



# Comments on Black-Jang-Kim paper

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# Question:

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**Do good governance structures cause increase of firm value ?**



# Alternative hypotheses:

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## **1. Signaling.**

**Firms adopt good  
governance structures to  
signal quality**



## 2. Reverse causality.

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- **Firms with high value more likely to adopt good governance structures to raise firm value still higher**



# Data and methodology:

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- **1. Data**

- **Survey data by KSE on governance structure (540 firms in 2001)**
  - **Constructing corporate governance indices (CG)**

- **2. Methodology**

- **2SLS and 3SLS estimation, using asset size dummy as an instrument**



# Result

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- **The authors' hypothesis is accepted.**
- **The two alternative hypotheses are rejected.**
- **Good CG causes increase of firm value.**



# Comment 1: Effect of endogenous portion of CG

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- **Firms with low value tend to have governance structure with higher CG index (Table 7)**
- **What does this relationship mean ?**
- **Does a certain restructuring mechanism work for firms with poor performance like contingent governance in Japan or take over in US ?**



# Comment 2: Relative magnitude of CG effect

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- Positive effect of CG1 on Tobin's q is larger for Chaebol firms than for non-Chaebol firms (Table 6)
- Positive effect of CG1 on Tobin's q is larger for firms with asset larger than KRW 2 trillion than for the others (Table 6)
- The result on Chaebol firms is robust, if we control for endogeneity (Table 10)
- How can we explain the difference of CG effect depending upon Chaebol affiliation and firm size?






# Comment 3: Another way to test the signaling hypothesis

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
- Information value of good governance structures is smaller for firms with asset larger than KRW 2 trillion, because some of the elements are mandatory by regulation
  - Signaling hypothesis predicts that the effect of CG1 is smaller for firms with asset larger than KRW 2 trillion
- On the other hand, positive effect of CG1 on Tobin's q is larger for firms with asset larger than KRW 2 trillion than for the others  
(Table 6)



# Comment 4: Qualification of the conclusions

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- Regulation concerning the firms with asset larger than KWR2 trillion is relevant only to the subindices C and D, and not to A, B, E and P
- The asset size dummy is an good instrument only for C and D
- Even in the cases of CG1 and the other composite indices, what can be evaluated as exogenous variance is only the portion of variance due to C and D
- The hypothesis rigidly tested in this paper is the causality from outside director and audit committee to firm value



# Comment 5: Some more instruments ?

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- Are debt/equity and sales growth exogenous ?
- If not, we should add instrument variables