Do Regional Free Trade Deals Spell Opportunity or Challenge for Growth? – Role of Technology Transfer

Yuki Masujima Bloomberg L.P. January 17th, 2022

Bloomberg

The views expressed here are solely the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bloomberg L.P. and Bloomberg Economics.

MOTIVATION AND QUESTIONS

Bloomberg

Two mega regional free trade deals in Asia and Pacific recently launched (RCEP in Jan. 2022 and CPTPP in Dec. 2018) and could expand further



BIGGER OPPORTUNITY FOR RCEP

Global share of total trade and GDP in RCEP members



Source: IMF, Bloomberg Economics

JAPAN'S LONG AMBITION TO EXPAND FTA AREAS

- Japan's Free Trade Agreement coverage increased rapidly for two decades
- RCEP is probably a final piece but U.S. participation in CPTPP



Source: Ministry of Finance, Bloomberg Economics

CHINA ALSO BENEFITS FROM RCEP



U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR AND NEW TRADE BLOC

New Cold War May Cost China 6% of GDP, Lift U.S.



Source: van Roye, Cousin and Orlik (2021), Bloomberg Economics

MOTIVATION AND QUESTIONS



PATENT SHOWS STRENGTH IN TECHNOLOGY

The U.S. Is Strong in Share of Biopharmacy, Medical Device Technology Patents



Source: Bloomberg Economics, World Intellectual Property Organization, Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

QUESTIONS

- 1. Do Mega Free Trade Deals and U.S.-China decoupling spell opportunity or challenge for growth?
- 2. How much do technology transfer boost potential growth (total factor productivity) via international trade and domestic patent accumulation?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Coe and Helpman (1995), Madsen (2007)

- The Link between long-term spillover of imports of technology and total factor productivity (TFP)

Petri and Plummer (2020), Park, Petri, and Plummer (2021)

– The CGE model analysis of RCEP, TPP, U.S.-China trade conflicts on trade and income growth

Masujima (2021)

- Scenario analysis of RCEP, TPP



CONTRIBUTION OF THIS PAPER

- Confirmed the C&H hypothesis that foreign knowledge influences growth through the channel of trade in both advanced and developing countries
- Added quality adjustment to domestic knowledge accumulation
- Showed that the influence on TFP of imports of knowledge is not driven by an independent positive effect of trade openness on TFP

→ Removing non-tariff barriers could increase value of openness

- Showed elasticities for both domestic and foreign knowledge are close to the elasticities achieved in the literature using R&D data
 - \rightarrow Patent data with time-variant quality adjustment could substitute to R&D expenditure

THE KEY FINDINGS

- The biggest swing factor is the U.S. decision on CPTPP
- Formation of RCEP has significant benefits for the participants, but CPTPP expansion has a greater impact on technology transfers due its lower barriers to goods and services trade and cross-border investment flows.
- In the best-case scenario -- RCEP succeeds and the U.S. joins CPTPP -- the U.S. and China both benefit from a 0.3 percentage-point bump to productivity growth relative to the baseline view. With more still to gain from technology transfer, Vietnam benefits even more, with productivity up 0.6 ppt.

Scenario	Baseline	2	2	3	3	4 RCEP Succeeds; U.S. joins CPTPP			
	RCEP Succeeds; U.S. not in CPTPP	RCEP U.S. not	Fails; in CPTPP	RCEP U.S. joins	Fails; in CPTPP				
	GDP in 2030 (Tri \$)	Deviation (%)	Change in TFP (ppt)	Deviation (%)	Change in TFP (ppt)	Deviation (%)	Change in TFP (ppt)		
China	24.6	-0.5	-0.1	-0.5	-0.1	1.4	0.3		
U.S.	25.0	0.2	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.9	0.3		
Japan	5.1	-1.3	-0.2	0.7	0.1	2.1	0.2		
Korea	2.1	-1.4	-0.1	-1.4	-0.1	0.0	0.0		
Vietnam	0.5	-1.4	-0.1	6.0	0.5	6.4	0.6		



DATA

- □ Sample period: annual data from 1995 until 2019
- Patent Stock Index constructed from Patent Applications Residents (World Intellectual Property Organization)
- High tech trade share made from bilateral trade data by Products HS92
 6-digit (BACI)
- □ Nominal GDP (USD), Employment, Population (IMF)
- □ 38 countries (Adv 12, Asia EM 11, ME/Africa 7, Latin AM 6, East EU 2)
 - U.S., Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Japan, U.K., Canada, S. Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, China, India, Brazil, Russia, Poland, Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenia, Pakistan, Bangladesh



THE MODEL Knowledge Spillovers on TFP





HIGH TECHNOLOGY TRADE



□ Using BACI annual trade data from 1995 until 2019 – HS92 6 digits

Create bilateral high technology product flow, by using the definition of the World Bank (SITC Rev.3)

□ The average HT product share of 38 countries is about 0.04 (High Tech Product Trade/ Total trade)

ASIAN COUNTRIES STILL HAVE TARIFFS AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS – HIGHER BENEFIT FROM FTA

Tariff Rates by Products



Source: Computed by Kazunobu Hayakawa (IDE-JETRO) using the WITS

PATENT STOCK INDEX – QUALITY ADJ. NEEDED



- New patent applications are added to knowledge stocks every year, with 5% depreciation of existing stocks and a patent quality adjustment for developing countries.
- The domestic stock of knowledge is measured using domestic patent application data back to 1870, following C&H the perpetual inventory method
- Patents applied for are probably better measures of the innovative activity than patents granted for international comparisons because the granting frequency varies substantially across countries.

PROPENSITY TO INNOVATE INDEX – 4 SECTIONS

These scores are used for quality adjustment for patents

	Institutions	IT Deepening	Economy	Human Capita		Institutions	IT Deepening	Economy	Human Capita		Institutions	IT Deepening	Economy	Human Capita		Institutions	IT Deepening	Economy	Human Capita		Institutions	IT Deepening	Economy	Human Capita
1 Japan	1.63	1.76	2.51	2.62	28 Slovenia	1.19	1.20	1.01	0.55	55 Mauritius	0.94	-0.28	-0.16	-0.15	82 Ecuador	-0.21	-0.32	-0.78	0.03	109 R. Congo	-1.51	-1.18	-0.24	-0.73
2 U.S.	1.43	2.28	1.89	2.73	29 Portugal	1.28	0.70	1.00	0.76	56 Qatar	-0.06	-0.03	-0.12	0.42	83 Lebanon	-0.77	-0.51	-0.03	-0.08	110 Lao P.D.R.	-1.17	-1.11	-0.49	-0.90
3 Germany	1.56	1.77	2.14	2.32	30 Poland	0.72	0.75	0.73	0.86	57 Panama	0.21	-0.33	0.48	-0.29	84 Moldova	-0.43	-0.10	-0.56	-0.40	111 Pakistan	-0.84	-1.01	-0.84	-1.15
4 Switzerland	1.90	2.32	2.33	1.00	31 Lithuania	1.11	0.92	0.26	0.60	58 Saudi Arabia	-0.53	0.20	0.14	0.22	85 Botswana	0.32	-0.63	-0.59	-0.68	112 Tanzania	-0.91	-0.97	-0.72	-1.25
5 Singapore	1.45	2.48	1.98	1.53	32 China	-0.37	0.24	0.90	2.11	59 Georgia	0.38	-0.22	-0.13	-0.03	86 Azerbaijan	-0.80	-0.27	-0.59	-0.10	113 Malawi	-0.60	-1.18	-0.75	-1.36
6 Taiwan	1.35	2.93	2.07	1.03	33 Hungary	0.41	0.90	0.64	0.63	60 Bahrain	-0.58	0.01	-0.05	0.52	87 El Salvador	-0.34	-0.70	-0.37	-0.37	114 Myanmar	-1.27	-0.90	-0.98	-0.89
7 Sweden	1.79	2.13	1.93	1.27	34 Latvia	1.06	0.68	0.09	0.62	61 India	0.26	-0.42	0.19	-0.13	88 Paraguay	-0.41	-0.43	-0.64	-0.39	115 Uganda	-0.87	-0.90	-0.82	-1.46
8 Denmark	1.78	2.77	1.44	1.09	35 Malaysia	0.62	0.62	0.80	0.39	62 South Africa	0.41	-0.03	0.17	-0.65	89 Morocco	-0.54	-0.37	-0.61	-0.54	116 Cameroon	-1.22	-0.99	-1.08	-0.80
9 Netherlands	1.79	2.27	1.50	1.44	36 Malta	1.02	0.41	0.23	0.70	63 Colombia	-0.07	-0.32	0.03	0.21	90 Sri Lanka	-0.31	-0.49	-0.61	-0.69	117 Madagascar	-0.93	-0.83	-1.05	-1.35
10 U.K.	1.35	1.17	1.99	2.24	37 Slovakia	0.80	0.66	0.60	0.27	64 Ukraine	-0.37	-0.13	-0.15	0.50	91 Kyrgyz Rep.	-0.81	-0.56	-0.36	-0.43	118 Tajikistan	-1.56	-0.95	-0.97	-0.72
11 Finland	1.90	1.74	1.71	1.16	38 Cyprus	1.04	0.29	0.51	0.51	65 Albania	0.09	0.02	-0.33	0.00	92 Ghana	0.04	-0.55	-0.88	-0.76	119 Burkina Faso	-0.57	-0.97	-1.28	-1.45
12 South Korea	1.09	1.53	1.95	1.61	39 Chile	1.11	0.04	0.20	0.56	66 Oman	-0.42	-0.14	-0.06	0.32	93 Egypt	-1.02	-0.54	-0.29	-0.70	120 Nigeria	-1.01	-0.84	-1.31	-1.12
13 France	1.40	1.25	1.65	1.82	40 UAE	0.43	0.45	0.44	0.49	67 Kuwait	-0.46	-0.08	-0.14	0.24	94 Kenya	-0.54	-0.69	-0.63	-0.68	121 Zimbabwe	-1.38	-0.80	-1.19	-0.95
14 Canada	1.68	1.10	1.28	1.67	41 Croatia	0.58	0.45	0.35	0.39	68 Kazakhstan	-0.54	-0.07	-0.39	0.52	95 Guatemala	-0.69	-0.65	-0.73	-0.71	122 Mauritania	-0.96	-1.24	-1.07	-1.30
15 Belgium	1.25	1.37	1.74	1.22	42 Greece	0.53	0.33	0.31	0.58	69 Trin. & Tob.	0.34	-0.16	-0.61	-0.06	96 Honduras	-0.74	-0.91	-0.53	-0.61	123 Ethiopia	-1.00	-1.19	-0.92	-1.49
16 Norway	1.84	1.54	1.07	0.93	43 Bulgaria	0.37	0.51	0.19	0.53	70 Vietnam	-0.60	-0.19	0.27	-0.01	97 Algeria	-0.75	-0.63	-1.20	-0.26	124 Mali	-1.07	-1.15	-0.97	-1.60
17 Hong Kong	1.27	1.15	1.51	1.35	44 Russia	-0.64	0.40	-0.02	1.44	71 Philippines	-0.06	-0.35	0.15	-0.30	98 Cambodia	-0.96	-0.74	-0.23	-0.94	125 Haiti	-1.79	-1.16	-1.25	-0.65
18 Austria	1.42	1.32	1.74	0.76	45 Serbia	0.07	0.31	0.22	0.47	72 Jamaica	0.52	-0.40	-0.33	-0.44	99 Senegal	-0.14	-0.74	-0.90	-1.09	126 Papua NG	-0.57	-1.24	-1.49	-1.56
19 Australia	1.58	1.07	0.74	1.49	46 Uruguay	0.82	0.10	-0.23	0.34	73 Jordan	-0.30	-0.40	-0.11	0.13	100 Nicaragua	-1.05	-0.83	-0.64	-0.40	127 Guinea	-1.06	-1.32	-1.35	-1.29
20 Spain	1.07	1.04	1.43	1.31	47 Brazil	-0.23	0.10	0.40	0.54	74 Indonesia	0.06	-0.45	-0.13	-0.22	101 Gabon	-1.17	-0.55	-1.04	-0.26	128 Angola	-1.23	-1.11	-1.74	-0.99
21 Ireland	1.45	1.35	1.30	0.75	48 Thailand	-0.18	0.19	0.85	-0.11	75 Peru	-0.12	-0.43	-0.49	0.09	102 Benin	-0.43	-1.06	-0.90	-0.88	129 Iraq	-1.44	-0.74	-2.05	-0.94
22 New Zealand	1.64	1.12	0.80	0.95	49 Romania	0.02	0.35	0.38	-0.02	76 Tunisia	-0.04	-0.29	-0.36	-0.43	103 Zambia	-0.58	-1.01	-0.78	-1.03	130 DR Congo	-1.78	-1.22	-1.13	-1.15
23 Czech Rep.	1.00	1.17	1.37	0.94	50 Costa Rica	0.60	-0.14	-0.05	0.18	77 Namibia	0.22	-0.55	-0.05	-0.82	104 Rwanda	-0.41	-0.74	-0.54	-1.72	131 Niger	-0.81	-1.57	-1.22	-1.98
24 Israel	1.02	1.16	1.08	1.05	51 Montenegro	0.04	-0.16	0.65	0.00	78 Armenia	-0.19	-0.30	-0.51	-0.20	105 Cote D'Ivoire	-0.62	-0.84	-0.80	-1.17	132 Sudan	-1.91	-1.12	-1.32	-1.33
25 Iceland	1.45	1.51	0.47	0.82	52 Argentina	0.26	-0.03	-0.28	0.50	79 Mongolia	0.05	-0.54	-0.94	0.21	106 Nepal	-0.81	-0.79	-0.95	-0.98	133 Afghanistan	-1.60	-1.24	-1.60	-1.36
26 Italy	0.59	0.56	1.58	1.48	53 Turkey	-0.44	0.05	0.31	0.48	80 Dom. Rep.	-0.29	-0.16	-0.48	-0.30	107 Bangladesh	-0.91	-0.85	-0.95	-0.82	134 Yemen	-2.38	-1.21	-1.39	-1.37
27 Estonia	1.24	1.64	0.55	0.65	54 Mexico	-0.17	-0.23	0.40	0.35	81 Bosnia-Herz.	-0.64	-0.31	-0.10	-0.22	108 Mozambique	-0.92	-1.08	-0.24	-1.32	135 Chad	-1.78	-1.53	-1.79	-1.88

Underlying indicators, weights and sources are shown below.

- Institutions: Government Effectiveness Index (2x weight, World Bank), Freedom in the World score (1x, Freedom House).
- IT Deepening: broadband internet speeds (2x, Cable), secure servers per million population (2x, World Bank and Netcraft), internet usage per capita (1x, International Telecommunication Union), E-Government Development Index (2x, United Nations), R&D spending to GDP (2x, World Bank).
- Business climate: export complexity (2x, Observatory of Economic Complexity), Logistics Performance Index (1x, World Bank), Financial Development Index (1x, International Monetary Fund), inward foreign direct investment to GDP(1x, emerging economies only, World Bank).
- Human Capital: learning-adjusted years of schooling (2x, World Bank), total scientific journal contributions (2x, SCImago), urbanization relative to total population (1x, United Nations).

PROPENSITY TO INNOVATE INDEX



Methodology

- □ To construct the scorecard, we standardized available data for 135 countries relative to the average for each indicator to arrive at Z-score. Values more than three standard deviations from the mean were truncated to a score of 3 or -3.
- Each pillar reflects a weighted average of its components. The overall ranking is a simple average of the scores across the four categories. At each stage, we standardized the scores again to maintain a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.

MODIFIED PATENT STOCK INDEX



□ Modified patent stock index = the original patent stock index data * propensity to innovate index

□ There is a log-linear relationship between Propensity to Innovate Index and GDP per capita. Based on this relationship, time-variant quality adjusted patent stock indexes were estimated.

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Bloomberg

0.0

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVER ESTIMATION (DOLS) (TIME-VARIANT QUALITY ADJUSTED PATENT INDEX)

		stock of domestic	e patents	stock of technology imports		
	$ln TFP_{it} = \alpha_0 + Total Factor Productivity$	$\alpha^{d} \ln S_{it}^{d}$	$+ \alpha^{f} m^{x} lr$	$S_{it}^{f} + CD + CD + CO + CO + CO + CD + CD + CD$	ed nies	
Row	Foreign knowledge measure	Depreciation rate (δ)	Import interaction term, if any (m^x)	Foreign knowledge coefficient (α^{f})	Domestic knowl coefficient (α^{d})	edge Cointegration test statistic (VR _P)
1	S ^{fL-S} (L&P, stock of import ratio)	5	None $(m^{x}=1)$	0.35 (4.43)	0.08 (7.36)	-3.4 (0)
2	S^{fL-F} (L&P, flow of import ratio)	5	None $(m^{x}=1)$	0.46 (2.56)	0.06 (1.72)	High Tech Lapports
3	S ^{-fL-S} (L&P, stock of import ratio)	5	m ^{x-S}	0.2 (0.21)	0.43 (1.09)	2.3 (0.87)
4	S ^{fL-S} (L&P, stock of import ratio)	5	m ^{x-F}	0.08 (0.14)	0.46 (1.23)	2.5 (0.95)
5	S^{fP-S} (S^{fL-S} normalized by pop)	5	None $(m^{x}=1)$	0.78 (6.54)	0.12 (3.24)	Nominal GDP -1.8 (0.01)
6	S^{fL-S} (L&P, stock of import ratio)	20	None $(m^{x}=1)$	0.44 (5.39)	0.07 (2.28)	-4.8 (0.05)
7	S^{fP-S} (S^{fL-S} normalized by pop)	20	None $(m^x=1)$	0.55 (7.82)	0.09 (1.98)	-4.6 (0.03)

Note. The numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics except in the last column where the numbers in parentheses are *p*-values. Constant terms and fixed-effect dumnies are included in the estimates but not shown. Two-period lags and leads and concurrent values of the explanatory variables in first-differences are included as additional regressors in the estimates. The *t*-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation following Stock andWatson (1993). VR_p is Westerlund's (2005) variance ratio test for cointegration and is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no cointegration. δ is the rate of depreciation as a percentage for the stock of knowledge and the stock of import ratios. Domestic stock of knowledge is normalised by population in the estimates in rows 5 and 7. Column m^x indicates whether the log of the stock of foreign knowledge is multiplied by the propensity to import. L&P = the index advised by Lichtenberg and van Potterie (see Eq. (2)). m^{x-S} is the 'stock' of the import propensity and $m^{x,-F}$ is the 'flow' of the import propensity.

Bloomberg

$$S_{it}^{fL-F} = \sum_{j=1}^{38} \frac{M_{ijt}^{\lambda}}{Y_{ijt}^{n}} S_{jt}^{d} \qquad i \neq j \qquad \qquad S_{it}^{fL-S} = \sum_{j=1}^{38} \left[\frac{M_{ijt}^{\lambda} + 0.95M_{i,t-1}^{\lambda S}}{Y_{ijt}^{n} + 0.95Y_{i,t-1}^{n,S}} \right] S_{jt}^{d} \qquad i \neq j$$

Flow of the propensity to high tech imports Stock of the propensity to high tech imports

IMPACTS OF ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AGREEMENTS: FOUR SCENARIOS

FTAs increases volume of trade more than GDP(GNI), increasing trade openness, high-tech trade

		stock dome	t of estic patents	stock o technol	f ogy imports			
ln Tot Pro	$\mathrm{TFP}_{it} = \alpha_0$ -	$+ \alpha^d \ln \eta$	$S_{it}^{\mathbf{d}} + \alpha$	of m ^x ln mports	$S_{it}^{f} + C$	D + euntry fixed	`it	
Scenario Baseline		(pı	coxy of trade	e openness)	en 8	4		
	RCEP Succeeds; U.S. not in CPTPP	RCEP U.S. not	Fails; in CPTPP	RCEP U.S. joins	Fails; in CPTPP	RCEP Succeeds; U.S. joins CPTPP		
	GDP in 2030 (Tri \$)	Deviation (%)	Change in TFP (ppt)	Deviation (%)	Change in TFP (ppt)	Deviation (%)	Change in TFP (ppt)	
China	24.6	-0.5	-0.1	-0.5	-0.1	1.4	0.3	
U.S.	25.0	0.2	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.9	0.3	
Japan	5.1	-1.3	-0.2	0.7	0.1	2.1	0.2	
Korea	2.1	-1.4	-0.1	-1.4	-0.1	0.0	0.0	
Vietnam	0.5	-1.4	-0.1	6.0	0.5	6.4	0.6	

Bloomberg

Data for impact estimation -- Petri and Plummer (2020),

POLICY IMPLICATION

- Enhancing high-technology trade contributes to boosting total factor productivity
- 2. A continuing effort to expand the FTA coverage, particularly to include the U.S. is beneficial for the global economy
- 3. Economic security is important, but quantitative assessment of cost-benefits analysis in FTAs and EPAs is also imperative to make a policy decision

DISCLAIMER

The BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL® service and BLOOMBERG Data (the "Services") are owned and distributed by Bloomberg Finance L.P. ("BFLP") in all jurisdictions other than Argentina, Bermuda, China, India, Japan, and Korea (the "BLP Countries"). BFLP is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bloomberg L.P. ("BLP"). BLP provides BFLP with global marketing and operational support and service for the Services and distributes the Services either directly or through a non-BFLP subsidiary in the BLP Countries. Certain functionalities distributed via the Services are available only to sophisticated institutional investors and only where the necessary legal clearance has been obtained. BFLP, BLP and their affiliates do not guarantee the accuracy of prices or information in the Services. Nothing in the Services shall constitute or be construed as an offering of financial instruments by BFLP, BLP or their affiliates, or as investment advice or recommendations by BFLP, BLP or their affiliates of an investment strategy or whether or not to "buy", "sell" or "hold" an investment. Information available via the Services should not be considered as information sufficient upon which to base an investment decision. BLOOMBERG, BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, BLOOMBERG NEWS, BLOOMBERG ANYWHERE, BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK, BLOOMBERG TELEVISION, BLOOMBERG RADIO, BLOOMBERG PRESS and BLOOMBERG.COM are trademarks and service marks of BFLP, a Delaware limited partnership, or its subsidiaries. © 2016 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. This document and its contents may not be forwarded or redistributed without the prior consent of Bloomberg.

Bloomberg Intelligence is a service provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliates. Bloomberg Intelligence shall not constitute, nor be construed as, investment advice or investment recommendations (i.e., recommendations as to whether or not to "buy", "sell", "hold", or to enter or not to enter into any other transaction involving any specific interest) or a recommendation as to an investment or other strategy. No aspect of the Bloomberg Intelligence function is based on the consideration of a customer's individual circumstances. Bloomberg Intelligence should not be considered as information sufficient upon which to base an investment decision. You should determine on your own whether you agree with Bloomberg Intelligence.

Bloomberg Intelligence is offered where the necessary legal clearances have been obtained. Bloomberg Intelligence should not be construed as tax or accounting advice or as a service designed to facilitate any Bloomberg Intelligence subscriber's compliance with its tax, accounting, or other legal obligations. Employees involved in Bloomberg Intelligence may hold positions in the securities analyzed or discussed on Bloomberg Intelligence.