companies are likely to adopt such measures if their shares are liquid and easy to acquire.

Published: Kaoru Hosono, Miho Takizawa and Kotaro Tsuru, 2011. "Managerial Entrenchment and Antitakeover Provisions in Japan," Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol. 24(3), pp. 287-331.
http://www.sje.ac.kr/modules/repec/backIssue_view.html?vol=24+%282011%29&num=3&p=2&no=499