| 作者 | 川本真哉(立教大学)、宫岛英昭(教职研究员) |
|---|---|
| 发表日期/编号 | 2026年11月 26-J-049 |
| 研究课题 | 企业治理分析的新领域 |
| 下载/链接 |
概要
This paper examines the structure of MBOs, the motivations for their implementation, their exit strategies, and their impact on post-delisting performance. The analysis revealed several findings. First, regarding the motivations for MBOs, addressing poor performance in terms of undervaluation and reducing free cash flow are key factors driving delisting. Furthermore, it was confirmed that companies with a higher proportion of foreign investor ownership are more likely to proceed with delisting via an MBO, and that companies facing large-scale shareholdings by activist investors are more likely to implement MBOs. Additionally, it was found that private equity funds tend to partner with companies that have a low proportion of shares held by executives and a high proportion of shares held by foreign investors to carry out MBOs. Next, regarding the impact of MBO structure on subsequent exit strategies, it was confirmed that family-owned companies are less likely to choose relisting as an exit strategy and are more likely to remain private. Finally, regarding post-MBO performance, average ROA improved following an MBO, driven primarily by asset restructuring. Furthermore, a disaggregated analysis of MBO structures revealed that ROA improvement was unclear in transactions backed by domestic private equity funds, while such it was clear in non-fund transactions (pure MBOs), where the effect of incentive realignment was observed. Additionally,among transactions involving low-debt companies, asset restructuring and the resulting improvement in operational efficiency were observed, confirming that debt discipline also serves as a mechanism for improving efficiency.