

Relocating the value chain: offshoring & agglomeration in the global economy


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Tony Venables

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RIETI, Tokyo*

The 1st & 2nd unbundlings


1st unbundling:

Spatial separation of production & consumption.



2nd unbundling:

2.1 Factories.



2.2 Offices.




Unbundling 2.1: Factory Asia

Clusters & uneven unbundling (death of distance mistake)



Unbundling 2.1: Factory Asia

Growing Automobile Agglomeration in Pearl River Delta




2nd Unbundling : “New paradigm”

- Conceptual framework
- Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg
 - Simple model of ‘tasks trade’.
- Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud
 - Integrates tasks trade into Heckscher-Ohlin & monopolistic competition trade theory.
 - Offshoring as ‘shadow migration’ on quantity side and technological change on price side.


This paper

- Study the process of 2nd unbundling taking seriously engineering details of supply chain.




Spider & Snake

“spider”



“snake”



Basic assumptions


- Perfect competition, constant returns.
- All final consumption in North
- Shipping costs of final good αt .
 - *Traditional trade costs*
- Offshoring cost of a part, $\theta(i)\tau$
 - Costs that explain why factories bundled spatially even within nations.

Specifically

- Parts are indexed by type $y \in Y$
- Unit production cost in S is $b(y)$; unit costs of all parts normalised to 1 in N.
- Low b parts can be produced more cheaply in S
 - refer to low b parts as ‘labour-intensive’
- Assembly of parts: a_N, a_S in N & S.
- Per-unit off-shoring costs is $t\theta(y)$ if not produced in region of assembly (shipping & coordination costs).
- If assembly in S then $t\alpha$ is paid to ship to N consumers.


Spider

Part's relative cost in S



Spider

Part's relative cost in S



Each part is a point in b, θ space.

-3 sets of parts, N, NS, S

-N is set always cheapest in N & S in S.

-NS, cheapest location of part depends upon location of assembly.

Single agent cost minimisation

- Assembly in S iff

$$a_N + \int_{y \in \mathcal{N} \cup \mathcal{NS}} \psi(y) dy + \int_{y \in \mathcal{S}} [b(y) + t\theta(y)] \psi(y) dy$$


- is greater than

$$a_S + \alpha t + \int_{y \in \mathcal{N}} [1 + t\theta(y)] \psi(y) dy + \int_{y \in \mathcal{S} \cup \mathcal{NS}} b(y) \psi(y) dy$$

- NB:
 - if $t=0$, then NS disappears \Rightarrow pure comparative advantage for parts & assembly.
 - If $t=\infty$, trade costs dominate; all parts made in N & assemble in North.
 - For intermediate, get tension trade costs vs comparative advantage.

Cost minimising location


- Focus on comparative advantage;
 - Assume all offshoring costs equal for all parts, so horizontal axis now “ t ”, not theta
- Start with assembly in North; assume $a_S < a_N$.



Result: Offshoring “overshooting” of parts

Another example


- S'pose S has strong c.a. in parts, but N has c.a. in assembly $a_S > a_N$.



Nash in parts location


- Multiple eq'm arise:

Figure 5: Equilibrium locations, low cost assembly in S ($a_S < a_N$)




Snake

“spider”



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


Basic assumptions

- Stages of production continuum; $z \in (0,1)$
 - $z = 0$ the most upstream
- Each stage combines primary factors with the output of the previous stage.
- In general factor intensity need not vary continuously with z , but we assume this.
- Factor cost in S is $c[z]$; normalised to 1 in N .
 - Low $c[z]$ = “very L-intensive”
- Off-shoring costs $\tau[z]t$;


Snake: General issues

- More difficult as cannot freely re-order the parts by comparative advantage.
- Parts vary by c.a. and by offshoring costs



Snake: General issues

- If stages 0 to z_1 in S
 - Save area A on factor cost, but pay $(\tau[0]+\tau[z_1])t$ in offshoring costs.




General results

- Won't get infinitely small segments of supply chain offshored; cluster tendency
- Offshore overshooting again; if one stage is offshored already, trade costs favours production of immediate up and down stream stage in S.
 - In multiple S world, suggests agglomeration.

Example 1: Upstream offshoring


- S'pose $c[z]$ increase (i.e. upstream parts are most L-intensive and so c.a. in S).
 - Single break in supply chain, \hat{z} .

$$\hat{z} \in (0,1]: \quad U(\hat{z}) = \int_0^{\hat{z}} c(z) dz + \tau(\hat{z})t + \int_{\hat{z}}^1 dz$$



Upstream offshoring

- Factor cost savings vs OS'ing costs



Labour mkt implications

- Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud insight
- Start with standard HO 2x2x2 model with free trade in goods but no offshoring.
- Assume N has Hicks neutral tech advantage.

$$\begin{bmatrix} X \\ Y \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{A}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} L \\ K \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} X^* \\ Y^* \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \mathbf{A}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} L^* \\ K^* \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} w \\ r \end{bmatrix} = (\mathbf{A}^T)^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ p \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} w^* \\ r^* \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\gamma} (\mathbf{A}^T)^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ p \end{bmatrix}$$

Allow offshoring

- N can combine its superior tech with lower prices S labour and re-import that stage.
- Means N can produce same output with fewer resources, i.e. shadow migration.

Offshoring : Equilibrium

- Full-employment conditions ('o' ≡ offshoring)

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} L \\ K \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Home}} = (\mathbf{A} - \mathbf{A}_1) \begin{bmatrix} X_o \\ Y_o \end{bmatrix}, \quad \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} L^* \\ K^* \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Foreign}} = \gamma \mathbf{A} \begin{bmatrix} X_o^* \\ Y_o^* \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{A}_1 \begin{bmatrix} X_o \\ Y_o \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{A}_1 \equiv \begin{bmatrix} a_{LX1} & a_{LY1} \\ a_{KX1} & a_{KY1} \end{bmatrix}$$

→ “Shadow migration”

$$\begin{bmatrix} L + \Delta L \\ K + \Delta K \end{bmatrix} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} L_o \\ K_o \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{A} \begin{bmatrix} X_o \\ Y_o \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} \Delta L \\ \Delta K \end{bmatrix} \equiv \mathbf{A}_1 \begin{bmatrix} X_o \\ Y_o \end{bmatrix} > \mathbf{0}; \quad \tilde{L}_o^w \equiv L + \frac{L^*}{\gamma} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}\right) \Delta L$$

→ Offshoring in L-intensive sector tends to shift N towards L-int production

Offshoring : Equilibrium (ctd.)

- Pricing conditions

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ p_o \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Home}} = (\mathbf{A}^T - \mathbf{A}_1^T) \begin{bmatrix} w_o \\ r_o \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{A}_1^T \begin{bmatrix} w_o^* \\ r_o^* \end{bmatrix}$$

Home

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ p_o \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Foreign (no change)}} = \gamma \mathbf{A}^T \begin{bmatrix} w_o^* \\ r_o^* \end{bmatrix}$$

Foreign (no change)

→ Cost saving \Leftrightarrow technical progress (Stolper-Samuelson)

$$\begin{bmatrix} S_X + 1 \\ S_Y + p_o \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{A}^T \begin{bmatrix} w_o \\ r_o \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ p_o \end{bmatrix} = \gamma \mathbf{A}^T \begin{bmatrix} w_o^* \\ r_o^* \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} S_X \\ S_Y \end{bmatrix} \equiv \mathbf{A}_1^T \begin{bmatrix} w_o - w_o^* \\ r_o - r_o^* \end{bmatrix}$$

→ Wage effects depends upon cost savings by sector, not nature of cost-savings per se.

Conclusion

- Early stage in theory development.
- Theory needs guidance from facts on unbundling in specific industries.
- Please see:
www.VoxEU.org