

Expectations for Completion of Full-Fledged Agricultural Policy Reform

YAMASHITA Kazuhito

Senior Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract

In moves to strengthen international competitiveness the EU is lowering prices for farm products and introducing a direct payment scheme. For structural reform, it will be necessary to reduce prices and adopt direct payments limited to eligible farms. In order to adopt aggressive agriculture policy there is vital need to carry out structural reform and achieve “robust farming.”

This latest round of reforms represents an important first step toward full-fledged reform in Japanese agricultural policy. From the perspective of rehabilitating the country’s agriculture through structural reform, however, this plan is incomplete, and it will be important to continue the reform process.

This article was published by the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Division, Research Bureau of the House of Representatives in "Scholars' Viewpoints on 'Aratana keiei shotoku antei taisaku to' (New Measures for Stabilizing Farming Household Incomes)" (January 2006).

Introduction

I served in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) for nearly 30 years, but looking back now I must say with regret that the only truly notable progress achieved during that time was the introduction of direct payments to farmers in hilly and mountainous areas and other agricultural districts. In my position at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) I am now observing the nation’s agricultural policy from the sidelines. Although I do not believe that Gresham’s law “bad money drives good money out of circulation” can be applied to MAFF, according to the conclusions of a certain research study it would appear that, in Japan: “...many members of the top management of superior companies seem to have spent some time on an offshoot during their careers. Those who have faced hardships while working in peripheral departments or subsidiaries have generally been more successful in carrying out reforms than those who were swept along in the company's mainstream and moved

smoothly up the ranks. It is for the very reason that such people had the opportunities to view companies objectively from the outside that they were able to perceive the true essence of corporate operations with clear presence of mind, thereby discovering the irrational points that demand reform” (Hiroaki Niihara). Both former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Hiroo Wada and former MAFF Vice-Minister Takekazu Ogura, two men instrumental in steering postwar agricultural policy in Japan, experienced imprisonment, demotion and other setbacks earlier in their lives. In this sense, it is my hope that the opinions expressed here, in the aforementioned capacity of observer, will prove of some use in the development of future agricultural policy.

1. The Need for Agricultural Policy Reform

Although Japanese agriculture has been protected over the years by high farm produce prices supported by tariffs, the state of the country’s farming has continued to decline. Agriculture as a percentage of GDP has slipped from 9% in 1960 to only 1% at the present, while the level of elderly farmers (age 65 or over) has risen from 10% to 60% during the same period. Full-time farming households have declined from 34.3% to 19.5% of all farming households, in contrast to the increase in “class 2 part-time farmers” from 32.1% to 67.1%. Rice, which was cheaper than the international market levels until 1953, has seen a stark decline in its global competitiveness due to protection under an almost 800% tariff and other measures. Japan’s food self-sufficiency rate has plummeted from 79% to 40%.

In order to cope with the tariff reductions demanded in World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreement negotiations, it has proved necessary to lower Japan’s domestic farm produce prices.

2. The Structure of Japan’s Agricultural Protection

The Producer Support Estimate (PSE), developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as an indicator of agricultural protection, is calculated by adding the consumer burden of high domestic produce prices (the difference between domestic and international prices multiplied by production volume) to the taxpayer burden of subsidies and payments to farmers. In 2004, the PSE in the United States was \$46.5 billion, in the EU \$133.4 billion and in Japan \$48.7 billion. With Japan’s PSE being roughly the same as that in the U.S. and far less than half that in the EU, the overall level of protection is not high.

Nevertheless, Japan is criticized both at home and abroad for being the world's most agriculturally protectionist country, which constantly adopts solely negative responses in the farming sector in WTO negotiations and other global forums. The reason for this situation lies in Japan's mistaken approach to market protection.

Examining a breakdown of the PSE, which as mentioned is calculated from the burdens of consumers and taxpayers, the shift in the share of the consumer burden when comparing the 1986-'88 level to that of 2004 represented a decline from 46% to 35% in the U.S., and a fall from 85% to 54% for the EU. In contrast, in Japan the burden rose slightly from 90% to 91%. In the U.S. and the EU, agricultural policy reforms are being promoted to shift the burden away from consumers and onto taxpayers. For example, in 1992 the EU lowered regional support prices for grains and other produce and began compensating farmers with direct payments from the public coffers. In the EU today, it is possible to compete with US-grown wheat free of export subsidies or tariffs. Only Japan has been left behind in reform, with the current structure effectively pitting the U.S. and EU against Japan. Because of its tariff- and price-dependent approach to agricultural protection, Japan has no choice but to oppose tariff cuts at WTO talks and other forums.

Table: Comparisons of Policies in Selected Countries

Category / Country	Japan	U.S.	EU
Direct payment untied to production	No	Yes	Yes
Environment direct payment	No	Yes	Yes
Direct payment by farmland area	No	Yes	Yes
Direct payment to disadvantaged districts	Yes	No	Yes
Price supports by production adjustment	Yes	No	No
1,000% + tariff	2 items (miscellaneous beans, konjak root)	None	None
500–1,000% tariffs	2 items (rice, peanuts)	None	None
300–500% tariffs	2 items (butter, sugar)	None	None
200–300% tariffs	5 items (wheat, starch, raw silk, etc.)	None	2 items (certain dairy products, sugar) Reforms may lower rates to 100%

When protection for farming is biased toward specified products, the result is even greater economic inefficiency. According to the OECD index of differentials in commodity support the OECD average is 75, the EU is 59 and the U.S. is 29, but Japan stands out at a whopping 118. This shows that in comparison to other countries Japan’s agricultural protection leans heavily toward specific products – rice in particular.

3. Declining Food Self-Sufficiency and International Competitiveness Due to Consumer Burden-Weighted Agricultural Policy

The former Agricultural Basic Law of 1961 sought to structurally reform Japanese agriculture through cost reductions based on scale expansion and productivity improvements, raising agricultural earnings and correcting the income disparities between agriculture and industry. In reality, however, the focus of agricultural policy was predominantly placed on the price of rice in an attempt to raise farm household income. Implementing production set-aside programs on rice for over 30 years, a crop for which demand was falling and there was eventually a surplus, and the failure to shift

farming resources from rice (and the high returns it generated) to other crops effectively lowered Japan's food self-sufficiency rate.

As cost per unit of agricultural produce is calculated by dividing the cost per unit of farmland by yield, increasing the yield through improvements in crop varieties and other technical progress should lower the cost of the produce. However, yield increase would have led to strengthened production set-aside programs and improvements in yield have been curbed. Moreover, with the high price of rice making it cheaper for high-cost farm households to grow their own rice than to buy it, small farmers remained in business and there has been no consolidation of farmland, thereby undermining plans to expand farm scale. In this way structural reform has failed to make headway and international competitiveness has fallen. Even following the abolition of the Food Control Law, a cartel continued to support the price of rice through production set-aside programs.

4. Desirable Agricultural Policy Reform

Small part-time farmers averaged an income of ¥1.09 million from rice sales in 2002, but just ¥120,000 translated into farming income after costs were subtracted. Even this income would disappear with a mere ¥1,800 drop in the current rice price of ¥16,000 per 60kg. If production set-aside programs were abolished and the price of rice was lowered to around ¥9,500 on a supply-demand equilibrium basis, part-time farmers would stop cultivation and rent out their croplands. On the other hand, if direct payments were issued to full-time farms above a certain acreage thus increasing their ability to pay land rents, full-time farmers would consolidate farmland and costs would decrease. Factors necessary to achieve more efficient agriculture through structural reform, therefore, are lower prices and direct payments limited to eligible farms.

There is no valid reason for farmers' organizations to oppose this on the grounds that farms are chosen on a selective basis. Although small farmers would not receive direct payments when cultivating on their own, if cropland were rented out to full-time farmers it would become possible for those small farmers to also receive a portion of the direct payments in the form of increases in their land rental income.

Moreover, these direct payments would fuel demand for farmland and also lead to effective use of abandoned cultivated land for agriculture and food production. This arrangement would be superior to the approach of maintaining regulations or taxation

exclusively for the purpose of the upkeep of such abandoned farmland.

5. Assessment of Current Agricultural Policy Reform¹

Up to now, despite the fact that the Japan Agricultural (JA) cooperatives have carried out expansion of scale through consolidation for the sake of streamlining their own management and organization, JA has opposed the structural reform vision of nurturing entrepreneurial full-time farmers and expanding the scale of farming, labeling it selective policy, ever since the passage of the Agricultural Basic Law. This is most likely because the opinions of part-time farmers, a segment that enjoys an overwhelming majority under the system of one vote per union member pursuant to the Agricultural Cooperative Law, are readily reflected in JA operations. This leads to political clout not for full-time farmers, who are few, but for the part-time majority. Current farming policy reform deserves high marks for going a considerable way toward breaking through this barrier and placing limits on the farms targeted under the policy.

Nevertheless, if we use the WTO traffic light analogy, current reform is effectively limited to switching one part of “amber box” direct payments (deficit payments) to “green box” (no holds barred) direct payments, and will fail to implement direct payments like those in the EU to address tariff or price cuts. While the element of limiting eligible farms has been introduced in these reforms, the additional element of direct payments accompanying price reductions has yet to be realized. Because of this, in addition to rice² (for which no direct payments have been introduced), the effects of structural reform cannot be expected to wheat and other dryland crops, as the prices of such crops will not fall. It will also be difficult to respond in WTO talks and in that sense, current reform remains incomplete.

Before World War II, the Ministry of the Army, which championed the cause of food self-sufficiency, opposed the “acreage set-aside” policy proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to support the price of rice. True food self-sufficiency is incompatible with production set-aside and rice price supports. This raises another question. As Japan enters an era of major population decline, to what lengths will those

¹ For discussion of apprehension about declining food self-sufficiency, etc., see K. Yamashita (2005 e, f, and g).

² With regard to rice, there are measures aimed at easing the income fluctuations of those who bear the burden. However, to instill these measures with structural reform effects will require reductions and fluctuations in the price of rice.

in positions of responsibility at farmers' organizations go to demand that farmers bolster production set-aside aimed at maintaining the price of rice against the backdrop of steadily declining demand? If the idea is to sustain the price of rice at the current level even if the nation's population falls to 100 million, it will be necessary to carry out production adjustments of approximately 2.2 million hectares, thereby shrinking the cultivation area to about 500,000 hectares (or half the current level). Under that scenario, the downside of the food security argument is abundantly clear.

Lowering the price of rice would make it possible to generate new demand for imported products made from rice flour and other ingredients, livestock feed rice, and rice for use in biodegradable plastics, ethanol and other areas, thereby raising the overall consumption of rice. Besides this, the relative profitability of rice versus wheat and other crops would be corrected, expanding production of wheat and similar crops. Paddy fields would be put to full use in an ongoing trend that would serve to improve Japan's food self-sufficiency.

Who will resist efforts to lower prices? Full-time farmers, who project that even if the government weathers the negotiations this time around tariffs are destined to come down sooner or later, likely feel that they will be unable to maintain their income if they do not expand in scale and reduce costs. For these farms it would be appropriate to deal with price declines by augmenting their income with direct payments. Of the average ¥7.92 million annual income of small part-time farmers, a figure far above the ¥6.46 million for wage-earning households, only a paltry ¥120,000 is generated from rice farming. Under these circumstances, it makes far more financial sense to give up rice growing and collect farmland rental income.

JA, however, is opposed to any cuts in the price of rice or other farm produce. This stance stems from the fact that such cuts would make it difficult for the cooperatives to maintain high income from sales commissions, and also bring a halt to the high prices that they charge farmers for chemical fertilizers, agrochemicals and other supplies. In an ideal world, collective purchasing of supplies by cooperatives functions to raise bargaining power in the marketplace, thereby enabling supplies to be sold to members at lower prices. For the JA, however, selling to its membership at inflated prices is a method used to generate profits. This situation is a flaw in the design of the agricultural cooperative system. When it comes to sales of supplies, JA should subscribe to a system under which the cheaper it sells these items the higher its commissions become. Once that step is taken, price negotiations with the producers of those supplies would become

a far more serious affair.

Contradictions have also emerged from the dearth of integration in agricultural policy. While infrastructure improvements in farmland are a private investment, the justification for carrying out farming infrastructure projects through public works is that such cost cutting will lower the prices of farm produce and those savings will be channeled back to consumers. In contrast, however, assistance has been given to production set-aside, which in essence amounts to refusal to lower the price of rice. It is vital, therefore, that agricultural policy reform not be limited to direct payments alone, but rather be carried out in a comprehensive and inclusive manner geared also to encompass farmland management and proper approaches to farmers' organizations.

6. Expectations for Genuine Agricultural Policy Reform

In WTO negotiations the U.S., the EU, Brazil and almost all other major players are in agreement on maximum import tariff rates of approximately 100%. The only exceptions recognized were for the rates for scaling back of tariffs, with no exceptions made for maximum tariff rates. EU opposition to the exceptions recognized under this scheme is based on the fact that its current maximum tariff rate of 200% is lower than that of Japan's. This means that under the 50% plus tariff reduction rate demanded by the U.S., the EU tariff would fall below a 100% maximum rate (at an 80% reduction rate, the tariff would further shrink to 40%). Even if exceptions are approved, the condition that compensation must be paid in the form of an expansion in tariff-rate quota (TRQ) is the same as the case of the special treatment of tariffication for rice in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks and almost all major powers have agreed to that approach.

The protection of farming and the means used to implement that protection are totally separate issues. Tariffs, prices and other steps are strictly means to an end – nothing more, nothing less. To cope with tariff cuts, it is possible to adopt the EU approach of introducing direct payments and lowering domestic prices.³ However, expanding tariff quotas against a backdrop of disparities between domestic and overseas prices will trigger contraction in domestic production. In the event of calls for improvements in food self-sufficiency, in cases when demands are made to either lower tariffs or expand tariff quotas, there should be no hesitation in choosing the route of lowering tariffs and striving to introduce direct payments. This is a lesson that should have been learned

³ Last November the EU lowered by 36% the price of sugar, which had remained untouched for 40 years up that point, with 64% of the lowered value converted to direct payments.

from the tariffication of rice in 1999. If the desire is to team up with the EU in WTO negotiations, there will be a need to collaborate on the policy front as well. Why can't Japan do what the EU has done? Is the EU in fact sacrificing its farming sector by lowering price supports? Lowering tariffs does not signify defeat at the negotiating table. The price cuts and the direct payments to full-time farming households required through this transition will spark the revival and structural reform of agriculture.

Using PSE calculations, the consumer burden of Japan's agricultural protection is ¥5 trillion, while the taxpayer burden is only ¥500 billion. According to the OECD the full value of direct payments translates into farm income, but under price supports the level of farming income after paying for agrochemicals, fertilizers and other supply costs drops to less than one-fourth of the revenue. Even if domestic prices are lowered to the international level, the direct payments of ¥1.25 trillion (equivalent to one-fourth of \$5 trillion) would make it possible to maintain farm income at the present level.⁴ The figure of \$5 trillion is equivalent to 2% of the consumption tax. At the present time, consumers are paying taxes for high-priced farm produce. Even if consumption tax were raised by 2% there would be no change in the overall burden on the public. While there is naturally a need to review the budget for agriculture, forestry and fisheries, if that is not enough it would be acceptable to raise consumption tax by 2%, mobilize agricultural policy to have one-fourth or less of that amount returned and use the remainder to finance fiscal reconstruction. MAFF should also take the initiative in clearly and openly demanding what it deems necessary to achieve this end.

While there is much talk about "agriculture renewal," true agricultural renewal requires robust farming. Efforts to achieve a solid agricultural base through structural reform are vital for both the sake of exports and for securing the domestic market. If Japan converts to direct payment-based agricultural policy, it would open the door to coping with tariff reductions and to taking the offensive at the negotiating table. There are weaknesses in the U.S., EU and Brazil positions.⁵

⁴ This is roughly the same value as the trial computations for the system of direct payments per acreage that I have asserted. See K. Yamashita (2004 c), pp. 308-10.

⁵ The greatest weakness the U.S. position is the CCP (counter-cyclical payments – which effectively amount to deficit payments). The portion of the CCP earmarked for exports is economically indistinguishable from export subsidies. Should this be recognized as "blue box" policy? The U.S. claims that setting the maximum blue box policy at 2.5% or less of agricultural production value amounts to retrenchment of the CCP, although the standard years used to compute the agricultural production value raise questions. U.S. agricultural production value during 1996-'98, the years insisted upon by Washington for used as the standard, was \$200.2 billion. In contrast, the value during the standard years of 1986-'88 under the current AMS calculations is only \$142.9 billion.

In my view, the Japan proposition vis-a-vis direct payment for the sake of achieving multifunctional agriculture, a concept dismissed at the time of Japan's modality proposal of 2002, needs to be revived, with a review of the idea of adopting the green box policy for payment of domestic subsidies. This is indeed a globally viable assertion that is supported by the OECD. In addition, if the intention is truly to drum up support for food security, the proper route will be either to abolish or exercise control over export volume restrictions or export duties by exporter countries.

Conclusion

In postwar Japan, agricultural land reform was carried out as a major revamping of agricultural policy, which realized the prewar dreams of agricultural administrative bureaucrats. However, because this reform was so sweeping, subsequent farming policymakers thought only of preserving the fruits of that change. This, in turn, impeded resolution of another key issue – the structure of small-scale farming. Thus, while the latest reform is incomplete, they nevertheless augur well for the future.

In *The WTO and Agricultural Policy Reform*, written five years ago, I made a case for structural reform through lowering prices and direct payments in which the eligibility criteria would be specified. At that time I received warm support and encouragement from the distinguished representatives of the Agricultural Economics Society of Japan taking part in the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Center founded by Takekazu Ogura, principal architect of the Agricultural Basic Law. However, there was no reaction from others involved in the farming field and, as it turned out my assertions amounted to little more than “the cry of a lonely crane in the wilderness” – the metaphor used by Seiichi Tohata to describe the agricultural policy theories of Kunio Yanagida.

In this latest reform, however, a part of these aims has been realized. I cite, for instance, the fact that ruling parties have also accepted the concept of direct payments only to the eligible full-time farmers. The main impetus of this reform was generated by the forerunners of Japanese agricultural policy – among them Kunio Yanagida, Tadaatsu Ishiguro, Hiroo Wada, Shiro Tohata and Takekazu Ogura. In a marked change from the

The weakness of the EU position is the low tariff-rate quota (TRQ). Even for rice, the crop for which Japan's TRQ is the lowest, consumption is 8%. For wheat, it is close to 90%. The EU does not pledge domestic consumption of 5%, but only the balance left after subtracting past import volume. For beef this is 2% of consumption, while for cheese it is 3%.

A negotiating offensive against Brazil may be mounted on its high tariffs on industrial products.

situation that existed two years ago, around the time when I was sent to my current post at RIETI, the official MAFF recruitment guide now extols the ministry's "passionate spirit of reform."

All in all, I have high hopes and expectations that the meaningful completion of Japan's agricultural reform is at last drawing close.

(December 1, 2005)

References

- Egaitsu, F. and Shogenji, S. (1995); "*Kokoro yutaka nare nihon nogyo shinron*" (Become Rich in Heart – New Theories on Japanese Agriculture); Ie-No-Hikari Association.
- Kawano, S. (2000); "*Kaiso no nogyo, keizai*" (Agriculture and the Economy in Retrospect); Ie-No-Hikari Association.
- Kojima, K. (1994); "*Oyoo kokusai keizaigaku, dainihan*" (Applied International Economics, Second Edition; Bunshindo.
- Kondo, T. (1998); "*Kihonho noseika no nihon inasaku – sono keiryō keizaiteki kenkyū*" (Econometrical Research of Japanese Rice Growing Under the Agricultural Basic Law-Based Farming Policy); Hokkaido University Press.
- Masuda, B. (1998); "*Gendai nogyo seisakuron*" (Modern Agricultural Policy Theory); Association of Agriculture & Forestry Statistics.
- Ogura, T. (1997); "*Sabaku ni bara wo sagase*" (Search for Roses in the Desert); Food and Agriculture Policy Research Center.
- Ogura, T. (1987); "*Nihon nogyo wa ikinokoreru ka*" (Can Japanese Agriculture Survive?); Rural Culture Association.
- Ogura, T. (1995); "*Aru mongaikan no shin-nosei shiron*" (An Outsider's Essay on New Agricultural Policy); Food and Agriculture Policy Research Center.

- Oizumi, I. (2001); “*Nippon no kome*” (Japanese Rice); Asahi Sensho.
- OECD (2001); “Multifunctionality : Towards an Analytical Framework”
- OECD (2002 a); “The Incidence and Efficiency of Farm Support”
- OECD (2002 b); “Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: A Positive Reform Agenda”
- OECD (2003 a); “Multifunctionality: The Policy Implications”
- OECD (2003 b); “The OECD Agricultural Outlook”
- Ouchi, T. (1997); “*Nogyo kihonho 30 nen – nosei no kiseki*” (The Agricultural Basic Law After 30 Years – The History of Agricultural Policy).
- Saeki, N. (1989); “*Nogyo keizaigaku kogi*” (Agronomics Lecture); University of Tokyo Press.
- Shogenji, S. (1998); “*Anchi kyushinha no nosei kaikakuron*” (Anti-Extremist Agricultural Policy Reform Theory); Association of Agriculture & Forestry Statistics.
- Teruoka, S. (editor) (2003); “*Nihon no nogyo 150 nen*” (150 Years of Japanese Agriculture); Yuhikaku Publishing.
- Yagi, H. (2004); “*Gendai nihon no nogyo bijinesu*” (The Modern Japanese Agricultural Business); Association of Agriculture & Forestry Statistics.
- Yamashita, K. (2004); “*WTO to nosei kaikaku*” (The WTO and Agricultural Policy Reform); Food and Agriculture Policy Research Center.
- Yamashita, K. (2003); “*Nogyo, chokusetu shiharai de kyosoryoku*” (Agriculture – Competitive Strength Through Direct Payments); *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* “Economics Classroom” column, Dec. 22, 2003
- Yamashita, K. (2004 a); “*WTO, FTA wo ikinuku nogyo kaikaku*” (Agricultural Reform to

Survive the WTO and FTA); *Economy, Trade and Industry Journal*, Jan. 2004

Yamashita, K. (2004 b); “*Nichi-bei-EU hikaku – nihon dake ga kokusai kijun kara torinokosareta*” (Comparing Japan, the United States and the European Union – Only Japan Left Behind in International Standards); *Economist* (Mainichi Newspapers), Mar. 23, 2004

K. Yamashita (2004 c); “*Kokumin to shohisha jushi no nosei kaikaku*” (Agricultural Reform Stressing the Public and Consumers); Toyo Keizai, Inc.

K. Yamashita (2004 d); “*Chokusetu shiharai de nogyo kaikaku*” (Agricultural Reform through Direct Payments); *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* “Economics Classroom” column, Aug. 26, 2004

K. Yamashita (2004 e); “*Nogyo shometsu – kyuseishu wa beika hikisage to chokusetu shiharai*” (Vanishing Farmlands – The Saviors are Lower Rice Prices and Direct Payments); *Economist* (Mainichi Newspapers), Sep. 21, 2004

Yamashita, K. (2004 f); “*Shin no nogyo kozo kaikaku no jitsugen wo*” (Realizing Genuine Agriculture Structural Reform); *Economy, Trade and Industry Journal*, Oct. 2004

Yamashita, K. (2004 g); “What Should the WTO Negotiations Aim at?; Fair Trade Center Symposium (The Way Forward to a Successful Doha Development Agenda)”, Tokyo.

Yamashita, K. (2004 h); “Implementation of Income Objectives in Farm Policies: A Japanese Experience”; proceedings of OECD/PACIOLI Workshop on Information Needs for the Analysis of Farm Household Income Issues, Paris, France.

Yamashita, K. (2005 a); “*Boeki kosho to nihon no nosei*” (Trade Negotiations and Japanese Agricultural Policy); Law News Report, Jun. 2005

Yamashita, K. (2005 b); “*WTO nogyo kyotei no mondaiten to DDA kosho no genjo ‘tenbo*” (Problems with the WTO Agriculture Agreement, Current Status and Outlook for DDA Negotiations); Japan Association of International Economic Law, Annual Bulletin No. 14.

Yamashita, K. (2005 c); “*Nokyo no kaitaiteki kaikaku wo*” (Dismantling Based Reform for Japan Agricultural Cooperatives); *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* newspaper “Economics Classroom” column, Jun. 7, 2005

Yamashita, K. (2005 d); ““*Nokyo no kaitaiteki kaikaku wo*’ ni taisuru nokyo kara no hanron ni tsuite” (Examining the JA Response to “Dismantling Based Reform for Japan Agricultural Cooperatives”); Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

Yamashita, K. (2005 e); “*Nosei kaikaku no misuteri*” (The Mystery of Agricultural Policy Reform); *Weekly Norin*, Oct. 5

Yamashita, K. (2005 f); “*Aru mongaikan no mosei kaikaku shian*” (An Outsider’s Tentative Plan for Agricultural Policy Reform); *Weekly Norin*, Oct. 15

Yamashita, K. (2005 g); “*Honkakuteki na nosei kaikaku de seme no kosho wo!*” (Aggressive Negotiations for Full-Fledged Agricultural Policy Reform!); *Weekly Norin*, Nov. 15