Where Do the Rich Live in a Big City?

TABUCHI Takatoshi
RIETI
Where Do the Rich Live in a Big City?

TABUCHI Takatoshi
University of Tokyo and RIETI

Abstract
We reveal the spatial distribution of income classes in a big city by examining housing prices and rent microdata, which increase with income. Traditional urban economic theory of a monocentric city predicts that the suburbs tend to house high income households relative to the central cities, which is often observed in U.S. cities. However, we find that the rich and poor collocate and are sorted by income near the central cities while the middle class locates almost everywhere according to the microdata of detached house prices in the Tokyo metropolitan area. By introducing the time cost of commuting to the traditional urban economic theory, we show that this international difference in the spatial distribution is attributed to the pecuniary commuting cost and the income elasticity of demand for housing space. We then show that any condominium resident locates almost everywhere in the Tokyo metropolitan area. This is because the income elasticity of demand for condominium space is close to 1 and the pecuniary cost of commuting is zero in Japan.

Keywords: Monocentric city, High and low income class, Collocation, Income elasticity of demand for housing

JEL classification: R14, R20
1 Introduction

To determine where rich and poor households live in cities, we need to first identify the rich and the poor by their household income. Because household income is not available as public data, we know only the average household income by district or by municipality. However, we can conjecture the spatial distribution of income class by using housing price microdata as a house is a major part of household assets and whose value is considered to increase with household income.

The literature indicates that central cities tend to house low-income households relative to the suburbs in the US (Ihlanfeldt and Young, 1994; Timothy and Wheaton, 2001; Rosenthal and Ross, 2015) and in the UK (Cuberes and Roberts, 2015). This may be due to limited access to public transit in suburbs (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Glaeser et al., 2008).

However, this is not the full picture. The social amenities in a central city such as downtown Paris attract the wealthy (Brueckner et al., 1999). In fact, the census tracts closest to the city center are often among the richest in US metropolitan areas (Glaeser et al., 2008). Furthermore, Benito and Oswald (2000) found that there was a negative relation between commuting times and hourly pay in UK cities, and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau et al. (2016) found that the effect of household income on distance was negative in Danish cities.

In Japan, central cities in the largest metropolitan areas house more high income households relative to the suburbs. Figure 1 shows the income-distance relationship in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The vertical axis is the mean income per taxpayer in each municipality belonging to Tokyo MA in 2013, while the horizontal axis is the distance from Tokyo station in kilometers (see the Appendix for an explanation of the data). The negative relationship between the per capita income and distance from the city center appears obvious. In fact, the correlation coefficient is $-0.633$ and its $t$-value is $-145$.\footnote{The correlation coefficient is $-0.436$ in the Osaka metropolitan area and $-0.473$ in the Nagoya metropolitan area.} Hence, we confirm that unlike in the US, the wealthy tend to locate closer to the central business district (CBD) in Japan. This is empirically investigated further using housing price microdata in Tokyo MA in this study by assuming that the household income is monotone increasing in terms of the housing price or...
apartment rent. This is also theoretically examined by considering the opportunity cost of commuting time.

In order to explain the spatial distribution of income class in a metropolitan area, we extend Alonso’s (1964) monocentric city model of urban economics by incorporating leisure time into the utility function and considering a trade-off among leisure, commuting and working times in the next section. We show that the rich and poor tend to collocate near the CBD, while the middle class locates in the suburbs in the case of detached-house residents in Section 3. In Section 4, we show empirically and theoretically that different income groups collocate everywhere in a metropolitan area in the case of condominium residents. We also provide some empirical evidence of these results by apartment rent microdata in Tokyo MA in Section 5. The last section concludes the paper.

2 Model

Consider Alonso’s (1964) monocentric city in linear space, where the CBD is approximated by a point. A representative resident commutes to the CBD located at \( x = 0 \) and maximizes her utility \( U \) with respect to the composite good \( z \) which is assumed to be a numeraire, the housing space \( s \), the leisure time \( t_l \), and location \( x \) which is the distance from the CBD:

\[
\max_{z,s,t_l,x} U = U(z, s, t_l) \tag{1}
\]

The total time \( T \) of each resident is fixed and allocated among leisure time \( t_l \), working time \( t_w \), and commuting time \( t(x) \), and thus, the time constraint is given by

\[
T = t_l + t_w + t(x) \tag{2}
\]

The trade-off among leisure, commuting time, and working time implies a marginal disutility from longer commutes.

In addition, she is subject to the usual income constraint:

\[
y_0 + wt_w = z + rs + \tau(x) \tag{3}
\]

where \( \tau(x) \) represents the pecuniary commuting cost for distance \( x \), \( y_0 \) is the fixed salary which does not depend on hours worked \( t_w \), \( w \) is the hourly wage which differs
by the heterogeneity of the workers, and \( r \) is the land rent per space.\(^2\) Therefore, the generalized cost of commuting consists of the time cost \( wt(x) \) and the pecuniary cost \( \tau(x) \). The former is the opportunity cost of time and the latter is gasoline cost or train fare. The endogenous variables \( s, z, t_t, \) and \( t_w \) vary with distance \( x \) and wage \( w \). The endogenous variable \( r \) varies with distance \( x \) but is independent of wage \( w \) because of the law of one price.

Substituting these two constraints (2) and (3) into the utility (1) yields

\[
U = U(s, t_t, y_0 + w(T - t_t - t(x)) - rs - \tau(x))
\]

which is to be maximized with respect to \( s, t_t \) and \( x \). The first-order conditions are

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial s} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial s} - \frac{\partial u}{\partial z} r = 0 \quad (4)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial t_t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t_t} - \frac{\partial u}{\partial z} w = 0 \quad (5)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial x} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial s} s' + \frac{\partial u}{\partial t_t} t_t - \frac{\partial u}{\partial z} [wt_t + wt'(x) + r's + rs' + \tau'(x)] = 0
\]

where the prime is the derivative with respect to distance \( x \). Then, we get

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial x} = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial z} [wt'(x) + r's + \tau'(x)] = 0
\]

from which we readily have

\[
r' = -\frac{wt'(x) + \tau'(x)}{s} \quad (6)
\]

This is the so-called rent gradient formula, where the numerator is the marginal commuting cost and the denominator is the space for housing. Because the time and pecuniary costs of commuting are increasing with the distance, we get \( t'(x) \geq 0 \) and \( \tau'(x) \geq 0 \). Hence, the land rent gradient \( r' \) is always negative.

In the next two sections, we consider the two main hypotheses derived from two propositions. The first hypothesis is the polarization of the income groups especially near the CBD. Moving from the CBD, the income of the rich deceases and that of the poor increases so that the polarization shrinks in equilibrium. Finally, the two

\( ^2 \)If housing is purchased rather than rented, then all the variables would be defined in stock rather than in flow, e.g. housing price rather than housing rent. Yet, the analysis is still valid throughout the study.
income classes coincide at the city border. The second hypothesis is the coexistence of many different income groups: the rich reside next to the poor and middle. That is, almost all income groups coexist almost everywhere in the metropolitan area.

3 Evidence of Polarization near the CBD

In order to observe the location of the different income groups, we differentiate the rent gradient $r'$ of (6) with respect to the wage rate $w$, which is linearly increasing in the resident’s income $y_0 + wt$:

$$\frac{dr'}{dw} = \frac{-t'(x)s + [wt'(x) + t'(x)] \frac{\partial w}{w}}{s^2} = \frac{\varepsilon t'(x) - (1 - \varepsilon) wt'(x)}{ws} \tag{7}$$

where $\varepsilon \equiv \frac{\partial s / s}{\partial w / w}$ is the wage elasticity of demand for housing space. The sign of the derivative $\partial r'/\partial w$ determines whether the rich live near the CBD or in the suburbs. From (7), the sign is dependent on the wage rate $w$ as follows.

$$\frac{dr'}{dw} \geq 0 \iff w \leq \bar{w} = \frac{\varepsilon t'(x)}{(1 - \varepsilon) t'(x)} \tag{8}$$

Inequality (8) shows that if the wage $w$ is smaller than the threshold $\bar{w}$, then $dr'/dw > 0$. Noting that $r'$ is negative, if $w < \bar{w}$, the rent gradient of the poorer households is steeper, and hence, the poorer residents locate closer to the CBD. This implies that as the wage of the low-income households rises, they tend to locate to the suburbs.

On the other hand, if the wage is large $w > \bar{w}$, then $dr'/dw < 0$. The rent gradient of the richer is steeper, and thus, the richer residents choose to locate closer to the CBD. This means that as the wage of the high income households rises, they select to locate near the CBD.

Putting these two results together, we have that the richest and the poorest reside near the CBD, while the middle-income class locates near the city border. This is elaborated as follows.

Proposition 1 The richest and the poorest collocate near the CBD. The income of rich residents with $w > \bar{w}$ decreases according to the distance from the CBD, whereas that of poor residents with $w < \bar{w}$ increases according to the distance. Their incomes coincide at the city border, where middle-income residents locate.

3The case of $dr'/dw = 0$, or $w = \bar{w}$ is analyzed in Section 4.
This proposition holds insofar as the income differential is large enough so that there are both workers with income lower than the threshold \( \bar{w} \) and those with income higher than \( \bar{w} \). Such a large income differential would be likely to occur in large metropolitan areas.

Testing Proposition 1 with real urban data requires caution regarding the spatial distribution of heterogeneous residents. Suppose that there are 12 workers with different incomes, whose numbers coincide with their income and that there are four rings of width 1, whose numbers are the distance from the CBD. Workers locate in the four rings according to Proposition 1. Because of a land constraint, for simplicity, only three residents can be located in each ring. One example of such a location pattern is given in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ring 1</th>
<th>ring 2</th>
<th>ring 3</th>
<th>ring 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rich</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3, 5, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>3, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Illustration of Proposition 1

Ring 1 is the closest to the CBD and accommodates the richest worker with income 30 and the poorest workers with incomes 1 and 2. Its mean income is 11, which is larger than the mean income of the outer ring. That is, the mean income is decreasing with the distance from the CBD, which qualitatively agrees with Figure 1.

However, if the rich and poor collocate as in the next section, the mean income is obviously an inadequate index in testing Proposition 1. Instead, we need to look at an inequality index in each ring and compare it between rings. This may be done by computing the Gini coefficient in each ring. For better specificity, we check the degree of polarization because the middle class seems to disappear near the CBD in Proposition 1. This is tested by using the polarization index defined by Wolfson (1994).

### 3.1 Test of polarization

Data on spatial distribution of household income is available to the public only at an aggregate level such as the municipal mean income displayed in Figure 1. Instead,
we use the housing price microdata, which is assumed to be monotone increasing with household income given the same location. That is, in order to infer the spatial distribution of the income of heterogeneous workers, we use the housing price as the proxy for income because higher individual income is associated with higher housing prices.

However, it should be noted that the household income does not necessarily monotone increase with housing price if people live in different locations. Suppose that two residents live in houses with the same housing price, but one lives near the CBD and another in the suburbs. Then, the suburban resident must be richer because she can afford higher commuting cost.

The housing price data are transaction prices of residential land and buildings in the Tokyo metropolitan area of 2015 (see the Appendix for the data source). The number of observations of the detached-house prices is 31,359, and that of the condominium prices is 27,124, both of which are sufficiently large. The median is 35.0, the mean is 59.1, and the standard deviation is 189 in million yen in the case of the detached-house prices, while the median is 23.0, the mean is 27.9, and the standard deviation is 33.8 in million yen in the case of the condominium prices. Because the medians are lower than the means, the distributions are right-skewed, which agrees with the income distribution in the real world.

Figure 2a displays the scattergram, where the vertical axis is the detached-house price and the horizontal axis is the one-way commuting time to Tokyo station. Similarly, Figure 2b displays the scattergram, where the vertical axis is the condominium price. The commuting time consists of the walking time to the nearest train station and the riding time on commuter trains, with the latter calculated based on the average train speed of 50km/hour. The correlation coefficient between the detached-house price and the commuting time to the CBD is −0.193 and its t-value is −34.8, while that between the condominium price and the commuting is −0.230 and its t-value is −39.0. Since both are highly significant, we may be inclined to say that richer people tend to locate closer to the CBD on average, which is consistent with

\footnote{Although it is common to commute by car in many cities in developed countries, we assume that workers commute by train in Tokyo MA, where the suburb–central city gap in public transit is small. In fact, trains accounted for 53 % of commuting transport in Tokyo MA in 2008, with passenger cars at 24 % and bicycles 10 % according to Tokyo MA Transport Planning Council (2012, p. 24).}
the observation in Figure 1. However, unlike Figure 1, Figures 2a and 2b do not seem to display as clear a linear relationship. In the latter, it looks as if houses and condominiums with various prices coexist in every location. This is not surprising because big houses are often located next to small ones and there are diverse sizes in the same condominium building in Japanese cities.

In order to visualize where the lowest and the highest income groups reside, we divide the data into 24 rings: ring $i$ is the time distance between $5(i-1)$ minutes to $5i$ minutes from the CBD for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, 24$. In Figure 3, poor groups are depicted by the blue and green lines, which are logarithms of the mean income of the bottom 10% and 50% income group in Tokyo MA, respectively. We observe that both lines look nearly flat, but rise slightly from 0 to 30-50 minute rings. On the other hand, the red and yellow lines are logarithms of the mean income of the top 10% and 50% income group in Tokyo MA, respectively. They are wealthy groups and are generally falling as they move away from the CBD. The behaviors of the lines are not regular from 60 to 120 minutes possibly due to the existence of subcenters, which are explained in details in Section 4.1. In fact, such subcenters or edge cities are very prevalent in large cities such as Tokyo MA due to the suburbanization of jobs.\footnote{For example, there are 64 subcenters in Los Angeles MA according to McMillen and Smith (2003).}

The blue and green slopes of the lower income groups are flatter than the red and yellow ones of the higher income groups from 0 to 30-50 minute rings. This is because the income distribution is right-skewed such that there are many low-income workers and few high-income workers in the economy, where the income differential among the former is much smaller than that among the latter. As a result, the income differential among low-income workers does not differ much across rings compared to among high-income workers. In summary, although the slopes of the bottom income groups are not steep, it seems that Figure 3 supports Proposition 1 that the richest and the poorest locate close to the CBD whereas the middle class locates in the suburbs about one hour from the CBD.

Next, Figures 4a and 4b plot the Gini coefficient and the polarization index in each ring of the detached-house prices and the condominium prices, respectively. The Gini coefficient (blue line) decreases up to an 40-80 minute commuting time from the
CBD, indicating that the income differential shrinks according to the distance from the CBD. This result also supports Proposition 1 albeit indirectly.\footnote{The Gini coefficient decreases with the distance from the CBD in Hiroshima MA and Fukuyama MA with 1,656 and 1135 observations respectively although they are statistically insignificant. The former population is 1.5 million and the latter 0.6.}

In order to see if the income groups are polarized, we compute Wolfson’s polarization index, which is shown by the orange line in Figures 4a and 4b. It is also decreasing: the income (i.e., housing price) is the most polarized near the CBD and is gradually less polarized according to the distance from the CBD up to an 40 minute commuting time from the CBD. This supports Proposition 1 up to an 30-40 minute commuting time.\footnote{The polarization index decreases with the distance from the CBD in the large Hiroshima MA but increases with the distance from the CBD in the mid-size Fukuyama MA, although both these changes are statistically insignificant.} Again, the behaviors of the graphs are not as regular from 80 to 120 minutes possibly owing to the existence of subcenters.

In sum, although it is not very clear, we found some empirical evidence on the polarization shown in Proposition 1 by the detached-house price data in Tokyo MA.

\section{Coexistence of different income groups}

Collocation of the rich and the poor shown in Proposition 1 is realized only when $\bar{w}$ in (8) takes an intermediate value, so that there are heterogeneous workers both richer than $\bar{w}$ and poorer than $\bar{w}$. Note that $\bar{w}$ consists of the ratio of the marginal pecuniary commuting cost $\tau'(x)$ to the marginal commuting time cost $t'(x)$ as well as the elasticity $\varepsilon$.

If $\bar{w}$ takes a large value, then $\partial \tau'/\partial w > 0$ holds for any income level so that richer people tend to locate farther from the CBD. This occurs when the pecuniary commuting cost is large relative to the time cost of commuting and/or the wage elasticity of demand for space is large. On the other hand, if $\bar{w}$ is sufficiently small, then $\partial \tau'/\partial w < 0$ for any income level so that the richer people locate closer to the CBD. This happens when the pecuniary commuting cost is small relative to the time cost of commuting and/or the wage elasticity of demand for space is small. That is, \textit{the richer residents tend to locate farther away from (resp. closer to) the CBD if the}
marginal pecuniary cost of commuting are large (resp. small) relative to the marginal
time cost of commuting.

This result may explain how the international difference in the pecuniary cost
of commuting affects the intracity distribution of income class, especially in Japan
and Denmark versus the US. While the pecuniary cost of commuting is incurred
by city residents in many countries including the US, workers are fully paid for by
firms in Japan and get substantial income tax reductions based on their commutes in
Denmark. That is, \( r'(x) = 0 \) holds in the RHS of (8) so that \( \partial r'/\partial w < 0 \) is always
satisfied, which implies that the richer residents locate closer to the CBD in Japan
and Denmark for all \( \varepsilon \neq 1 \). The case of \( \varepsilon = 1 \) is discussed below. On the other hand,
the richer residents locate farther away from the CBD in the US. It must be the case
that \( \partial r'/\partial w > 0 \), which may imply the existence of nonnegligible pecuniary cost of
commuting relative to the time cost of commuting in the US.

We could think of a third possibility that almost all income groups coexist every-
where. This is because we often observe that rich, middle and poor residents often
collocate in the same apartment buildings in many locations of big cities consuming
different housing space. This is indeed evidenced in Figures 2a and 2b, where a vari-
ety of different income groups are shown to collocate in the same locations of Tokyo
MA.

Theoretically, such coexistence of different income classes occurs when \( r' \) is inde-
pendent of \( w \), namely, \( \partial r'/\partial w = 0 \) holds in (7) for all \( w \). This is satisfied if and only if

\[
\varepsilon r'(x) = (1 - \varepsilon) t'(x) = 0
\]

Given \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and \( t'(x) > 0 \), we establish the following coexistence result.

**Proposition 2** Different income groups coexist everywhere if

\( r'(x) = 0 \) and \( \varepsilon = 1 \) \hspace{1cm} (9)

The former condition \( r'(x) = 0 \) means that the pecuniary commuting cost does
not depend on the commuting distance, which is true in Japan and in Denmark. The
latter condition \( \varepsilon = 1 \) is on the wage elasticity of demand for space, which is close to
the income elasticity of demand for space.
As documented by Rosenthal and Ross (2015), numerous estimates in the literature confirm that the income elasticities of demand for housing and land are well below 1. For example, Glaeser et al. (2008) present it as 0.25 and Rosenthal (2014) as 0.12-0.41. Nevertheless, larger elasticity is observed in Japan at 1.4 (Horioka, 1988) and in Hong Kong at 0.88-0.98 (Tse and Raftery, 1999).

We compute the income elasticity $\varepsilon$ of demand for space by using the Japanese data. According to the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 2014, the Gini coefficient of real estate asset is 0.565 and that of annual income is 0.314 in Japan. If we assume that the asset and income per capita follow Pareto distributions, then the Pareto coefficient is computed as 1.39 for the real estate asset and 2.09 for the annual income. Suppose that the income is expressed as a power function $w = \alpha R^\beta$, then we have

$$\beta \equiv \frac{\partial R}{\partial w} = \frac{2.09}{1.39}$$

On the other hand, the asset elasticity of demand is computed by our dataset as follows

$$\frac{\partial s}{s} = \frac{\partial R}{R} = \begin{cases} 
0.185 & \text{for the detached-house prices} \\
0.651 & \text{for the condominium prices}
\end{cases}$$

Hence, the income elasticity of demand is

$$\varepsilon = \frac{\partial s}{s} \frac{\partial R}{R} = \frac{\partial s}{s} \frac{\partial R}{R} \frac{\partial w}{w} = \begin{cases} 
0.279 & \text{for the detached-house prices} \\
0.984 & \text{for the condominium prices}
\end{cases}$$

That is, while the income elasticity of demand is much below 1 for detached-house residents, it is very close to 1 for condominium residents. This implies that Proposition 1 is valid for the detached-house residents: the richest and the poorest collocate near the CBD and middle-income residents in the suburbs. This also implies that Proposition 1 no longer holds for condominium residents.

For condominium residents, $\varepsilon$ is not significantly different from 1. Furthermore, the pecuniary commuting cost does not depend on the distance from the CBD like in Japan. Then, conditions (9) are nearly satisfied, so that $\partial r' / \partial w = 0$ holds almost everywhere in Japanese condominium residents. The rent gradient (6) is reduced to

$$r' = -\frac{wt'(x)}{s}$$

(10)
It is known that the elasticity is equal to 1 for any homogeneous utility function that involves the CES utility function. When \( \varepsilon = 1 \), \( s \) is shown to be proportional to \( w \) by definition, so that the rent gradient \( r' \) is independent of wage \( w \) from (10). That is, the rent gradient is common to all income levels at each location and is determined by the marginal time cost of commuting only.

In order to gain further insight, assume the Cobb-Douglas utility function as a special case of the CES utility function hereafter. Specifically,

\[
u(z, s, t_l) = z^a s^b t_l, \quad 0 < a, b, c < 1 \text{ and } a + b + c = 1
\]

Utility maximization with the income constraint (3) yields the optimal consumptions:

\[
z = ay, \quad s = \frac{b}{r}y, \quad t_l = \frac{c}{w}y
\]

where \( y \equiv y_0 + wT - wt(x) - \tau(x) \) is the income net of the generalized commuting cost. Substituting these consumptions into the utility function yields the indirect utility function of a resident at location \( x \) with wage \( w \):

\[
v(r, w, x) = a^b b^c r(x)^{-b} w^{-c} y
\]

If \( y_0 - \tau(x) \) is negligible, then it is rewritten as

\[
v(r, w, x) = a^b b^c r(x)^{-b} w^{1-c} [T - t(x)]
\]

The spatial equilibrium condition holds when (11) is constant for all \( x \). This is attained when \( r(x)^{-b} [T - t(x)] = C \) is constant for all \( x \). Thus, the unit rent curve is uniquely determined as

\[
r(x) = C^{-1/b} [T - t(x)]^{1/b}
\]

which is common to all income groups. Since \( t'(x) > 0 \), the rent curve \( r(x) \) is decreasing with the distance \( x \) from the CBD, which is consistent with the real world.

Then, the demand for housing space by residents with wage \( w \) at location \( x \) is obtained as

\[
s(x) = \frac{bw}{r} [T - t(x)] = bC^{-1/b} w [T - t(x)]^{-1/b+1}
\]

We confirm that housing space \( s(x) \) is proportionate to wage \( w \) because of \( \varepsilon = 1 \) and that housing space increases with the commuting time cost \( t(x) \), which is increasing.
in $x$. That is, the housing space monotonically increases with the distance $x$ from the CBD given wage level $w$.

The housing rent paid by a worker with wage $w$ located at $x$ is given by

$$ R(x, w) = r(x)s(x) = bw[T - t(x)] \quad (14) $$

Because $t(x)$ is increasing in $x$, the housing rent $R(x, w)$ decreases in $x$ while increasing in $w$. This means that workers with given location $x$ pay more for housing as they get richer and workers with given wage $w$ pay less for housing as they locate farther from the CBD.

Equation (14) may be exemplified by the superimposed curves in Figure 2b. We observe that various housing prices coexist in many locations, implying that a continuum of income groups collocate everywhere. It should be noted that the large variance in housing price is also attributed to variations in building age and type and location characteristics, as the hedonic theory suggests. We often observe that old and new houses are located close because of different building and rebuilding processes. The old houses are resided by the poor because of the filtering process, whereas the new houses are resided by the rich due to new development in the suburbs or gentrification of rebuilding process near the CBD. Thus, different income groups tend to collocate in across locations.

In Figure 2a, the rich are indifferent on curve Rich, and so are the other income groups. We know from (14) that when wage $w$ is higher, the curve’s intercept $bwT$ is higher and its slope $-bw't(x)$ is steeper in spatial equilibrium. This implies that in order to satisfy the spatial equilibrium condition, the housing price of curve Rich falls abruptly relative to curve Poor as illustrated in Figure 2a. This is because the opportunity cost of the rich is very high as compared to the poor. It follows from this result that the housing price variations are very large near the CBD and decrease according to the distance from the CBD, which we have shown in Section 3.1.

---

8This is also confirmed by the similar scattergrams of the large Hiroshima MA and the mid-size Fukuyama MA.
4.1 Presence of subcenters

As we discussed in Section 3, the presence of subcenters in big cities does affect the housing rent. In order to understand the effect, consider the existence of a subcenter at location $\hat{x}$ in a city as illustrated in Figure 5. The subscript of $w$ expresses the wage ranking such that $w_i > w_{i+1}$. Whereas the unit housing rent $r(x)$ of (12) is uniquely determined in each location $x$, the housing rent (housing price) $R(x, w)$ of (14) is not unique as drawn in Figure 5. Such nonuniqueness is also empirically observed in Figures 2a and 2b.

Although the unit land rent $r(x)$ decreases from 0 to $\bar{x}$, it rises from $\bar{x}$ to the subcenter location $\hat{x}$. This is because those living in $[0, \bar{x}]$ commute to the CBD, while those living in $[\bar{x}, x_b]$ commute to the subcenter. That is, the four downward sloping curves drawn in the interval of $[0, \bar{x}]$ follow the housing rent curve (14), whereas the three curves in the interval of $[\bar{x}, x_b]$ follow

$$R_{\text{sub}}(x, w) = qbw [T - t(|x - \hat{x}|)]$$

where

$$q \equiv \frac{T - t(\bar{x} - 0)}{T - t(\hat{x} - \bar{x})} < 1$$

The latter is an inverted U-shaped curve.

The housing rent of the richest with $w_1$ is shown by the upper-most curve in Figure 5. Since they do not commute to the subcenter because of its relatively low wage, their locations are confined to the interval of $[0, \bar{x}]$. The same is true for the second richest with $w_2$.

On the other hand, the housing rent of the poorest with $w_6$ is shown by the lower-most inverted U-shaped curve about the subcenter at $\hat{x}$. The lowest wage $w_6$ at the subcenter is smaller than the lowest wage $w_5$ at the CBD. The reason for this is explained by the following. Suppose that there is a standard of living in terms of housing, below which residents receive no utility, and suppose that such a minimum housing space exists both in the CBD and in the subcenter. Then, it must be the case that the lowest wage $w_5$ of residents living in the minimum housing space in the CBD is higher than the lowest wage $w_6$ in the subcenter because the unit land rent in the former is higher. This is also true for the maximum land rent, $w_1 > w_3$, because of the productivity difference between the CBD and the subcenter.
Furthermore, the highest rent curve $R(x, w_1)$ and the lowest rent curve $R(x, w_5)$ starting from the CBD do not reach beyond boundary $\bar{x}$ whereas the middle rent curves $R(x, w_2)$ and $R(x, w_4)$ go beyond. That is why curves Rich and Poor are short whereas curve Middle is long in Figure 2a.

The highest wage $w_3$ at the subcenter is low, but still higher than that around the subcenter. Therefore, as there are many subcenters in Tokyo MA, this would be the reason why the Gini coefficient and the polarization index in Figures 4a and 4b are non-monotone in the rings with commuting time more than 60 minutes.

At the boundary location $\bar{x}$, the second richest with $w_2$ and the third richest with $w_3$ pay the same housing rent for the same housing space. Although the former resident has the higher nominal wage, she incurs the higher time cost of commuting, which is offset by the higher nominal wage. In other words, the two workplaces with different wages are indifferent for workers residing at boundary $\bar{x}$ because the welfare is the same in the spatial equilibrium.

Figure 5 may be illustrated by Table 2, where ring 4 involves the subcenter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ring 1</th>
<th>ring 2</th>
<th>ring 3</th>
<th>ring 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rich</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very poor</td>
<td>1, 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Illustration of coexistence in many locations

Table 2 shows that the rich with income 4 are indifferent in rings 1 and 2, the middle class and the poor are indifferent in rings 1 to 4, and the very poor locate only in rings 3 and 4. The rich do not locate in the suburbs because the opportunity cost of time is very high. The very poor do not live near the CBD because they cannot pay high land rent.

4.2 Welfare implications

Because the unit land rent at the city border is equal to the agricultural land rent $r_A$, the indirect utility (11) can be rewritten as

$$v = a^t b^c (a - b w_1) [T - t(x)]$$

(15)
where the city border $x_b$ is determined by the land market clearing condition, which is determined by the distribution of income groups. For example, suppose that quite a few people become very rich. Since they occupy a large housing space, the city border $x_b$ expands, which raises the time cost of commuting from the city border to the CBD, $t(x_b)$. This decreases the indirect utility (15) of workers with unchanged wage. Such an externality is undesirable for them, while those who become rich may be better off.

On the other hand, improvements in transport technology that reduce the time cost of commuting raise the utility of all income groups because the indirect utility (15) is decreasing in $t(x_b)$.

5 House prices and apartment rent

In order to check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous sections, we do the same analysis using apartment rent in Tokyo MA. The housing rent data is explained in the Appendix. Figures 2A-4A are plotted as counterparts to Figures 2-4. We observe that (i) both the apartment rent and the housing price have a similar relationship with the distance from the city center in Figures 2a and 2A; (ii) both exhibit similar distributions of high and low detached-house prices in Figures 3 and 3A; and (iii) both show a similar Gini coefficient and polarization index in Figures 4a and 4A.

Housing is often purchased by high- and middle-income groups, whereas apartments are often rented by low and middle-income groups. Therefore, Figures 2-4 may be for upper-income groups and Figures 2A-4A for lower-income groups. Nevertheless, both the housing price and the apartment rent exhibit very similar attributes in our dataset.

In particular, many residents belong to the middle class, and thus, the housing market for the middle class is thick. Their wage is intermediate and may be close to $\bar{w}$, which leads to the coexistence condition $\partial r'/\partial w = 0$, which satisfies Proposition 2. That is, the middle class is indifferent to residing at any location in the metropolitan area.

On the other hand, the coexistence condition of the rich and poor may be satisfied
only at limited intervals near the CBD, and thus they are likely to be sorted spatially according to their income near the CBD, which satisfies Proposition 1. Hence, we may summarize the overall analysis that the sorting by income is applied to high and low income groups near the CBD, whereas the middle class locates almost everywhere.

6 Conclusion

Urban economic theory predicts that the suburbs tend to have high income people relative to the central cities, which is often observed in U.S. cities. However, according to the microdata of detached-house prices and apartment rentals in Tokyo MA, the rich and poor collocate near the central city while the middle class locates in both the central city and the suburbs. Introducing the time cost of commuting to the urban economic theory, we showed that such an international difference is attributed to international differences in the commuting cost and the income elasticity of demand for housing space. We then obtained the spatial equilibrium condition for coexistence of various income groups in various locations throughout the city, and empirically showed that any income group residing in condominiums locates almost everywhere in Tokyo MA. This is explained by the fact that the income elasticity of demand for condominium space is close to one and the pecuniary cost of commuting is zero in Japan.

References


A Data sources

1. Per capita income: Annual taxable income per taxpayer in 2013. Shichoson Zei Kazei Jokyoto no Shirabe (Survey of Municipal Taxation), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/ssds/2.htm#itiran)


3. Housing rent: Apartment rents on April 4, 2017 in Tokyo metropolitan area which consists of prefectures of Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa on the website of Recruit SUUMO. (http://suumo.jp/)
Figure 1: Per capita income in thousand yen and distance from the center of Tokyo MA in kilometer

Figure 2a: Detached house price in million yen and time distance from the city center in Tokyo MA by minute
Figure 2b: Condominium in million yen and time distance from the city center in Tokyo MA by minute

Figure 3: Distribution of high and low detached house price groups in each ring by minute in logarithm
Figure 4a: Gini coefficient and polarization index of detached house price by time distance from the city center by minute

Figure 4b: Gini coefficient and polarization index of condominium price by time distance from the city center by minute
Figure 5: Housing rent with a subcenter

Figure 2A: Apartment rent in 10 thousand yen and time distance from the city center in Tokyo MA by minute
Figure 3A: Distribution of high and low apartment rent groups in each ring by minute in logarithm

Figure 4A: Gini coefficient and polarization index of apartment rent by time distance from the city center by minute