防止“米荒”的政策

In grain exporting countries like the U.S. and the EU, there are no domestic grain shortages. If rice acreage reduction is abolished in Japan, exports will be possible. Even if domestic consumption increases or production decreases, the turmoil resulting from rice shortages in 2024 could easily be avoided by adjusting (reducing) export volumes.

Abolishing the rice acreage reduction policy would increase the supply of rice and lower the price. Small part-time farmers with high costs could lease their farmland to larger full-time farmers. Limiting direct payments from the government to full-time farmers would reduce the burden of renting land and promote the liquidation of farmland. With increasing numbers of larger-scale, full-time farmers, costs would decline, and profits would increase, and rent paid to former small-scale farmers would also increase. The rice acreage policy has made breeding to increase yield a taboo subject for researchers at the national and prefectural levels. Increasing the yield of Japanese rice to the level of California rice by abolishing the policy would increase the supply of rice and significantly reduce costs.

A decline in prices resulting from higher yields and larger rice production would improve international competitiveness and increase rice exports. Even in the event of a food crisis if imports are disrupted, it would be possible to supply the nation with sufficient supplies. Exports in peacetime would also serve as a free stockpile. As structural reform of agriculture progresses and the earnings increase, the rents received by landowners who provide farmland to farmers would also increase. Structural reform is also necessary for rural development.

China, a major market for Japanese rice, uses plant quarantine (SPS) measures to restrict rice imports from Japan. In order to expand exports of all Japanese agricultural products, active negotiations on agricultural trade must be conducted to prevent SPS measures from being utilized as shadow import restrictions in addition to traditional import restriction measures such as tariffs.

We also use theoretical and practical information to explain the fallacies in the criticisms against ending rice acreage reductions and direct payments to expand rice exports and ensure food security. Furthermore, it is shown that the “individual income compensation” program implemented by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the past was an obstacle to structural reform and preserved the regressive nature of the system.