Japanese Attitudes Toward Immigrants' Voting Rights: Evidence from Survey Experiments

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Japanese attitudes toward immigrants’ voting rights: Evidence from survey experiments*

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Abstract
The presence of native allies is important for the success of immigrants’ social movements in East Asian countries, as the number of immigrants is relatively low. However, it remains unclear whether advocacy messages from natives or from immigrants are more effective in changing the attitudes of natives to support policies for immigrants. From the perspective of social identity theory, we hypothesized that the effectiveness of persuasive messages would vary depending on the group issuing the message. To test this, we conducted a survey experiment using a Japanese case of granting local voting rights to immigrants. Our results showed that Japanese support for granting immigrants local voting rights did not decrease when they heard an advocacy message from Japanese but decreased when it came from a Korean immigrant whose voting rights are highly relevant. These results suggest that advocacy messages from natives may lead to more support for immigrants.

Keywords: social movements, immigrants, voting rights
JEL classification: D72, D91

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Immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities continue to be socioeconomically and politically disadvantaged in many countries (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010; Cascio and Washington 2014). To change the situation around them, they engage in social movements to interact with politics and question society, as exemplified by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement for racial equality that emerged in the United States (Szetela 2020). These movements are attempts to influence the host society to improve the socioeconomic and political situations of immigrants and minorities (Biggs and Andrews 2015; Steil and Vasi 2014). However, unlike in the United States, in East Asian societies, the size of ethnic minorities and immigrants is considerably smaller. Even though immigrants are politically and socioeconomically disadvantaged in those societies as well, their small population size is the reason for the low success rates and influence of their social movements (Cascio and Washington 2014). Therefore, in these societies, the actors that matter are allies, consisting of members of the ethnic majorities and natives. Native residents who are sympathetic to immigrants organize NGOs to support and empower them (Piper 2004a, 2004b; Shipper 2008) and, at times, to speak for them (Steil and Vasi 2014; Tsuda 2006; Yamanaka 2010).

In East Asian countries, NGOs organized by native citizens play a very important role in communicating messages about the disadvantaged status of immigrants to other citizens and to local and national governments (e.g., Milly 2014; Shipper 2008). However, it is not clear who should take the initiative in such social movements or who should convey such messages to the host society. For example, Hayduk and Coll (2018, 15) argued that “immigrants are the most credible spokespeople for noncitizen voting rights, and their personal stories about the adverse impacts of disenfranchisement are often the most effective arguments that win over both voters and policy-makers.” Nevertheless, their arguments remain theoretical and have not been empirically tested. From the perspective of social identity theory, it is expected that citizens will be more persuaded by co-ethnic speeches due to in-group favoritism (e.g., Barnum and Markovsky 2007; Wyer 2010).

This study focuses on the impact of different sources of claims regarding local election suffrage, or local-level voting rights, for immigrants in Japan on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants’ rights. Previous studies have shown that the granting of suffrage to noncitizen immigrants helps improve their socioeconomic status (Cascio and Washington 2014; Naidu 2012). Although not all democratic countries enfranchise immigrants, a significant number of countries do grant (local) suffrage to immigrants, including a majority of European countries, some parts of the United States and Canada, South Korea, and Hong Kong (Hayduk 2004; Arrighi and Bauböck 2017; Mosler and Pedroza, 2016). In Japan, by contrast, second- and third-generation immigrants, mainly from South Korea, have demanded suffrage in local elections for decades (Tsutsui and Shin 2008), but their claims have not been successfully legislated. As a result, Japan is often referred to as a prime example of a country where immigrants’ political rights are restricted (e.g., Earnest 2015).

Furthermore, due to population aging and the resulting labor shortage, the Japanese government has liberalized its immigration policy to accept more immigrants and extend their stay in Japan. In response to these changes in society, the Japanese people are faced with the situation of reconsidering the acceptance of immigrants and the granting of voting rights to them. Testing messages that can change the mindset of the Japanese people, who tend to be restrictive and resistant to changes on immigrants’ rights, will be beneficial in that it cannot only deepen our understanding of the mechanisms of support for granting voting rights to immigrants in Japan, but also can reveal insights for other democracies where immigration is on the rise.

In this study, we examine how the difference between natives and immigrants as advocates affects the Japanese public’s support for granting local election suffrage to permanent residents. Based on the social identity perspective, we expect that Japanese
citizens who receive voting advocacy messages from immigrants are less likely to support local suffrage for them. Using a vignette survey experiment, we test this possibility and analyze the heterogeneous effects among respondents.

In the following sections, we first review the literature on the social identity theory of inter-group relationships. Then, we explain the context of immigrant voting rights in Japan, mentioning Korean immigrants who have received the most attention regarding the issue of granting local election suffrage to permanent residents, as well as the movements of NGOs. We consider the possibility of different effects of in-group favoritism among Japanese people and the heterogeneity of the effects of groups advocating for the granting of suffrage. Finally, after explaining the research design, we present the results and discuss their implications.

Social identity theory of inter-group relationships
According to the social identity theory, when social categorization is prominent, people seek similarity with members of the in-group (i.e., the group with which they are identified) and attempt to differentiate themselves from those of the out-group (i.e., group with which they are not identified) (Hornsey 2008; Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979). People tend to evaluate their own group (i.e., in-group) and in-group members positively to maintain a positive self-concept and for their self-evaluation and self-esteem. This produces “in-group favoritism,” a positive evaluation and treatment of in-group members. However, one’s evaluation of the in-group is relative: people evaluate one group in comparison to another. As a result, to form a favorable in-group image, members of the in-group tend to evaluate the out-group and its members negatively. An example of this out-group derogation is that natives with a strong in-group identity form negative attitudes toward out-group immigrants (Aboud 2003; Raijman, Davidov, Schmidt, and Hochman 2008; Verkuyten 2009).

Positive evaluations of in-group members lead to higher trust in them; conversely, in-group members are less likely to trust out-group members (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, and Hodson 2002; Voci 2006). Therefore, when compared with messages from out-group members, those from in-group members are more likely to capture the attention of the in-group members and be more persuasive (Barnum and Markovsky 2007; Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, and Skelly 1992; Nelson and Garst 2005; Wyer 2010). Indeed, prior research on the BLM movement has found that White respondents tend to respond positively to appeals from co-racial individuals (Arora and Stout, 2019). Applying these arguments to an opinion formation situation, we expect that messages from in-group members would be more influential in changing a person’s attitude than those from out-group members.

Furthermore, the effects of social identity are expected to be heterogeneous, as various immigrant groups attach different relevance and political importance to the issues in focus. Social identity theory relies on the saliency of group boundaries. Therefore, when in-group members perceive stronger group boundaries, they feel a greater need to emphasize their differences from the out-group, thus reinforcing their favoritism for the in-group and contempt for the out-group (Alba 2005).

Japanese context
Before introducing the hypotheses, this section provides a brief description of the immigration situation in Japan to help readers understand the Japanese context as a case to test the abovementioned arguments. As of 2018, there are 2.73 million residents with foreign backgrounds living in Japan (Ministry of Justice 2019), accounting for 2.16% of the total population. Although this proportion is small compared with North American and Western European countries, it is the largest number of immigrants in Japan’s history.

Despite the growing number of immigrants, the Japanese government does not grant sufficient rights to immigrants in several areas (Solano and Huddleston 2020). Specifically,
local suffrage has not been granted to immigrants or non-citizens, which distinguishes Japan from other democratic countries (Earnest 2015; Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). In 1995, in a case where Korean residents in Japan sought the right to vote in local elections, the Supreme Court ruled that “granting local voting rights did not violate the Constitution and the parliament can enact a statute without amending the Constitution” (Kondo 2002: 420). Since this Supreme Court decision has been made, the Japanese government has discussed the possibility of granting local voting rights to foreign residents; however, no such rights have been granted yet (see Day 2008 and Kalicki 2008 for reviews of the political debate). The government’s ruling party, especially the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, has been reluctant to introduce the voting right because of the small number of potential voters who would support it and the small political payoff (Chung 2010). Furthermore, there is strong opposition among conservative Japanese to granting local voting rights to foreigners, as they fear that immigrants will vote for their own politicians and control local governments (Higuchi 2014). This political situation makes it difficult for immigrants to participate in elections, especially at the local level.

Koreans living in Japan and their descendants who came to Japan between 1910 and 1945, when Korea was colonized by Japan, (called Zainichi Koreans)1 have actively engaged in collective action to win political rights, in cooperation with international and Japanese NGOs (Growitz 1999; Tsutsui and Shin 2008). Although they have been successful in some areas, such as social welfare (Chung 2010), they have failed to achieve significant success regarding political rights (Tsutsui and Shin 2008). Even though the political empowerment of immigrants remains an issue, Zainichi Korean activism has declined for decades (Yamawaki 2001; Motomori and Sakaguchi 2020).

NGOs organized by Japanese citizens also play an important role in attempts to expand the rights of immigrants (Shipper 2008; Tsuda 2006). These organizations address not only political rights, but also issues as diverse as 1) immigration control systems (i.e., visas, asylum, and detention centers), 2) legal and procedural rights and protections, 3) labor protection and employee-related policies, and 4) social issues (Milly 2006). NGOs, sometimes in cooperation with ethnic and Zainichi Korean organizations, seek to address these issues through lobbying to local and national governments, taking legal actions, and mobilizing people (e.g., Shipper 2008).

Hypotheses
To realize the granting of suffrage to foreign residents as a social movement, who should demand the suffrage? Should it be Japanese citizens or immigrants? Based on the social identity theory, we expect the voice of Japanese citizens to be more persuasive. Natives tend to avoid situations in which the out-group threatens the resources and power they hold (Blumer 1958; Raijman et al. 2008). If in-group members are advocates, Japanese people may trust their messages; in contrast, if out-group members are advocates, they may be perceived by Japanese citizens as trying to exploit the citizens’ political resources. Therefore, Japanese respondents are likely to find messages from the in-group more persuasive than those from the out-group (immigrants) because of the mechanism of favoritism for the in-group and contempt for the out-group. This leads to hypothesis 1:

**H1:** Japanese respondents are more supportive of granting local suffrage to foreign residents when hearing advocacy messages from Japanese citizens rather than immigrants.

We further expect that there may be heterogeneous effects among Japanese respondents. If social identity theory is correct, Japanese people who have a stronger sense of belonging to Japan or a higher level of Japanese nationalism may be more effectively
persuaded by advocacy messages from their fellow Japanese than from immigrants. Thus, we formulate hypothesis 2 as follows:

\[ H2: \text{Japanese respondents with a high level of nationalism are more supportive of granting local suffrage to foreign residents when hearing advocacy messages from Japanese citizens rather than immigrants.} \]

The effects of the distinction between in-group and out-group on support for the granting of voting rights may also depend on which ethnic group members within the immigrant population deliver the advocacy message. As mentioned earlier, social identity theory depends on the salience and strength of the group boundary between natives and immigrants. Japanese people may perceive strong group boundaries for Korean immigrants, as Zainichi Koreans have formed multiple social movements for voting rights (Tsutsui and Shin 2008). Because of their frequency, the claims of Zainichi Koreans are likely to receive the most political attention. In other words, Zainichi Koreans’ social movement for local suffrage may function as a strong reminder of the categorization between Japanese and Koreans. Therefore, we focus on the difference in the effect of the claims made by Zainichi Koreans and those by other ethnic groups.

The Japanese people perceives local suffrage claims as being made primarily by Zainichi Koreans and not by other immigrants, making Korean immigrants politically salient (Higuchi 2014). When Japanese people receive messages about local suffrage from Zainichi Koreans, their sense of group boundaries is reinforced, leading to greater in-group favoritism and out-group contempt. As a result, the claims made by Korean residents are expected to reduce Japanese support for local suffrage more than those made by other immigrants. In other words, for H1 and H2, we expect advocacy messages from Korean immigrants to have a stronger effect. We present this as Hypotheses 3a and 3b below.

\[ H3a: \text{Japanese respondents are more supportive of granting local suffrage to immigrants when exposed to advocacy messages from Japanese citizens rather than Koreans.} \]

\[ H3b: \text{Japanese respondents with a high level of nationalism are more supportive of granting local suffrage to foreign residents when hearing advocacy messages from Japanese citizens rather than Koreans.} \]

**Research design**

To test the hypotheses, we conducted a vignette survey experiment with respondents registered with Rakuten Insight, Inc., one of the largest web-survey companies in Japan, in April 2021. We sampled data based on gender, age, and area of residence to ensure the representation of the census population in Japan. Excluding those who were not sufficiently attentive to the survey or did not answer the manipulation check questions correctly, the total number of valid respondents was 3,400.\(^2\)

For the vignette, we created a hypothetical story in which the current situation regarding local suffrage for non-Japanese residents was briefly explained and an activist commented on it. Here we manipulated the nationality of the activist to be either Japanese, Korean, or Finnish. In other words, the experiment consisted of three conditions: one ethnic majority condition and two ethnic minority conditions. We used the Japanese condition as a reference. Koreans are the most salient immigrant group in Japan, whereas Finns represent the least salient immigrant group. The comment section manipulated in the vignette was as follows:
Takashi Igarashi, a member of a foreigner support NGO/Kim Soo-hyun, a South Korean/Daniel Niina, a Finnish], 52 years old, who has lived in Osaka for many years, said, “Foreigners living in Japan, even those who have graduated from Japanese schools, speak Japanese, and are familiar with the Japanese culture, are not even able to participate in local elections. Foreign residents are placed in a particularly difficult socioeconomic position that is directly affected by politics. We need to appeal more to politics to change this situation.”

We randomly assigned one of the conditions to each respondent; after reading the story, the respondents were asked to rate on a five-point scale whether they agreed or disagreed with the granting of local suffrage to foreign residents in Japan. To test H1, we combined the Korean and Finish conditions into one category, making a dichotomous treatment variable: Japanese and immigrant spokespersons. We then used the original treatment variables to examine how the effects of the Japanese and Korean treatments differed (H3a).

To examine the effects of nationalism (H2 and H3b), we measured the respondents’ level of nationalism on a six-point scale with the following four items: “I would rather be a citizen of Japan than of any other country in the world,” “The world would be a better place if people in other countries were more like the Japanese,” “Generally speaking, Japan is a better country than most other countries,” and “I am proud to be Japanese.” We combined these variables and performed a factor analysis to create a factor score. Respondents were also asked other demographic questions, such as their age, gender, education, and region of residence. We also asked about their political ideologies (conservative or liberal). To ensure robustness, we added these in the analysis as control variables and found that the results were the same regardless of whether these variables were included or not.

Results
First, we tested the effects of the spokesperson’s in-group or out-group status. The results are shown in Model 1 in Table 1. As indicated, the respondents’ attitudes did not change according to whether they heard advocacy messages from a Japanese or non-Japanese spokesperson. Thus, H1 was not supported. We further divided the respondents according to their level of nationalism, but no significant effect was found between respondents with high and low levels of nationalism (see Appendix I for the results). These results indicate that H2 was not supported either.

Table 1. Support for the granting of local suffrage to foreign residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiments (ref: Japanese condition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant (Korean and Finnish) condition</td>
<td>-.045 (.053)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean condition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.149* (.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish condition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.035 (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.004* (.001)</td>
<td>-.004** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.398*** (.047)</td>
<td>-.401*** (.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref: Junior high school)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>-.032 (.216)</td>
<td>-.008 (.216)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Next, we de-categorized the immigrant treatment into the Korean and Finish conditions to examine the heterogeneous effects of nationality. We found that respondents who were assigned to the Korean condition were significantly less likely to support the granting of local suffrage to immigrants compared with those in the Japanese condition, whereas those who were assigned to the Finnish condition did not respond differently from those in the Japanese condition. These results support H3a, suggesting that Japanese respondents care about the nationality of the spokesperson and react negatively to advocacy messages issued by the most prominent immigrant group, Zainichi Koreans. In other words, Japanese citizens do not show increased support for voting rights when they hear advocacy messages from immigrants, and social identity theory is a plausible explanation for this.

The results shown in Model 2 partially support in-group favoritism and out-group contempt, indicating that messages from Japanese individuals may change respondents’ attitudes more favorably than messages from Korean immigrants. To test whether there are heterogeneous effects depending on the level of nationalist sentiment of the Japanese respondents (H3b), we followed the approach of previous studies (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) and divided the respondents into those with high nationalism levels (defined as nationalism scores equal to or higher than the average) and those with low nationalism levels (defined as nationalism scores lower than the average). If in-group preferences are functioning, those who are more nationalistic would react negatively to advocacy messages from Koreans.

Table 2 shows the results, which indicate that only the respondents with high nationalism reacted negatively to the Korean condition. This result supports the assumption about in-group favoritism that only those with strong attachment to the in-group react negatively to the claims of the out-group. Additionally, to see the robustness of the results, we also divided the respondents by demographic variables and ideology, but the results varied only for the nationalism variable.

Table 2. Support for the granting of local suffrage to foreign residents by respondents’ level of nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiments (ref: Japanese condition)</th>
<th>Respondents with a high level of nationalism</th>
<th>Respondents with a low level of nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (S.E.)</td>
<td>B (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean condition</td>
<td>-.221* (.089)</td>
<td>-.082 (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish condition</td>
<td>-.029 (.085)</td>
<td>.064 (.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>1,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001. The same control variables as those in Table 1 are included.
but not presented in the table.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this study was to identify who should advocate for immigrants’ rights. Previous studies have assumed that immigrants would be the most effective in eliciting support from natives (Hayduk and Coll, 2018), but to the best of our knowledge, this expectation has not been empirically tested until now. These issues are particularly relevant to East Asian countries, where the size of the immigrant population is smaller than in Western societies, and the support of natives is crucial for successful social movements to ensure the rights of immigrants (Shipper, 2008).

Employing the case of local suffrage, which has been a major political issue for immigrants in Japan, we experimentally examined whose claims are more important for Japanese citizens to support immigrant local suffrage. From the perspective of social identity theory, we expected that Japanese citizens would prefer the advocacy messages from the in-group to those of the out-group. Furthermore, we expected that the influence of ethnic groups would be heterogeneous and that mechanisms of social identity would be applied especially to Korean advocates, which are prominent in social movements for local suffrage.

The results did not fully support our expectations from social identity theory. However, we found that advocacy by a Japanese person or Finnish immigrant had no effect on the Japanese respondents’ attitudes toward the local suffrage for immigrants, while advocacy by a Korean immigrant had a negative effect. In other words, consistent with social identity theory, the Japanese citizens were shown to be less likely to support local suffrage for immigrants when it was advocated by a Korean immigrant in comparison to another Japanese citizen.

The reason a Korean immigrant spokesperson had a negative effect on Japanese people’s support for local suffrage may be found in the history of Korean immigrants’ efforts to achieve local suffrage. In fact, social movements calling for local suffrage for foreigners often originate from Zainichi Koreans, not Japanese citizens. The assertion of rights by Zainichi Koreans may have caused a backlash against the granting of local suffrage. Japanese people who receive messages from Korean immigrants become more aware of the group boundary between the two ethnic groups; and because of this boundary, the Japanese may not support local suffrage for immigrants. In support of these arguments, only the respondents with high levels of nationalism, one of the indicators of the strength of the group boundary, did not support local suffrage.

Finally, we believe that socially meaningful implications have emerged from this study, but there are several limitations that future research must overcome. First, this study used two groups of immigrants: Koreans and Finns living in Japan. We restricted the number of immigrant nationalities to increase the statistical power. As a result, Japanese citizens’ responses to advocacy messages by other foreign residents remain unexplored. Since Zainichi Koreans are the most salient group regarding local suffrage, we think advocacy by members of other ethnic groups is unlikely to exacerbate Japanese attitudes toward the granting of voting rights. To test this, future research could increase the number of immigrant nationalities to examine how Japanese citizens respond. Second, we examined the most politically important issue for immigrants in Japan: the right to vote. However, since the right to vote is associated with exclusive membership, Japanese people’s reactions to other rights may differ from those observed in this study. Future research could include a comprehensive examination of support for immigrants’ rights while varying the nationality of the rights advocates.
Note

1) Since most Zainichi Koreans are born and raised in Japanese society, some may doubt that a clear boundary exists between Zainichi Koreans and Japanese. However, it has been experimentally shown that having Japanese ancestry is seen by the Japanese as an important factor for a person to be Japanese (Ishida 2016). In other words, although Zainichi Koreans are members of Japanese society, Japanese citizens can be said to draw a clear boundary between themselves and Zainichi Koreans.

2) Some might question this study’s external validity because it relied on a web-based survey, which is not representative of random sampling. Using a random sampling method would have been ideal, even though our sample was collected close to the distribution of the census population. However, some studies have found no difference in experimental results between representative samples and opt-in web surveys (Coppock, Leeper, and Mullinix 2018). Therefore, the results of our experiment may not significantly differ from those of an experiment conducted in a representative survey.

3) We conducted a balance test by running a multinomial regression with the assigned experimental condition as the dependent variable and the respondent’s age, gender, education, region of residence, ideology, and nationalism as the independent variables. We did not find any statistically significant outcomes, which verifies that the randomization was successfully made across groups.

4) We specifically used principal factor solution and promax rotation to generate a measure of nationalism. Factor loadings of these variables are .786, .780, .604, and .706, respectively.
References


## Appendix I

Table A1. Support for the granting of local suffrage to foreign residents by respondents’ level of nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiments (ref: Japanese condition)</th>
<th>Respondents with a high level of nationalism</th>
<th>Respondents with a low level of nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant (Korean and Finnish) condition</td>
<td>-.110 (.078)</td>
<td>-.000 (.072)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N | 1,728 | 1,666 |

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. The same control variables as those in Table 1 are included but not presented in the table.