Dale Jorgenson
Professor, Harvard University
The role of information technology and productivity growth has
become the subject of hot debate in the US for a number of reasons.
The US is now officially in recession, as of March 2001. And there
are added uncertainties associated with the events of September
11. My view is that we should expect to see a continued impact
of information technology on productivity growth and an acceleration
in economic growth relative to periods when IT was less important.
This is not the only view out there. Last year, at a meeting
at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Larry Summers of Harvard University
was optimistic and said productivity would grow at three percent
a year. Others, such as Martin Bailey, the former chairman of
President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors, were less optimistic
and predicted two percent growth. The projection of productivity
growth is important for economic policymaking, such as setting
budgets and taxation.
Last year I dated the US productivity revival at 1995. This was
based on my view of the role of IT in the economy. If we look
at the more recent evidence, business sector productivity has
grown at about 1.5% per year from the third quarter of 2000 to
the third quarter of 2001. During this period, output grew at
only 0.1%. What has happened is that there has been a sharp jump
in the unemployment rate. For the last quarter of 2001, there
was also strong productivity growth.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for pessimism. In July 2001,
the official national accounts were revised downward. In particular,
estimates of investments in software were sizably reduced. And
then there was a cyclical slowdown (the recession). But productivity
growth has been more rapid during this recession than the past
nine recessions. So clearly something different is happening here.
Productivity growth has been high since 1995, peaked in 2000,
and has been coming down since. Nevertheless, during this recession,
productivity growth has continued. The resurgence in productivity
has continued into the current recession. These are the facts
about labor productivity.
But let me remind you that economists use the word "productivity"
in at least two different senses: labor productivity (output per
hour worked) and overall productivity or total factor productivity
(output per unit of all inputs including labor). So what happens
next?
Long-term projections for analyzing fiscal policy in the US look
at ten-year periods, so I will look at a period of ten years too.
For my presentation today, I would like to look at the role of
IT in productivity growth and to make a projection of growth eliminating
the cyclical component.
First I would like to review the historical record. I would like
to compare output and labor productivity for the periods of 1995-2000
and 1973-1995. Output will be broadly defined to include housing
services, non-profits, and service flow from consumer durables.
My data comes from the Department of Commerce. From 1973 to 1995,
hours growth was 1.55%, while labor productivity growth was 1.44%.
Meanwhile, from 1995 to 2000, those numbers were 2.24% and 2.36%.
Hours growth and labor productivity both grew. What are the sources
of labor productivity growth?
One source is capital deepening, which is the result of investment;
investment provides more and better capital to labor. A second
source, which is extremely important, is increases in the quality
of labor. The idea is that underlying trends for increased educational
attainment and age and gender composition of the work force all
impact labor quality. Labor quality is defined as labor input
per hour worked. Finally, there is output per unit of input (technology
and everything else) or total factor productivity (TFP).
What happened after 1995? First of all, capital deepening increased
substantially. One reason is because of the increased role of
IT. Between 1995 and 2000, there was a huge increase (0.76%) in
capital deepening associated with IT. What does that represent?
It represents the higher levels of investment in IT, specifically
computers, telecommunications, and software.
Meanwhile, during the late 1990s, labor quality actually slowed.
Why? There was a huge increase in the growth of hours worked.
With this increase, there was both an increase in people employed
with high skills and people employed with low skills. We had welfare
reform that resulted in an increase of people with very low skills
in the labor force. The consequence is that labor quality was
reduced.
But TFP growth accelerated. IT TFP contribution almost doubled.
There was a change in the product cycle of semiconductors. Overall,
the change in labor productivity growth after 1995 was about 0.9%,
a sizable number. Of that, slightly less than half was due to
IT capital deepening. Eight percent was due to other types of
capital deepening. Labor quality fell. TFP in IT production contributed
to about one quarter, as did TFP in other sectors. That is the
historical picture. Despite the slowdown, the productivity revival
remains strong.
How about looking forward? How much is transitory? The two key
assumptions we will make to remove transitory effects are the
following: first, in the long run, output and reproducible capital
(producible capital, which excludes land) have to grow at the
same rate; second, hours growth matches labor force growth.
There is a lot of uncertainty. So I will give you a pessimistic,
optimistic, and base-case. As is customary, I will assume that
hours and labor quality are the same, from demographic projections.
I will also assume that capital, labor, and IT output shares are
equal to historical averages.
We then calibrate alternative assumptions, which vary across
scenarios according to TFP growth in IT production, TFP growth
elsewhere in the economy, and capital quality growth. The base-case
scenario will be based on the "International Technology Roadmap
for Semiconductors," which argues an eventual reversion to
the three-year product cycle. The optimistic scenario is based
on Intel's view that we will see a continuation of the two-year
product cycle. The pessimistic scenario says we will revert to
the 1973-1995 experience.
The TFP contribution from IT is significant for all three scenarios:
for the pessimistic view it is 0.37%, for the base-case it is
0.44%, and for the optimistic view it is 0.52%. Capital quality
growth was exceptional, at 2.45% average growth for 1995 to 2000,
but it is unlikely to continue at this rate. The pessimists say
capital quality growth will go to 0.84%; the base-case would be
at 1.75%; and the optimists say it will go to 2.45%.
Reasonable demographic assumptions see hours growth declining
to 1.1% per year or half of what it was during the late 1990s
(2.24%). We are not going to have the kind of increase in labor
participation increases we have had because that is simply unsustainable.
This is the core of the pessimistic view, that IT was a bubble
and cannot be repeated. Hours growth can not continue as it did
during the 1990s. So we put it at 1.1% for each scenario. The
other assumptions determine the range of productivity growth projections.
Adding hours growth and productivity together, the pessimists
project productivity will be at 2.43% and that the late 1990s
were just a bubble (this is a view held only by the extreme pessimists);
the base-case say 3.34%; the optimists (like Larry Summers) say
4.08%.
Keep two things in mind: First, there will be a slowdown in US
economic growth. Second, there is an enormous range of uncertainty,
which has to do with labor productivity in different scenarios.
The key to the uncertainty is the future of technology. It is
what drives IT-related TFP and capital quality growth.
The US productivity remains intact. IT use and production play
important roles in TFP and capital deepening. Post-1995 productivity
growth can continue. 2.25% per year seems reasonable; this is
the consensus view (views of publications such as The Wall Street
Journal, which is pessimistic, and BusinessWeek, which is optimistic,
are converging). It is important to avoid giving the impression
that these estimates are precise. There is tremendous uncertainty.
The virtue of IT is that it grows rapidly. In ten years, there
were three separate product cycles, so it is difficult to be precise.
Planning for the future must reckon with this uncertainty related
to IT.
Rizaburo Nezu
Director, RIETI
At the OECD, I spent a great deal of time studying this subject.
You say that US productivity will continue to grow, despite the
economic downturn. This has sparked some debate inside the OECD.
I do have a couple of questions. If in the years to come, productivity
will increase, shouldn't the US then change its macroeconomic
policy? As for the semiconductor product cycle, how quickly will
consumers want to adopt this new technology? I am worried about
the demand side of the equation. The price of semiconductors is
only a small chunk of the total price of IT.
Question and Answer
Q: The hardware proportion of IT expenditure is shrinking.
To what extent would you projection change from this trend?
Dale Jorgenson
At first there were two views at the OECD: one represented by
Mr. Nezu's science, technology, and industry division and one
by the economics division. By the time Mr. Nezu left the OECD,
the economists had appropriated the views of Mr. Nezu's division.
In fact the economists stole the ideas from STI. So it was a total
triumph for Mr. Nezu.
The role of these projections on economic policy is that they
are a basic input for deciding fiscal policy (taxation and expenditure
levels). The Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management
and Budget are pretty much in line with this thinking.
The most prominent of the pessimists, Paul Krugman, wrote a piece
called "Setting the Speed Limit," in the Harvard Business
Review. He took a pessimistic view and said there was no significant
role for IT in productivity. He said that productivity growth
would stay at 2.5% per year. And this was the consensus view.
Alan Blinder wrote a similar piece.
My, relatively moderate, view is now the consensus. It reflects
the triumph of Mr. Nezu and his colleagues at the OECD and his
counterparts in the US.
Most publicity has been about monetary policy. The Federal Reserve
let things get out of hand in 2000. The impact of tightening monetary
policy is unpredictable. There is a surge in productivity, so
some feel we have to worry less about inflation. That is true;
but it is also true that the variability in productivity growth
makes the job of monetary policymakers much more difficult. That
lesson has yet to sink in.
There are mysteries about IT. The IT productivity TFP is not
totally explained by the product cycle. It is not only about IT
production, but also it is about IT absorption and adoption (which
is reflected in capital deepening and capital quality). Capital
deepening is associated with the demand for different skills.
The relative demand for skills changes. The labor force is slow
to change. We get a rapid change capital allocation, but slower
changes in the labor force.
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