China seen from Korea

Introduction

The Korean peninsula is already influenced by China in multiple spheres - political, economic, social and cultural. Indeed South Korea's rather submissive position vis-a-vis China, its enemy during the Korean War, contrasts starkly with the image of the 50-year U.S.-South Korea alliance facing possible sudden collapse. But then, this is the reality of South Korea today.

This contrast can be seen in the behavior of major South Korean political figures. Since the inauguration of the Roh Administration, South Korean political figures have tended to visit Beijing before visiting Washington D.C. Without exception, they have called for China's active engagement in solving the Korean peninsula's security problems. For the younger generation in particular, being pro-China increasingly has a positive connotation and is associated with being proactive and nationalistic in a healthy way, while association with pro-Japanese or pro-American views, is regarded negatively.

In light of this prevailing China-friendly mood in South Korea, I would like to discuss what policy China - a country increasingly beginning to have influence in the region as compared to the U.S. - will take vis-a-vis the Korean peninsula in the early 21st century. And pertinently, how China will view its communist brother North Korea, branded as a member of the Axis of Evil, as well as the manner in which it may choose to respond to requests by various South Korean politicians on their increasingly frequent visits to Beijing.

The more you press North Korea, the more it resists.

As soon as the war with Iraq is over, China is expected to become more visible in tackling the North Korean nuclear crisis. Chinese leaders are well aware that U.S. frustration over Kim Jung Il's bad behavior is reaching its limit. Indeed similar thoughts were voiced in March by a Bush administration China-expert who was until recently a fellow at the Heritage Foundation, prior to joining the administration. According to this expert, "through various channels, China has already expressed to Washington its willingness to cooperate on the North Korean nuclear issue." This has subsequently been proved to be the case, as evident in an April 4 article in the Washington Post. The article stated that "the Chinese government has warned North Korea to stop provoking the United States, backing up the warning by closing an oil pipeline to North Korea for three days in late February." Published at a moment when the post-Saddam Iraq reconstruction plan was emerging as a core issue, the article was a pointer that the world's media attention would be turning towards North Korea following collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime.

China's official explanation of the oil stoppage was that it was due to technical problems with the pipeline. However, that statement was largely viewed as a face-saving diplomatic maneuver by the Chinese. An "uncomfortable meeting" between North Korea's secret envoy and Chinese leaders in late February suggests that the stoppage was not an accident or technical glitch. North Korean Foreign Minister Bak Nam-Sun and Supreme Peoples' Assembly Chairman Kim Young-Nam are also thought to have secretly visited Beijing with requests for advanced weapon systems as well as stinger missiles for defensive use in case of possible war with the U.S. Though China in the past has understood North Korean security concerns and participated in the Korean War, losing 1 million soldiers in support of North Korea, despite considerable North Korean efforts at persuasion, China coldly refused the request. Instead China simply reiterated its basic principle of "nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula." As Jiang Zemin has himself admitted, North Korea is known to be a country which resists more, the more it is pushed. And therefore China possibly took the unconventional route of expressing concern while at the same time Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi directly advised North Korea.

North Korea would be paralyzed within 6 months if China stopped delivering energy supplies.

Since the meeting in February, the Chinese leadership, as expressed officially by the Foreign Ministry and other subsidiary organizations, continues to hold the above position. Both Beijing University and World Affairs Magazine have been reporting "we cannot continue to protect North Korea. It is increasingly widely believed by the Chinese leadership that North Korea will eventually arm itself with nuclear weapons. This constitutes a significant threat to China." They have also been quoted as saying that "North Korea is next on the agenda for the Bush administration after Iraq. The Bush administration does not see the Kim regime as a negotiating partner but rather a regime to be removed. As the U.S. places North Korea as its top policy priority, China cannot but help engage on the issue more pro-actively."

Hu Jintao, selected as the next General Secretary at the tenth National Peoples' Congress, emphasized the importance of Chinese's role in solving the North Korean issue in the course of his conversation with President Bush on March 16th, when President Bush telephoned to convey his congratulations. That statement signified that the Chinese leadership had finally responded positively to the US's request for a multilateral negotiation format with regard to North Korea. Until then, China's official policy towards the North Korean issue had been to leave it to bilateral talks between the US and North Korea.

The warning sign of closing the oil pipeline shows that China has shifted its position from supporting North Korea's line for bilateral negotiations with the US, to supporting the US's aim of negotiating the North Korean nuclear issue within the context of a multilateral framework. 60 per cent of North Korea's total energy requirements are provided by China. Though China itself imports 30 per cent of its energy needs from other countries, it has been providing energy to North Korea at a very low price. Should China halt its supply of energy, it is estimated that North Korea's economy would be paralyzed within a period of six months.

Bilateral negotiations within a multilateral framework

General Secretary Hu's response to this first diplomatic test was pro-American in nature. However in his response he also exercised Chinese diplomatic power in way as to ensure that ensuing events and diplomatic options would not be controlled exclusively by Washington. While China agreed to a multilateral negotiating framework for the North Korean nuclear development issue, it left certain items such as a US-North Korea Non-aggression Treaty to be discussed in a bilateral US-North Korea context. South Korea too supports China's "partial bilateral negotiation within a multilateral negotiation framework" position. In summary then, China is taking the US position into consideration when it pressures North Korea - a reflection of the fact that within the Chinese leadership the North Korean nuclear issue is regarded as one concerning the wider world, not just the region.

Why has China changed its position on North Korea and taken a more pro-US stance? It is because China has been watching the US's determined action against Iraq. President Bush's 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17 was also a warning message to Kim Jung Il. The ultimatum sent three messages to the North Korean leader. First, any rogue state or organization that holds weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be considered an enemy of the United States, and thus liable for removal. Second, the US will not employ any form of appeasement to deal with terrorist organizations, such as Saddam Hussein's regime. And third, the US will not hesitate to use military power in response to threats posed by such regimes or terrorist groups.

The ultimatum has since become more effective as a message following the US's massive scale military intervention in Iraq which resulted in capture and control over Baghdad after only a little over two weeks of fighting, and in the process proved many critics wrong. North Korea has already been labeled as a terrorist nation for possessing bio/chemical weapons, irrespective of its nuclear weapons development program. Therefore, the message of the ultimatum is that North Korea fits the definition of a dangerous enemy state and is hence liable to be a target for destruction. The Chinese for their part understand this situation perfectly well, given that they closely witnessed the manner in which the US determinedly set about preparing to attack Iraq despite strong opposition from France and Germany, long-time allies of the US.

Vice President Cheney - the most pro-China voice within the administration.

The most likely scenario to unfold immediately after war in Iraq is the US bringing the North Korean matter to the United Nations Security Council as a means to stop Kim Jung Il's plans to develop nuclear weapons. Officially, China is opposed to the employment of economic sanctions against North Korea by the UN Security Council. However, the Bush administration may have calculated that there are no grounds for China to support North Korea, should the UN Security Council decide to employ economic tools to deal with the North Koreans. Originally, China expressed its opposition to bringing the North Korean matter to the UN Security Council but has since cast a yes vote to bring the matter to the Council following the IAEA's request to that effect.

China's role and responsibilities will become clearer after the scheduled visit of Vice President Cheney to East Asia. Originally scheduled for April, it has since been postponed due to the situation in Iraq. Ever since September 11th, it is well known that Vice President Cheney has not made an official overseas visit. It is expected that the main purpose of his Asian visit will be to negotiate with the Chinese government over the North Korea issue.

It is believed that neo-Conservatism will be the guiding principle of the Republican Party in the 21st Century. However, if one takes a careful look, it can be discerned that Vice-President Cheney has taken the most pro-China stance within the highest ranks of the administration. Following September 11th, Cheney's attitude toward China took a 180 degree turn, indeed he has taken the leading role in tilting the administration's policy towards a more pro-China orientation. Chinese leaders too are well aware of these efforts. And with good reason, Cheney is referred to as 'the President of the President.' In sending Cheney to Asia, the US is perhaps trying to draw as many concessions as possible from China over North Korea. Whether or not the UN Security Council will employ economic sanctions; what North Korea will provide if negotiations start; what will happen if North Korea crosses declared "red lines" - these issues should all become clearer once the discussions between Vice President Cheney and the Chinese leadership are concluded.

(April 28, 2003)



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