Estimates of Multifactor Productivity, ICT Contributions and Resource Reallocation Effects in Japan and Korea

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April 2009

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*We acknowledge the research efforts made by the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database Project Team and the Korea Industrial Productivity (KIP) Database Project Team through joint workshops in Fukuoka in 2005 and in Tokyo and Seoul in 2007. Please use k.fukao@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp and pyohk@plaza.snu.ac.kr for correspondence.
Abstract

As the studies of Krugman (1994), Young (1994), and Lau and Kim (1994) showed, the East Asian economic miracle may be characterized as 'input-led' growth. However, both the stagnation in investment and the decrease in average working hours combined with a decrease in the fertility rate require a productivity surge for renewed, sustainable growth in East Asia. The purpose of our study is to identify the sources of economic growth based on a KLEMS model for Japan and the Republic of Korea, which experienced a “Lost Decade” and a financial crisis in 1997-1998, respectively. We report estimates of multifactor productivity in the market economy of Japan and Korea based on the dataset of a 72-industry classification following EU KLEMS project guidelines. We also identify the contributions of ICT assets and resource reallocations in two economies. Both economies have strong ICT-producing sectors but relatively weaker ICT-usage effects. Lower productivity in service industries due to excessive regulations and lack of competition in public service sectors seem to have worked against enhancing ICT-usage effects and finding renewed sustainable growth paths. The resource reallocation effects of capital input in both Japan and Korea were either negligible or insignificant, while those of labor input (the labor shift from lower wage industries to higher wage industries) were positive and significant. Therefore, a series of productivity-enhancing policies designed to promote reallocation of capital input seems crucial for both economies to resume sustainable growth paths.

Keywords: MFP, Resource reallocation, ICT
JEL Classification numbers: O30, O47, O57
1. Introduction

As the studies of Krugman (1994), Young (1994), and Lau and Kim (1994) showed, the East Asian economic miracle may be characterized as 'input-led' growth. However, both the stagnation in investment and the decrease in average working hours combined with a decrease in the fertility rate require a productivity surge for renewed sustainable growth in East Asia. The purpose of our study is to identify the sources of economic growth based on a KLEMS model for Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereinafter called Korea), which experienced a “Lost Decade” and a financial crisis in 1997-1998, respectively. We report estimates of KLEMS inputs, gross output and multifactor productivity in Japan and Korea based on the dataset of a 72-industry classification following EU KLEMS project guidelines. We also identify the contributions of ICT assets and resource reallocation effects in two economies. We have found that the slow-down of MFP was a main factor behind Japan’s Lost Decade. In Korea's late-stage industrialization we have also found that its catch-up process with industrial nations has been predominantly input-led and manufacturing-based, as documented in both Timmer (1999) and Pyo (2001). However, the sources of growth in the two economies seem to have switched from input-led growth to MFP-growth by the introduction of ICT-intensive production and service industries. Both economies have strong ICT-producing sectors but relatively weaker ICT-usage effects. Lower productivity in service industries due to excessive regulations and the lack of competition in the public service sectors of the two economies seem to have worked against enhancing ICT-usage effects and discovering renewed sustainable growth paths. The resource reallocation effects of capital input in both Japan and Korea were either negligible or insignificant while those of labor input (the labor shift from lower wage industries to higher wage industries) were positive and significant, implying that more structural adjustments in capital inputs are needed in both economies.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide estimates of a 72-industry level multifactor productivity in Japan and Korea by following the guidelines of the database of the EU KLEMS project in a gross-output growth accounting framework. We have used a 72-sector industrial classification for future comparability with EU member countries and non-member countries including the United States. An analysis based on detailed industrial classification gives us better views on productivity and growth, which is difficult to grasp in broader industrial classifications. Industries in an economy have shown different productivity trends, growth patterns and resource reallocation effects according to their production characteristics, competition policies and other economic and non-economic circumstances.
KLEMS is a particular kind of gross output growth accounting model in which output is measured by gross output and inputs are decomposed by capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), material (M), and service (S). Since this methodology is basically based on gross output, it has the advantage of separating effects of intermediate inputs from other inputs on productivity, therefore allowing productivities by industry to be more accurate. Moreover, the assumption of a real value-added production function (separability assumption) is not usually guaranteed,\(^1\) which also gives legitimacy to gross output growth accounting. However, gross output growth accounting requires more information on intermediate inputs than value-added growth accounting. Therefore, the data structure for estimating productivity has to be consistent with not only national income accounts but also input-output tables. Use and Make Matrix etc. and the estimation methodology for unavailable data should be examined more carefully.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines estimates of 72-industry level multifactor productivity of Japan and Korea by following the guidelines of the database of the EU KLEMS project in a market economy accounting framework; Section 3 identifies the contribution of ICT capital accumulation in recent economic recoveries of Japan and Korea; Section 4 provides estimates of resource reallocation effects in both Japan and Korea; and the final section concludes.

2. Growth Accounting and MFP Growth

2.1 Overview of growth accounting for Japan and Korea in comparison with the major economies in the EU and the U.S.

We first report the results of growth accounting for Japan and Korea and compare them with the major EU economies (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy), and the U.S. in Table 2-1.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) The growth accounting analysis for the Japanese economy in this section is based on the EU KLEMS Database, March 2007. For details regarding this database see Timmer et al. (2007).
Table 2-1 Growth Accounting for the Market Sector in Japan, the US, and the Major EU Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gross value added growth</th>
<th>Contribution of labor input growth</th>
<th>Contribution of capital input growth</th>
<th>Contribution of MFP growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980-95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995-2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008.

Table 2.1 shows the growth accounting results for the market sector of these countries for the periods, 1980-1995 and 1995-2005. Although Korea’s economic growth slowed down significantly after the financial crisis of 1997, the country nevertheless recorded the highest growth among the seven countries in both periods. The figure shows that Japan experienced a severe stagnation during the latter period, and of the countries considered here registered the second highest annual rate of growth (3.9%) in 1980-95, but the lowest rate (1.0%) in 1995-2005. Germany experienced a mild slowdown in economic growth from 1.9% to 1.0%. The other four countries (France, the UK, Italy, and the U.S.) saw economic growth accelerate after 1995. The average growth rate for the four countries rose from 2.3% in 1980-95 to 2.6% in 1995-2005.

In Japan, three factors contributed to the slowdown in growth in the market sector: the deceleration in MFP was responsible for 36% of the slowdown, while the negative contribution of capital accumulation and the decline in the contribution of labor input growth each accounted for 32% of the slowdown.

Looking at the factors contributing to the slowdown in growth in the market sector of Korea’s economy, the most important factor is the decline in the contribution of MFP growth. Of the 4.7 percentage-point decline in the growth rate of Korea’s market sector from the earlier period (1980-1995) to the latter period (1995-2005), 57% was accounted for by deceleration in MFP growth. The slowdown in the contribution of

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3 The EU KLEMS data on Germany for years before Germany’s unification include East Germany.
labor input growth accounted for 32% of the decline of Korea’s growth rate. The contribution of capital input growth did not decline substantially.

In both Japan and Korea, the most important factor contributing to the slowdown of economic growth was the deceleration in MFP growth. In a comparison over the two periods, Korea’s average MFP growth rate dropped by 2.7 percentage points from +1.8% in 1980-95 to -0.9% in 1995-2005, while in Japan the MFP growth rate dropped by 1.0 percentage point, from 1.5% in 1980-95 to 0.5% in 1995-2004. Turning to MFP growth in the four major EU economies, a similar slowdown can be observed. Taken together, the combined MFP growth rate of the four major economies declined 0.8 percentage point from 1.1% in 1980-95 to 0.3% in 1995-2005. Thus, among the six major developed economies, the U.S. is exceptional in the acceleration in MFP growth that it experienced.

There is a stark difference in the causes underlying the acceleration in growth in France, the UK and Italy on the one hand, and the US on the other. In the three EU countries, the acceleration in economic growth was mainly achieved through labor input growth. As Figure 2-2 shows, the increase in labor input growth in Italy did not take the form of improvements in labor quality but of increases in total hours worked. In contrast,
in the case of the UK and France the quality of labor input improved substantially. Until 1995, these three countries suffered high unemployment rates, especially among less-educated young people, but subsequently succeeded in creating more jobs for the unemployed. The average of the standardized unemployment rate of the three countries declined from 11.3% in 1995 to 7.4% in 2004. On the other hand, the standardized unemployment rate in Japan increased from 3.1% to 4.7% during the same period (OECD 2006). In contrast to the three EU countries just mentioned, the main cause of growth acceleration in the U.S. was an increase in MFP growth (from 0.7% in 1980-95 to 1.6% in 1995-2004).

As Figure 2-3 shows, in Japan there was a large decline in the contribution of capital accumulation to economic growth. The contribution of capital accumulation also declined slightly in Korea and Germany. In contrast, in each of the other four countries the contribution of capital input growth increased. The U.S. and the UK in particular experienced an acceleration in capital accumulation. This capital deepening in the two countries was caused by the rapid accumulation of ICT capital (Figure 2-3).
To sum up the above analysis, it is not the gap in MFP growth but differences in factor input growth that caused the large difference between the economic growth performance of France, the UK and Italy on the one hand and Japan on the other in the period after 1995. The four major EU economies (Germany, France, the UK and Italy) and Japan experienced a slowdown in MFP growth of a similar magnitude after 1995, while Korea suffered a much larger decline. Thus, the U.S. is the exception with its acceleration in MFP growth.

Figure 2-4 compares industry level MFP growth in the seven countries before and after 1995. Beginning with the electrical machinery, post and communication sector (ICT producing sector), we find that Korea still had the second-highest MFP growth in the period after 1995, trailing only the U.S. The ICT-producing sector is the leading sector for enhancing productivity growth in Korea, and as shown in Table 3-2 and analyzed in detail by Ha and Pyo (2004), the input of ICT capital services in the ICT sector has increased greatly since 1995. On the other hand, Japan’s MFP growth in the ICT-producing sector after 1995 declined to the mid-range level among the seven economies. Both in Korea and in Japan, MFP growth in this sector is relatively higher than that in the other five sectors. However, the problem for both Korea and Japan is that, like in other countries, the share of this sector in the overall economy is not very
large. The average share of labor input (hours worked) in this sector for Korea’s and Japan’s total labor input in 1995-2005 was 4.7% and 4.3% respectively. In the U.S., this share was 3.2%.

The largest declines in MFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution services (retail, wholesale and transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical machinery). The labor input shares of these two sectors were 23.4% and 16.8% respectively. Korea experienced a severe slowdown in MFP growth in all sectors except the ICT-producing sector. In the case of Korea, we observe that the estimated MFP growth rates in manufacturing in general are greater than in services. This may be due to the fact that innovations such as product innovation or process innovation are more common in manufacturing than in services. Also, R&D investment for innovation is in general more intensive in manufacturing than in services. This may explain why MFP growth rates in manufacturing are greater than in services.

The highest MFP growth among the seven countries in almost all sectors was recorded by the U.S. In comparison to the U.S. and the major EU economies except...
Italy, both Korea’s and Japan’s MFP growth in 1995-2005 in manufacturing excluding electrical machinery was low. MFP growth in personal and social services stalled in all of the countries examined here except France. Moreover, with the exception of the U.S. and the UK, MFP growth in finance and business services stalled in all the countries examined here.

To sum up the above analysis, Korea and Japan experienced relatively higher MFP growth in the ICT-producing sector. However, the problem for the two countries is that MFP growth in ICT-using sectors, such as distribution services (retail, wholesale and transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical machinery), declined substantially after 1995. And these ICT-using sectors have larger shares of the overall economy than the ICT-producing sector.

2.2. The cumulative contribution of sectors to MFP growth in Japan and Korea

Following Farrell, Baily and Remes (2005) and Fukao, Kim and Kwon (2006), we plot a modified Harberger (1998) diagram and examine the contribution of individual sectors to macro-level productivity growth. The results for the Japanese economy are shown in Figures 2-5, 2-6, and 2-7. The vertical axes display the cumulative sector contributions to aggregate MFP growth; while the horizontal axes depict the cumulative sector output share in total value added (Domar weights). Sectors are lined up by descending order of MFP contribution.

Figure 2-5 shows the sectoral MFP growth contribution for the period 1973-2005 for the economy as a whole. The weight of the gross output of sectors with positive MFP growth is 62%, while the weight of sectors with negative MFP growth is 38%. The top five sectors in terms of their MFP growth contribution are electrical and optical equipment, wholesale trade, transport equipment, chemicals and chemical products, and machinery not elsewhere classified. As can be seen, productivity growth in the economy as a whole, which is represented by the broken horizontal line, was lower than the sum of the contributions of the two leading sectors, electrical and optical equipment and wholesale. Sectors whose contribution to economy-wide MFP growth was negative include real estate, machinery and equipment rental, and construction.

Figure 2-6 shows the cumulative contribution to MFP growth within the manufacturing sector. In manufacturing, most industries made a positive contribution to MFP growth: the weight of the gross output of industries with positive MFP growth is 73%. Only three industries - textiles, leather products and footwear; food, beverages and tobacco; and coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel underwent substantial negative MFP growth.
Next, Figure 2-7 shows the cumulative contribution to MFP growth within the service sector. In services, the MFP growth contribution of about half of the industries were negative. The weight of the gross output of industries with negative MFP growth was about 48%, as a result the MFP growth of the overall service sector in 1973-2005 was relatively small. These results indicate that for Japan’s economy to achieve sustainable MFP growth, an acceleration of productivity growth in the service sector is indispensable.
Figures 2-8, 2-9 and 2-10 show the results for Korea. We begin with the economy as a whole, where the weight of gross output of industries with positive MFP growth in 1972-2005 is about 66%, while that for industries with negative MFP growth is about 34%. Figure 2-8 shows the industries that made a positive contribution to economy-wide MFP growth. Leading industries in this group include financial intermediation and post and telecommunications in the services sector, and chemicals, electronic valves and tubes, and basic metals in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, industries with a negative contribution to economy-wide MFP growth included public administration and defense, other real-estate activities, hotels and restaurants, construction, and education.

Figure 2-9 shows the industry contribution to MFP growth in the manufacturing sector. The weight of the gross output of industries that made a positive MFP growth contribution in manufacturing is 99%, while the weight of those that made a negative MFP growth contribution is 1%. Industries making a leading contribution to MFP growth include the IT industries, i.e., electronic valves and tubes; other electrical machinery and apparatus; telecommunication equipment; office, accounting and computing machinery; radio and TV receivers; and a number of non-IT industries including chemicals, basic metals; machinery; fabricated metal; coke refined petroleum and nuclear fuel; and pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, industries with negative MFP growth include aircraft and spacecraft, railroad equipment and transport equipment, and printing and reproduction.
Turning to services, the results are shown in Figure 2-10. The weight of the gross output of industries with positive MFP growth in services is only about 38%, while the weight of industries with negative MFP growth is 62%. Service industries that made a positive contribution to MFP growth include financial intermediation, post and communication, inland transport, insurance and pensions, and water transport. Industries with negative MFP growth include public administration and defense, other real-estate activities, hotels and restaurants, education, legal, technical and advertising services, research and development, other service activities, and wholesale trade.
Figure 2-9 Cumulative Contribution of Industries to MFP Growth: Korea, 1972-2005, Manufacturing

Figure 2-10 Cumulative Contribution of Industries to MFP Growth: Korea, 1972-2005, Services
3. Has ICT Investment Contributed to Economic Growth in Japan and Korea?
3.1 Accumulation of ICT assets in Japan and Korea

From the JIP and KIP databases, we are able to extract data on ICT assets and compare the trends in ICT investment between the two countries. Our definition of ICT assets is consistent with that stipulated by the EU KLEMS project and is comprised of computer and peripheral equipment, communication equipment and software.

Developments in ICT investment in Japan are shown in Figure 3-1-1. ICT investment in Japan grew steadily until 1991 and its annual average growth rate was 8.6% in 1970-2005. However, since the early 1990s, growth has been more uneven. Stagnating in the first half of the 1990s, ICT investment picked up again during the second half of the decade and has continued to increase. In 2005, ICT investment stood at 23.5 trillion yen (in constant 2000 prices) and accounted for 18% of total investment. The biggest component within ICT investment is investment in computers and other ICT equipment, which in 2005 amounted to 13.5 trillion yen or 58% of total ICT investment.

The movement in ICT investment in Korea is shown in Figure 3-1-2. The annual average growth rate of Korean ICT investment was 6.0% during 1970-2005, which was lower than the Japanese growth rate of ICT investment. However, in 1995-2005 the growth rate of Korean ICT investment, at 15.5%, was higher than the 13.1% growth rate of Japanese ICT investment. Although Korean ICT investment showed steady growth until 1997, it declined drastically in 1998 due to the Asian currency crisis. However, it
recovered rapidly and reached 23 trillion won in 2005. The share of ICT investment in total investment in Korea was 11.2% in 2005. Unlike Japan, the largest component in ICT investment in Korea is software, accounting for 51.1% of total ICT investment.

![Figure 3-1-2 ICT Investment in Korea](image)

Next we compare the ICT investment/GDP ratios of major developed economies, including Japan and Korea (Figure 3-2). We find that the trends in the ICT investment/GDP ratios in major developed countries since the late 1990s fall into two groups. In the U.S. and UK, the ratios increased rapidly and reached 13% and 11% in 2005, respectively. On the other hand, in other countries the ratios were only in the 4% range with the exception of Germany at 6%. While Japan’s ICT investment/GDP ratio was the lowest among the countries here for much of the 1990s and 2000s, it caught up with many of the other countries in 2005 due to the economic recovery in Japan. On the other hand, the trend in Korea closely followed that in the U.S. and the UK before the Asian currency crisis, but since then Korea's ICT investment/GDP ratio has stagnated around 4%.
Turning to the growth in ICT capital services of the major developed economies, the trends are displayed in Figure 3-3. In four countries (the UK, U.S., Korea and Germany) the growth rates of ICT capital services after 1995 exceeded 10% per annum. On the other hand, the growth rate of ICT capital service of Japan was the lowest among the major developed countries due to the long-term stagnation of the economy. Nevertheless, by 2005 growth in Japan's ICT capital services had almost reached the same level as in France and Italy.
3.2 The contribution of ICT capital services to economic growth in Korea and Japan

Using the growth accounting data from Table 3-1, we compare the contribution of ICT capital services to economic growth in Korea and Japan. We find that in 1980-2005, the growth rate of value added in Korea was considerably higher than that in Japan. As shown in the table, the high growth rate in Korea was largely driven by the rapid increase in capital services, while the increase in capital services was much slower in Japan. However, the substantial gap in the contribution of capital services between the two countries is not the result of a difference in the ICT capital services growth rate, but the difference in the growth rate of non-ICT capital services.
Table 3-1 Growth accounting including ICT capital service (Market economy)(%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value added</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-hour</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor quality</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT capital</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ICT capital</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU KLEMS Database March 2008 and KIP Database

Next, we compare the contribution of capital services to economic growth by industry. As shown in Table 3-2, the contribution of capital services in the market economy in 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 was highest in Korea, the UK and U.S. Moreover, whereas the contribution of capital services input growth in the market economy overall in the latter period declined in most countries, it increased in the UK and U.S.

Table 3-2 Contributions of ICT Capital Service Input Growth to the Economic Growth (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market economy total</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery, post and communication</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing, excluding electrical</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goods producing industries</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution services</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and business services</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and social services</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU KLEMS Database March 2008 and KIP Database

Looking at individual industries we find that in the electrical machinery and post and communication industry the contribution of ICT capital services in Japan, as in Korea (and the UK), was relatively high in 1995-2000. However, whereas the contribution of ICT capital services remained high in Korea (and the UK), it substantially declined in Japan in the 2000-2005 period.

In the service sector, notable results include a low contribution of ICT capital services in Japan’s distribution industry for the entire decade, and a high contribution of ICT capital services in Korea’s finance and insurance industry. Another notable pattern
is the across-the-board increase in the growth contribution of ICT capital services in the service industries of the UK and U.S.

Finally, regarding the accumulation of ICT assets we find different patterns for Korea and Japan. Korean ICT capital accumulation was rapid until the Asian currency crisis, but then it slowed down in the early 2000s. On the other hand, ICT capital accumulation in Japan was slow in the 1990s due to a prolonged economic stagnation. However, in conjunction with the economic recovery from 2002, ICT capital accumulation in Japan gradually caught up with other countries, as can be seen in Figure 3-2. The contribution of capital services to economic growth in the Japanese service sector was relatively low when compared to the other countries examined here.

4. Resource Reallocation Effects in Japan and Korea

4.1 Measurement methodology and results for the market economy as a whole

We commonly observe that factor prices for the same category of labor or rates of return to capital are different across industries. If such differences are caused by institutional obstacles to inter-industry factor movements and each factor price is equal to the marginal product of that production factor, GDP can be raised by shifting production factors from industries with low factor prices to those with high factor prices. In this section, we analyze how such resource reallocations have contributed to Japan’s economic growth.4

Let us analyze this issue in a growth accounting framework. As Jorgenson et al. (2007) have shown, how the resource reallocation effect is measured in growth accounting depends on the type of growth accounting method chosen. In the case of growth accounting in the EU KLEMS project, factor price equalization between industries is not assumed and macro-level factor inputs are calculated by a Tornqvist index, in which factor input growth across industries is aggregated by using the factor income in each industry as aggregation weights. Therefore, if production factors move from low factor price industries to high factor price industries, this reallocation will be treated as an increase in macro-level factor inputs. Jorgenson et al. labeled this type of growth accounting method the “direct aggregation across industries” approach.

However, there is another type of growth accounting method, which Jorgenson et al. called the “production possibility frontier” approach. In this case, each input is assumed to receive the same price in all industries. The macro-level quantity of each

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4 For more details on the analysis of resource reallocation effects in Japan, see Fukao, Miyagawa and Takizawa (2007).
input is the simple sum of inputs across industries. In this approach, reallocation effects are included in macro MFP growth.

Jorgenson et al. (2007) showed the following relationship between the macro MFP growth derived from the production possibility frontier approach, \( \nu_T \), and the macro MFP growth derived from the direct aggregation across industries approach, \( \nu_T^D \).

\[
\nu_T = \nu_T^D + \left( \sum_j \left( \frac{\nu_{K,j}}{\nu_{V,j}} K_j \Delta \ln K_j \right) - \nu_K \Delta \ln K \right)
+ \left( \sum_j \left( \frac{\nu_{L,j}}{\nu_{V,j}} L_j \Delta \ln L_j \right) - \nu_L \Delta \ln L \right)
\]

where \( \nu_T^D \) is equal to the weighted sum of industry level MFP growth, \( \nu_j \), across industries:

\[
\nu_T^D = \left( \sum_j \frac{\nu_j}{\nu_{V,j}} \right)
\]

The upper bars denote the average values across periods \( t \) and \( t+1 \). \( \Delta \) represents the change of a value from period \( t \) to period \( t+1 \), \( w_j \) is the proportion of industry \( j \)'s value added in aggregate value added, \( \nu_{K,j} \) and \( \nu_{L,j} \) are the share of capital and labor income, respectively, in industry \( j \)'s gross output, and \( \nu_{V,j} \) stands for industry \( j \)'s value-added gross output ratio. Therefore the coefficient of \( \nu_j \), \( w_j/\nu_{K,j} \), in equation (2) denotes the ratio of industry \( j \)'s gross output to aggregated value added. Equation (2) implies that the macro MFP growth derived from the direct-aggregation-across-industries approach, \( \nu_T^D \), is equal to the direct aggregation of each industry’s MFP growth with Domar weights.

In equation (1), \( K_j \) denotes the Tornqvist index of capital input in industry \( j \), and \( L_j \) the Tornqvist index of labor input in industry \( j \):

\[
\Delta \ln K_j = \sum_k w_{k,j} \Delta \ln K_{k,j}
\]

\[
\Delta \ln L_j = \sum_j w_{j,l} \Delta \ln L_{l,j}
\]

where

\[
w_{k,j} = \frac{P_{k,k,j} K_{k,j}}{\sum_k P_{k,k,j} K_{k,j}}
\]
\[ w_{l,j} = \frac{P_{L,l,j}L_{l,j}}{\sum_l P_{L,l,j}L_{l,j}} \]

\( K_{k,j} \) denotes input of type \( k \) capital in industry \( j \), and \( L_{l,j} \) input of type \( l \) labor in industry \( j \). Similarly, \( P_{K,k,j} \) denotes the price for type \( k \) capital in industry \( j \), and \( P_{L,l,j} \) the price for type \( l \) labor in industry \( j \).

\( K \) and \( L \) denote the macro-level capital input index and the macro-level labor input index, respectively, which are calculated under the assumption of identical factor prices across industries:

\[ \Delta \ln K = \sum_k w_k \Delta \ln K_k \]

\[ \Delta \ln L = \sum_l w_l \Delta \ln L_l \]

where

\[ K_k = \sum_j K_{k,j} \]

\[ L_l = \sum_j L_{l,j} \]

and \( w_k \) and \( w_l \) are defined by

\[ w_k = \frac{P_{k,k}K_k}{\sum_k P_{K,k}K_k} \]

\[ w_l = \frac{P_{L,l}L_l}{\sum_l P_{L,l}L_l} \]

\( P_{K,k} \) stands for the economy-wide average price for type \( k \) capital, and \( P_{L,l} \) the economy-wide average price for type \( l \) labor. In equation (1), \( v_K \) represents the aggregated capital income value-added ratio and \( v_L \) the aggregated labor income value-added ratio.

The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) denotes the effect of capital reallocation on macro MFP growth, \( v_T \), which is derived from the production possibility frontier approach. Similarly, the third term on the right-hand side of equation (1) denotes the effect of labor reallocation on macro MFP growth, \( v_T \), which is derived from the production possibility frontier approach. We can rewrite the second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) as
where \( w_{K,j} \) is defined by
\[
\sum_j \left( w_j \frac{v_{K,j}}{v_{V,j}} \Delta \ln K_j \right) = \sum_j \left( w_j \frac{v_{K,j}}{v_{K,j}} \Delta \ln K_j - \sum_k \frac{v_{K,j}}{v_{K,j}} \Delta \ln K_j \right)
\]
\[
= \sum_j \left( w_j \frac{v_{K,j}}{v_{V,j}} - \sum_k \frac{v_{K,j}}{v_{K,j}} \right) \Delta \ln K_j + \sum_k \frac{v_{K,j}}{v_{K,j}} \Delta \ln K_j - \Delta \ln K
\]

In equation (3), the value of \( w_j v_{K,j} / v_{V,j} \) is equal to the ratio of capital income in industry \( j \) to the macro-level value added. The value of this coefficient shows the percentage increase in GDP for a one-percent increase in capital input in industry \( j \). On the other hand, the value of \( w_{K,j} v_K \) shows the percentage increase in GDP for a one-percent increase in capital input in industry \( j \) when the average price of capital across different types of capital in industry \( j \) is equal to the economy-wide average price of capital, that is, \( \Sigma_k P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j} = \Sigma_k P_{K,k} K_{K,j} \).

Therefore, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) denotes the inter-industry reallocation effect of aggregated capital. If the industry-level growth rate of capital input, \( \Delta \ln K_j \), is positive in industries where the industry-level average capital price is higher than the macro-level average capital price, i.e., \( \Sigma_k P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j} > \Sigma_k P_{K,k} K_{K,j} \), and if the industry-level growth rate of capital input, \( \Delta \ln K_j \), is negative in industries where the industry-level average capital price is lower than the macro-level average capital price, i.e., \( \Sigma_k P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j} < \Sigma_k P_{K,k} K_{K,j} \), then there will be a positive inter-industry reallocation effect of aggregated capital.

In the case of the continuous time version of equation (3), the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) can be expressed as
\[
\sum_k \sum_j \sum_k \frac{P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j}}{\sum_k P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j}} \left( \frac{P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j}}{\sum_k P_{K,k,j} K_{K,j}} - \frac{P_{K,k} K_{K,j}}{\sum_k P_{K,k} K_{K,j}} \right) \hat{K}_{K,j}
\]

Therefore, we can interpret the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) as the reallocation effect of changes in the capital composition within each industry. Suppose that the relative price of type \( k \) capital to the average value of prices for other types of capital in industry \( j \) is lower than the macro-level average relative price of type \( k \) capital, then an increase of capital input of this type in industry \( j \) will improve resource
allocation and raise the macro MFP growth rate derived from the production possibility frontier approach, $v_T$.

A similar interpretation applies to the labor reallocation effect. The third term on the right-hand side of equation (1) can be decomposed into the inter-industry reallocation effect of aggregated labor and the reallocation effect of changes in the labor composition within each industry.

However, as we have already pointed out, it is difficult to measure actual income for each type of capital in each industry. Because of this difficulty, we mainly focus on the inter-industry reallocation effect of aggregated capital and aggregated labor in this paper.

Table 4-1 shows the MFP growth in Japan\(^5\) and Korea\(^6\) derived from the production possibility frontier approach, $v_T$, the MFP growth derived from the approach by direct aggregation across industries, $v_T^D$, the reallocation effect of capital input, and the reallocation effect of labor input for each period. It should be noted that the analysis here only focuses on reallocation effects in the market economy, not the economy as a whole.

The table shows that the reallocation effect of labor input was negligible in Japan except in the period 1990-2000. On the other hand, there was a positive and substantial reallocation effect of capital input for the whole period analyzed. The table also shows that, during the period 1990-2000, the total reallocation effect of labor and capital input became greater than the Domar-weighted MFP growth (macro MFP growth derived from the approach by direct aggregation across industries approach), $v_T^D$.

In contrast to the case of Japan, in Korea the reallocation effect of labor input was greater than the reallocation effect of capital input in all periods. What is more, for the period 1980-2000, we find relatively large negative values for the reallocation effect of capital input. On the other hand, the reallocation effect of labor input was positive – and greater than the Domar-weighted MFP growth – except during the period 1980-90. Thus, while the reallocation of labor, that is, the shift of labor from low wage industries to high wage industries, has made a substantial positive contribution to Korea’s aggregate MFP growth, the contribution of capital reallocation has been negative.

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\(^5\) The analysis of the Japanese economy is based on the JIP Database 2008. JIP Database 2008 was compiled in a collaboration between RIETI as part of its "Study on Industry-Level and Firm-Level Productivity in Japan" research project and Hitotsubashi University as part of its Hi-Stat (21st-Century COE Program, "Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in the Social Sciences") project. For details on the JIP Database, see Fukao et al. (2007).

\(^6\) The analysis of the Korean economy is based on the KIP Database 2007.
To sum up the above analysis, it seems that Japan has problems mainly in the reallocation of labor input, while Korea's problems lie more in the reallocation of capital input.

### Table 4-1 Aggregate Reallocation Effects in Japan and Korea

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Growth rate of aggregated MFP, $\nu_T$</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Domar weighted MFP growth, $\nu_{TD}$</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Reallocation effects of capital input</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Reallocation effects of labor input</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

These estimates for Japan are from Fukao, Miyagawa and Takizawa (2007).

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korea</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Growth rate of aggregated MFP, $\nu_T$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Domar weighted MFP growth, $\nu_{TD}$</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Reallocation effects of capital input</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Reallocation effects of labor input</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These estimates for Korea are based on Korea Industrial Database (2007).

#### 4.2 Industry-level Reallocation Effect of Capital and Labor in Japan

While the results shown in Table 4-1 are instructive, they show us neither in what sectors factor prices are high, nor how production factors have moved between industries. In order to intuitively understand the process of capital and labor input reallocation, we examine reallocation effects across industries. The results are shown in Figures 4-1-1 and 4-1-2.

We begin with the figure for capital input (Figure 4-1-1), which shows the aggregate reallocation effect, $(w_j\nu_{K,j}/\nu_{V,j} - w_{K,j}\nu_K)\Delta \ln K_j$, as well as its two components, $w_j\nu_{K,j}/\nu_{V,j} - w_{K,j}\nu_K$ and $\Delta \ln K_j$, in the two countries for the periods 1975-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2005. Values are on an annual basis. As explained above (Section 4.1), $w_j\nu_{K,j}/\nu_{V,j} - w_{K,j}\nu_K$ is positive in industries where the industry-level average capital price is higher than the macro-level average capital price. We also prepare a similar figure to show the process of labor input reallocation across sectors.

Because the number of industries used for the derivation of Table 4-1 is too great in the case of Japan and in the case of Korea to obtain instructive graphs, the figures here show resource reallocation effects based on more aggregated industry classifications. Specifically, the whole market economy of Korea or Japan is decomposed into seven sectors: IT-using manufacturing, IT-using non-manufacturing, IT-producing manufacturing, IT-producing non-manufacturing, non-IT intensive manufacturing, non-IT intensive non-manufacturing, and other industries. We then
examine resource reallocation across these sectors, definitions of which are provided in Appendix Table 1.

Figure 4-1-1 shows the industry level reallocation effect of aggregated capital input, \((w_jv_K/v_j - w_Kv_K)\Delta\ln K_j\) and the two components of this value, \(w_jv_K/v_j - w_Kv_K\) and \(\Delta\ln K_j\) for Japan for the periods 1975-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. In almost all industries, capital inputs increased in the three periods. Therefore, industries with high capital prices, such as the IT-using non-manufacturing sector (finance, insurance, gas and water supply, wholesale, retail, etc.) contributed to the improvement of capital allocation. On the other hand, industries with low capital prices, such as the non-IT intensive non-manufacturing sector (real estate, transportation, eating and drinking places, etc.), were responsible for negative reallocation effects. In Japan, capital inputs increased rapidly in the IT-producing manufacturing sector while in what was probably a reflection of Japanese electronics firms losing their competitiveness in the 2000s, capital prices in this industry declined substantially. This change created the negative reallocation effect of capital inputs after 2000.

Figure 4-1-2 shows the industry level reallocation effect of aggregated labor input, \((w_jv_L/v_j - w_Lv_L)\Delta\ln L_j\) and the two components of this value, \(w_jv_L/v_j - w_Lv_L\) and \(\Delta\ln L_j\), in Japan for the periods 1975-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. Labor prices are highest in the IT producing non-manufacturing sector (telephone and information
services, broadcasting, etc.). The labor input increase in this sector after 2000 created positive reallocation effects. The second-highest labor prices can be found in the IT-producing manufacturing sector. However, the rapid decrease of labor inputs in this sector resulted in negative labor reallocation effects in the 2000s. In other industries (the primary sector, construction and civil engineering), in which labor prices are low, the decline of labor input created a large positive reallocation effect.

**Figure 4-1-2 Industry-Level Reallocation Effect of Labor Input in Japan: 1975-2005**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IT-using manufacturing sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT-using non-manufacturing sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT-producing manufacturing sector</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IT-producing non-manufacturing sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-IT intensive manufacturing sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-IT intensive non-manufacturing sector</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Industries</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Industry-level Reallocation Effect of Capital and Labor in Korea

Figure 4-2-1 shows the industry level reallocation effect of aggregated capital inputs in Korea for each period. As in Japan, capital inputs increased in the three periods in each of the industries. Therefore, industries with high capital prices, such as other industries, contributed to the improvement of capital allocation. In contrast to Japan, where capital prices are highest in the IT-using non-manufacturing sector, capital prices in Korea are highest in other industries (the primary sector, construction and civil engineering), and these industries created significant positive reallocation effects. On the other hand, as in Japan, capital prices in the non-IT intensive non-manufacturing sector (real estate, transportation, eating and drinking places, etc.) were low and this sector was responsible for large negative reallocation effects.
Figure 4-2-2 shows the industry level reallocation effect of aggregated labor inputs in Korea for each period.

As in Japan, other industries (the primary sector, construction and civil engineering) have the lowest labor prices. In Korea, labor inputs in this sector declined steadily over the last three decades at an annual rate of about two percent. This continuous movement of workers from the low labor price sector to other sectors created large positive reallocation effects in labor inputs in Korea.

Until 1990, jobs were mainly created in the manufacturing sectors. After that, however, the two sectors that absorbed the most workers were IT-producing non-manufacturing and non-IT intensive non-manufacturing (real estate, transportation, eating and drinking places, etc.). The IT-producing non-manufacturing sector has high labor prices and contributed to positive reallocation effects in labor input. On the other hand, the non-IT intensive non-manufacturing sector has low labor prices and was responsible for negative labor reallocation effects.
5. Conclusion

Using the recently released EU KLEMS Database (March 2007) and other statistics, we conducted a growth accounting analysis of Korea and Japan. We also compared the movement in ICT investment in Japan with that in Korea based on the data of Pyo, Jung and Cho (2007). In addition, we compared the impact of ICT capital services on economic growth in Japan, the U.S. and major EU countries. Using the KIP Database 2007 and the JIP Database 2006, we also examined the reallocation of resources in Korea and Japan. We studied this issue in a growth accounting framework based on Jorgenson et al. (2007).

The major results obtained through our analysis are as follows:

1. We have found that the slowdown of MFP was a main factor behind Japan’s Lost Decade. We have also found that Korea’s catch-up process with industrial nations in its late industrialization has been predominantly input-led and manufacturing-based as documented in Timmer (1999) and Pyo (2001).

2. We observe that the estimated MFP growth rates in manufacturing are much greater than in services in general, both in Korea and Japan.

3. Both economies experienced a slowdown in economic growth in the 90s. However, growth accounting in both economies tell different stories. The Japanese economy experienced similar problems as the major EU economies with regard to the slowdown of MFP growth. On the other hand, the slowdown in capital accumulation
was a major factor of the slowing economic growth in Korea after the currency crisis in 1997.

4. The sources of growth in the two economies seem to have switched from input-led growth to MFP-growth by the introduction of ICT-intensive production and service industries. Both economies have strong ICT-producing sectors but relatively weaker ICT-using effects.

5. As for ICT capital accumulation, Japan and Korea showed similar patterns. We were not able to find clear differences in the trends of the ICT investment/GDP ratios of the two countries. However, the speed of ICT accumulation in the ICT sector in Korea is faster than that in Japan. The composition of ICT assets in Japan is different from that in Korea. In Japan, investment in computer equipment accounted for the largest share of ICT investment, while in Korea investment in communication equipment accounted for the largest share.

6. The MFP growth rate in the ICT sector in both the Japanese and Korean economies is higher than it is in other sectors. In particular, the MFP growth rate in the Korean ICT-producing service sector is extraordinary high. Comparing Japanese ICT capital accumulation with the U.S. and major EU countries, we find that Japanese ICT capital accumulation is slower than other countries except Italy after 1995.

7. The reallocation effect of capital input was negligible or negative for most periods, both in Korea and Japan. On the other hand, the reallocation effect of labor input was positive for most periods, both in Korea and Japan, and it became greater than the Domar-weighted MFP growth in recent years in both Japan and Korea.
References


