

Unemployment in a Small Open Economy Model with Heterogeneous Job Separations

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Very preliminary. Please do not cite.

Background and motivation

◆ Balassa-Samuelson effect

- Developed countries tend to experience **real exchange rate appreciation**

◆ Mechanism

- **Productivity in the tradeables sector** improves → wage increases → Nontradeables price increases → Domestic price level increases → Real exchange rate appreciation
 - Perfect labour mobility and the sectoral equalisation of wages are the assumptions underpinning this result

Background and motivation

◆ Empirical invalidity of a basic B-S model

- Basic B-S model tends to **overvalue** the response of relative price to changes in the productivity

◆ Some recent studies

- Sheng and Xu (2011JIMF) show that a change in the price of nontradeables depends on the **relative market matching efficiency** between the two sectors
- Hamano (2014JJIE) shows that theoretical B-S effect is amplified when **extensive margins** are taken into account
- Cardi and Restout (2015JIE) remove the assumption of **frictionless intersectoral labour mobility** to improve the predictive ability

What we do

◆ We develop a modified B-S model with the following characteristics

□ There is one pool of job seekers

- Unemployed search across all sectors (e.g. Gomes, 2015EJ); a sectoral unemployment rate is a redundant concept

□ Separation rates differ across industries

- Separation rates by industry differ widely (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992QJE)
- Accordingly, there is a compensating wage differential ('wage gap') between the sectors

◆ We examine the B-S effect and unemployment effect of productivity growth

Model setup

◆ Small open economy

- Price of tradeables is exogenous

◆ Two sectors

- Tradeables and nontradeables

◆ Specific factor framework

- Capital is specific to each sector
- Capital accumulation captures productivity improvement

◆ Search matching unemployment

- One pool of job seekers and heterogeneous job separations

Main results

◆ Theoretical propositions

- P1: Wages are higher in the sector with **higher separations**
 - Compensating wage differentials
- P2: Labour moves across sectors so that the **marginal contribution of labour over wage cost** is equalized
 - This occurs due to positive bargaining power of producers
- P3: The real exchange rate appreciates (depreciates) with improvements in **technological progress** in the tradeables (nontradeables) sector
 - The B-S effect can be muted but the primary effect (the basic B-S effect) always dominates the secondary effect

Main results

◆ Simulation results of the B-S effect

□ In the homogeneous case ($s_T = s_N$), the B-S effect is determined only by **the relative productivity effect** (Eq.97)

➤ Basic B-S model is nested as a special case

□ In the heterogeneous case ($s_T > s_N$), **the relative labour effect** offsets nearly 38% of the relative productivity effect (Eq.100)

➤ Heterogeneous job separations explain overvaluation in the basic B-S framework

Main results

◆ Simulation results for (un)employment

- ❑ There is the range of **the substitutability in consumption between tradeables and nontradeables** in which labour demand in both sectors increases with productivity growth in the tradeables sector (Fig.4)
- ❑ **Unemployment decreases** with productivity growth in the tradeables sector regardless of the **substitutability** (Fig.4)
- ❑ **The wage gap increases** with productivity in the tradeables sector (Fig.5)
- ❑ There is **no value** of the **substitutability** for which both sectors expand employment (Fig.6)

Search and matching

◆ Labour stock evolution

$$\square \dot{L}_i = \frac{m_I}{V_I} V_i - s_I L_i, \quad i \in I, \quad I = N, T \cdots (1)$$

➤ Assume that **separation rates (s_I)** differ across sectors

$$\square V_I = \int_{i \in I} V_i di$$

◆ Economy-wide vacancies

$$\square V = V_N + V_T$$

Search and matching

◆ Inverse Beveridge ratio

$$\square \theta_I = \frac{V_I}{U}$$

$$\square \theta = \theta_N + \theta_T = \frac{V_N + V_T}{U} = \frac{V}{U}$$

◆ Matching function

$$\square M(U, V) = AU^\alpha V^{1-\alpha}, \alpha \in (0, 1)$$

◆ Number of matches

$$\square m_I = \frac{V_I}{V} M(U, V)$$

$$\square M(U, V) = m_N + m_T$$

Vacancy posting

◆ Firm's optimization problem

$$\square \max_{V_i} \int_0^{\infty} \pi_i(t) e^{-rt} dt \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (1)$$

$$\square \pi_i = p_i F_i(k_i, L_i) - w_i L_i - \gamma V_i$$

◆ FOCs & transversality condition

$$\square \Lambda_i m_I = \gamma V_i$$

$$\square \dot{L}_i = \frac{m_I}{V_i} V_i - s_I L_i$$

$$\square \Lambda_i = \frac{p_i F'_{iL} - w_i}{r + s_I} + \frac{1}{r + s_I} \dot{\Lambda}_i$$

$$\square \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-rt} \Lambda_i L_i = 0$$

Equilibrium

◆ Steady state condition

$$\square m_I = s_I L_I$$

➤ Number of entrants to, and exits from, each sector is **offsetting**

$$\square \dot{U} = 0, \dot{L}_I = 0 \text{ and } \dot{m}_I = 0$$

◆ Labour market equilibrium

$$\square \bar{L} = L_N + L_T + U$$

➤ That is, there is **presence of unemployment**

Wage determination

◆ Discounted return on being unemployed

$$\square E_U = \frac{1}{1+r} \left\{ z + \left(\frac{m_N}{U} E_N + \frac{m_T}{U} E_T \right) + \left(1 - \frac{m_N + m_T}{U} \right) E_U \right\}$$

◆ Discounted return on being employed

$$\square E_i = \frac{1}{1+r} \{ w_i + s_I E_U + (1 - s_I) E_i \}$$

◆ Nash bargaining over wages

$$\square \max_{w_i} S_i = (E_i - E_U)^\beta \Lambda_i^{1-\beta}$$

$$\square w_I = z + \frac{\beta \gamma}{1-\beta} \left\{ \frac{\theta^\alpha (r + s_I)}{A} + \theta \right\} \dots (46)$$


Compensating wage differentials (from Eq. 46)

◆ **Proposition 1: Wages are higher in the sector that has higher separations.**

➤ **Proof.** $\tilde{W} = w_T - w_N = \frac{\beta\gamma}{1-\beta} \left\{ \frac{\theta^\alpha (s_T - s_N)}{A} \right\}$. ■

- Firms in the sector with higher separation rate have to pay **higher wages** to attract workers
- If either the transaction cost of hiring workers (γ) or the worker's bargaining power (β) were zero, **wages are equalised**

Lower panel of Figure 3. Wage setting curves (See Eq. 46)



Note: $s_T > s_N$ is assumed

The price of nontradeables

◆ Consumer's CES preference

$$\square C = \left[\psi^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_N^{1-\frac{1}{\rho}} + (1-\psi)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_T^{1-\frac{1}{\rho}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\rho}}}, \quad \psi \in (0,1), \quad \rho > 0$$

➤ As ρ approaches infinity (zero) then tradeables and nontradeables are perfect **substitutes (complements)**

◆ Demand for nontradeables

$$\square \bar{L} c_N = \frac{Y}{P}$$

➤ Ignore international borrowing and lending, i.e., assume **balanced trade**

The price of nontradeables

◆ National income

$$\square Y = pF_N + F_T$$

- Unemployment benefits, zU , are **a transfer** of income to the unemployed

◆ Price of nontradeables (Real Exchange Rate, RER)

$$\square p = \left(\frac{\psi F_T}{F_N} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

- p is determined by *domestic* demand and supply

Equilibrium

◆ Equilibrium conditions for L_N , L_T , p and θ

$$\square A\theta^{1-\alpha}(\bar{L} - L_N - L_T) = s_N L_N + s_T L_T$$

$$\square p = \left(\frac{\psi F_T}{F_N} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$


$$\square p F'_{NL} = \frac{\gamma \theta^\alpha (r + s_N)}{(1-\beta)A} + z + \frac{\beta \gamma \theta}{1-\beta}$$

$$\square F'_{TL} = \frac{\gamma \theta^\alpha (r + s_T)}{(1-\beta)A} + z + \frac{\beta \gamma \theta}{1-\beta}$$

◆ From last two conditions

$$\square F'_{TL} - p F'_{NL} = \tilde{W} / \beta \cdots (58)$$

Upper panel of Figure 3. Wage setting curves ($s_T > s_N$ is assumed)



Labour allocation (from Eq. 58)

◆ **Proposition 2: Labour moves across sectors so that the marginal contribution of labour over wage cost is equalised.**

➤ **Proof.** Using (58), the steady-steady state condition can be rewritten as: $pF'_{NL} - \frac{w_N}{\beta} = F'_{TL} - \frac{w_T}{\beta}$. ■

□ When $\beta = 1$, we get the labour allocation condition familiar in **the Ricardo-Viner model**

□ When $\beta = 0$, that $w_N = w_T = z$, **the value of the marginal product** is equalised across sectors

Unemployment and the Balassa-Samuelson effect

◆ Equilibrium dynamics

$$\square R_N dL_N + R_T dL_T - d\theta = 0$$

$$\square F'_{NL} dp + p F''_{NL} dL_N - Q_N d\theta = -p F''_{NLk} dk_N$$

$$\square F''_{TL} dL_T - Q_T d\theta = -F''_{TLk} dk_T$$

$$\square \frac{dp}{p} = \underbrace{\eta^{-1} \left(\varepsilon_{Tk} \frac{dk_T}{k_T} - \varepsilon_{Nk} \frac{dk_N}{k_N} \right)}_{\text{(i) Relative Productivity Effect}} + \underbrace{\eta^{-1} \left(\varepsilon_{TL} \frac{dL_T}{L_T} - \varepsilon_{NL} \frac{dL_N}{L_N} \right)}_{\text{(ii) Relative Labour Effect}}$$

Primary (basic) B-S effect

Secondary effect from labour allocation

Real exchange rate (from Eqs. 80 & 89)

◆ Proposition 3: The real exchange rate, p , appreciates (depreciates) with improvements in technological progress in the tradeables (nontradeables) sector.

➤ **Proof.** (80) and (89) take positive and negative signs, respectively. ■

□ Relative labour effect **does not overcome** basic B-S effect, i.e. relative productivity effect

Simulating the Balassa-Samuelson effect

◆ Production function

$$\square F_I = v_I^{-1} k_I L_I^{\nu_I} \rightarrow \varepsilon_{IL} = \frac{F'_{IL} L_I}{F_I} = \nu_I, \varepsilon_{Ik} = \frac{F'_{Ik} k_I}{F_I} = 1$$

◆ Baseline parameter values

s_N	0.025	ρ	0.5	ν_N	0.66	r	0.003	k_N	1
s_T	0.025	α	0.5	ν_T	0.66	\bar{L}	1	k_T	1
ψ	0.5	A	1	β	0.5	z	0.71	γ	2.5

Figure 1. Determination of L_T and L_N in the homogeneous case ($s_N = s_T$)





Figure 2. Determination of L_T and L_N in the heterogeneous case ($s_N < s_T$)



The B-S effect in homogeneous & heterogeneous cases

◆ B-S effects

$$[\text{Homo}] \frac{dp}{p} = \eta^{-1} \left(\frac{dk_T}{k_T} - \frac{dk_N}{k_N} \right)$$

$$[\text{Hetero}] \frac{dp}{p} = \eta^{-1} \left(\frac{dk_T}{k_T} - \frac{dk_N}{k_N} \right) + \eta^{-1} \left(v_T \frac{dL_T}{L_T} - v_N \frac{dL_N}{L_N} \right)$$

◆ Productivity growth in Sector T ($dk_T/k_T = 0.1$)

$$\square \frac{dp}{p} \Big|_{\text{Homo}} = 0.2$$

$$\square \frac{dp}{p} \Big|_{\text{Hetero}} = 0.1986 - 0.0763 = 0.1223 < \frac{dp}{p} \Big|_{\text{Homo}}$$

➤ The relative labour effect **offsets nearly 38 per cent** of the relative productivity effect

Wage, labour demand and unemployment (heterogeneous case)

◆ Wage gap ($\tilde{W} = w_T - w_N$) increases

$$\square d\tilde{W}/\tilde{W} = 0.1226 > 0$$

◆ Labour demand in respective sectors

$$\square dL_T/L_T = -0.0229 < 0$$

$$\square dL_N/L_N = 0.0347 > 0$$

◆ Unemployment decreases

$$\square dU/U = -0.1089 < 0$$

➤ The rise in the nontradeables labour input exceeds the lower tradeables labour demand

◆ Substitutability matters → See Figures 4 and 5

Figure 4. Response of labour demand and unemployment to productivity growth in the tradeables sector

Both L_T and L_N increase nearby $\rho = 1$

U always decreases although the response decreases with ρ

Complements

Substitutes




Figure 5. Response of the wage gap to productivity growth in the tradeables sector for alternative degrees of substitutability





Figure 6. Response of labour demand and unemployment to productivity growth in the nontradeables sector ($dk_N/k_N = 0.1$)



Conclusion

◆ We explain **overvaluation of the B-S effect** with heterogeneous job separations

□ In the heterogeneous case ($s_T > s_N$), **the relative labour effect** offsets nearly 38 per cent of the relative productivity effect (Eq.100)

◆ **Substitutability** significantly matters for the dynamics of (un)employment

□ Rising productivity and capital growth in the nontradeables sector **increases unemployment** if tradeables and nontradeables are complements