North Korea as a complex humanitarian emergency

RIETI Marcus Noland September 2023



Key messages



- Complex humanitarian emergency, but...
- In a "hard" state, intensifying external belligerency
- Quantity and price evidence suggests lack of food
- Legal and institutional changes may affect the incidence of food insecurity
- Longer-run questions
 - Will North Korea turn decisively toward reform?
 - Is muddling through a long-run option?




Strategic context



- Embrace of nuclear weapons, first strike doctrine, florid language
- Under nine UNSCRs
 - Initially targeted arms ("defensive"), luxury goods (aimed at elite)
 - No evidence of effectiveness either on luxury products or raising risk premia more broadly
 - Some evidence of disrupting arms trade
 - Three resolutions in 2017 greatly broadened sanctions, no longer targeted
- China and Russia blocked new sanctions resolutions after multiple ICBM launches in 2022-23
- Sanctions evasion increasingly cyber oriented



So how do they pay for the military?



- Conventional exports minimal
- Historically illicit sources of revenue: drugs, counterfeiting, etc.
- Cyber/crypto
 - 2011 DoS attacks, harassment
 - 2014 Sony Pictures hack
 - 2016 Lazarus Group \$951 million Bangladesh central bank heist; 90% recovered
 - 2017 Lazarus Group Wannacry ransomware attacks
 - 2022 Lazarus group multiple crypto platform attacks netting \$600-700 million
 - Chainalysis puts total 2022 revenue at \$1.7 billion
 - Anne Neuberger, Deputy National Security
 Adviser for cyber claimed cyber finances as much as 1/3 of missile program (July 2022)
 - Echo chamber claim: 40% of GDP



Economic context



Macro:

- Already under sanctions
- Pandemic response: January 2020 border closure
- April 2020 bond issuance sign of fiscal distress
- Low reported budget growth

Tightening:

- Eighth WPK Congress January 2021: recentralization, call for revival of heavy industry
- Crackdowns on Chinese cell phones, August 3rd workers, regulation of waku and kiji etc.

Signals of challenges in the food economy throughout 2021:

- Kim invokes "Arduous March" (code for 1990s famine) (April)
- Focuses on agriculture at WPK Central Committee (December)
- Scattered reports of hunger-related deaths

Re-opening this spring, reported trade values up



Institutional change in agriculture




- New laws and amendments:
 - Law on Agriculture (amended 2020)
 - Law on Farms (amended four times between 2020-21)
 - Law on Grain Policies (amended 2021)
 - Law Against Institutional Specialization and Selfishness (2021)
 - False Report Prevention Law (2022)
- Net impact:
 - Increase direct state control over cooperative farms
 - Reduce the role of prices and the market
 - Channel distribution through state stores
 - Access to food shifting from marketbased to politically-determined, recalling the old system



Grain balance—FAO/WFP methodology

- Domestic availability (domestic production)
- Total utilization
 - Food use
 - Feed use
 - Seed requirement
 - Post-harvest losses
 - Stock build-up
- Import requirements
 - Anticipated commercial imports
 - Aid on hand or pledged
- Uncovered deficit
- Uncertainties about all these entries
 - Production
 - Human consumption—composition of diet, population size








Estimates of domestic grain production





- Three data sources:
- FAO
- KRDA
- USDA
- Compositional definition of "grain" consistent over time, consistent with demand estimate



Alternative estimates of grain balance

North Korean grain balance, UN sources; 1995/96-2020/21, millions of metric tons






Note: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) did not publish production estimates for 2009/10, 2014/15, and 2019/20,

Sources: UN Food and Agriculture Organization and UN World Food Program

North Korean grain balance, alternative sources, 1995/96-2020/21, millions of metric tons










Price evidence


Two NGO sources of data: DailyNK, AsiaPress

- DailyNK reports for three cities:
 Sinuiju, Pyongyang, and Hyesan
- AsiaPress data from Ryanggang,
 North Hamgyong, North Pyongan,
 and unnamed locations

Data on corn, rice, parallel market rate for US dollar and Chinese yuan











Increased volatility post-border closure






Domestic corn-rice relative price






Domestic price factoids



- FX prices more highly correlated than grain prices
- All prices across sources, cities correlated at 5% or greater level
- Rice price correlation between Daily NK Pyongyang and Asia Press lowest (0.3).
- Econometric results:
 - Corn prices rise post-border closure
 - Hyesan distinct:
 - Corn prices rise less than other cities,
 - Rice prices rise more than other cities
- Increase cross-city price dispersion postborder closure



Comparison to world and Chinese prices





Pandemic and war in Ukraine as added drivers

Pandemic

- Border closure hurt economy
- Refused multiple offers of vaccines
- Admitted outbreak associated with re-opening, but reported data not credible
- Pandemic response seemingly low diplomatic salience

War

- Contributed to adverse rise in global food prices
- Pushed Russia, China, and North Korea closer together diplomatically e.g. failure of UNSCR sanction resolutions
- North Korea selling arms, personnel (?); Kim-Putin meeting suggests arms for food, energy, military technology swap



Most likely medium-run scenario: Muddling through



Short-run

- Weakening of sanctioning coalition,
- De facto acceptance of North Korean nuclear status
- Levitating North Korean economy

Longer-term

- Generational and demographic change means South Korea likely to accommodate North Korea and China
- Conditional on US diplomacy, Japan may either acquiesce or draw closer to US
- Ever present possibility of German-style collapse and absorption



Long-run questions



- Will North Korea turn decisively toward reform?
 - Will more formal market supporting institutions be embraced?
 - What extent can such reforms contribute to poverty alleviation and a reduction in inequality?
- Answer
 - Past history and oddly supportive international environment suggests not, however...
 - KJU far younger than KJI was—standing pat and dying peacefully in your bed as the king of North Korea lower probability



Leadership



Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google, on first and only visit to North Korea



Dennis Rodman, on second of four visits to North Korea



Final thoughts: buckle your seatbelt



Complex humanitarian emergency...in a belligerent state

Institutional changes in the food economy imply incidence of food insecurity may be increasingly politically determined, an echo of the old system

Lack of internal accountability and enablement primarily by China and Russia allow North Korea to maintain this contradiction

Likely to muddle through—but at enormous cost to the population

