Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade: Theory and Evidence

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Outline

- (1) How actually the protection of IPR is dispersed among countries?
- (2) Why the harmonization of IPR protection is so difficult?
- (3) Stronger IPR will be better: evidences from the export, the local production and the offshore R&D of Japanese firms.
- (4) New paradigm of international trade: importance of IPR enforcement in East Asian countries
- (5) Policy suggestion: importance of international coordination and cooperation

How actually the protection of IPR is dispersed among countries?

Dispersion of patent protection system



Higher income, stronger patent protection



Why the harmonization of IPR protection is so difficult: theoretical aspects

Conflicts of national interests

- Suppose a country maximizes the total welfare of its own country (consumer's surplus and innovators profit)
 - The country wants the strongest protection of patent in foreign countries, and weakest protection in its own domestic markets.
- The smaller or more innovative country prefers longer-than-optimal protection, while the larger country prefers shorter-than-optimal protection.
- Countries disagree on the harmonized protection.

Is IPR protection consistent with innovation and growth?

- The case for weak protection
 - IPR protection guarantees the monopoly power in market and may not stimulus to innovation in the closed and less competitive market.
 - Strong IPR protection limits the dissemination of new ideas and opportunities for economic growth.
 - In the innovation-consuming countries, the cost of monopolization offsets the contribution of stronger IPR protection.

- The case for strong protection
 - In open trade, weak IPR protection impedes the efforts of technology-importing countries because innovating firms refuse to license or lease new technology, deter FDI and joint venture in R&D. This limits the dissemination of new knowledge.

Dynamic Equilibrium of Innovation and Growth between "North" and "South"



Is IPR protection consistent with innovation and growth?

- long run
 - in open trade, North produces more old-technology goods, which takes resources away from innovation because the stronger protection limits the imitation which enables South to develop the production of new goods.
 - The rate of innovation falls in the world.
 - Better market access to North promotes the production by South, then mitigates the deficiency of the stronger IPR.

No clear-cut relation between IPR, trade and economic growth

Stronger IPR will be better: some empirical evidences of Japanese firms

- Export and local production of Japanese MNC: asymmetry
- Offshore R&D
- Modes of offshore R&D
- Intra-firm technology transfer

Many studies using US and European firm data by Keith Maskus.

Effects of IPR on Japanese export and local production: asymmetry between high and low income countries

| Source: Makeoudi (2007) | Export | Local Production | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|------------------|--|
| | 1995-98 | 1995-98 | |
| Constant | 17.5842 *** | 2.8657 | |
| | (4.3976) | (0.3995) | |
| North country | -7.5422 *** | -2.7817 | |
| | (-4.6466) | (-0.9554) | |
| GDP | 0.2022 * | 0.6258 *** | |
| | (1.8034) | (3.1117) | |
| Per capita GDP | 0.8369 *** | 0.5047 | |
| | (2.9360) | (0.9870) | |
| Distance | -1.1496 *** | -0.9008 ** | |
| | (-5.4939) | (-2.3999) | |
| Patent Index*South country dummy | -0.1462 | 1.3497 | |
| | (-0.3138) | (1.6265) | |
| Patent Index*North country dummy | 1.7013 *** | 1.5872 *** | |
| | (6.0068) | (3.1242) | |
| Ν | 40 | 40 | |
| R^2 | 0.7703 | 0.5829 | |

Positive effect on offshore R&D

| Dependent verieblet | Constant | -8.904 ** (2.33700) |
|-------------------------|---|------------------------|
| R&D/Local sales | per caita GDP | -2.033 ** |
| | | (0.30000) |
| | Infrastructe | 1.347 ** |
| | | (0.35300) |
| | IPR | 8.807 ** |
| | | (0.51 100) |
| | Export | 0.151 ** |
| | | (0.00800) |
| | Operating period | 0.21 ** |
| | IPR Export Operating period Industry dummy Year dummy | (0.06800) |
| | Industry dummy | ** |
| | Year dummy | ** |
| | R ² | 0.094236 |
| Source: Wakasugi (2007) | Ν | 10578 |

IPR and modes of offshore R&D

| | 1998 Marginal Effects | | |
|-------------|-----------------------|----------|----------|
| Variable | No, R&D | No, Lab | Yes, Lab |
| SalesEx | -0.0006 | 0.0002 | 0.0005 |
| Age | -0.0021 | 0.0002 | 0.0019 |
| Sales | -0.0010 | 0.0007 | 0.0004 |
| P_R&D | -0.018 | 0.008 | 0.010 |
| P_Sales | -0.000004 | 0.000002 | 0.000002 |
| Researchers | -0.360 | 0.134 | 0.226 |
| Tech | -0.047 | 0.002 | 0.045 |
| R_IPR | -0.159 | 0.073 | 0.086 |

Source: Ito and Wakasugi (2007)

Technology transfer of Japanese MNC

Dependent Variable: In TF (Royalty Payments from Subsidiaries to Their Parent Firm)

| | [1]Random | [2]Tobit |
|--|-----------|-----------|
| ln(IPP: "Index of Patent Pichts" in the best country) | 0.536 | 0.727 |
| m(<i>IFK</i> . Index of Fatent Rights in the nost country) | [0.135]** | [0.231]** |
| $\ln(P, R \& D; R \& D)$ expanditures of Japanese parent firms) | 0.084 | 0.120 |
| In(1_N&D. K&D experiences of Japanese parent finns) | [0.016]** | [0.028]** |
| $1 \times (FMD, 41 + \dots + 1 + \dots + f + fG1) + (1 + \dots + 1 + \dots + 1)$ | 0.633 | 1.157 |
| In(<i>EMP</i> : the number of affiliate's employee) | [0.028]** | [0.053]** |
| | -0.163 | -0.282 |
| In(<i>MSIZE</i> : total industrial value added in the nost country) | [0.036]** | [0.062]** |
| TAY, the components to water in boot converters minute the one in Israen | 0.025 | 0.047 |
| TAX: the corporate tax rate in nost country minus the one in Japan | [0.007]** | [0.012]** |
| Industry dummy variables | Yes | Yes |
| | 2.255 | 1.278 |
| Constant | [0.986]* | [1.681] |
| the number of observations | 2,269 | 2,269 |

Source: Wakasugi and Ito (2007)

New paradigm of international trade: importance of IPR enforcement in East Asian countries



Low technology

using A's high technology

Offshore outsourcing in the production process of X1, by using A's superior technology and cheap labor in country B, with a cost to coordinate the task of X1 in B with other tasks in A

"Using A's technology in country B" must be noted

Japanese firms outsourcing offshore



Ito, Tomiura and Wakasugi (2007)

China and East Asia: major destination





Ito, Tomiura and Wakasugi (2007)

Offshore outsourcing of production process



IPR and offshoring: A key role for trade and growth in East Asia

- Offshoring is a key for increasing trade and growth in East Asia.
- Technology transfer is crucial for unbundling the tasks and offshoring.
- Stronger IPR protection will raise the contractibility and provides a favorable market condition for technology transfer.
- Stronger IPR protection will be a key for trade and growth in East Asia under a new paradigm of international trade.

Policy suggestion: importance of international coordination and cooperation between advanced and emerging countries

Policy suggestions

- Importance of the harmonization of IPR protection among trade partners, in particular East Asian countries which absorb FDI/foreign technology and are incorporated in global outsourcing.
- Capacity building for creating innovation and absorbing foreign technology is important as well as support for establishing IPR protection and enforcement
- Trade liberalization is important for stronger IPR enforcement.
- Multilateral agreement among not only advanced countries but also emerging countries including China is crucial for the effective enforcement of IPR.

- To achieve these policy goals,
- (1) Establishment of APO (Asian Patent Office), like EPO (European Patent Office)
- (2) Trilateral network among UPO, EPO an APO toward WPO (World Patent Office, like WTO)
- are considerable for trade and economic development of the world.

Thanks!