The Search For Reasonable In Patent Licensing

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RIETI BBL Seminar


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Standard-Setting Organizations


Bylaws of the IEEE:

Owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) who intend to enforce their patents must offer a letter of assurance with:

... A statement that a license for a compliant implementation of the standard will be made available to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide basis without compensation or **under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination**.




The Smartphone Wars: What's Different Now? Patent wars are familiar for emerging industries




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
telephone



train air brake



automobile



airplane



radio

The Smartphone Wars: What's Different Now

- More patents cover products
 - More patent owners with royalty demands
- Standards
 - high switching costs make it hard to resist royalty demands
- New and more favorable litigation venues make it easier to monetize patents
 - Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
 - International Trade Commission
- Non-practicing entities
 - Should promote licensing?
 - But at what price?
- Drastic intervention (e.g. mandatory patent pools) is less likely

The Purpose of the F/RAND Commitment

- Avoid hold-up from standard-specific investments
- Provide assured access to technology necessary to implement a standard
- Assure access at terms that reflect the contribution of a technology to the value of a standard
- Provide inventors with a reasonable return on their investments
- All of the above? None of the above?

What Governs a F/RAND Commitment?

- Is a F/RAND commitment a contract between a SEP owner and a licensee?
 - Are third parties implied beneficiaries?
- Do SSOs set the rules?
 - What is the role of antitrust and the courts if the IPR policies of an SSO harm consumers?
 - What is the standard for consumer harm from the IPR policies of an SSO?
 - Can an SSO be liable under the antitrust laws if its IPR policies are deficient?

What Governs a F/RAND Commitment?

 Is a F/RAND commitment an enforceable contract between a SEP owner and all licensees?

• The case for:

 How does a F/RAND commitment protect users of standards if the commitment does not apply to all direct and indirect licensees?

• The case against:

- The patentee makes the F/RAND commitment to the SSO and its members, not to all users
- The commitment terms are vague, so what is there to enforce?

What Governs a F/RAND Commitment? Confusing statements of law

- Are third parties implied beneficiaries?
 - Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (2012): "... Microsoft, as a member of both the IEEE and the ITU, is a thirdparty beneficiary of Motorola's commitments to the IEEE and ITU."
 - Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc. (2012): "As a potential user of the standards at issue and a prospective licensee of essential patents, Apple is a third party beneficiary of the agreements between Motorola and IEEE and Motorola and ETSI."

What Governs a F/RAND Commitment?

- Have the courts spoken?
 - Does the defendant have to a member of the SSO?
 - Is it enough to be a user of the standard?
 - Will the US courts resolve their differences?

Intent of the patent owner as a willing licensor?

The following is a result from maximizing profits:

An owner of one or more SEPs will desire the maximum possible royalty if its share of patents exceeds its share of production, and will desire a zero royalty if its share of patents is less than its share of production.

Intent of the patent owner as a willing licensor?

Intent of the patent owner offers little guidance because objectives are so different.

Result of arms-length bargaining?

Bargaining may be one-sided if:

Standard adopters have made investments "ex post" that are specific to the standard or cannot coordinate a switch to an alternative: ("hold-up")

Adopters can negotiate ex ante to suppress royalties for SEPs: ("hold-out")

Contribution of the SEP to the standard and the standard to the product?

- How to isolate IP from other inputs
- What if adoption of a standard changes the value of a technology?
 - Changes in value due to adoption versus changes in value due to lock-in (hold-up)

The incremental value of a technology relative to its next best alternative?

- What if no "next best alternative"?
- What about incentives to participate in standard-setting?

"Royalty Stacking?" Desired Royalty Rates for LTE (4G) Patent Portfolios

Company	Disclosed Royalty (% of device price)	Royalty for \$400 device
Qualcomm	3.25%	\$13.00
Motorola	2.25%	\$9.00
Alcatel-Lucent	Up to 2%	\$8.00
Huawei	1.5%	\$6.00
Ericsson	1.5%	\$6.00
Nokia	1.5%	\$6.00
Nortel	1%	\$4.00
ZTE	1%	\$4.00
Siemens	0.8%	\$3.20
SUBTOTAL		\$59.20

The Calculation of Fair and Reasonable: Incremental Value

- Apportionment:
 - How to allocate incremental value for many essential patents
 - Equal value per patent?
 - Incentives to file multiple patent claims
- What if some patent owners do not enforce their patent rights or are content to charge a zero or low royalty? Does that increase the royalty that other essential patent owners may charge?

How to Allocate Values to Multiple SEPs

- F/RAND royalty for the standard, allocated to individual patents
 - Microsoft v Motorola: "[A] proper methodology for determining a [F]RAND royalty should address the risk of royalty stacking by considering the aggregate royalties that would apply if other SEP holders made royalty demands of the implementer."

The Calculation of Fair and Reasonable

The royalty base

- The end device
 - E.g., a \$400 handset for LTE patents
- The "smallest saleable patent practicing unit"
 - E.g., a \$20 baseband processor for LTE patents

Litigated SEP Royalties (U.S.)

SEP Holder	Motorola	Innovatio IP Ventures	
Licensee	Microsoft	Users and manufacturers of Wi-Fi equipment	
Technology	802.11 Wi-Fi H.264 Video Encoding	802.11 Wi-Fi	
Number of SEPs	802.11: 24 H.264: 16	19	
Requested Royalty	2.25% of device price (e.g., \$45 for a \$200 device)	Varied: e.g., \$16.17 per tablet	
Verdict	3.471 cents for Xbox .555 cents for other products	9.56 cents per device	

The Meaning of Non-discrimination

- Non-discrimination or no unreasonable discrimination?
- Does non-discrimination mean only that licensing terms should not unduly distort competition?
- Does non-discrimination mean that all licensees can choose from the same royalty terms?
 - Require licensors to post royalty terms
 - Is there scope for good bargainers, early adopters?
- How to measure royalties if no single patent cash option?

Non-Discrimination

- Does it matter where the royalty is collected?
 - Are royalties for end devices comparable to royalties for "smallest saleable patent practicing units"
- Different royalty terms for different applications of the standard?
- Different royalty terms for products manufactured, sold, or used in different countries?
- Should there be a published "royalty menu"?
 - Lessons from patent pools

F/RAND and Injunctions

- Injunction threat is a powerful bargaining tool
 - Particularly with switching costs, multiple essential patents
- If a RAND commitment means no injunction, this is arguably RAND's most important feature
- In the US, currently being tested in courts and especially at the International Trade Commission

F/RAND and Injunctions

- Injunctions for F/RAND encumbered patents:
 never, always, sometimes?
- Require adjudication of F/RAND offer before granting an injunction or exclusion order?
- What is a willing licensee?
- When can a licensor conclude that compensation is not likely?

F/RAND and Injunctions

- US courts generally have not denied injunctive relief
 - Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.

"By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to license the [patent] to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent."

- But injunctions still available to prevent "reverse hold up" (hold-out) when user refuses FRAND rate or refuses to negotiate
 - Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp.

"[A]n injunction may be warranted where an accused infringer of a standard-essential patent outright *refuses* to accept a RAND license.")

U.S. International Trade Commission

- Exclusion orders at the ITC and the public interest standard
- Samsung v. Apple, Inv. No. 337-TA-794
 - Commission granted exclusion order
 - Exclusion order reversed by the US Trade Representative
 - First such veto since 1987

Are SEPs Different?

- Arguments why SEPs are different:
 - Often one technology, but many patents
 - Need to allocate value to different patents and portfolios
 - Importance of cross-licensing
 - Switching costs from standard adoption
 - The F/RAND commitment
 - Rules for injunctions

Are SEPs Different?

- The Case For Patent Neutrality:
 - Often many patents cover a technology or product
 - Switching costs can be high for patents that do not cover standards
 - Firms often desire cross-licenses for freedom to operate

• What about the F/RAND commitment?

- Rules for injunctions apply to all patents
- A F/RAND commitment fits neatly into current patent law
 - Current patent law is consistent with "fair and reasonable" royalties
 - Patent owners often make "pledges" related to F/RAND commitments

Rather than changing the rules for dealing with infringement of SEPs, allow rules for SEPs and non-SEPs to converge

Holdup is a potential concern for all patents

- Current rules for calculation of infringement damages allow consideration of alternatives available to the infringer at the time of first infringement
 - Georgia-Pacific: the "amount that a licensor...and a licensee...would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement."
- Clarify rules for infringement to consider alternatives available before infringing firm or its customers make investments that are specific to the patented technology

The Case For Patent Neutrality: Injunctions

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., US Sup Ct (2006)

Plaintiff in a patent infringement suit must demonstrate:

- 1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
- 2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
- that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
- 4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

SSO participation

To avoid the burden of F/RAND commitment, firms may:

(a) refuse to participate in standard development, or

(b) participate selectively, withdraw, and patent (as alleged in U.S. Federal Trade Commission v. Rambus)

Patent neutrality addresses both concerns

- What about "non-discriminatory"?
- The non-discrimination requirement is part of the F/RAND commitment
- ND has largely been overlooked
- Nonetheless, the non-discrimination commitment is not qualitatively different from other commitments
 - E.g., most-favored customer clauses

Concluding Remarks

- Numerous unsettled issues associated with commitments to license standard essential patents at F/RAND terms
- Rather than develop special rules for SEPs, apply the same principles to all patents:
 - Injunctions
 - Reasonable royalties
 - Other commitments, such as non-discrimination
- May require damages to consider alternatives available *before* users make investments that are specific to the patented technology