Government of Nature:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Challenges

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Resource Governance at JICA-RI

- Focus on the trade-offs between multiple resources as an integral part of development process.

- Focus on the conflict and cooperation of key stakeholders in resource governance not only between the state and people but within the state itself.

- Emphasize historical trends in state formations to explain divergent institutional performance.

Topic Varieties

- Comparison of the evolution of resource administration in Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan.

- Resettlement and Infrastructure related conflict resolution in India, Sri Lanka, and Japan.

- "Resource Curse" in Zambian Copper development.

The Root of the Problem

- The "fit" between institutions and resource problems

  1) Inter-sectoral

  2) High uncertainty

  3) Multi-scale, multi-point source

  4) Unclear boundaries to establish property

- Bureaucratic fragmentation and in-action

  (cf. Parkinson's law)

Main Questions Today

- How do growth oriented developmental states adopt environmental institutions? (Foreign pressure? High environmental costs? NGOs movements?)

- If these countries are taking early enough actions, why are their environmental performance so poor?

So2 reduction/increase

Race to the later half of Kuznet (trend in ratio of SO2/ income per capita)

Two Types of Literature

- Cross-country statistical work with political, economic and geographical factors as explanatory variable for divergent environmental performance (e.g., environmental Kuznets curve).

- Within country sectoral case studies with a focus on institutional arrangement, people's participation, gap between policies and implementation.

Critique of the Literature

- State as monolithic entity.

- Lack of historical contexts.

- People and NGOs as sole change agents

- Sectoral division of labor.

Thailand as a Case

- While experiencing average economic growth rate of 8% in the 1960-70s; they have also enacted a comprehensive environmental law since 1975.

- Thai forest conservation laws dates back to 1916 and the forest department has expanded consistently while the actual forest cover declined to 1/3.

# Decline of Forests and Expansion of Forest Bureaucracy

Possible explanations

- Urge of development simply much stronger than that of environmental conservation?

- Do we have to wait for these countries to be rich enough to enjoy the environmental Kuznets curve?

- These arguments not only forgo the opportunity to *explain* but they are also unhelpful in deriving policy options.

A Brief History of Resource Governance in Thailand

- Nature became resources around late 19th century:

  1) Royal Mines and Geology Department (1891)
  2) Royal Forest Department (1896)

- Technologies included mapping, statistics, human resource training, marketing but their main function was to <u>resolve conflicts of interests</u>.

- The main function of these departments was to centralize revenue collection system, but it also involved "normalization of people" who were considered "untamed."

Bureaucratization of the Environment

1897   Teak Conservation Law

1901   Mines Act

1938   Forest Conservation Law

1958   National Park Law

1960   Wildlife Protection Law

1975   National Environmental Board established in the Ministry of Science and Technology

1981   National Environmental Policy

1992   Three Departments established (Pollution Control, Policy and Planning, Environmental Quality Promotion)

1997   Twenty year Plan for the Environment

2002   Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment established

Analyzing the State Structure

Around 1910

Ministry of Interior

Forestry

Mining

Irrigation

Range of State Interests

Sequence of State Interventions

Types of Resources/ environment	Technologies of Intervention	Incentive for intervention
Specific Good (e.g., teak)	Private property system	Revenue collection Dispute resolution
Land including the good (forests)	Mapping & statistics	Revenue security Dispute resolution
Land including multiple goods (biodiversity)	Species based map	Public goods security International standard
Environmental space with different intensity (air, water, waste)	Monitoring of output and law enforcement	Public complaints, health risk
Env. Space with similar intensity (climate)	Monitoring of source	International standard

**Time**

Observations

- Definition of Forests:

  "A land that no one claims its property rights in accordance with the land law"

  → Agricultural conversion, suppression of hill people

- Separation of planning/research and implementation (e.g., irrigation and water)

  → Policy beautification with less impact

- Expansion of resource bureaucracy invite *within-state* competition (e.g., mining & forestry)

Hypothetical trend and focus

Coverage of State Interest

Air, Pollution &Climate

water & ecosystem

Land

Forests & Mineral

Domain of state control

1890s - 1910s   1950s-60s   1970s-2000s

Implications for "building" institutions

- New institutions must be implemented in light of *accumulated layers* of property relations.

- Bureaucracy develops its own enemy within.

- Strengthening area based governance in instead of the functional is more promising.

- "Decentralization" is one possibility but yet to see what exactly is being decentralized.

More questions…

- How can we "environmentalize" an institution which was originally mandated to produce, instead of conserve, resources?

- Creating a new organization? No. We must devise ways to link forces that are scattered within the state system.

- International assistance tend to invite bureaucratic segmentation than promoting integration. Is there a better chance for relatively new recipients of aid to introduce integrated resource governance?

Summary

- State expansion often comes with segmentation of planning/research branch and implementation branch which tends to invite in-action.

- Accumulative effects of power relations and techniques employed in the governance process are central to the understanding of resource policy (not just organizations, rules and regulations).

- The way bureaucratic division of labor occurs gives us hints on why good institutional arrangements perform poorly.

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