American Foreign Policy after the 2008 Elections

Date January 9, 2008
Speaker Henry R. NAU(Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Legislative Exchange Programs, the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University)
Moderator KURIHARA Jun(Senior Fellow, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)
Materials

Summary

What will be the implications for American foreign policy following the presidential elections in 2008?

There is a very broad, general pattern to American foreign policy. It can potentially provide a backdrop for an assessment of how American foreign policy is likely to move after the elections. American foreign policy, irrespective of whether a Democrat or a Republican is elected, is likely to be much more modest in the next administration than it has been, certainly, in the second Bush-Cheney administration. This follows a discernable pattern in American foreign policy: a broad tendency to cycle between a "nationalist" phase (during which more modest ambitions or objectives are pursued) and an "internationalist" phase.

During the first century of America's existence, its foreign policy was "isolationist." Toward the end of the 19th century, the United States became more powerful, and entered into an internationalist phase under Teddy Roosevelt and, most dramatically, under Woodrow Wilson with the entry into World War I. This was followed by a very clear nationalist phase in the 1920s and 1930s: an isolationist phase during which America retreated from the international stage to tackle its problems at home, and ignored its obligations in the world community. Then there was an internationalist phase during World War II and the onset of the Cold War that followed: the U.S. finally assumed leadership in the world community. In the 1970s America tired of that role, particularly because of experiences in Vietnam, and resorted to a pull back during the Carter administration; this nationalist phase was not as strong a retrenchment as had occurred the 1930s, meaning that these nationalist phases have become more tempered. Reagan's approach was more internationalist, as was that of the Bush administration that followed. Clinton's administration was also internationalist, although it was of a different kind to Reagan's. At the end of Clinton's second term, it was clear that America was cycling back toward a more modest foreign policy. His successor, President Bush, talked about a more humble foreign policy: America should not be as engaged in international problems as it had been under Clinton. That approach was abruptly terminated by the 9/11 attacks, and President Bush, particularly during his second term, became more internationalist.

Today, weariness toward foreign policy can be sensed in the U.S.: there is a temptation on the part of the American people to pull back, in effect, to ask others to take up their own responsibilities. Americans feel exhausted by the experience in Iraq. Although Iraq is not another Vietnam, the Americans desire to end the conflict.

There is a good reason for this cycling. The American population is fairly evenly divided between those who are oriented to a nationalist foreign policy, and those whose orientation is to an internationalist one.

Thought and policy in American foreign affairs can broadly be divided into two large categories. The nationalist category, comprised of the traditions of the nationalists and "realists," is characterized by limited ambitions (primarily those related to defense) in the world system. In contrast, the internationalist category, comprised of the "neo-conservative" and "liberal international" traditions, is characterized by a much greater level of ambition (including the spread of democracy).

The nationalists and the realists, the two traditions in the nationalist category, have little interest in changing the world. Both nationalists and realists are characterized by a preoccupation with domestic development, and want America to be involved in the world only to the extent necessary to protect the U.S. Nationalists are exemplified by Andrew Jackson. Realists are either "defensive realists" (exemplified by Alexander Hamilton) or "offensive realists" (exemplified by Teddy Roosevelt). Neither nationalists nor realists are interested in regime change.

The two traditions in the internationalist category are those of the neo-conservatives (exemplified by Ronald Reagan) and the liberal internationalists (exemplified by Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Bill Clinton).

Within the nationalist category, the tradition of the nationalists is concerned with simply defending America, and primarily doing that in the western hemisphere. Nationalists focus on strong air and naval forces and have little interest in projecting land forces outside the western hemisphere. They are enthusiastic about missile defense. The nationalists are skeptical about U.S. involvement in the international system beyond defense: they are skeptical about the United Nations, trade, and nation-building, and even of allies. Nationalists react very fiercely to attacks on America: for them, there is no substitute for victory. In the Jacksonian vein, the objective is American victory, followed by return to the western hemisphere: no effort is made to pre-empt future threats that may emerge outside the Americas. There is no emphasis on broader diplomacy, or a broader approach to protecting U.S. interests in the world.

In the contemporary debate about American foreign policy, Ron Paul and Pat Buchanan are nationalists. The Cato Institute usually takes this general position in most discussions about American foreign policy. But of all the candidates in the presidential campaign, Mike Huckabee is the closest to this tradition, most evident in the fact that his article in Foreign Affairs is entirely limited to defeating America's overseas enemies. The whole article is about the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan: there is nothing broader about the world system. Huckabee favors the Powell Doctrine: American involvement in conflict must be wholehearted, and committed to victory. This comes from the post-Vietnam view of much of the military leadership: it was a mistake to fight partial wars. Huckabee also favors energy independence, and has argued that the U.S. should treat Saudi Arabia the way it does Sweden, implying that America should be neutral in relation to every country in the world once the terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan are defeated.

Compared to nationalists, defensive realists are more aggressive in their stance on defense. Defensive realists see that threats to the U.S. can emerge outside the western hemisphere, and are willing to consider heading them off before they develop. For defensive realists, American defense is predicated on the ability to prevent any other country from becoming dominant in Europe or Asia: the emergence of hegemons in those regions would be a prelude to threats to the western hemisphere. This objective can be met by balancing power through alliances (while at the same time expecting counterbalancing), through containment, and through the pursuit of stability in the world system. Defensive realists have no interest in democratizing the world, nor in promoting regime change; they are interested in managing the world as one of the great powers. They focus on great power concert through the United Nations Security Council, and are not against American cooperation with other countries as long as it is consistent with the national interests of the U.S.

Henry Kissinger is the best-known defensive realist. The Nixon Center and the Stimson Center are two of the research institutes in Washington that generally take a defensive realist position.

Amongst the candidates in the presidential campaign, Bill Richardson best reflects the defensive realist tradition. In his Foreign Policy article, Richardson wrote that the U.S. must reject both isolationist fantasies of retreat from global engagement and neo-conservative fantasies of transforming other countries through unilateral application of American power.

John McCain reflects certain aspects of the defensive realist tradition. McCain recognizes that power is shifting toward Asia. He would welcome Japan into an expanded United Nations Security Council. There is, however, almost a nationalist element to his thinking on Iraq: he says there is no Plan B for Iraq.

Offensive realists do not think it is sufficient to prevent other countries from becoming hegemons in regions outside of the western hemisphere: the U.S. should seek hegemony, and should try to maintain it, especially when it falls into America's lap (as it did after the end of the Cold War.) Offensive realists acknowledge that some state is going to exercise power, so having a dominant position is an advantage and an opportunity to pre-empt any challenges that might arise. Preserving dominance enables the U.S. to do a lot more that is consistent with both America's interests and values. For the offensive realists, pre-emption is the means to prevent counterbalancing. This is in contradistinction to the defensive realists, who expect counterbalancing and accommodate it. Offensive realists seek to work with coalitions of the willing, rather than being bound by standing alliances.

After the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon became the standard-bearer of the offensive realist tradition, with which Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld are identified. Rudy Giuliani, of all the candidates in the presidential campaign, is closest to the offensive realist tradition. In his Foreign Affairs article he calls for a "vigorous offense": a pre-emptive approach to the problem of terrorism. The rest of his piece is about strengthening the international system of sovereign states, but it is clear that within that context, America should be very aggressive in terms of defending its national interests. Giuliani refers to Japan as a "rock of stability" in Asia, and deems it central to America's interest in strengthening the current international system. He grants more importance to good governance than he does to democracy.

Now, let us turn our attention to the internationalist category. Proponents of the neo-conservative tradition and the liberal international tradition have more expansive ambitions for the world than those who favor any of the three traditions in the nationalist category. Neo-conservatives and liberal internationalists are interested in potentially transforming the international system, rather than merely defending or strengthening the old sovereign state system; they seek to change the basic character of the system from one in which authoritarian states are tolerated to one in which constant work goes into increasing the number of free, democratic countries. The underlying premise of these two traditions is that the spread of democracy is advantageous to security, because democracies do not go to war against other democracies (this is the so-called "democratic peace").

The neo-conservative tradition is a relatively recent tradition. Its tenets are the spread of democracy (instead of just hegemony, a noble purpose for American foreign policy is sought); use of military force to oppose oppression (there is a strong sense in this tradition that the fight against the absence of freedom must be vigorous); reliance on key democracies (such as the United Kingdom) rather than standing alliances (such as NATO) or great power concert; and low interest in nation-building, which will be taken care of by local leaders (the belief is that people everywhere want freedom, and can be expected to create a free government consistent with their own traditions).

Standard-bearers of the neo-conservative tradition are William Kristol (the current editor of The Weekly Standard) and Robert Kagan, who wrote about this idea in the late 1990s. The American Enterprise Institute supports this position, as does The Wall Street Journal more often than not.

Mitt Romney and McCain come closest to this position in the current debate, though Romney puts more emphasis on building institutions, albeit economic ones, than McCain does.

McCain discusses a League of Democracies as the primary forum for advancing America's interests in the world: this puts him in the company of neo-conservatives. In his article in Foreign Affairs, he talks about a "strength-based diplomacy" and identifies with the expansion of democracy in Asia.

Romney has some elements of the liberal international tradition mixed in with his neo-conservative position: he is skeptical of United Nations institutions, but not of the Bretton Woods ones, which he wants to strengthen.

The tenets of the liberal international tradition are the spread of democracy via collective security and international institutions (the objective is to reduce the relevance of military power in international affairs), to solve problems peacefully, to involve all countries in the international system regardless of whether or not they are democratic, and the acceptance of compromise.

Most of the Democratic candidates are part of the liberal international tradition. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and John Edwards differ somewhat in their positions. Having voted for the Iraq war, Hillary Clinton has the closest association with the use of power: she does not seek to completely remove all combat troops from Iraq. Edwards opposed the war from the beginning, and calls Iraq the greatest strategic mistake in American history. Obama takes the middle position: he wants all combat troops out.

It is clear that in the past year neo-conservatives have declined in influence. The realists and the liberal internationalists are on their way in: they make the same arguments against the neo-conservative tradition, namely that "democracy is a bridge too far," that use of force only increases terrorism, that the threats of terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction were exaggerated, and that it is a unilateral, arrogant tradition that destroys the credibility and legitimacy of the U.S. around the world. Realists argue that the U.S. should worry not so much about democracy, but rather about stability. The liberal internationalists suggest that the U.S. can accomplish most of its objectives through vigorous diplomacy: they argue for a "diplomatic surge." Realists and liberal internationalists seek to reduce or reposition America's overseas military deployments.

Unless the status of the debate changes, America's foreign policy is very likely to cycle back toward more modest ambitions (those of the realists) or more vigorous diplomacy (as advocated by the liberal internationalists). The constant cycling of foreign policy is disconcerting to the U.S.' allies, who have to contend with American over-involvement and then under-involvement in international affairs.

President Bush made mistakes of two sorts. He made mistakes associated with the tradition of the nationalists, as well as ones associated with the neo-conservative tradition. He reacted too fiercely to attack, epitomized by his comment "bring 'em on." The bigger mistake was rejecting NATO's offer of Article 5 cooperation in Afghanistan. He was too close to the tradition of the nationalists in his desire to strike back and needlessly ruled out the possibility of assistance from NATO in the aftermath of 9/11. In my mind, the use of force was not a mistake. But not following up the use of military force was an error: it was wrong to utilize force as a substitute for diplomacy. Bush failed to exploit the military advantage that the U.S. had in 2003-2004, when it was at the peak of its power, and when it should have accompanied its victory with a dramatic diplomatic effort in Iraq and in the region.

It would now be a mistake for America to move in the direction of a foreign policy conducted in the liberal international tradition. The U.S. made that mistake in the 1990s, when defense was neglected. The approach to the use of force advocated by the realists seems no longer applicable to the kind of threat that America faces: a strategy of containment is inadequate, and pre-emption will be necessary.

What can be done to avoid this cycling of American foreign policy? A new "conservative internationalist" position could become a sixth tradition. Two tenets distinguish it from the traditions of the liberal internationalists and the realists.

The first tenet is that the conservative internationalist position favors aggressive use of force, followed up by increased diplomatic efforts as soon as America gains a military advantage. Thus, from the conservative internationalist perspective, the purpose of the use of force is to ensure that America conducts diplomacy from the best possible position, so that as few compromises as possible have to be made. In short, America should make deals when it is strong.

The second tenet of this position is that proponents must be prepared to accept less than perfect outcomes. Attempts to transform non-democratic states into democracies should be pursued at the edge of the democratic world, not in the heart of authoritarian regions. This means an "ink blot" approach to the spread of democracy, rather than that of a bridge too far. Adherents of this approach would have deemed Turkey more important than Iraq. In terms of democratization, Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan, South Korea and Taiwan are more important than China, and Ukraine more so than Russia. The focus should be on creating the conditions that will advance democracy in countries bordering strong democracies. The ambition to change the moral character of the world is thus pursued in a way that is potentially much more practical and effective.

McCain is the presidential candidate closest to the conservative internationalist position. He has a clear understanding of both the importance of power and the importance of democracy. He understands the need to couple power and diplomacy.

If Obama were to win the presidential election, American foreign policy will definitely become less ambitious: there will be a general retrenchment post-Iraq, which could potentially cause problems in relationships with allies, in particular with Japan.

Questions and Answers

Q: What are the views of the presidential candidates on North Korea?

A: The U.S. should put the interests of emerging democracies like South Korea and Taiwan ahead of worries about democracy in China and North Korea. Democracy should be shored up in countries where it has a chance in the medium term. Engagement with China and North Korea should be in the economic sphere. The hope would be that, over time, these countries not only grow wealthy, but also become more open and, potentially, democratic. The way to maximize that possibility is to stay close to nearby democracies, and help democratic forces across the border to become stronger and stronger.

Q: What is your impression of the result of the primary election in New Hampshire?

A: It is way too soon to draw any conclusions. Hillary Clinton has stabilized her position after Iowa. The Democratic contest is a two-horse race between her and Obama, because Edwards is receding.

The debate in the U.S. is between those in favor of a candidate who has experience and a long association with foreign policy and those who want a president to change Washington not change the world.

Q: What accounts for the revival of McCain's campaign? Does his victory in New Hampshire have anything to do with the relative stability in Iraq and his consistent policy on the war? Will he continue to do well in the rest of the primaries?

A: McCain was supported heavily by independents in New Hampshire. One of the reasons why he has rebounded is that he has a certain renegade character about him that is not easily pigeonholed as partisan. He has disagreed with his Republican colleagues on numerous issues: taxes, abortion, and immigration, for example. Americans are generally unhappy with the partisanship in Washington, and many see McCain as someone who could bring the sides together, because he is not wedded to one or another set of solutions. His iconoclastic position on the troop surge in Iraq contributed to his rebound.

Q: Will the incoming administration have much interest in policy regarding northeast Asia?

A: As Asia becomes a more important center of power and democracy, the U.S. is going to play a lesser role, whether it likes it or not. The U.S. will not like it, just as it did not like it in Europe. America is always going to be skeptical about regional initiatives that exclude the U.S. But if Asia moves in a constructive direction, as Europe has done, then America's interests will actually be served. The U.S. is not going to be cheering this on, but will adjust, just as it adjusted to the transformation of the security relationship with Japan. There is no question that Japan has, in the past decade, taken on a stronger role in terms of security issues. The U.S. is wrestling with that, albeit at a much earlier stage, with the South Koreans.

It is up to the Asian countries to seize the initiative. But they should be aware of the fact that if these initiatives focus on opposing America (in the vein of France in recent years), they will not be appreciated by the U.S., which will fight back by trying to cause divisions and attempting to undermine the initiatives. For the last 15 years there has been a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. regarding the relationship with Japan and the relationship with China. China-bashing may lead to a split in the U.S. body politic on Asian policy, but recently it has been remarkably stable, and moving in the right direction: slowly ceding more influence to democratic allies in Asia and giving China an opportunity to become a stakeholder. However, not even the Chinese leadership can guarantee that China will not potentially use its greater power for hostile purposes.

Q: In your categorization, is it not the case that the use of a single axis is too simple to accommodate new thinking?

A: When summarizing, in a single PowerPoint slide, a spectrum of American views on foreign policy, oversimplification is unavoidable. The use of the nationalist and internationalist categories is not simply to do with ambitions. It also has to do with the question of what Americans think on the subject of the extent to which the U.S. needs to be involved in the world in order to take care of its interests. This framework can be used for any other country as well.

Engagement happens in three principle ways: through power, ideas, and institutions. The conservative internationalist position is located not very far from where the neo-conservative position is now, but it aims to develop the deeper historical roots of that tradition. The neo-conservative tradition was actually developed by liberal internationalists, and to some extent by realists, who were fleeing their traditions because they were unhappy with certain aspects of their respective traditions; some of them have returned to the fold of their former traditions now that the neo-conservative position has come into disrepute.

*This summary was compiled by RIETI Editorial staff.