

# Online Appendix for “Voter perceptions about dynastic politics in Japan”

## A. Question Wordings

The original Japanese questions follow after English translations.

### A.1. Stereotype Survey

#### Inference about the proportion of dynastic members in the Diet

In the Diet, there exist so-called *seshu giin* (the dynastic members of the Diet), who ran for and won a seat in a district succeeded from their father or relative who had served a member of the Diet. What do you think the proportion of dynastic members in the present House of Representatives (HoR) is? Please guess the value that you think is correct and answer it. (国会の中には、かつて国会議員を務めた父親などの親族から選挙区を引き継いで選挙に立候補して当選した、いわゆる世襲議員が存在しています。現在の衆議院における世襲議員の議席の割合はどのくらいだと思いますか。あなたが正解だと思う数値を推測してお答えください。)

[Respondents chose a value from 0% to 100% using a slider.]

#### Dynastic members in respondents' district

Has a dynastic member been elected from your district in the HoR elections? (衆議院議員選挙において、あなたの選挙区から世襲議員が選ばれたことはありますか。)

- Yes (はい)
- No (いいえ)
- I do not remember (覚えていない)

## Trait stereotypes about dynastic members

Some voters think that the members of the Diet have different personal traits from person to person. For each trait listed below, is it more applicable in general to dynastic members or non-dynastic members? Or Neither? Please choose one that applies. (有権者の中には、議員によってさまざまな個人的特性を持っていると考える人もいます。以下に示すそれぞれの特性について、それが一般的により当てはまるのは、世襲議員の方だと思いませんか、世襲ではない議員の方だと思いませんか。あるいは、どちらでもないと思いませんか。当てはまるものを選んでください。)

- ▷ Trustworthy (信頼できる)
  - ▷ Decisive (決断力がある)
  - ▷ Competent (有能である)
  - ▷ Politically experienced (政治的経験がある)
  - ▷ Honest (正直である)
  - ▷ Has strong leadership (強いリーダーシップを発揮する)
  - ▷ Benefits his or her constituency (選挙区に利益をもたらす)
  - ▷ Does not commit corruption (汚職をしない)
  - ▷ Wealthy (経済力がある)
  - ▷ Highly educated (高学歴である)
  - ▷ Has broad network in politics and business (政財界に広い人脈がある)
  - ▷ Likely to become a cabinet minister (大臣になりやすい)
- More applicable to dynastic members (世襲議員の方が当てはまる)
  - No difference between dynastic and non-dynastic members (世襲かどうかで差がない)
  - More applicable to non-dynastic members (世襲ではない議員の方が当てはまる)

## Issue stereotypes about dynastic members

Some voters think that each member of the Diet has his or her strong and weak policy areas. For each policy area listed below, which are generally better at handling it, dynastic members or non-dynastic members? Or Neither? Please choose one that applies. (有権者の中には、議

員によってそれぞれ得意あるいは不得意とする政策領域があると考える人もいます。以下に示すそれぞれの政策領域について，その政策を扱うのが一般的により得意なのは，世襲議員の方だと思いますか，世襲ではない議員の方だと思いますか。あるいは，どちらでもないと思いますか。当てはまるものを選んでください。)

- ▷ Education (教育)
  - ▷ Crime and public security (犯罪と治安)
  - ▷ Medical care (医療)
  - ▷ Child welfare (保育・児童福祉)
  - ▷ National security (安全保障)
  - ▷ Declining birthrate (少子化問題)
  - ▷ Fiscal deficit (財政赤字)
  - ▷ Diplomacy (外交)
  - ▷ Industrial policy (産業政策)
  - ▷ Public works (公共事業)
- Dynastic members are better (世襲議員の方が優れている)
  - No difference between dynastic and non-dynastic members (世襲かどうかで差がない)
  - Non-dynastic members are better (世襲ではない議員の方が優れている)

## A.2. Conjoint Survey

Respondents answered ten tasks about the HoR election and the other ten tasks about the House of Councillors (HoC) election. The order of the two types of elections was randomized. Emphases are in the original.

### Explanation of conjoint tasks

In the next page and later, we will show the profile of ten candidates for **the [HoR/HoC] election**. Please carefully read each candidate's profile and answer a question. (これから[衆議院/参議院]議員選挙への立候補者10人のプロフィールをお見せします。それぞれ候補者のプロフィールをよく見て，質問にお答えください。)

## Conjoint tasks

Please imagine that the following person is running for **the [HoR/HoC] election** in your area. (あなたがお住まいの地域で、次の人物が[衆議院/参議院]議員選挙に立候補しているとします。)

[A conjoint table was displayed here.]

To what extent is this candidate favorable as a [HoR/HoC] member? Please evaluate this candidate using an eight-point scale from “not favorable at all” to “very favorable.” (この候補者は、[衆議院/参議院]議員として、どのくらい望ましいと思いますか。「全く望ましくない」から「とても望ましい」までの8段階で、評価してください。)

[Respondents answer the question using an eight-point bipolar scale without numbered labels.]

## B. Details of the Analysis of the Perceived Share of Dynastic Members

### B.1. Model and Variables

We estimated linear models whose dependent variable was the estimated percentage of dynastic members. The definitions of their independent variables are listed below. The variable labels correspond to those used in Table 1 in the main text. We used the R package *estimatr* (Blair et al. 2021) to estimate these models by the ordinary least squares method and compute the HC2 robust standard errors.

**Female:** This variable takes one if a respondent is female and zero if a respondent is male.

**Age:** This variable denotes a respondent’s age. We included its squared term in the models.

**Middle education:** This variable takes one if a respondent’s educational level is middle level (technical college, community college, and vocational college) and zero otherwise.

**Higher education:** This variable takes one if a respondent’s highest educational attainment is college level or higher and zero otherwise. The reference category of *middle education* and *higher education* is low-level education (high school or lower).

**LDP support:** This variable takes one if a respondent supports the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and zero otherwise. Respondents' party support was measured by the standard wording used in Japan.

**Non-LDP right party support:** This variable takes one if a respondent supports Komeito or Nippon Ishin (the Japan Innovation Party) and zero otherwise.

**Left party support:** This variable takes one if a respondent supports the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Democratic Party for the People, the Japanese Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, or Reiwa Shinsengumi and zero otherwise. The reference category of these three variables on partisanship is independents, including those who support "other political organizations" and those who did not answer the question of party support.

**Ideological self-placement:** The survey asked respondents' ideological self-placement using a five-point scale. The correspondence of this variable and a respondent's answer to the question of ideological self-placement is as follows: 1 = "very progressive (very leftist)," 2 = "somewhat progressive (somewhat leftist)," 3 = "neither progressive nor conservative," 4 = "somewhat conservative (somewhat rightist)," and 5 = "very conservative (very rightist)."


**Ideological extremity:** We define this variable as the absolute value of (*ideological self-placement* - 3).

**Political trust:** The survey measured respondents' political trust by asking their agreement to the statement "we can trust national politics" using a five-point Likert scale with a "don't know" option. The correspondence of this variable and a respondent's answer to this item is as follows: 1 = "agree," 2 = "somewhat agree," 3 = "neither agree nor disagree," 4 = "somewhat disagree," and 5 = "disagree." We treated "don't know" responses as missing values.

**External efficacy:** This variable was measured in a similar way to *political trust*. The corresponding statement is "politicians no longer care about voters once elected."

**Internal efficacy:** This variable was measured in a similar way to *political trust*. The corresponding statement is "people like me have no say in what the government does."

**Elected: yes:** This variable takes one if a respondent chose "yes" to the question "Have a dynastic member been elected from your district in the House of Representatives elections?"



**Figure A.1.** The expected perceived share of dynastic members by respondents' age.

*Note:* The solid line represents point estimates, and the dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

and zero otherwise.


**Elected: no:** This variable takes one if a respondent chose “no” to the question “Have a dynastic member been elected from your district in the House of Representatives elections?” and zero otherwise. The reference category of *elected: yes* and *elected: no* is “I do not remember.”

## **B.2. The Curvilinear Relationship between Respondents' Age and the Perceived Share of Dynastic Members**

We computed the expected values of the perceived share of dynastic members in the Diet according to respondents' age based on Model 1, which is a model including only demographic variables. We set other variables to their most frequent category (*female* = 1, *middle education* = 0, and *higher education* = 1). Figure A.1 shows the results. The solid line represents point estimates, and the dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

## **B.3. The Relationship between Respondents' Ideological Self-Placement and the Perceived Share of Dynastic Members**

Based on the results of Model 2, we predicted the perceived share of dynastic members in the Diet according to respondents' ideological self-placement, which was also related to the




**Figure A.2.** The expected perceived share of dynastic members by respondents’ ideological self-placement.

*Note:* The dots represent point estimates, and the segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

variable of ideological extremity. The hypothetical person to be predicted was assumed to be female, college-educated (as in the above analysis), 49 years old (the average value of *age*), and non-partisan (i.e., *LDP support = non-LDP right party support = left party support = 0*). Figure A.2 shows the results. The dots represent point estimates, and the segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

### C. Analysis of Misperceptions of the Prevalence of Dynastic Members

We conducted an additional analysis to examine the perceived prevalence of dynastic members by changing the dependent variable from each respondent’s estimated percentage to the discrepancy between it and the actual value (the absolute value of the difference). The actual value we used was the percentage of Type 4 dynastic members in HoR after the 2014 election (14.3%). Although we did not rigidly define dynastic members in our survey, the description of dynastic members in the survey (“[those] who ran for and won a seat in a district succeeded from their father or relative who had served a member of the Diet”) is the closest to Type 4 of our typology. Unfortunately, the percentage at the time when the survey was conducted is not available, the



**Figure A.3.** Histogram of the deviation of the estimated percentage of dynastic members from the actual values.

percentage in 2014 was substituted as the most recent value. We show the histogram of this new dependent variable in Figure A.3. All other specifications were the same as in the original analysis.

Table A.1 shows the results. The signs and statistical significance of the coefficients are identical to those in Table 1 in the main text. This is reasonable due to the fact that most respondents (96.9%) overestimated the prevalence of dynastic members, resulting in very high correlations between the dependent variable in the present analysis and the original analysis (0.992). A substantive interpretation of these results is that respondents who were around 50 years old (see Figure A.4), independents, progressives (see Figure A.5), those with low levels of trust in politics and external political efficacy, and those who perceive that dynastic members had been elected from their districts were more likely to overestimate the prevalence of dynastic members in the Diet.

## D. Details of the Analysis of Heterogeneity in Stereotypes about Dynastic Politicians

To examine heterogeneity in stereotypes about the dynastic members of the Diet among Japanese voters, we applied the following multinomial logit model to the data of the stereotype survey:


$$\Pr(y_i = k) = \frac{\exp(\beta'_k \mathbf{x}_i)}{\sum_k \exp(\beta'_k \mathbf{x}_i)}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$



**Table A.1.** Estimated coefficients of linear models in which the dependent variable is the deviation of each respondent’s estimated percentage of dynastic members in the Diet from its actual value.


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	13.65*	16.41*	17.39*	18.45*
	(3.12)	(3.48)	(3.79)	(3.76)
Female	0.53	0.42	0.26	0.40
	(0.73)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.75)
Age	0.88*	0.91*	0.97*	0.92*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age (squared) / 10	-0.09*	-0.09*	-0.1*	-0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Middle education	-0.21	-0.27	-0.72	-0.65
	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.98)	(0.97)
Higher education	0.73	0.5	0.25	0.06
	(0.84)	(0.85)	(0.86)	(0.85)
LDP support		-2.41*	-1.05	-1.29
		(0.85)	(0.89)	(0.89)
Non-LDP right party support		-2.43	-1.55	-1.3
		(1.44)	(1.46)	(1.44)
Left party support		0.05	-0.18	-0.29
		(1.14)	(1.15)	(1.14)
Conservative self-placement		-1.02*	-0.75	-0.69
		(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.48)
Ideological extremity		1.66*	1.43*	1.31*
		(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Political trust			-1.23*	-1.28*
			(0.37)	(0.37)
External efficacy			-1.23*	-1.18*
			(0.37)	(0.37)
Internal efficacy			0.37	0.38
			(0.28)	(0.28)
Elected: yes				3.72*
				(0.83)
Elected: no				-2.12*
				(0.97)

*Note:* “Elected: yes” indicates a dummy variable for having seen dynastic members elected from their districts, and “Elected: no” indicates a dummy variable for having not. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. “Age (squared)” was divided by 10 for the presentation purpose. \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed).



**Figure A.4.** Expected misperception of the prevalence of dynastic members by respondents' age.

*Note:* The solid line represents point estimates, and the dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



**Figure A.5.** Expected misperception of the prevalence of dynastic members by respondents' ideological self-placement.

*Note:* The dots represent point estimates, and the segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

$y_i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$  denotes individual  $i$ 's survey response: 1 means “more applicable to dynastic members” or “dynastic members are better,” 2 means “no difference between dynastic and non-dynastic members,” and 3 means “more applicable to non-dynastic members” or “non-dynastic members are better.”  $x_i$  is the vector of individual  $i$ 's covariate, and  $\beta_k$  is a coefficient vector for response category  $k$ . We constrained  $\beta_1$  to 0 for parameter identification. We estimated this model for each of the trait and issue stereotype items.

We considered respondents' gender, age, and educational attainment (*female*, *age*, *middle education*, and *higher education*) as covariates. The definitions of these variables are shown in Section B.1. We included the squared term of *age* to examine a curvilinear relationship.

We estimated the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood using R package `mlogit` (Croissant 2020). Because the coefficients of the multinomial logit model are difficult to interpret on their own, we conducted the post-estimation simulations of predicted probabilities using parameters drawn from a multivariate normal distribution (King et al. 2000). In these simulations, we changed the value of the concerned variable in the original data, simulated predicted probabilities based on this data, and computed the average probability over individuals (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013).


Figures A.6 to A.8 show the results. In Figures A.6 and A.8, circles, cross marks, and squares indicate  $y$ -values of 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These dots represent point estimates, and segments represent 95% confidence intervals. In Figure A.7, the horizontal axis represents the value of age. Solid, dotted, and dashed lines indicate  $y$ -values of 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These lines represent point estimates, and shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

## **E. Details of the Conjoint Experiment**

### **E.1. Attributes and Levels**


Table A.2 shows attributes, their levels, and their marginal distributions in our conjoint experiment. The original Japanese labels follow after English translations.

The profile distribution followed the marginal distribution of each attribute of the 2014 HoR election candidates and the 2013 HoC election candidates, whose data were obtained from




**Figure A.6.** Predicted probabilities of trait and issue stereotype responses by respondents' gender.

*Note:* Predicted probabilities are based on post-estimation simulations using parameters drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. Dots represent point estimates, and segments represent 95% confidence intervals.



**Figure A.7.** Predicted probabilities of trait and issue stereotype responses by respondents' age.

*Note:* Predicted probabilities are based on post-estimation simulations using parameters drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. The horizontal axis represents the value of age. Lines represent point estimates, and shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.



**Figure A.8.** Predicted probabilities of trait and issue stereotype responses by respondents' educational attainment.

*Note:* Predicted probabilities are based on post-estimation simulations using parameters drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. Dots represent point estimates, and segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

あなたがお住まいの地域で、次の人物が衆議院議員選挙に立候補しているとします。

- ・これまで国会議員を6年経験
- ・親は元国会議員
- ・日本共産党所属
- ・67歳
- ・前の職業は会社役員
- ・地方国立大学卒
- ・男性
- ・北海道外出身

この候補者は、衆議院議員として、どのくらい望ましいと思いますか。「全く望ましくない」から「とても望ましい」までの8段階で、評価してください。

全く 望ま しく ない							とて も望 まし い
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

**Figure A.9.** An example of candidate profiles displayed in the conjoint experiment.

Horiuchi et al. (2018). The levels of age correspond to the 22, 50, 70, and 90 percentiles of the age of real-world candidates.<sup>1</sup> For party affiliation, we replaced the Democratic Party of Japan with the Constitutional Democratic Party.

Candidate profiles were presented one by one (not paired) by an itemized form instead of a table form for respondents' ease of reading. We randomized the order of attributes across respondents. Figure A.9 shows an example of candidate profiles.

## E.2. Results of All Attributes

Figure A.10 shows the overall estimation results of the AMCEs of the attribute-levels. The results are almost congruent with the findings of Horiuchi et al. (2020) except for dynastic status. The results were obtained by a linear probability model estimated by R package `estimatr` (Blair et al. 2021).

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
<sup>1</sup> We set the lower age to 42 because candidates less than 42 years old cannot serve as an HoC member for twelve years or more.

**Table A.2.** Attributes and their levels in the conjoint experiment

Attribute	Level	Prob.
Dynastic status	- His or her parents have no political experience (親の政治家経験はなし)	0.853
	- His or her parent was a local politician (親は元地方政治家)	0.036
	- His or her parent was a Diet member (親は元国会議員)	0.042
	- His or her parent was a cabinet minister (親は元大臣)	0.069
Gender	- Male (男性)	0.813
	- Female (女性)	0.187
Age	- 42 years old (42歳)	0.382
	- 52 years old (52歳)	0.215
	- 59 years old (59歳)	0.185
	- 67 years old (67歳)	0.218
Education	- He or she graduate from a high school (高校卒)	0.135
	- He or she graduate from a vocational collage (専門学校卒)	0.045
	- He or she graduate from a private university (私立大学卒)	0.430
	- He or she graduate from a local national university (地方国立大学卒)	0.168
	- He or she graduate from the University of Tokyo (東京大学卒)	0.092
	- He or she graduate from a graduate school (大学院卒)	0.130
Occupation	- His or her former occupation is a business employee (前の職業は会社員)	0.243
	- His or her former occupation is a business executive (前の職業は会社役員)	0.090
	- His or her former occupation is a government employee (前の職業は公務員)	0.115
	- His or her former occupation is a celebrity (前の職業はタレント)	0.036
	- His or her former occupation is a secretary of a Diet member (前の職業は国会議員秘書)	0.173
	- His or her former occupation is a local politician (前の職業は地方政治家)	0.343
Hometown	- His or her hometown is X (X出身)	0.586
	- His or her hometown is not X (X外出身)	0.414
Political experience	- He or she has not served as a Diet member (国会議員経験なし)	0.554
	- He or she has served as a Diet member for six years (これまで国会議員を6年経験)	0.316
	- He or she has served as a Diet member for twelve years or more (これまで国会議員を12年以上経験)	0.130
Party affiliation	- He or she is an independent (無所属)	0.052
	- He or she belongs to the LDP (自由民主党所属)	0.323
	- He or she belongs to the CDP (立憲民主党所属)	0.191
	- He or she belongs to Komeito (公明党所属)	0.054
	- He or she belongs to the JIP (日本維新の会所属)	0.096
	- He or she belongs to the JCP (日本共産党所属)	0.284

*Note:* Respondents' prefecture of residence recorded prior to the experiment was inserted into X. Parties' abbreviations are as follows: LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; CDP = Constitutional Democratic Party; JIP = Japan Innovation Party; JCP = Japanese Communist Party.





**Figure A.10.** Estimated average marginal component effects on voters' favorability toward candidates.

*Note:* Dots represent point estimates, and segments represent 95% confidence intervals. Parties' abbreviations are as follows: LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; CDP = Constitutional Democratic Party; JIP = Japan Innovation Party; JCP = Japanese Communist Party.

### E.3. Results of the Analyses of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects


We examined heterogeneous treatment effects of candidates' dynastic ties depending on the following respondent-level variables: gender, age, education, political knowledge, and partisanship. Political knowledge was based on respondents' self-evaluation of their own measured by a five-point from "I think I know a lot about politics" to "I think I know very little about politics." Other variables were measured by the standard wording. As partisanship, we focus on the difference between LDP supporters and the remaining respondents (including independents and those who provided a "don't know" response) because many dynastic politicians are LDP members.

I split respondents into subgroups and computed marginal means, which "describes the level of favorability toward profiles that have a particular feature level, marginalizing across all other features" (Leeper et al. 2020, 210) and is suitable for subgroup comparison (Clayton et al. 2021; Leeper et al. 2020).<sup>2</sup> Figure A.11 shows the results of subgroup comparisons. Because the averages of the outcome (i.e., the grand mean) differ across subgroups, we illustrate centered marginal means (i.e., marginal means minus the grand mean of each subgroup) in this figure.

To formally test whether the effects of candidates' dynastic ties differ across subgroups, we conducted  $F$ -tests comparing the following two models: (1) a linear regression in which independent variables are dummy variables for all attribute-levels (excluding baseline levels) and the concerned respondent-level variable and (2) a linear regression in which we added interaction terms between dummy variables for the attribute-levels of dynastic ties and the concerned respondent-level variable to Model (1). In these analyses, we treated age, education


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<sup>2</sup> The categories of "young," "middle," and "old" for age include those who are 39 years old or younger, those who are 40–59 years old, and those who are 60 years or older, respectively. The categories of "low," "middle," and "high" for education include high school or less, technical college/community college/vocational college, and college or higher, respectively. The categories of "low," "middle," and "high" for political knowledge include those who chose the top two options, those who chose the third option, and those who chose the bottom two options, respectively. We excluded respondents who answered "neither male nor female" for the question of gender from the comparison of male and female respondents.



**Figure A.11.** Estimated centered marginal means of voters' favorability toward candidates for the attribute of dynastic status depending on respondents' characteristics.

*Note:* Dots represent point estimates, and segments represent 95% confidence intervals.



**Figure A.12.** Estimated centered marginal means of voters' favorability toward candidates for the attribute of dynastic status depending on the type of elections.

*Note:* Dots represent point estimates, and segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

(three strata), and political knowledge as continuous variables. The  $p$ -values were 0.501, 0.016, 0.853, 0.128, 0.011 for gender, age, education, political knowledge, and partisanship, respectively. Therefore, we conclude that the effects of candidates' dynastic ties depend on voters' age and support for the LDP.

In addition, we checked whether the effects of dynastic status were different between the HoR and HoC elections. Figure A.12 compares centered marginal means and demonstrates that, though dynastic candidates seem to have been slightly more punished when the election was for the HoC than the HoR, confidence intervals widely overlapped. The  $p$ -value of the  $F$ -test was 0.373. Thus, we conclude that the effects of dynastic status do not differ by the type of election.

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