Diplomatic Protest and Patriotism: 
The Effect of Foreign Voices on Japanese Public Opinion

KAGOTANI, Koji
Osaka University of Economics

ONO, Yoshikuni
RIETI
Diplomatic Protest and Patriotism
The Effect of Foreign Voices on Japanese Public Opinion*

KAGOTANI, Koji
Osaka University of Economics

ONO, Yoshikuni
Tohoku University & Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

Abstract
The military expansion of a country, even for defensive purposes, often invites diplomatic protests from neighboring countries. In this study, we look into how diplomatic protests shape public opinion and foreign policy preferences. We contend that diplomatic protests which take the form of costless threats are sufficient to cause patriotism and hawkish policy preferences within the target country. This has a potential to lead to hostile foreign policy behavior and international conflicts as well. Repeated disputes among international rivals and criticisms from quasi-allies may encourage the public to recognize differences between the two societies, thereby enhancing the patriotic effect. The results of our survey experiment show that diplomatic protests give rise to patriotism only within rivalries. States tend to lodge diplomatic protests against security policies from their own perspectives, consequently inducing patriotism and hawkish reactions in their target countries. We call this phenomenon "the dilemma of diplomatic protests." Moreover, diplomatic protests can cause a "spiral of distrust." This paper focuses on the case of Japan, highlighting the processes behind the rising tensions among the countries in East Asia.

Keywords: Diplomatic Protest, Patriotism, Japanese Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Survey Experiment
JEL classification: D91, D71, D74

The RIETI Discussion Paper Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional papers, with the goal of stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the author(s), and neither represent those of the organization(s) to which the author(s) belong(s) nor the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.

*This study is conducted as a part of the Project “Research on Political Behavior and Decision Making: Searching for evidence-based solutions to political challenges in the economy and industry” undertaken at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). This study utilizes the micro data of the questionnaire information based on the “Survey on attitudes toward politics, society, and the economy” which is conducted by RIETI. The author is grateful for helpful comments and suggestions by Charles Crabtree (Dartmouth College), James Druckman (Northwestern University), Kentaro Fukumoto (Gakushuin University) and Discussion Paper seminar participants at RIETI.
1 Introduction

On December 18, 2018, the Cabinet of Japan approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for the fiscal year 2019 and onwards. In addition to this, the Medium Term Defense Program was likewise approved. This stipulated an annual increase in Japan’s defense budget by 10 percent for the next five years. This also provided for the conversion of the Izumo-class multi-purpose destroyer, which were then helicopter carriers, into air-craft carriers capable of operating the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (STOVL) F-35B. The same also led to the purchase of two ground-based Aegis Ashore air defense radars built in the U.S. to track and target ballistic missiles in space.1 Hua Chunying, the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said in the regular press conference that “due to what happened in history, Japan’s moves in the field of military security have been closely followed by its neighboring countries in Asia and the international community at large. We urge Japan to keep its commitment to the strategy of ‘purely defensive defense’, adhere to the path of peaceful development and act cautiously in the area of military security.”2

The military expansion of a country, even for defensive purposes, often invites diplomatic protests from neighboring countries. The media broadly covers diplomatic conflicts among states and informs the public of the said disputes from the perspective of their own countries. This study looks into how diplomatic protests shape public opinion and foreign policy preferences. In order to answer this question, we extend the rally-round-the-flag argument to the context of diplomatic protests, and explore political consequences of the said protests using a survey experiment. With regard to the rally-round-the-flag argument, foreign threats and international militarized disputes tend to induce the public to recognize the difference between its own country and the rival country, giving rise to patriotism in the public mind. Such an emotional reaction induces a more positive view toward the national leader (Levy

---

1989; Mueller 1970), as well as toward the current policy positions (Norpoth 1991; Parker 1995). We contend that diplomatic protests, which take the form of costless threats are sufficient to cause patriotism and hawkish policy preferences within target countries. We also highlight international rivalries and quasi-alliance relationships as factors which enhance the patriotic effect among the public. The repeated disputes among international rivalries and the criticisms from quasi-allies may encourage the public to recognize the difference between the two societies, consequently inducing patriotism in the public mind. The results of our survey experiment conducted in Japan show that diplomatic protests give rise to patriotism only within rival dyads.

This article has some notable contributions to the existing literature on this field of study. First, this fills the gap in the literature by providing evidence on the patriotic effect resulting from diplomatic protests. It is explained here how diplomatic protests may affect public opinion in the target country in the same manner as do foreign threats and international crises. However, only a few studies have examined the relationship between diplomatic protests from neighboring countries and the public’s reactions in the target country. Diplomatic exchanges are most often used to show both cooperative and conflicting behavior in contemporary international relations. In this study, we shall address the political impact of diplomatic protests on public opinion.

Second, our results reveal a new political process behind the escalation of international tensions between countries. The military expansion of a country induces neighboring countries to increase military spending as well. This may be seen as a reaction to a perceived threat. Such phenomena are called the “security dilemma” (Jervis 1978). The “security dilemma” highlights the strategic interactions between countries–states seeking security advantages cause socially undesirable outcomes by escalating tensions, hence creating “the spiral of fear”. However, this classic model does not capture the domestic political consequences of diplomatic protests arising from military expansion of countries. Similarly, states

---

3One exception is a study on diplomatic quarrels and public opinion in the third-party country (Kohama, Inamasu and Tago 2017).
tend to lodge diplomatic protests against military expansion from their own perspective, consequently inducing patriotism and hawkish reactions within their rivals. We call this phenomena “the dilemma of diplomatic protests.” Moreover, the said diplomatic protests can cause “the spiral of distrust.” This paper focuses on the case of Japan, highlighting the process behind the rising tensions among countries in East Asia.

The paper is organized into five sections. Following the introduction, the next section discusses the theory of diplomatic protests focusing on patriotism and bilateral contexts such as international rivalries and quasi-alliance relationships. We then present the study’s research design, followed by the results of the survey experiment. Finally, the last section tackles the main points discussed in the study and shall end with a conclusion of the paper.

2 Theory

This section explores the effects of diplomatic protests on the enhancement of the public’s support toward the target country’s national leader and its defense policy. We shall explain the reason for the public’s patriotic reaction arising from diplomatic protests in the target country. We also consider the bilateral contexts by which states engage in diplomatic disputes. This shall aid us in understanding the conditions under which diplomatic protests induce stronger patriotism among the public. We argue that the patriotic effect is conditioned on the attributes of a rival and an American ally.

2.1 Patriotism

The public often reacts more positively towards its leaders and their country’s security policies when the said country confronts foreign threats and/or faces various international crises. This instantaneous surge of political support has been seen as an emotional response to the said external shocks the country is facing. Foreign threats and international crises highlight the differences between the members of one society (in-group) and that of another
These external shocks induce patriotism among the public, thereby creating a sense of social solidarity (Levy 1989). However, this psychological reaction of the public creates political consequences. First, patriotism triggered by external shocks can instantaneously boost political support by the public for their national leaders. This is called the “rally-'round-the-flag effect” or the “rally effect” (Mueller 1970). Even though empirical studies show no consistent evidence supporting this phenomena, several researchers confirm the existence of the said rally effect in the U.S. (Parker 1995; Edwards III and Swenson 1997; Nickelsburg and Norpoth 2000) and the U.K. (Lai and Reiter 2005). Japan is also no exception (Kagotani 2015; Ohmura and Ohmura 2014).

Second, foreign threats and international crises can urge the public to make a more positive assessment of the incumbent’s policies (Norpoth 1991; Parker 1995). The politicians of the opposition parties often hesitate to scrutinize the leader during international crises (Brody 1991), only doing so when the incumbent leader’s policy choice is against national interests (Schultz 2001). The lack of criticism from opposition parties makes patriotic reactions even more influential. Thus, external threats and international conflicts can give rise to an instantaneous surge of political support for the incumbent leader, as well as the status of the economy, politics, and the society.

We apply the same logic to the relationship between diplomatic protests and the corresponding public’s reactions in the target country. A diplomatic protest toward the target country’s defense policy is similar to a verbal threat to the said target country. Such protest highlights the existence of conflicting interests and/or non-militarized disputes between the countries in dispute. The target country’s public becomes more conscious about the difference between their country and the protesting country. This psychological reaction triggers patriotism in the minds of the target country’s public. The patriotic public is now more likely to accept the legitimacy of their country’s defense policy and would probably approve their national leader. Hence, diplomatic protests can give rise to patriotism in the target country. This leads to the following hypothesis on the patriotic effect of diplomatic protest:
Hypothesis 1 (Patriotism): Diplomatic protests induce the target country’s public to give more favorable views toward the country’s defense policy and its incumbent leader.

2.2 International Rivals

The nature of diplomatic protests may depend on whether the country lodges a diplomatic protest against the target with or without political disputes. A series of political disputes are continued between specific pairs of countries. Goertz and Diehl (1993) calls this phenomenon as an “enduring rivalry.” Rivals have a history of past failures of settling disputes, which further drives the onset of the current conflict between them (Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005). Thus, rivals are more likely to escalate territorial disputes to military confrontations (Vasquez 1996). Unless one side forces the other to accept the settlement of a dispute or a foreign-imposed regime change, rivals will not be able to terminate future conflicts (Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter 2008; Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008; Senese and Quackenbush 2003). In the rivalry dyad, one side strengthens the belief that the other is an international rival. As mentioned earlier, a series of disputes between two countries shall lead to the public seeing the difference between their own country and their international rival, thereby triggering patriotism.

In the context of international relations in East Asia, we are able to apply this logic to Japan’s bilateral relationships with China and South Korea. Japan has failed to completely settle the issues of its invasion during the World War II and the problems brought about by its 35-year long colonial history. To divert the public dissatisfaction toward international affairs and to improve their bargaining leverage, China and South Korea have repeatedly politicized the said issues and have lodged diplomatic protests against Japan (Kagotani, Kimura and Weber 2013; Kimura 2019; Weiss 2014). Moreover, Japan has been consistently engaging with China and South Korea in the said territorial disputes. For example, the 2010 Senkaku
boat collision incident triggered the escalation of a territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands. Similarly, since President Lee’s landing on the Takeshima or Dokdo Islands in August 2012, the relations between Japan and South Korea have rapidly deteriorated. A series of diplomatic protests and the escalation of territorial disputes are already sufficient to remind Japan’s public of the difference between their own country and that of China or South Korea, thereby inducing patriotism among themselves. Japan’s public reacted negatively to these events and has expressed the loss of affinities to China and South Korea. According to the Jiji monthly poll conducted in Japan, between 1995 and 2015, the percentage of the people who liked China dropped from 13 percent to merely 1.6 percent. On the other hand, those who initially disliked China has increased from 13 percent to a whopping 70 percent. Those who liked Korea, despite being only 4 percent in 1995, actually rose to 15 percent in April 2011 but eventually dropped again to 4 percent in 2015. The percentage of those who disliked South Korea remained at around 20 percent since 1995, but this has increased sharply since August 2012 to around 50 percent. The changes in these trends create an environment wherein diplomatic protest can trigger the prevalence of patriotism among the public. Thus, the patriotic effect of diplomatic protest may be enhanced through a protest from a country with outstanding political disputes. We offer the following hypothesis on the conditional effect of diplomatic protest:

**Hypothesis 2 (International Rivals):** Diplomatic protests from international rivals (or countries with political disputes) increase the patriotic effect.

### 2.3 American Allies

The nature of diplomatic protest may depend on whether the protesting country and the target country have a common ally or not. The U.S. has built a series of bilateral alliances through the year and this hub-and-spoke alliance network has been successful at maintaining
peace in East Asia. The U.S. has been protecting Japan and South Korea under a security treaty between the U.S. and Japan as well as through the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. Moreover, the U.S. has also provided Taiwan with arms under the Taiwan Relations Act since the abrogation of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of China in 1979. American allies in East Asia have no alliance treaties among themselves, but they are supposed to cooperate like quasi-allies. Here, we shall consider the effect of diplomatic protests coming from a quasi-ally.

To understand the effect of diplomatic protests from an ally, we shall explore the theories of alliances and shall consider the expectation of what alliance members are supposed to do in an alliance. States achieve power aggregation through alliance formation to be able to counter the rival’s capability and deter possible aggression (Morgenthau 1973 [1948]; Waltz 1979). However, the rising powers are not always willing to invade their neighboring countries. States pursue alliance formation to realize power aggregation only when the rising power is already recognized as a threat (Walt 1987). Also, in an alliance, a great power exchanges interests with a minor power in order to enhance their ties. A great power provides protection for a minor power, while the minor power in turn gives political support for the great power’s attempt to change the status quo (Morrow 1991). To achieve common security goals, allies are required to work on policy coordination during peacetime. However, problems may still arise since allies often worry about fears of abrogation and risks of entrapment (Snyder 1984). Allies are expected to coordinate their security policies by creating a balance between fears of abrogation and risks of entrapment. At the same time, allies are expected not to unnecessarily lodge diplomatic protests against their partner countries. Such unnecessary protests may work as a kind of verbal threat to the other country, which may later give rise to possible conflicts of interests and/or non-militarized disputes between them. Hence, such unnecessary protests can increase the patriotic effect.

This reasoning is applicable even to a quasi-alliance. The Japan-South Korea bilateral
relationship is an illustrative example of explaining how an unnecessary protest can cause domestic backlash in the target country. Japan and South Korea are quasi-allies because both are U.S. alliance partners. Moreover, they have common security concerns about the Chinese territorial extensionalism as well as with the nuclear ambitions of North Korea. Their defense policies have been more or less aligned with U.S. military strategies, thereby forming the expectations of policy coordination between quasi-allies. Quasi-allies are more likely to cooperate when U.S. commitments to East Asia begin to become less reliable (Cha 2000a, b). Obama’s pivot to Asia was acclaimed as a manifestation of America’s strong commitment toward its Asian allies (Campbell 2016). Recently, President Trump has been calling for financial burden-sharing in U.S. alliances, and has constantly asked the partners to increase their military expenditures. This, however, only reflects U.S. weak commitment. Given these circumstances, American allies are expected to understand another ally’s military buildup for defense. Unnecessary diplomatic protests against military buildup for defense may destroy the mutual trust among American allies. This may also further invite domestic backlash in the partner countries. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis on the conditional effect of diplomatic protests.

**Hypothesis 3 (American Allies):** Diplomatic protests from American quasi-allies increase the patriotic effect.

### 3 Research Design

In this section, we describe the design of the survey experiment we conducted in Japan. We used the Rakuten Insight, Inc. to conduct an internet survey experiment from March 15 to March 19h, 2019. The survey is a national representative of Japan, with the sample size of 3,000. The respondents are vote-eligible adults, who are 18 years of age or older. We set the quotas based on gender, age, and 47 prefectures such that the samples reflects the census
Our experiment begins with a newspaper article in order to provide all respondents with the background information on the Abe administration and its critics. The first paragraph is about an issue regarding PM Abe’s defense policy, while the second paragraph is about a protest against the said defense policy. Each respondent is assigned to one of the five groups that manipulated the content of the article. The manipulated section is the speaker of the message regarding the concerns toward the Abe administration. In the second paragraph of the following message, “XX” represents the speaker of the message. The speaker is randomly chosen from one of the five actors: the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade spokesperson, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) top politician, and the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) top politician.

Concerns about the Annual Increase in Defense Budget

The total budget for the fiscal year 2019 defense-related expenses, which the government decided on the 21st session of the Cabinet, reached a record-high of 5.25 trillion yen, exceeding the 4,912 billion yen in 1997. After the establishment of the Shinzo Abe administration at the end of 2012, the defense budget has been increased for seven consecutive years. In order to strengthen the ballistic missile defense system, it included related expenses such as the introduction of the land-based interception missile system “Aegis Ashore.”

In response to the government’s budget, “XX” stated that “Japan will give full power to introduce missiles with offensive capabilities. It clearly exceeds the exclusive defenses defined by the peace constitution. In the six years of the Abe administration, the military expansion has been rationalized by measures such as enactment and revision of the Security Law, but the introduction of long-

---

4 We referred to the population estimates by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and used the population data as of October 1st, 2017.
distance cruise missiles is completely against the peaceful spirit of the Japanese Constitution of ‘Abandonment of War.’ In the long run, an increase in Japan’s defense budget could pose a threat to the security situation in Asia and the Pacific.”

Next, the respondents were asked about their political inclinations after reading both the background information and one of the manipulated messages in the article. We specifically asked three questions regarding the respondent’s political attitudes.

The first question asked “Do you support the government’s defense policy?” The respondent may select one from the following options: “Do not support at all,” “Do not support,” “Somewhat do not support,” “Cannot say either,” “Somewhat support,” “Support,” and “Strongly support.” If the respondent chooses “Cannot say either,” we asked the follow up question: “In a nutshell, what do you think about the government’s defense policy?” The respondent may select one from the following options: “Do not support if anything,” “Support if anything,” and “Do not know.” We replaced “Cannot say either” with “Do not support if anything,” “Do not know,” and “Support if anything” in ascending order. Here a 9-point scale was created from “Do not support at all” (= 0) to “Strongly support” (= 8).

The second question asked “What do you think about Japan’s defense budget?” The respondent may select one from the following options: “Should be reduced significantly,” “Should be reduced,” “Maintain the status quo,” “Should be increased,” and “Should be increased significantly.” We created a 5-point scale from “Should be reduced significantly” (= 0) to “Should be increased significantly” (= 4).

The third question asked: “Do you support the Abe administration?” The respondent may select one from the following options: “Do not support at all,” “Do not support,” “Do not support somewhat,” “Cannot say either,” “Support somewhat,” “Support,” and “Strongly support.” If the respondent chooses “Cannot say either,” we asked the follow up question: “In a nutshell, what do you think about the Abe administration?” The respondent may then select one from the following options: “Do not support if anything,” “Support if
anything,” and “Do not know.” We replaced “Cannot say either” with “Do not support if anything,” “Do not know,” and “Support if anything” in ascending order. Here, we were able to create a 9-point scale which ranged from “Do not support at all” (= 0) to “Strongly support” (= 8).

We then ran a series of OLS regression models in order to examine the patriotic effect of diplomatic protests. We use the answers to the three questions above as dependent variables. To be able to test our hypothesis, we had to construct three sets of binary independent variables depending on which of the five manipulated message groups a respondent was assigned to in our survey. We had three types of treatments regarding diplomatic protests: the message by the Australian spokesperson as the treatment of diplomatic protests and American allies (T1); the message by the Chinese spokesperson as the treatment of diplomatic protests and international rivals (T2); and the message by the South Korean spokesperson as the treatment of diplomatic protests, international rivals, and American allies (T3). If we estimate an OLS model using the treatment variables \( Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1 + \beta_2 T2 + \beta_3 T3 \), the effects of diplomatic protests, international rivalries, and American allies are thereby confounding. To decompose such confounding effects, we need to estimate the following model: \( Y = \beta_0 + (\beta_1 + \beta_2 - \beta_3)DiplomaticProtest + (\beta_3 - \beta_1)InternationalRivals + (\beta_3 - \beta_2)AmericanAllies \).

*Diplomatic Protest* equals 1 if a respondent receives either T1, T2, or T3, and 0 otherwise. *International Rivals* is equal to 1 if a respondent receives either T2 or T3, and 0 otherwise. *American Allies* is equal to 1 if a respondent receives either T1 or T3, and 0 otherwise.

We also include a binary variable representing the top LDP politician’s message (T4) and set a group receiving the message from the top CDP politician as the benchmark category. This is the baseline model. We further include possible control variables that are likely to affect the respondent’s political attitudes (i.e., our dependent variables). The incumbent variable reflects party identification. The variable is equal to 1 if the respondent supports either the LDP or the Komeito, and 0 otherwise. The female variable indicates the sex of the respondent. The variable is equal to 1 if the respondent is a female, and 0 otherwise.
The age variable records the respondent’s age. In the appendix, we present the summary statistics for all the variables used in the study.

### 4 Results

The study explore the patriotic effect of diplomatic protests on Japan’s defense policy, its defense budget, and the approval ratings of the Abe administration. In Table 1, we report the results of the two OLS models for each dependent variable. The baseline model includes only a series of independent variables: Diplomatic Protest, International Rivals, American Allies, and LDP Politician’s Protest. For this, the benchmark is the group that received the CDP politician’s message treatment. We then estimated the other model as the baseline model with the possible control variables of party support, gender, and age. In the appendix, we also report the validity of the respondents’ perception of treatment messages, which is associated with the core assumption of our theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defense Policy</th>
<th>Defense Budget</th>
<th>Cabinet Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 (S.E.)</td>
<td>Model 2 (S.E.)</td>
<td>Model 3 (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Protest</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rivals</td>
<td>0.402***</td>
<td>0.402***</td>
<td>0.103*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Allies</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.250**</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP Politician’s Protest</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>1.956***</td>
<td>0.640***</td>
<td>3.040***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.503***</td>
<td>-0.177***</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.678***</td>
<td>3.776***</td>
<td>1.718***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F statistic</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>95.74</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
Figure 1 focuses on the effects of the independent variables on the country’s defense policy, defense budget and cabinet approval. The thick and thin lines extending from each estimate represent the 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The coefficient of each independent variable is consistent between two different models. Diplomatic protests have no effect on the three different dependent variables. On the other hand, diplomatic protests by Japan’s rivals have the significant positive effect on the three different dependent variables. In contrast, diplomatic protests by American allies have no effect on the three different cases, with the exception for Model 2. LDP politician’s protest has no effect on the three different dependent variables. Thus, not all kinds of diplomatic protests may invoke Japanese patriotism. Moreover, the effect of diplomatic protest is actually conditioned on whether or not the message comes from Japan’s rivals.

![Graph showing the effect of diplomatic protests](image)

**Figure 1: The Effect of Diplomatic Protests**

Furthermore, the results show some nuanced tones of Japanese patriotism. Diplomatic protests by Japan’s rivals generates a 0.4 point increase in support of Japan’s defense policy, a 0.1 point increase in support of Japan’s defense budget expansion, and a 0.3 point increase in support of the Abe administration. Patriotism may have a relatively smaller effect when
the public assesses the expansion of Japan’s military budget. Diplomatic protests by Japan’s rivals can encourage the public to give more positive evaluations to Japan’s defense policy and the Abe administration. On the other hand, the Japanese patriotic reaction is moderate with regard to the expansion of Japan’s defense budget. The expansion of defense budget may raise tensions among Japan and its adversaries. Therefore, Japan must keep the public calm regarding the expansion of Japan’s defense budget rather than Japan’s defense policy stances and the approval ratings of the Abe administration. The results imply the prevalence of the pacifist norm among the Japan’s public.

Japan has been known to be a pacifist country, with Article 9 of its Constitution preventing aggression and its defense budget being kept only at one percent of GDP due to the prevailing pacifist norm (Samuels 2007, Chapter 2). However, in the post-Cold War period, Japan has confronted North Korea’s nuclear development, as well as China’s territorial expansionism. As a result, starting with the Nye Initiative in 1995, the U.S. and Japan had begun to strengthen the coordination of their security policy under the U.S.-Japan security treaty, actively conducting joint military exercises. Some scholars explain this trend from the perspective of defensive realism and contend that Japan’s recent policy shift is not for offensive purposes, but rather countering the rising security concerns in the said countries (Midford 2002; Twomey 2000; Hughes 2005). Others argue that policy makers and citizens remain to be self-constrained due to the prevalence of Japan’s pacifist norms such as anti-activism and anti-militarism (Berger 1998; Katzenstein 1998; Olos 2008). Our results validate the said pacifist argument.

5 Conclusion

In this study, we explored the relationship between diplomatic protests and patriotism. The results of our survey experiment conducted in Japan show that diplomatic protests do not always cause domestic backlash in the target country. Furthermore, we found that
the patriotic effect of diplomatic protests is actually conditioned on whether or not the said protests arise from disputes involving international rivals. Diplomatic protests also emphasize the difference between the members of a one society and that of another, which may often lead to social solidarity by invoking patriotism. Moreover, diplomatic protests from international rivals can heighten the popularity of a country’s leader, as well as induce a more positive outlook toward hard-line policies in the target country. Diplomatic protests produce the patriotic effect only when a rivalry dyad is involved. In this specific circumstance, one country posits that the other is an international rival, and a series of disputes between the said countries show the public the difference between their own country and a rival country.

The results of this study have some important implications for international relations theory and East Asian security. Diplomatic protests can encourage the Japanese public to support Japan’s defense policy, its defense budget expansion, as well as the Abe administration. International rivals lodge diplomatic protests from their own security perspectives, encouraging the public in the target country to support certain hard-line policies. This is the dilemma of diplomatic protests, realizing the spiral of distrust. This phenomenon is similar to the strategic interaction problem behind the security dilemma, wherein the spiral of fear induces the rival country to engage in military expansion in response to another country’s military buildup for defense. In this situation, the country’s security status worsens. However, this classic model does not capture the domestic political consequences of diplomatic protests arising from military expansion of countries. The anarchic nature of the world forces states to engage in military expansion for defense, leading to the security dilemma. It can also induce states to lodge diplomatic protests against their rivals’ security policies and cause the dilemma of diplomatic protests. International rivals would get caught in the spiral of distrust. The results of this study highlight the process behind the rising tensions among countries in East Asia.

Finally, we briefly discuss the limitation of this research and the issues for future research.
This study provides only an evidence on the patriotic effect of diplomatic protests in Japan. Further experiments in South Korea and Taiwan will extend our understanding of conflict and cooperation among American allies in East Asia. This study pointed out the dilemma of diplomatic protests as a cause of the spiral of distrust. The future study should explore the way of breaking a vicious cycle. Support and opposition from the third-party country may change public opinion in the target country. The contents of the third-party message may also shape public opinion in the target country. These issues remain for future research.

References


Appendix

Sample Characteristics

Table 2 shows the differences between the Japanese Census population and our sample in the survey conducted. We set quotas in the process of recruiting respondents; hence, the distribution of basic demographic attributes, such as the region of residence, age, and sex, are very close to the distributions of that of the population. We note, however, that similar to many studies which also employed online surveys, the respondents in our sample tend to have higher educational attainment levels than that of the entire population.

Table 2: Population and Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population (%)</th>
<th>Sample (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tohoku</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>7.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanto (excluding Tokyo)</td>
<td>23.20</td>
<td>21.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanto (Tokyo)</td>
<td>10.74</td>
<td>11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chubu</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinki</td>
<td>17.69</td>
<td>17.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chugoku</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shikoku</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyushu</td>
<td>11.41</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>12.19</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>18.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>16.38</td>
<td>19.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>14.37</td>
<td>17.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66-</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>20.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48.67</td>
<td>49.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51.33</td>
<td>50.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Primary school or junior high school</td>
<td>17.43</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior high school</td>
<td>44.46</td>
<td>26.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional training college</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>10.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior college</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>11.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>College/university or graduate school</td>
<td>23.27</td>
<td>49.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary Statistics

Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the study.

Table 3: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Support for Defense Policy</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Preferences on Defense Budget</td>
<td>1.774</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Support for the Abe Administration</td>
<td>3.448</td>
<td>2.531</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Protest</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rivals</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Allies</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP Politician’s Protest</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>49.341</td>
<td>16.099</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experiment Stimulus and Question Wording

Our experiment was conducted in Japanese. For the reader’s convenience, we presented our experiment stimulus—a newspaper vignette—which was translated from Japanese into English. Figure 2 shows the original treatment material (written in Japanese) used in our survey experiment. We drafted our newspaper vignette based on several real newspaper articles circulated online (i.e., Nihonkeizai Shimbun, Bloomberg, AFPBB News, and the People’s Daily).

Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the instruments used to measure our outcome variables. Specifically, the first question asked “Do you support the government’s defense policy?” The respondent selected one of the the following options: “Do not support at all,” “Do not support,” “Do not support somewhat,” “Cannot say either,” “Support somewhat,” “Support,” and “Strongly support.” If the respondent chooses “Cannot say either,” we then asked the follow up question: “In a nutshell, what do you think about the government’s defense policy?” The respondent may then select one of the following options: “Do not support if
anything,” “Support if anything,” and “Do not know.” We replaced “Cannot say either” with “Do not support if anything,” “Do not know,” and “Support if anything” in ascending order. Here, we have created a 9-point scale from “Do not support at all” (= 0) to “Strongly support” (= 8).

The second question asked: “What do you think about Japan’s defense budget?” The respondent may select one of the following options: “Should be reduced significantly,” “Should be reduced,” “Maintain the status quo,” “Should be increased,” and “Should be increased significantly.” We created a 5-point scale from “Should be reduced significantly” (= 0) to “Should be increased significantly” (= 4).

The third question asked: “Do you support the Abe administration?” The respondent may select one of the following options: “Do not support at all,” “Do not support,” “Do not support somewhat,” “Cannot say either,” “Support somewhat,” “Support,” and “Strongly support.” If the respondent chooses “Cannot say either,” we asked the follow up question:
“In a nutshell, what do you think about the Abe administration?” The respondent may then select one of the following options: “Do not support if anything,” “Support if anything,” and “Do not know.” We replaced “Cannot say either” with “Do not support if anything,” “Do not know,” and “Support if anything” in ascending order. Here, we were able to create a 9-point scale which ranged from “Do not support at all” (= 0) to “Strongly support” (= 8).

Figure 3: Outcome Variable 1

Manipulation Checks

After the respondents answered the questions regarding the dependent variables in our analysis, we also asked them questions on how foreign governments assess the Abe administration. The respondents assessed Australia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Russia, and the U.S. The respondents chose from the following options: negative (= 1), somewhat negative (= 2), neither (= 3), somewhat positive (= 4), and positive (= 5). To check the validity of our manipulations, we examined the effects of T1, T2, and T3 on each of the government’s assessment
### Q16 日本の防衛予算について、あなたはどう思いますか。

- 大きく増やすべきだ
- 減らすべきだ
- 現状を維持すべきだ
- 増やすべきだ
- 大きく増やすべきだ

**Figure 4: Outcome Variable 2**

### Q17 あなたは安倍内閣を支持しますか。

- 全く支持しない
- 支持しない
- あまり支持しない
- どちらとも言えない
- それなりに支持する
- 支持する
- 強く支持する

**Figure 5: Outcome Variable 3**
of the Abe administration. We considered a simple OLS model, \( Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1 + \beta_2 T2 + \beta_3 T3 \), with the dependent variable being each government’s assessment of the Abe administration. We estimated this model for six countries such as Australia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Russia, and the U.S. For example, if a respondent received T1, he or she will think that Australia has a negative view of the Abe administration, while the other foreign governments do not. Thus, \( \beta_1 \) should be negative and statistically significant only for Australia, and 0 for the other countries. Similarly, \( \beta_2 \) should be negative and statistically significant only for China, and 0 otherwise. \( \beta_3 \) should also be negative and statistically significant only for South Korea, and 0 otherwise.

Figure 6 shows that the respondents receiving T1 thought that Australia would give negative views of the Abe administration. Except for China’s assessment, T1 has no impact on the other countries’ assessments. Contrary to our expectation, the respondents receiving T1 thought the Chinese government would have a negative view on the Abe administration. The respondents may have thought that Japan’s military expansion may easily invoke the Chinese government’s anxieties because even Australia, being an American ally, also gives warning. T1 works relatively well.

Figure 7 shows that T2 has a negative impact only on the Chinese government’s assessment of the Abe administration. The results are consistent with our expectation. T2 works pretty well.

Figure 8 shows that T3 has no impact on any government’s assessment of the Abe administration. The South Korean government has been switching policy stances between China and the U.S. The South Korean leader, President Moon, has been consistently continuing diplomatic protests against Japan. With this, Japan’s public may not be able to fully understand the true message behind diplomatic protests from South Korea. T3 works relatively poorly. Overall, the results of manipulation checks reflect the current status of the international political environment surrounding Japan.
Figure 6: The Effect of the Australia Treatment (T1)

Figure 7: The Effect of the China Treatment (T2)
Figure 8: The Effect of the South Korea Treatment (T3)