

Shareholder activism in Japan Quiet vs. public activism

Waseda-RIETI Symposium Corporate Control and ESG under "New Capitalism"

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Kazunori (Icko) Suzuki, Waseda University, ECGI

Joint research with Marco Becht (Université Libre de Bruxelles, ECGI) Julian Franks (London Business School, ECGI) Hideaki Miyajima (Waseda University, RIETI)

Preliminary. Results may change.

Part 1: Background Changing Ownership Structure and Hedge Fund Activists





Decline of insider ownership

FY End	1985	1990	2000	2010	2020	Change <u>1985~2020</u>
Individuals	22%	20%	19%	20%	17%	-5%
Non-Financial Corps.	29%	30%	22%	21%	22%	-7%
Financial Corps	38%	39%	36%	25%	20%	-18%
Foreigners	7%	5%	19%	27%	29%	22%

Corporate holdings (non-fin. and fin.) FY end 1985:67% => FY end 2020:42%

Foreigners + individuals ("non-stable" shareholders) FY end 1985:29% => FY end 2020:46%



History of activism in Japan 2000~

[1st Decade = 2000s 1G activists]

Relentless, public and theatrical

- 2000 Murakami/MAC: Dawn of shareholder activism
- 2003 Steel Partners: Relentless activists vs. defensive/refusing target management
- 2007 TCI: Challenge against quasi-governmental utility company
- 2009: Global financial crisis and the retreat of activists



History of activism in Japan 2000~

- [2nd Decade = 2012~now 2G activists] Behind closed door, tactical and more accommodating?
- 2013 Third Point vs. Sony, Effisimo: Comeback of activists
- 2014~15 CG/Stewardship Code: Increased activism
- More engagement from institutional investors
- 2019 Olympus accepting 2 external board members from ValueAct
- 2020~ Toshiba saga



- Facts on shareholder proposals of activist funds
- # of companies received shareholder proposal 2020: 25, 2021: 21, 2022: 47
- Image and the second seco
- Average approval rate of shareholder proposals 2020~2022:
 - Board 27%, Payout 22%,
 - Asset sales 18%, Abolish takeover defense: 30%



Activists are increasingly "active"





Public activism agenda by activists

Engagemen	its			Agenda I	tems for A	Activists			
Start Year	No.	With at least one outcome	Success Rate	Board	Payout	Strategy/ asset sales	Against	Abolish takeover defense	Others
2000	1	0	0.0%	0	1	0	0	0	0
2001	2	1	50.0%	2	2	1	0	0	0
2002	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	10	4	40.0%	1	3	0	1	0	1
2004	13	3	23.1%	2	8	1	3	0	0
2005	15	8	53.3%	3	8	2	4	1	0
2006	5	0	0.0%	0	4	0	0	0	1
2007	11	3	27.3%	1	5	1	3	0	3
2008	4	2	50.0%	0	2	0	2	0	0
2009	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
2011	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
2012	1	0	0.0%	0	1	0	0	0	0
2013	6	3	50.0%	3	1	1	1	0	0
2014	6	2	33.3%	1	4	0	1	1	0
2015	10	6	60.0%	3	8	5	1	0	0
2016	9	4	44.4%	0	8	3	0	0	0
2017	14	3	21.4%	5	8	4	1	1	4
2018	16	5	31.3%	8	11	5	1	2	1
2019	16	1	6.3%	5	8	2	0	2	1
2020	2 6∎	• • • • •	.	• 1 5 •	- 3			• • 1• •	10
2021	24	4	16.7%	8	12	6	3	1	10
TOTAL	190	51	26.8%	55	108	38	21	9	31

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Institutional investor spectrum

Concentration of Investment	Low (Diversified)	Mid (Selective)	High (Concentrated)
	Passive fund manager	Active fund manager	Hedgefund activist
# of invested companies	Thousands	Hundreds	Less than 20
Public shareholder proposal (Voice through public campaign)	No	Yes	Yes
Proxy voting (Voice through voting)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Non-public dialogue with invested firm (Engagement)	Partly yes	Partly yes	Yes
Selling invested firms (Exit)	No	Yes	Yes
# of firms manged by a fund manager	250 per fund mgr	20~30 per fund mgr	< 5 per fund mgr
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Part 2: Our Research Engagement by GO Japan vs. Public Activism by Activists



Our research

- 1. To analyze the engagements conducted by Governance for Owners Japan (GO-Japan)
- 2. Comparison between engagement service (JEC) and active fund engagement (JEF): contents, target responses, outcomes, etc.
- Comparison of returns from GO Japan engagement with that from public activism (CAR, BHAR, etc.)



About GO Japan engagement

□GO Japan: JV 60% GO Inv. Partners, 40% Tokio Marine AM

JEC/JSS (engagement service) Engagement service for institutional investors (fixed fees)

Dialogue on behalf of asset owners 39 firms engaged (total for 2009~2018)

 JEF (TMAM-GO Japan Engagement Fund) TMAM operates the fund and GO Japan provides advisory services as investment advisor
 (performance-based fees) 21 firms engaged (total for 2012~2020)

Closed-door engagement in both cases



JEC/JSS Fund Outstanding Outstan-Year Start End balance Year Start Exit ding balance Total Total

*Source: Becht, Franks, Miyajima and Suzuki (2021)



JEC/JSS	Mean	25%-tile	Median	75%-tile	Min	Max
Mkt cap. at start (in billion yen)	904.0	209.9	364.2	1,103.5	34.2	5,501.6
JEF	Mean	25%-tile	Median	75%-tile	Min	Max
Mkt cap. at start (in billion yen)	164.1	41.1	157.7	216.2	29.1	557.7
TOPIX top 20 percentile	Mean	25%-tile	Median	75%-tile	Min	Max
1		25%-tile 239.5	Median 335.8	75%-tile 3,788.5	Min 143.2	Max 10,016.4
percentile Mkt cap. in 2008 (in	674.5					



JEC/JSS engagement agendas

JEF engagement agendas

Category	N	Outcome	Outcome Prob.	Category	Ν	Outcome	Outcome Prob.
Asset Efficiency/Cash Balance/ Payout	29	20	69.0%	Asset Efficiency/Cash Balance/ Payout	32	17	53.1%
	18.6%				25.8%		
Board	31 19.9%	22	71.0%	Board	17 13.7%	12	70.6%
Disclosure Improvement	22 14.1%	11	50.0%	Disclosure Improvement	14 11.3%	6	42.9%
Enivironment / Social	8 5.1%	1	12.5%	Liquidity improivement/ listing change	8 6.5%	3	37.5%
Remuneration	6 3.8%	2	33.3%	Removal of Takeover Defense	4 3.2%	3	75.0%
Removal of Takeover Defense	11 7.1%	4	36.4%	Strategy	49 39.5%	14	28.6%
Strategy	49 31.4%	20	40.8%	Total	124	55	44.4%
Total	156	80	51.3%				



JEF engagement counterparts

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Level of counterpart	CEO/	External	Senior	Middle	Junior Staff	Outsiders/	Total
	President	Board	Mgmt	Mgmt	Junor Stan	Competitors	Meetings
All Invested Firms	129	17	232	137	10	16	541
(% of total meetings)	23.8%	3.1%	42.9%	25.3%	1.8%	3.0%	100.0%
Average per Firm	6.1	0.8	11.0	6.5	0.5	0.8	25.8
Median per Firm	2	1	11	2	0	0	
Min per Firm	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Max per Firm	32	2	26	23	7	10	



JEC/JSS: CAR at outcome announcement

CAR Period	Aggregate CARs (n=32)	Asset/Cash/ Payout (n=20)	Board (n=22)	Strategy (n=20)	Defense removal (n=4)
[-5~+5]	6.47%**	1.23%	4.94%**	2.97%*	8.29%
[-1~+1]	2.65%*	2.62%	1.13%	0.78%	4.35%*

JEF: CAR at outcome announcement


CAR Period	Aggregate CARs (n=17)	Asset/Cash/ Payout (n=15)	Board (n=11)	Strategy (n=7)	Defense removal (n=3)
[-5~+5]	4.13%	4.55%	0.10%	3.82%	-9.62%
[-1~+1]	9.40%***	6.16%*	3.31%	2.67%	-2.38%



JEC/JSS BHAR (equally weighted over 9 years)

Outcome	BHAR						
	Mean	t-stats	Median	p-value			
With outcome (n=30)	20.5%	0.76	-15.7%	20.1%			
Without outcome (n=6)	24.8%	1.23	27.3%	21.9%			
All (n=36)	21.2%	0.83	-8.7%	61.7%			

JEF BHAR (equally weighted over 8 years)





Benchmark: BHAR of public activism

[BHAR over TOPIX throughout holding period]

	Report submission			Report submission to the end, for sample			
	to the end, for sample						
	with outcor	ne (n=30)		without ou	tcome (n=	51)	
Mean	23.66%	1.91*		15.37%	2.15**		
Median	7.05%	1.42	(Wilcoxon)	4.46%	1.70*	(Wilcoxon)	



Outcome of JEF engagement

- Board: Outcome 12/17 (71%)
- □ Payout: Outcome 17/32 (53%)
- Strategy: Outcome 14/49 (29%)
- Removal of takeover defense: Outcome 3/4 (75%)
- Liquidity/listing: Outcome 3/8 (38%)
- Generally comparable outcome (success) rate as JEC (41% vs. 51%)
- Higher success rate than the public activists' shareholder proposal campaign
- CAR [-1,+1] around outcome larger than JEC (9.4% vs. 2.7%), but CAR [-5, +5] lower.
- BHAR much higher than JEC (61.6% vs. 21.2%)



Public activism and outcome/CARs

[Source] Activist shareholding/activism data compiled from newspaper data sources, EDINET (government database) and other data sources.

[Period] Activist cases: 2001~2020 Dec.: 230 target firms recorded



JEC/JSS engagement agendas

JEF engagement agendas

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Asset Efficiency/Cash Balance/ Payout	29	20	69.0%	Asset Efficiency/Cash Balance/ Payout	32	17	53.1%
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Removal of Takeover Defense	11 7.1%	4	36.4%	Strategy	49	14	28.6%
Strategy	49	20	40.8%	Total	<u>39.5%</u> 124	55	44.4%
Total	31.4% 156	80	51.3%				*****



GOJ engagement vs. activism

[Outcome rate]

□JEF: 44%, JEC: 51% Public activism: 27%

Possible reasons for the difference

 (1) Quiet dialogue leads to more open discussion and acceptance of the agenda
 (2) Activists may engage quietly before the public activism (under-estimation of the outcome rate)
 (3) GO Japan may choose better agenda for a target company and engage in longer-term perspectives



CAR around outcome announcement

CAR	JEF	JEC/JSS	Activists
Period	(n=17)	(n=34)	(n=47)
[-5~+5]	4.13%	6.47%**	7.44%***
[-1~+1]	9.4%***	2.65%*	4.85%***

* The first figure in each cell reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the period, and the second figure in brackets reports t-statistics, where "*" and "**" showing that the statistics is significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Source: Becht, Franks, Miyajima and Suzuki (2019)



CAR around outcome announcement [CAR/BHAR]


□JEF experiences larger mean CAR around announcement of outcome (9% for CAR[-1~+1]), but several cases experience large negative CAR prior to the outcome announcement

There are additional CAR of +3.5% for public activists when they submit "tairyo-hoyuu (large holdings)" statement.

BHARs are much higher for JEF (average 62%) than that of JEC (avg. 21%) and public activism (avg. 19%).



Submission of statement and CAR





Conclusion

On average, GO Japan's quiet (not public) engagements work well.

Outcome (success) rate for agendas higher (around 50%) than that of public activism (27%).

CARs at outcome announcement are comparable between public and GO Japan activism.

BHARs are much higher for JEF (average 62%) than that of JEC (avg. 21%) and public activism (avg. 19%). *BHARs can be higher if we reflect the timing of entry or exit.

=> Quiet engagement can work as well or better than public activism.