Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)



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Mind what your voters read: Media exposure and international economic policy making

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MOTIVATION

- Knowledge of elected representative's behavior is key to insure accountability
- Media role is significant on a range of electoral/policy outcomes:
 - Electoral participation (Stromberg 2004, Gentzkow 2006)
 - Incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder 2006)
 - Politician's selection (Drago, Nannicini and Sobbrio 2014)
 - Politician's performance (Stromberg and Snyder 2010, Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson 2011, Prat and Stromberg 2011, Drago, Nannicini and Sobbrio 2014)
 - Government spending (Stromberg and Snyder 2010)
 - Harshness of judicial sentences (Lim, Snyder and Stromberg 2014)
- Our paper focuses on whether media exposure makes the politician accountable on two specific policy issues: *migration* and *trade*.

MOTIVATION

- Why focusing on migration and trade?
- Standard economic theory predicts similar effects of trade and immigration on labor market outcomes of workers in the destination country. Economic drivers play an important role in shaping individual preferences towards globalization (Conconi et al. 2014).
- Nonetheless, important differences exist between the determinants of preferences towards trade and migration (e.g. welfare state considerations and non-economic factors)
- More generally, migration and trade might not be perceived as equally salient by the electorate
- The disciplining effect of **media exposure** on politicians' behavior may vary according to the **saliency** of the issue at stake.

OUTLINE

- Measuring media coverage
- Data and Facts
- Empirical analysis
- Conclusions

MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE

- Ashworth (2012): the key challenge when studying the effect of media exposure is identifying plausible exogenous variation on features that affect the responsiveness of the politician to the electorate.
- Snyder and Strömberg (2010) focus on the market for local newspapers, as they devote more coverage to Congress than local television.
- Idea: «economic-geography» factors shaping the market for local newspapers are different from the «political geography» factors that determine congressional district boundaries:
 - «economic-geography» factors: local newspapers typically based in urban areas; sales in the surrounding areas depend on the distance between the suburb and the newspaper's headquarters and on the socio–economic characteristics of the area's residents
 - «political geography» factors: congressional districts boundaries are drawn so that all districts in each state have the same population, representation is guaranteed to different racial groups etc.
 - Overlap between congressional districts and locals newspaper markets exhibit substantial variation across space and over time.



MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE

- Snyder and Strömberg (2010) build a «congruence» measure of congressional districts and local newspaper markets to identify an effect of media coverage on voters, politicians, and policy outcomes
- Formally:

 $Congruence_d = \sum_n MarketShare_{nd} ReaderShare_{nd}$

- where *MarketShare_{nd}* is the newspaper *n* share of total newspaper sales in district *d*; *ReaderShare_{nd}* is the share of newspaper *n* sales that are in district *d*.
- Note: since congruence is defined using mkt share, it does not depend upon total mkt penetration, which depends on education, income etc.

MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE



Figure 1: Congruence

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MEASURING MEDIA EXPOSURE

- Snyder and Stromberg (2010) find that higher congruence is correlated with:
 - More coverage of local congressman
 - Voters are better informed/more likely to participate in elections
 - Politicians pursue more actively the interests of their constituency
 - More federal funds flow to congressman's district.

DATA

- Time period covered: U.S. 1986 2004
- **Dependent variable**: dummy $Vote_{dt}$ coded as 1 if the representative of district d at time t votes on a bill in favor of trade or migration liberalization, 0 otherwise
- Key explanatory variables:
 - Aggregate measures of individual **opinion** at congressional district level d

Migration

ANES asked: "Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, stay as now, or decreased?" *Proimmig*=1 if increased/stay as now

Trade

ANES asked: "Some people have suggested placing new limits on imports in order to protect American jobs/exports. Do you favor placing new limits on imports, or not?" *Protrade*=1 if does not favor

Measure of media coverage ("Cong_{dt}")

DISTRICT-LEVEL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROLS

- District-level characteristics: economic characteristics, industry of employment, socio-demographic characteristics
- Individual-level characteristics: politician's characteristics (e.g. age, gender, ideology)

INTUITION

Figure 2: Individual opinions on migration, congruence and voting behavior on HR 3736 (1998)



Figure 2.2: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 -

Figure 2.3: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 -Congruence



Figure 3.1: Texas – Congressional Districts Map







Figure 3.3: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 -Congruence



Figure 3.4: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 -Vote on trade

Figure 3: Individual opinions on trade, congruence and voting behavior on HR 2621 (1998)

Opinions on migration



EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

• We estimate a **linear probability model** :

 $Vote_{Mdt} = \alpha^{1} MigOp_{dt} + \beta^{1} Cong_{dt} + \gamma^{1} MigOp_{dt} \times Cong_{dt} + X_{dt}\delta + I_{st} + u_{dt}$ $Vote_{Tdt} = \alpha^{2} TrdOp_{dt} + \beta^{2} Cong_{dt} + \gamma^{2} TrdOp_{dt} \times Cong_{dt} + X_{dt}\delta + I_{st} + u_{dt}$

- The key parameters are the coefficients γ^1 and γ^2
- If γ is positive and significant \rightarrow the elected official's behavior becomes more in line with the prevailing opinion of her electorate as congruence rises
- A lack of significance would instead indicate the absence of any disciplining effect of press coverage on the policy maker's behavior

ESTIMATION RESULTS

Table 3: Baseline specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4))	(5))
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion</i> _{dt}	0.294	0.0426	-0.236	-0.0777	-0.316	-0.142	-0.447	-0.159	-0.428	-0.0520
	(0.153)	(0.0916)	(0.237)	(0.139)	(0.231)	(0.117)	(0.235)	(0.117)	(0.240)	(0.113)
$Congruence_{dt}$			-0.775**	-0.0374	-0.654	-0.345	-0.447	-0.264	-0.316	-0.207
			(0.288)	(0.188)	(0.343)	(0.211)	(0.359)	(0.233)	(0.370)	(0.214)
Interaction _{dt}			1.694**	0.474	1.663**	0.217	1.781**	0.231	1.665**	-0.132
			(0.582)	(0.416)	(0.547)	(0.367)	(0.549)	(0.364)	(0.577)	(0.355)
State*year fixed effect	YE	ES	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S
Economic characteristics	N	С	NO	C	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S
Socio-demographic characteristics	N	С	NO)	NO)	YE	S	YE	S
Politician's characteristics	NO	С	NO	C	NO)	NO)	YE	S
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139
R-squared	0.329	0.272	0.350	0.276	0.399	0.368	0.424	0.371	0.439	0.414

Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. **Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.

- Estimates of the coefficients of the interaction term between opinion and congruence differ between immigration and trade:
 - **Migration regression** $\rightarrow \gamma^1$ positive and highly significant in all specifications
 - Trade regression $\rightarrow \gamma^2$ not different from zero in all specifications 12

ESTIMATION RESULTS

Marginal effect of district's migration opinion on Representative's voting behavior



ESTIMATION RESULTS

Marginal effect of district's trade opinion on Representative's voting behavior



QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS

• Consider two districts:

- Florida's 4th in 1996. Congruence is slightly above average at 0.44; a ten percentage points increase in the share of pro-migration individuals in the population leads to a 2.9 percentage point in the probability that the representative will support immigration;
- Pennsylvania's 5th in 1998. Congruence is at 0.7 (90th percentile). A similar increase in the pro-migration electorate leads to a 7.4 percentage point increase in the probability that the representative will support immigration.

ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: CLOSENESS OF THE RACE

	(1	.)	(2)	(3	6)	(4	4)
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion</i> _{dt}	-0.323	-0.0764	-0.414	-0.139	-0.390	-0.168	-0.447	-0.0171
	(0.283)	(0.199)	(0.297)	(0.163)	(0.296)	(0.161)	(0.309)	(0.162)
Congruence _{dt}	-0.838*	-0.145	-0.762	-0.368	-0.434	-0.290	-0.434	-0.282
	(0.368)	(0.232)	(0.401)	(0.244)	(0.424)	(0.267)	(0.439)	(0.258)
MoVdt	0.0252	-0.158	-0.0491	0.0275	0.0261	0.0341	-0.00403	-0.0321
	(0.260)	(0.139)	(0.273)	(0.133)	(0.260)	(0.132)	(0.266)	(0.128)
Congruencedt*Opiniondt	2.235**	0.405	2.087**	0.274	1.848*	0.315	1.936*	-0.186
	(0.754)	(0.558)	(0.737)	(0.491)	(0.734)	(0.486)	(0.760)	(0.471)
MoVdt*Opiniondt	0.297	0.0484	0.371	-0.000272	-0.0248	0.0281	0.128	-0.0316
	(0.490)	(0.268)	(0.465)	(0.228)	(0.429)	(0.233)	(0.445)	(0.233)
Congruencedt*MoVdt	0.139	0.162	0.108	0.0496	-0.175	0.0461	-0.0816	0.181
	(0.554)	(0.357)	(0.606)	(0.328)	(0.604)	(0.333)	(0.612)	(0.353)
Congruencedt*Opiniondt*MoVdt	-2.071	0.121	-2.012	-0.0895	-1.066	-0.174	-1.511	0.0507
	(1.220)	(0.792)	(1.194)	(0.700)	(1.141)	(0.715)	(1.182)	(0.752)
State*year fixed effect	YE	ES	Y	ES	YI	ES	YI	ES
Economic characteristics	N	О	Y	ES	YE	ES	YI	ES
Socio-demographic characteristics	N	О	N	Ю	YE	ES	YI	ES
Politician's characteristics	N	О	N	IO	N	0	YI	ES
Observations	260	1,130	260	1,130	260	1,130	260	1,130
R-squared	0.378	0.279	0.430	0.367	0.458	0.370	0.473	0.412

ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: CLOSENESS OF THE RACE

Migration



Small margin of victory



ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: CLOSENESS OF THE RACE

Trade

Large margin of victory

Small margin of victory



ELECTION COMPETITIVENESS: TURNOUT

Migration

Trade



ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

- Reverse causality concerns
- Years included in the analysis
- Alternative measures and definition of «opinion»
- Alternative **district level** controls
- Different measures of **politician's characteristics**
- Placebo tests



REVERSE CAUSALITY

- Politicians could influence individual opinions on trade and migration through the local media; this effect could be greater in those districts where the coverage of local politicians is higher.
- The correlation between congruence and opinions on trade/migration is not statistically significant.
- Still, to further address this concern, we implement an IV strategy that builds upon the literature on the individual level determinants of attitudes towards trade and migration.

Determinants of individual opinion

High School - No diplomae -0.0170 (0.0707) High School - Diplomae (0.0707) (0.0337) High School - Diplomae (0.0650) (0.0300) Some College - No degree# 0.118 0.143*+ (0.0630) (0.0337) BA level degrees# 0.264** 0.309** (0.0699) (0.0336) Advanced degrees# 0.334** 0.360** (0.0099) (0.0356) (0.0356) Female -0.00810 -0.0063** (0.0555) (0.0120) Age Group 25.34* -0.013 -0.013 Age Group 35.44* 0.00335 -0.0439 (0.0289) Age Group 45.54* 0.00267 -0.029 (0.0296) Age Group 75-74* -0.0468 -0.027 (0.0296) Age Group 75-74* -0.0468 -0.0214 (0.0331) Age Group 75-74* -0.0468 -0.0215 (0.0617) (0.0335) Age Group 75-74* -0.06441 -0.0324 (0.0517) (0.0335) Age Group 75-reer (0.0617)		Opinion on Migration	Opinon on Trade
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Age Group 25-34* -0.0413 -0.00163 Age Group 35-44* (0.0566) (0.0289) Age Group 45-54* -0.00267 -0.0229 (0.0569) (0.0298) -0.0298) Age Group 55-64* -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0296) -0.0267 Age Group 55-64* -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0276) -0.0229 Age Group 55-74* -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0617) (0.0323) -0.0267 Age Group 75-over* (0.0642) (0.0324) (0.0617) (0.0354) -0.015 Black* (0.017) (0.0354) Black* (0.017) (0.0354) Main* 0.285 0.453** (0.165) (0.0880) -0.22* (0.211) (0.159) -0.014 Native-American* -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.151) (0.152) Mexican* 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) -0.255 Hispanic - not Mexican* VES YES		(0.0205)	(0.0120)
(0.0566) (0.0289) Age Group 35-44# 0.00395 -0.0439 (0.0555) (0.0289) -0.0229 (0.0569) (0.0298) -0.0229 (0.0569) (0.0298) -0.0219 (0.0569) (0.0298) -0.0247 (0.0569) (0.0296) -0.0243 (0.0617) (0.0296) -0.0267 (0.0617) (0.0296) -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) -0.0267 (0.0647) (0.0354) -0.0267 (0.0647) (0.0354) -0.0215 (0.0617) (0.0354) -0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) -0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) -0.0215 (0.161) (0.152) -0.0694 Asian# -0.0694 0.322* (0.111) (0.152) -0.0694 Matican# -0.0694 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) -0.114 (0.256) (0.171)	Age Group 25-34it	-0.0413	-0.00163
Age Group 35-44:: 0.00395 -0.0439 (0.0555) (0.0289) Age Group 45-54:: -0.0267 -0.0229 (0.0569) (0.0298) Age Group 55-64:: -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0296) Age Group 65-74:: -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) (0.0617) (0.0324) Age Group 75-over: 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) (0.0617) (0.0354) Black: 0.570** 0.0215 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black: 0.570** 0.0215 (0.015) (0.0880) Asian* 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.152) Native-American* -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican* 0.240 0.275 (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican* 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) VES YES YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Bacedo R-squared		(0.0566)	(0.0289)
Age Group 45-54# -0.0267 -0.0229 (0.0559) (0.0298) Age Group 55-64# -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0296) Age Group 65-74# -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0612) (0.0333) -0.0267 (0.0612) (0.0333) -0.0267 (0.0612) (0.0333) -0.0267 (0.0612) (0.0333) -0.0267 (0.0617) (0.0354) -0.0164 Black# -0.0524 -0.0267 (0.0617) (0.0354) -0.0164 Black# 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) -0.029 Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) -0.0164 Matice-American# 0.240 0.275 (0.211) (0.164) -0.026 Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) -0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# YES YES Race*Age group YES </td <td>Age Group 35-44^{it}</td> <td>0.00395</td> <td>-0.0439</td>	Age Group 35-44 ^{it}	0.00395	-0.0439
Age Group 45-54* -0.0267 -0.0229 (0.0569) (0.0298) Age Group 55-64* -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0296) Age Group 65-74* -0.0408 -0.0267 Age Group 75-over* 0.00642) (0.0323) Age Group 75-over* 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) 0.0354) Black* 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) 0.0159 Asian* 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) 0.152) Native-American* 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) 0.114 Hispanic - not Mexican* VES YES Race*Educational Attainment YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.0555)	(0.0289)
(0.0569) (0.0298) Age Group 55-64 ^a -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0296) Age Group 65-74 ^a -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) Age Group 75-over ^a 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black ^a 0.570** 0.0215 (0.0165) (0.0880) Asian ^a 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American ^a -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) 0.0463 Mexican ^a 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) 0.114 Hispanic - not Mexican ^a 0.660* 0.114 Kace*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.115	Age Group 45-54 ^{it}	-0.0267	-0.0229
Age Group 55-64: -0.0104 -0.0343 (0.0617) (0.0296) Age Group 65-74: -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) Age Group 75-over* 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black* 0.570** 0.0215 (0.0617) (0.0380) Asian* 0.285 0.453** (0.165) (0.0880) Asian* 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American* -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican* (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican* 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) 0.155 Race*Educational Attainment YES YES Race*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.0569)	(0.0298)
(0.0617) (0.0296) Age Group 65-74" -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) Age Group 75-over" 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black" 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) Asian" 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-Americant" -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexicant" 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexicant" 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) 0.55 Race*Educational Attainment YES YES YES YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Age Group 55-64 ^{it}	-0.0104	-0.0343
Age Group 65-74# -0.0408 -0.0267 (0.0642) (0.0323) Age Group 75-over# 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black# 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) 114 Co256 YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.0617)	(0.0296)
(0.0642) (0.0323) Age Group 75-over# 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black# 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Age Group 65-74 ^{it}	-0.0408	-0.0267
Age Group 75-over# 0.00848 -0.0524 (0.0617) (0.0354) Black# 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 VES VES VES State*Picture affect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.0642)	(0.0323)
(0.0617) (0.0354) Black# 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.17) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# YES YES Race*Educational Attainment YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Age Group 75-over ^{it}	0.00848	-0.0524
Black# 0.570** 0.0215 (0.165) (0.0880) Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 0.256 U U Race*Educational Attainment YES YES Race*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.0617)	(0.0354)
(0.165) (0.0880) Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 0.256) 0.114 0.256) 0.114 0.256) YES YES Race*Educational Attainment YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Blackit	0.570**	0.0215
Asian# 0.285 0.453** (0.211) (0.159) Native-American# -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican# 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican# 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) YES Race*Educational Attainment YES Race*Educational Attainment YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.165)	(0.0880)
(0.211) (0.159) Native-American ^{is} -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexican ^{is} 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican ^{is} 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment YES YES State*year fixed effect YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Asianit	0.285	0.453**
Native-Americanit -0.0694 0.322* (0.211) (0.152) Mexicanit 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexicanit 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment YES YES Race*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.211)	(0.159)
(0.211) (0.152) Mexican ⁱⁱ 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexican ⁱⁱ 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment Race*Age group YES State*year fixed effect YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Native-American ^{it}	-0.0694	0.322*
Mexicanii 0.240 0.275 (0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexicanii 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment Race*Age group YES State*year fixed effect YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.211)	(0.152)
(0.187) (0.164) Hispanic - not Mexicani ¹¹ 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment YES YES Race*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Mexican ^{it}	0.240	0.275
Hispanic - not Mexican ⁱⁱ 0.660* 0.114 (0.256) (0.171) Race*Educational Attainment YES YES Race*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155		(0.187)	(0.164)
(0.256)(0.171)Race*Educational AttainmentYESRace*Age groupYESState*year fixed effectYESObservations2,708Observations0.1110.155	Hispanic - not Mexicanit	0.660*	0.114
Race*Educational AttainmentYESYESRace*Age groupYESYESState*year fixed effectYESYESObservations2,7086,390Pseudo R-squared0.1110.155		(0.256)	(0.171)
Race*Educational AttainmentYESYESRace*Age groupYESYESState*year fixed effectYESYESObservations2,7086,390Pseudo R-squared0.1110.155			
Race*Age group YES YES State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Race*Educational Attainment	YES	YES
State*year fixed effect YES YES Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	Race*Age group	YES	YES
Observations 2,708 6,390 Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.155	State*year fixed effect	YES	YES
<u>Pseudo R-squared</u> 0.111 0.155	Observations	2,708	6,390
	Pseudo R-squared	0.111	0.155

IV ESTIMATES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4))
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
Opinion ^{dt}	-1.375*	0.213	-1.737**	-0.0385	-2.094**	-0.0568	-1.975**	-0.0534
	(0.611)	(0.251)	(0.581)	(0.230)	(0.681)	(0.228)	(0.672)	(0.208)
Congruencedt	-2.083**	-0.291	-2.029**	-0.532*	-1.989**	-0.487	-1.952**	-0.460
	(0.607)	(0.265)	(0.666)	(0.254)	(0.681)	(0.272)	(0.699)	(0.238)
Interaction ^{dt}	4.447**	1.326*	4.775**	0.858	5.056**	0.889	4.972**	0.708
	(1.231)	(0.639)	(1.335)	(0.567)	(1.353)	(0.567)	(1.390)	(0.525)
State*year fixed effect	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S
Economic characteristics	NO)	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S
Socio-demographic characteristics	NO	C	NO)	YE	S	YE	S
Politician's characteristics	NO	C	NO)	NO	C	YE	S
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic	12.16	45.58	13.83	30.58	12.37	30.19	11.88	30.23
State*year fixed effect	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S
Observations	263	1.118	263	1.118	263	1.118	263	1.118

YEARS INCLUDED

	(1) Years 94-96-98		(2 Years 93-	;) 94-96-98	(3 Years 9) 6 -98-03	(4) Years 96-98-03-04		
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	
<i>Opinion</i> _{dt}	-0.428	-0.0548	-0.428	0.167	-0.428	-0.0534	-0.428	-0.0403	
	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.240)	(0.202)	(0.240)	(0.208)	(0.240)	(0.169)	
<i>Congruence</i> _{dt}	-0.316	0.441	-0.316	-0.372	-0.316	0.338	-0.316	-0.0761	
	(0.370)	(0.484)	(0.370)	(0.361)	(0.370)	(0.359)	(0.370)	(0.320)	
<i>Interaction</i> _{dt}	1.665**	-0.504	1.665**	-0.477	1.665**	-0.461	1.665**	-0.284	
	(0.577)	(0.653)	(0.577)	(0.599)	(0.577)	(0.536)	(0.577)	(0.459)	
State*year fixed effect	YE YE	ES	YE YE	ES ES	YE YE	ES	YE YE	ES ES	
Socio-demographic characteristics	YE	ES	YI	ES	YI	ES	YI	ES	
Politician's characteristics	YE	ES	YE	ES	YE	ES	YE	ES	
Observations	265	204	265	475	265	298	265	480	
R-squared	0.439	0.454	0.439	0.449	0.439	0.635	0.439	0.575	

MEASURES OF OPINION

	(1))	(2))	(3))	(4)	(5)	(6))
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade								
Mean opinion $decade_{dt}$	-0.294	-0.142										
	(0.393)	(0.135)										
Mean opinion _{dt}			-0.523	-0.0508	-0.495	-0.0686	-0.781	-0.0956				-0.0520
			(0.281)	(0.118)	(0.363)	(0.157)	(0.444)	(0.167)				(0.113)
Median opinion _{dt}									-0.259	-0.0148		
									(0.146)	(0.0773)		
Mean opinion rescaled _{dt}											-0.329	
											(0.170)	
Congruence _{dt}	-0.642	-0.273	-0.490	-0.205	-0.383	-0.214	-0.652	-0.216	0.157	-0.257	-0.249	-0.207
	(0.549)	(0.224)	(0.425)	(0.218)	(0.503)	(0.237)	(0.581)	(0.244)	(0.336)	(0.181)	(0.371)	(0.214)
Mean opinion decadedt*Congruencedt	2.293*	0.0779										
	(1.093)	(0.417)										
Mean opiniondt*Congruencedt			2.068**	-0.143	2.064*	-0.281	2.553*	-0.239				-0.132
			(0.685)	(0.373)	(0.876)	(0.481)	(1.012)	(0.511)				(0.355)
Median opiniondt*Congruencedt									0.648	-0.0241		
									(0.362)	(0.207)		
Mean opinion rescaleddt*Congruencedt											1.258**	
											(0.476)	
		~		~		~		~		~		~
State*year fixed effect	YE	S	YE	s								
Economic characteristics	YE	S	YE	S								
Socio-demographic characteristics	YE	S	YE	S								
Politician's characteristics	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S	YE	ËS	YE	S	YE	S
Observations	265	1,139	228	1,079	188	908	154	844	265	1,139	265	1,139
R-squared	0.436	0.414	0.454	0.415	0.467	0.435	0.491	0.441	0.434	0.413	0.440	0.414

DEFINITIONS OF OPINION

	(1)	(2)			
	Opinion pro l include	iberalization es DK	Opinion against liberalization includes D			
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade		
<i>Opinion</i> _{dt}	-0.476	-0.0436	-0.421	-0.138		
	(0.246)	(0.133)	(0.243)	(0.171)		
$Congruence_{dt}$	-0.362	-0.381	-0.294	-0.223		
	(0.374)	(0.270)	(0.369)	(0.220)		
Interaction _{dt}	1.741**	0.256	1.647**	-0.111		
	(0.583)	(0.435)	(0.578)	(0.500)		
State*year fixed effect	YE	S	YE	S		
Economic characteristics	YE	S	YE	S		
Socio-demographic characteristics	YE	S	YE	S		
Politician's characteristics	YE	YES		S		
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139		
R-squared	0.441	0.413	0.438	0.415		

ALTERNATIVE DISTRICT-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS

	(1)	(2	2)	(3)	(4)
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion_{dt}</i>	-0.397	-0.0533	-0.403	-0.0537	-0.418	-0.0547	-0.420	-0.0395
	(0.239)	(0.113)	(0.238)	(0.113)	(0.241)	(0.113)	(0.244)	(0.113)
Congruence _{dt}	-0.325	-0.208	-0.327	-0.211	-0.324	-0.185	-0.350	-0.201
	(0.375)	(0.214)	(0.374)	(0.214)	(0.370)	(0.217)	(0.375)	(0.214)
Interaction _{dt}	1.616**	-0.133	1.625**	-0.131	1.633**	-0.142	1.716**	-0.157
	(0.575)	(0.355)	(0.576)	(0.355)	(0.581)	(0.356)	(0.607)	(0.353)
SkillRatio _{dt}	3.633*	1.040	3.747*	1.089	3.646*	1.047	3.366	1.289
	(1.622)	(0.812)	(1.741)	(0.932)	(1.753)	(0.917)	(1.787)	(0.899)
Unemployment _{dt}	4.296	-2.815	4.401	-2.835	5.204	-2.701	5.066	-2.014
	(3.078)	(1.538)	(3.184)	(1.585)	(2.976)	(1.474)	(2.935)	(1.492)
Log mean family $income_{dt}$			-0.602	-0.208	-0.551	-0.173	-0.551	-0.178
			(0.511)	(0.265)	(0.495)	(0.263)	(0.501)	(0.269)
Log median family income _{dt}	-0.566	-0.190						
	(0.465)	(0.234)						
<i>Inequality</i> _{dt}			0.348	0.127				
			(0.565)	(0.352)				
<i>Farmer</i> _{dt}	4.026	3.711*	4.188	3.741*	3.685	4.068*	4.720	4.133*
	(2.842)	(1.674)	(3.134)	(1.657)	(3.221)	(1.692)	(3.240)	(1.671)
Wholesale, Retail and Transportation _{dt}	5.949*	-1.628	5.917*	-1.643	5.354	-1.817	5.913*	-1.007
	(2.774)	(1.619)	(2.794)	(1.648)	(2.935)	(1.622)	(2.898)	(1.662)
Urban _{dt}	0.0136	0.239	0.0160	0.241	0.136	0 195	0.0254	0.237
	(0.207)	(0.168)	(0.209)	(0.168)	(0.259)	(0.188)	(0.215)	(0.169)
Log Pop Density _{dt}					-0.0449	0.0175	(0.2.0)	(012.07)
					(0.0497)	(0.0316)		
Foreign - $born_{dt}$	1.171*	0.683	1.183*	0.684	1 ///7**	0.599	1 //55*	0.458
	(0.452)	(0.374)	(0.459)	(0.368)	(0.486)	(0.410)	(0.627)	(0.447)
Foreign - born growthd	-0.0381	-0.0401	-0.0387	-0.0404	0.0222	0.0441	0.0406	0.0222
	(0.0357)	(0.0373)	(0.0360)	(0.0374)	-0.0352	-0.0441	-0.0400	-0.0333
African - American	0.527	-0.223	0.527	-0.223	0.550	0.245	0.567	0.220
,	(0.374)	(0.207)	(0.375)	(0.208)	(0.336)	-0.245	(0.307	-0.520
Turnout Rate Previous Electionsd	(0.2.1.)	()	(0.0.0)	(0.200)	(0.580)	(0.211)	0.540	0.464
							0.540	-0.464
							(0.702)	(0.339)
State*year fixed effect	YE	ES	YI	ES	YE	ES	YE	S
Economic characteristics	YE	ES	YI	ES	YE	ES	YE	S
Politician's characteristics	YE	ES	YI	ES	YE	ES	YE	S
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	260	1,128
R-squared	0.440	0.414	0.440	0.414	0.442	0.414	0.432	0.411

ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

	(1)	(.	2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
Oninion	0.441	0.0554	0.420	0.0478	0 204	0.0775	0.260	0.0561	0.268	0.000061
Opinion _{di}	-0.441	-0.0554	-0.420	-0.0478	-0.394	-0.0775	-0.300	-0.0301	-0.308	0.000901
_	(0.238)	(0.113)	(0.240)	(0.113)	(0.240)	(0.112)	(0.249)	(0.113)	(0.245)	(0.113)
Congruence _{dt}	-0.312	-0.208	-0.320	-0.265	-0.226	-0.304	-0.220	-0.359	-0.171	-0.269
	(0.348)	(0.217)	(0.375)	(0.206)	(0.370)	(0.221)	(0.373)	(0.217)	(0.395)	(0.194)
Interaction _{dt}	1.721**	-0.119	1.638**	-0.217	1.581**	0.00334	1.526**	-0.0564	1.404*	-0.205
	(0.565)	(0.356)	(0.572)	(0.359)	(0.574)	(0.346)	(0.584)	(0.345)	(0.598)	(0.346)
Age - representative _{dt}			0.00531	0.000363	0.00396	0.000279	0.00231	-0.000157	0.00263	-0.000384
			(0.00385)	(0.00217)	(0.00367)	(0.00228)	(0.00360)	(0.00217)	(0.00376)	(0.00196)
<i>Tenure</i> _{dt}	0.0240**	0.00292								
	(0.00891)	(0.00559)								
Gender - representative $_{dt}$	0.128	-0.0161	0.0878	0.00717	0.0496	0.0120	0.0507	0.00853	0.0482	0.0322
	(0.105)	(0.0800)	(0.0996)	(0.0822)	(0.1000)	(0.0822)	(0.103)	(0.0839)	(0.104)	(0.0774)
Democrat _{dt}	0.0656	-0.341**	0.102	-0.352**					0.0842	-0.295**
	(0.0924)	(0.0570)	(0.0953)	(0.0558)					(0.0975)	(0.0589)
Educ - representative - ivv4	(****=*)	(0.02.0)	0.0675	0.176*					(010710)	(0.02.07)
			(0.104)	(0.0734)						
DW - nominate score			(0110.1)	(010121)	0.209	-0 335**				
					(0.114)	(0.0764)				
					(0.114)	(0.0704)				
ADA score _{dt}							0.00242	-0.00487**		
							(0.00148)	(0.000909)		
PACLabor _{dt}									0.174	-0.0986
									(0.130)	(0.0542)
<i>PACCorporate</i> _{dt}									0.0527	0.209**
									(0.0905)	(0.0451)
State*year fixed effect	YE	S	Y	ES	Y	ES	Y	ES	Y	ES
Economic characteristics	YE	S	Y	ES	Y	ES	Y	ES	Y	ES
Socio-demographic characteristics	YE	S	Y	ES	Y	ES	Y	ES	Y	ES
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	252	1,124	251	1,124
R-squared	0.456	0.414	0.440	0.420	0.445	0.397	0.446	0.421	0.455	0.447

PLACEBO TESTS

		(1)	((2)	((3)	((4)
	Vote on Migration	Vote on Trade						
Opinion on Abortion _{dt}	-0.128	-0.0938						
	(0.233)	(0.159)						
Opinion on Religion _{dt}			0.0597	-0.0512				
			(0.353)	(0.176)				
Opinion on TrustinFedGov _{dt}					-0.129	-0.150		
					(0.301)	(0.147)		
Opinion on WomenRole _{dt}							0.303	-0.229
							(0.247)	(0.130)
Congruence _{dt}	0.345	-0.563	0.774	-0.205	0.263	-0.484	0.505	-0.0196
	(0.462)	(0.333)	(0.750)	(0.459)	(0.391)	(0.254)	(0.429)	(0.299)
OpinionAbortiondt*Congruencedt	0.211	0.575						
	(0.715)	(0.500)						
OpinionReligiondt*Congruencedt			-0.407	-0.0491				
OpinionTructinEadCondt*Concernancedt			(0.931)	(0.558)	0.676	0 702		
Opinion Trustini eu Goval Congruenceal					(0.857)	(0.436)		
OpinionWomenRoledt*Congruencedt					(0.057)	(0.150)	0.0483	0.413
							(0.572)	(0.369)
State*year fixed effect	У	YES	Ŷ	YES	Ŷ	ΈS	Ŷ	ES
Economic characteristics	У	YES	Y	YES	Y	ΈS	Y	ES
Socio-demographic characteristics	У	YES	Y	YES	Y	ΈS	Y	ES
Politician's characteristics	У	YES	Y	TES	Y	ΈS	Y	ΈS
Observations	265	1,137	265	1,130	264	1,026	264	1,031
R-squared	0.421	0.415	0.421	0.412	0.423	0.396	0.439	0.395

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: PROBIT MODEL

	(1))	(2)	(3))	(4))	(5)	
	Migration	Trade								
<i>Opinion</i> _{dt}	0.939*	0.136	-1.006	-0.271	-1.342	-0.472	-2.083*	-0.547	-2.061*	-0.211
	(0.457)	(0.274)	(0.716)	(0.409)	(0.726)	(0.399)	(0.830)	(0.406)	(0.827)	(0.409)
<i>Congruence</i> _{dt}			-3.171**	-0.0713	-2.902*	-1.402	-1.948	-1.188	-1.264	-1.065
			(0.998)	(0.591)	(1.186)	(0.726)	(1.293)	(0.775)	(1.305)	(0.751)
Interaction _{dt}			6.572**	1.675	6.925**	0.916	7.912**	0.992	7.592**	-0.162
			(1.937)	(1.286)	(1.969)	(1.211)	(2.094)	(1.217)	(2.070)	(1.241)
State*vear fixed effect	YF	S	YF	S	YF	S	YE	S	YE	S
Economic characteristics	NC)	N)	YE	S	YE	S	YE	S
Socio-demographic characteristics	NO	C	NO	С	NO)	YE	S	YE	S
Politician's characteristics	NO)	NO	C	NO)	NO)	YE	S
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139

DISCUSSION

- Study the direct effect of individual preferences towards globalization on the policy making process
- Focus on the role of the media in making politicians more accountable to their constituencies
- Main findings:
 - Individual attitudes towards globalization are strongly correlated with the policy maker's behavior only when it comes to migration
 - Media exposure has a significant and positive effect on politicians' behavior only when it comes to migration
- How can this finding be explained? Previous studies have emphasized the low saliency of trade. This is confirmed in our data

DISCUSSION



Responses on trade and migration opinion questions.