

RIETI BBL Seminar Handout

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Mind what your voters read: Media exposure and international economic policy making

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MOTIVATION

- Knowledge of elected representative's behavior is key to insure accountability
- Media role is significant on a range of electoral/policy outcomes:
 - Electoral participation (Stromberg 2004, Gentzkow 2006)
 - Incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder 2006)
 - Politician's selection (Drago, Nannicini and Sobbrío 2014)
 - Politician's performance (Stromberg and Snyder 2010, Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson 2011, Prat and Stromberg 2011, Drago, Nannicini and Sobbrío 2014)
 - Government spending (Stromberg and Snyder 2010)
 - Harshness of judicial sentences (Lim, Snyder and Stromberg 2014)
- Our paper focuses on whether media exposure makes the politician accountable on two specific policy issues: *migration* and *trade*.

MOTIVATION

- Why focusing on migration and trade?
- Standard economic theory predicts **similar effects** of trade and immigration on labor market outcomes of workers in the destination country. Economic drivers play an important role in shaping individual preferences towards globalization (Conconi et al. 2014).
- Nonetheless, **important differences** exist between the determinants of preferences towards trade and migration (e.g. welfare state considerations and non-economic factors)
- More generally, migration and trade might not be perceived as equally **salient** by the electorate
- The disciplining effect of **media exposure** on politicians' behavior may vary according to the **saliency** of the issue at stake.

OUTLINE

- Measuring media coverage
- Data and Facts
- Empirical analysis
- Conclusions

MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE

- Ashworth (2012): the key challenge when studying the effect of media exposure is identifying plausible exogenous variation on features that affect the responsiveness of the politician to the electorate.
- Snyder and Strömberg (2010) focus on the market for local newspapers, as they devote more coverage to Congress than local television.
- Idea: «**economic-geography**» factors shaping the market for local newspapers are different from the «**political geography**» factors that determine congressional district boundaries:
 - «**economic-geography**» factors: local newspapers typically based in urban areas; sales in the surrounding areas depend on the distance between the suburb and the newspaper's headquarters and on the socio-economic characteristics of the area's residents
 - «**political geography**» factors: congressional districts boundaries are drawn so that all districts in each state have the same population, representation is guaranteed to different racial groups etc.
 - Overlap between congressional districts and locals newspaper markets exhibit substantial variation across space and over time.

MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE

- Snyder and Strömberg (2010) build a «**congruence**» measure of congressional districts and local newspaper markets to identify an effect of media coverage on voters, politicians, and policy outcomes
- Formally:

$$Congruence_d = \sum_n MarketShare_{nd} ReaderShare_{nd}$$

- where $MarketShare_{nd}$ is the newspaper n share of total newspaper sales in district d ; $ReaderShare_{nd}$ is the share of newspaper n sales that are in district d .
- Note: since congruence is defined using mkt share, it does not depend upon total mkt penetration, which depends on education, income etc.

MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE




Figure 1: Congruence



MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE

- Snyder and Stromberg (2010) find that higher congruence is correlated with:
 - More coverage of local congressman
 - Voters are better informed/more likely to participate in elections
 - Politicians pursue more actively the interests of their constituency
 - More federal funds flow to congressman's district.

DATA

- Time period covered: U.S. 1986 - 2004
- **Dependent variable:** dummy $Vote_{dt}$ coded as 1 if the representative of district d at time t votes on a bill in favor of trade or migration liberalization, 0 otherwise
- **Key explanatory variables:**
 - Aggregate measures of individual **opinion** at congressional district level d
 - **Migration**
ANES asked: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, stay as now, or decreased?” $Proimmig=1$ if increased/stay as now
 - **Trade**
ANES asked: “Some people have suggested placing new limits on imports in order to protect American jobs/exports. Do you favor placing new limits on imports, or not?” $Protrade=1$ if does not favor
 - Measure of **media coverage** (“ $Cong_{dt}$ ”)

DISTRICT-LEVEL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROLS

- **District-level** characteristics: economic characteristics, industry of employment, socio-demographic characteristics
- **Individual-level** characteristics: politician's characteristics (e.g. age, gender, ideology)

INTUITION

Figure 2: Individual opinions on migration, congruence and voting behavior on HR 3736 (1998)




Figure 2.1: Florida – Congressional Districts Map




Figure 2.2: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 - Opinions on migration




Figure 2.3: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 - Congruence




Figure 2.4: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 – Vote on migration

Figure 3: Individual opinions on trade, congruence and voting behavior on HR 2621 (1998)




Figure 3.1: Texas – Congressional Districts Map



Figure 3.2: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 - Opinions on trade




Figure 3.3: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 - Congruence



Figure 3.4: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 – Vote on trade

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

- We estimate a **linear probability model** :

$$Vote_{Mdt} = \alpha^1 MigOp_{dt} + \beta^1 Cong_{dt} + \gamma^1 MigOp_{dt} \times Cong_{dt} + X_{dt}\delta + I_{st} + u_{dt}$$

$$Vote_{Tdt} = \alpha^2 TrdOp_{dt} + \beta^2 Cong_{dt} + \gamma^2 TrdOp_{dt} \times Cong_{dt} + X_{dt}\delta + I_{st} + u_{dt}$$

- The key parameters are the coefficients γ^1 and γ^2
- If γ is **positive and significant** \rightarrow the elected official's behavior becomes more in line with the prevailing opinion of her electorate as congruence rises
- A lack of significance would instead indicate the absence of any disciplining effect of press coverage on the policy maker's behavior

ESTIMATION RESULTS

Table 3: Baseline specification


	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	0.294 (0.153)	0.0426 (0.0916)	-0.236 (0.237)	-0.0777 (0.139)	-0.316 (0.231)	-0.142 (0.117)	-0.447 (0.235)	-0.159 (0.117)	-0.428 (0.240)	-0.0520 (0.113)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>			-0.775** (0.288)	-0.0374 (0.188)	-0.654 (0.343)	-0.345 (0.211)	-0.447 (0.359)	-0.264 (0.233)	-0.316 (0.370)	-0.207 (0.214)
<i>Interaction_{dt}</i>			1.694** (0.582)	0.474 (0.416)	1.663** (0.547)	0.217 (0.367)	1.781** (0.549)	0.231 (0.364)	1.665** (0.577)	-0.132 (0.355)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	NO		NO		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	NO		NO		NO		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	NO		NO		NO		NO		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139
R-squared	0.329	0.272	0.350	0.276	0.399	0.368	0.424	0.371	0.439	0.414

Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. **Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.

- Estimates of the coefficients of the interaction term between opinion and congruence differ between immigration and trade:
 - **Migration regression** $\rightarrow \gamma^1$ positive and highly significant in all specifications
 - **Trade regression** $\rightarrow \gamma^2$ not different from zero in all specifications


ESTIMATION RESULTS

Marginal effect of district's migration opinion on Representative's voting behavior



ESTIMATION RESULTS

Marginal effect of district's trade opinion on Representative's voting behavior



QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS

- Consider two districts:
 - *Florida's 4th in 1996*. Congruence is slightly above average at 0.44; a ten percentage points increase in the share of pro-migration individuals in the population leads to a **2.9** percentage point increase in the probability that the representative will support immigration;
 - *Pennsylvania's 5th in 1998*. Congruence is at 0.7 (90th percentile). A similar increase in the pro-migration electorate leads to a **7.4** percentage point increase in the probability that the representative will support immigration.


ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: CLOSENESS OF THE RACE

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	-0.323 (0.283)	-0.0764 (0.199)	-0.414 (0.297)	-0.139 (0.163)	-0.390 (0.296)	-0.168 (0.161)	-0.447 (0.309)	-0.0171 (0.162)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	-0.838* (0.368)	-0.145 (0.232)	-0.762 (0.401)	-0.368 (0.244)	-0.434 (0.424)	-0.290 (0.267)	-0.434 (0.439)	-0.282 (0.258)
<i>MoV_{dt}</i>	0.0252 (0.260)	-0.158 (0.139)	-0.0491 (0.273)	0.0275 (0.133)	0.0261 (0.260)	0.0341 (0.132)	-0.00403 (0.266)	-0.0321 (0.128)
<i>Congruencedt*Opiniondt</i>	2.235** (0.754)	0.405 (0.558)	2.087** (0.737)	0.274 (0.491)	1.848* (0.734)	0.315 (0.486)	1.936* (0.760)	-0.186 (0.471)
<i>MoVdt*Opiniondt</i>	0.297 (0.490)	0.0484 (0.268)	0.371 (0.465)	-0.000272 (0.228)	-0.0248 (0.429)	0.0281 (0.233)	0.128 (0.445)	-0.0316 (0.233)
<i>Congruencedt*MoVdt</i>	0.139 (0.554)	0.162 (0.357)	0.108 (0.606)	0.0496 (0.328)	-0.175 (0.604)	0.0461 (0.333)	-0.0816 (0.612)	0.181 (0.353)
<i>Congruencedt*Opiniondt*MoVdt</i>	-2.071 (1.220)	0.121 (0.792)	-2.012 (1.194)	-0.0895 (0.700)	-1.066 (1.141)	-0.174 (0.715)	-1.511 (1.182)	0.0507 (0.752)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	NO		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	NO		NO		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	NO		NO		NO		YES	
Observations	260	1,130	260	1,130	260	1,130	260	1,130
R-squared	0.378	0.279	0.430	0.367	0.458	0.370	0.473	0.412


ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: CLOSENESS OF THE RACE

Migration

Large margin of victory




Small margin of victory




ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: CLOSENESS OF THE RACE

Trade

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


Small margin of victory




ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: TURNOUT

Migration



Trade



ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

- **Reverse causality** concerns
- **Years** included in the analysis
- Alternative measures and definition of «**opinion**»
- Alternative **district level** controls
- Different measures of **politician's characteristics**
- **Placebo** tests

REVERSE CAUSALITY

- Politicians could influence individual opinions on trade and migration through the local media; this effect could be greater in those districts where the coverage of local politicians is higher.
- The correlation between congruence and opinions on trade/migration is not statistically significant.
- Still, to further address this concern, we implement an IV strategy that builds upon the literature on the individual level determinants of attitudes towards trade and migration.

Determinants of individual opinion

	Opinion on Migration	Opinion on Trade
<i>High-School - No diplomaⁱⁱ</i>	-0.0170 (0.0707)	-0.0124 (0.0357)
<i>High-School - Diplomaⁱⁱ</i>	0.0654 (0.0650)	0.0172 (0.0300)
<i>Some College - No degreeⁱⁱ</i>	0.118 (0.0636)	0.143** (0.0317)
<i>BA level degreesⁱⁱ</i>	0.264** (0.0694)	0.309** (0.0336)
<i>Advanced degreesⁱⁱ</i>	0.334** (0.0699)	0.360** (0.0356)
<i>Femaleⁱⁱ</i>	-0.00810 (0.0205)	-0.0903** (0.0120)
<i>Age Group 25-34ⁱⁱ</i>	-0.0413 (0.0566)	-0.00163 (0.0289)
<i>Age Group 35-44ⁱⁱ</i>	0.00395 (0.0555)	-0.0439 (0.0289)
<i>Age Group 45-54ⁱⁱ</i>	-0.0267 (0.0569)	-0.0229 (0.0298)
<i>Age Group 55-64ⁱⁱ</i>	-0.0104 (0.0617)	-0.0343 (0.0296)
<i>Age Group 65-74ⁱⁱ</i>	-0.0408 (0.0642)	-0.0267 (0.0323)
<i>Age Group 75-overⁱⁱ</i>	0.00848 (0.0617)	-0.0524 (0.0354)
<i>Blackⁱⁱ</i>	0.570** (0.165)	0.0215 (0.0880)
<i>Asianⁱⁱ</i>	0.285 (0.211)	0.453** (0.159)
<i>Native-Americanⁱⁱ</i>	-0.0694 (0.211)	0.322* (0.152)
<i>Mexicanⁱⁱ</i>	0.240 (0.187)	0.275 (0.164)
<i>Hispanic - not Mexicanⁱⁱ</i>	0.660* (0.256)	0.114 (0.171)
Race*Educational Attainment	YES	YES
Race*Age group	YES	YES
State*year fixed effect	YES	YES
Observations	2,708	6,390
Pseudo R-squared	0.111	0.155

IV ESTIMATES

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	-1.375*	0.213	-1.737**	-0.0385	-2.094**	-0.0568	-1.975**	-0.0534
	(0.611)	(0.251)	(0.581)	(0.230)	(0.681)	(0.228)	(0.672)	(0.208)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	-2.083**	-0.291	-2.029**	-0.532*	-1.989**	-0.487	-1.952**	-0.460
	(0.607)	(0.265)	(0.666)	(0.254)	(0.681)	(0.272)	(0.699)	(0.238)
<i>Interaction_{dt}</i>	4.447**	1.326*	4.775**	0.858	5.056**	0.889	4.972**	0.708
	(1.231)	(0.639)	(1.335)	(0.567)	(1.353)	(0.567)	(1.390)	(0.525)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	NO		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	NO		NO		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	NO		NO		NO		YES	
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic	12.16	45.58	13.83	30.58	12.37	30.19	11.88	30.23
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	263	1,118	263	1,118	263	1,118	263	1,118

YEARS INCLUDED

	(1) Years 94-96-98		(2) Years 93-94-96-98		(3) Years 96-98-03		(4) Years 96-98-03-04	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	-0.428 (0.240)	-0.0548 (0.235)	-0.428 (0.240)	0.167 (0.202)	-0.428 (0.240)	-0.0534 (0.208)	-0.428 (0.240)	-0.0403 (0.169)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	-0.316 (0.370)	0.441 (0.484)	-0.316 (0.370)	-0.372 (0.361)	-0.316 (0.370)	0.338 (0.359)	-0.316 (0.370)	-0.0761 (0.320)
<i>Interaction_{dt}</i>	1.665** (0.577)	-0.504 (0.653)	1.665** (0.577)	-0.477 (0.599)	1.665** (0.577)	-0.461 (0.536)	1.665** (0.577)	-0.284 (0.459)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	265	204	265	475	265	298	265	480
R-squared	0.439	0.454	0.439	0.449	0.439	0.635	0.439	0.575

MEASURES OF OPINION

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Mean opinion decade_{dt}</i>	-0.294 (0.393)	-0.142 (0.135)										
<i>Mean opinion_{dt}</i>			-0.523 (0.281)	-0.0508 (0.118)	-0.495 (0.363)	-0.0686 (0.157)	-0.781 (0.444)	-0.0956 (0.167)				-0.0520 (0.113)
<i>Median opinion_{dt}</i>									-0.259 (0.146)	-0.0148 (0.0773)		
<i>Mean opinion rescaled_{dt}</i>												-0.329 (0.170)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	-0.642 (0.549)	-0.273 (0.224)	-0.490 (0.425)	-0.205 (0.218)	-0.383 (0.503)	-0.214 (0.237)	-0.652 (0.581)	-0.216 (0.244)	0.157 (0.336)	-0.257 (0.181)	-0.249 (0.371)	-0.207 (0.214)
<i>Mean opinion decade_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>	2.293* (1.093)	0.0779 (0.417)										
<i>Mean opinion_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>			2.068** (0.685)	-0.143 (0.373)	2.064* (0.876)	-0.281 (0.481)	2.553* (1.012)	-0.239 (0.511)				-0.132 (0.355)
<i>Median opinion_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>									0.648 (0.362)	-0.0241 (0.207)		
<i>Mean opinion rescaled_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>												1.258** (0.476)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	228	1,079	188	908	154	844	265	1,139	265	1,139
R-squared	0.436	0.414	0.454	0.415	0.467	0.435	0.491	0.441	0.434	0.413	0.440	0.414

DEFINITIONS OF OPINION

	(1)		(2)	
	Opinion pro liberalization includes DK		Opinion against liberalization includes DK	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	-0.476 (0.246)	-0.0436 (0.133)	-0.421 (0.243)	-0.138 (0.171)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	-0.362 (0.374)	-0.381 (0.270)	-0.294 (0.369)	-0.223 (0.220)
<i>Interaction_{dt}</i>	1.741** (0.583)	0.256 (0.435)	1.647** (0.578)	-0.111 (0.500)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	YES		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139
R-squared	0.441	0.413	0.438	0.415

ALTERNATIVE DISTRICT-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	-0.397 (0.239)	-0.0533 (0.113)	-0.403 (0.238)	-0.0537 (0.113)	-0.418 (0.241)	-0.0547 (0.113)	-0.420 (0.244)	-0.0395 (0.113)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	-0.325 (0.375)	-0.208 (0.214)	-0.327 (0.374)	-0.211 (0.214)	-0.324 (0.370)	-0.185 (0.217)	-0.350 (0.375)	-0.201 (0.214)
<i>Interaction_{dt}</i>	1.616** (0.575)	-0.133 (0.355)	1.625** (0.576)	-0.131 (0.355)	1.633** (0.581)	-0.142 (0.356)	1.716** (0.607)	-0.157 (0.353)
<i>SkillRatio_{dt}</i>	3.633* (1.622)	1.040 (0.812)	3.747* (1.741)	1.089 (0.932)	3.646* (1.753)	1.047 (0.917)	3.366 (1.787)	1.289 (0.899)
<i>Unemployment_{dt}</i>	4.296 (3.078)	-2.815 (1.538)	4.401 (3.184)	-2.835 (1.585)	5.204 (2.976)	-2.701 (1.474)	5.066 (2.935)	-2.014 (1.492)
<i>Log mean family income_{dt}</i>			-0.602 (0.511)	-0.208 (0.265)	-0.551 (0.495)	-0.173 (0.263)	-0.551 (0.501)	-0.178 (0.269)
<i>Log median family income_{dt}</i>	-0.566 (0.465)	-0.190 (0.234)						
<i>Inequality_{dt}</i>			0.348 (0.565)	0.127 (0.352)				
<i>Farmer_{dt}</i>	4.026 (2.842)	3.711* (1.674)	4.188 (3.134)	3.741* (1.657)	3.685 (3.221)	4.068* (1.692)	4.720 (3.240)	4.133* (1.671)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation_{dt}</i>	5.949* (2.774)	-1.628 (1.619)	5.917* (2.794)	-1.643 (1.648)	5.354 (2.935)	-1.817 (1.622)	5.913* (2.898)	-1.007 (1.662)
<i>Urban_{dt}</i>	0.0136 (0.207)	0.239 (0.168)	0.0160 (0.209)	0.241 (0.168)	0.136 (0.259)	0.195 (0.188)	0.0254 (0.215)	0.237 (0.169)
<i>Log Pop Density_{dt}</i>					-0.0449 (0.0497)	0.0175 (0.0316)		
<i>Foreign - born_{dt}</i>	1.171* (0.452)	0.683 (0.374)	1.183* (0.459)	0.684 (0.368)	1.447** (0.486)	0.599 (0.410)	1.455* (0.627)	0.458 (0.447)
<i>Foreign - born growth_{dt}</i>	-0.0381 (0.0357)	-0.0401 (0.0373)	-0.0387 (0.0360)	-0.0404 (0.0374)	-0.0332 (0.0355)	-0.0441 (0.0373)	-0.0406 (0.0367)	-0.0333 (0.0375)
<i>African - American_{dt}</i>	0.527 (0.374)	-0.223 (0.207)	0.527 (0.375)	-0.223 (0.208)	0.550 (0.386)	-0.245 (0.211)	0.567 (0.395)	-0.320 (0.210)
<i>Turnout Rate Previous Elections_{dt}</i>							0.540 (0.702)	-0.464 (0.539)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	260	1,128
R-squared	0.440	0.414	0.440	0.414	0.442	0.414	0.432	0.411

ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{it}</i>	-0.441 (0.238)	-0.0554 (0.113)	-0.420 (0.240)	-0.0478 (0.113)	-0.394 (0.240)	-0.0775 (0.112)	-0.360 (0.249)	-0.0561 (0.113)	-0.368 (0.245)	0.000961 (0.113)
<i>Congruence_{it}</i>	-0.312 (0.348)	-0.208 (0.217)	-0.320 (0.375)	-0.265 (0.206)	-0.226 (0.370)	-0.304 (0.221)	-0.220 (0.373)	-0.359 (0.217)	-0.171 (0.395)	-0.269 (0.194)
<i>Interaction_{it}</i>	1.721** (0.565)	-0.119 (0.356)	1.638** (0.572)	-0.217 (0.359)	1.581** (0.574)	0.00334 (0.346)	1.526** (0.584)	-0.0564 (0.345)	1.404* (0.598)	-0.205 (0.346)
<i>Age - representative_{it}</i>			0.00531 (0.00385)	0.000363 (0.00217)	0.00396 (0.00367)	0.000279 (0.00228)	0.00231 (0.00360)	-0.000157 (0.00217)	0.00263 (0.00376)	-0.000384 (0.00196)
<i>Tenure_{it}</i>	0.0240** (0.00891)	0.00292 (0.00559)								
<i>Gender - representative_{it}</i>	0.128 (0.105)	-0.0161 (0.0800)	0.0878 (0.0996)	0.00717 (0.0822)	0.0496 (0.1000)	0.0120 (0.0822)	0.0507 (0.103)	0.00853 (0.0839)	0.0482 (0.104)	0.0322 (0.0774)
<i>Democrat_{it}</i>	0.0656 (0.0924)	-0.341** (0.0570)	0.102 (0.0953)	-0.352** (0.0558)					0.0842 (0.0975)	-0.295** (0.0589)
<i>Educ - representative - ivy_{it}</i>			0.0675 (0.104)	0.176* (0.0734)						
<i>DW - nominate score_{it}</i>					0.209 (0.114)	-0.335** (0.0764)				
<i>ADA score_{it}</i>							0.00242 (0.00148)	-0.00487** (0.000909)		
<i>PACLabor_{it}</i>									0.174 (0.130)	-0.0986 (0.0542)
<i>PACCorporate_{it}</i>									0.0527 (0.0905)	0.209** (0.0451)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	252	1,124	251	1,124
R-squared	0.456	0.414	0.440	0.420	0.445	0.397	0.446	0.421	0.455	0.447

PLACEBO TESTS

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Vote on Migration	Vote on Trade	Vote on Migration	Vote on Trade	Vote on Migration	Vote on Trade	Vote on Migration	Vote on Trade
<i>Opinion on Abortion_{dt}</i>	-0.128 (0.233)	-0.0938 (0.159)						
<i>Opinion on Religion_{dt}</i>			0.0597 (0.353)	-0.0512 (0.176)				
<i>Opinion on Trust in Fed Gov_{dt}</i>					-0.129 (0.301)	-0.150 (0.147)		
<i>Opinion on Women Role_{dt}</i>							0.303 (0.247)	-0.229 (0.130)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>	0.345 (0.462)	-0.563 (0.333)	0.774 (0.750)	-0.205 (0.459)	0.263 (0.391)	-0.484 (0.254)	0.505 (0.429)	-0.0196 (0.299)
<i>Opinion Abortion_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>	0.211 (0.715)	0.575 (0.500)						
<i>Opinion Religion_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>			-0.407 (0.931)	-0.0491 (0.558)				
<i>Opinion Trust in Fed Gov_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>					0.676 (0.857)	0.702 (0.436)		
<i>Opinion Women Role_{dt}*Congruence_{dt}</i>							0.0483 (0.572)	0.413 (0.369)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Economic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	265	1,137	265	1,130	264	1,026	264	1,031
R-squared	0.421	0.415	0.421	0.412	0.423	0.396	0.439	0.395


ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: PROBIT MODEL

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Migration	Trade								
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	0.939*	0.136	-1.006	-0.271	-1.342	-0.472	-2.083*	-0.547	-2.061*	-0.211
	(0.457)	(0.274)	(0.716)	(0.409)	(0.726)	(0.399)	(0.830)	(0.406)	(0.827)	(0.409)
<i>Congruence_{dt}</i>			-3.171**	-0.0713	-2.902*	-1.402	-1.948	-1.188	-1.264	-1.065
			(0.998)	(0.591)	(1.186)	(0.726)	(1.293)	(0.775)	(1.305)	(0.751)
<i>Interaction_{dt}</i>			6.572**	1.675	6.925**	0.916	7.912**	0.992	7.592**	-0.162
			(1.937)	(1.286)	(1.969)	(1.211)	(2.094)	(1.217)	(2.070)	(1.241)
State*year fixed effect	YES									
Economic characteristics	NO		NO		YES		YES		YES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	NO		NO		NO		YES		YES	
Politician's characteristics	NO		NO		NO		NO		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139

DISCUSSION

- Study **the *direct effect*** of individual preferences towards globalization on the policy making process
- Focus on **the role of the media** in making politicians more accountable to their constituencies
- Main findings:
 - **Individual attitudes** towards globalization are strongly correlated with the policy maker's behavior only when it comes to migration
 - **Media exposure** has a significant and positive effect on politicians' behavior only when it comes to migration
- How can this finding be explained? Previous studies have emphasized the low saliency of trade. This is confirmed in our data

DISCUSSION



Responses on trade and migration opinion questions.