## On the Role of Technical Cooperation in International Technology Transfers

by

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#### **Abstract**

We investigate whether and how technical cooperation aid (TC) facilitates technological diffusion from developed to developing countries, comparing it with foreign direct investment (FDI) and external openness. Two robust findings emerge. First, TC, FDI and openness all contribute to international technology transfers and openness seems to contribute the most which is followed by TC. Second, around six to 17 countries out of 85 in our sample fail to catch up to the technological leader over the 36 years. These results suggest that as a policy instrument, TC can play an important role in facilitating technological catch up of developing countries.

*Keywords:* Technical Cooperation, Technology Diffusion, TFP, FDI, Openness *JEL Classification:* O33, O47, O11, F43

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### 1. Introduction

Recently, there is an emerging dispute over the effectiveness of foreign aid in facilitating economic growth (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly et al. 2004; Dalgaard, et al. 2005; Roodman, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). Burnside and Dollar (2000), one of the most influential papers in this issue, found that the impact of aid on the growth of recipients is positive, conditional on good policies. However, other studies cast doubts on this conditional linkage between aid and growth (Easterly et al. 2004; Easterly 2003; Roodman, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). These studies treat aid as homogeneous official capital flows from developed to developing countries. Yet, three types of foreign aid flow exist: loans, grants, and technical cooperation aid (hereafter, TC). By the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, loans, grants, and TC are defined, respectively, as "transfers for which repayment is required," "transfers made in cash, goods, or services for which no repayment is required," and "activities whose primary purpose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills, and technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries." Figure 1 shows the trend of these three aid components.

While there are recent policy and academic debates over the relative effectiveness of loans and grants (Meltzer 2000; Bulow and Rogoff 2005; Iimi and Ojima 2008; Cordella and Ulku 2004; and Gupta et al. 2003), there are only a few existing studies which explicitly analyze heterogeneities in types of aid. Particularly, the effectiveness of technical cooperation aid has been largely unexplored. For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000) employed the aid variable compiled by Chang et al. (1998) that is a sum of loans and grants, excluding TC because, in their view, the

donor, rather than the recipient, benefits from payments received in return for the technical assistance supplied. Moreover, Cassen et al. (1994) pointed out the absence of ready methodology for measuring the effectiveness of aggregate long-run effects of TC and difficulties in measuring the impacts have hindered academia from conducting quantitative evaluations of TC.

Apparently, however, TC shares a non-negligible portion of the total ODA and the amount is increasing (Figure 1). Conceptually, it may be obvious that, by nature, there are positive spillover effects of international technology transfers through TC, as some international aid agencies state explicitly (JICA 2007; GTZ 2007). TC's range of coverage is wide: training staff to deliver technological skills in the areas of agriculture, forestry, engineering, and ICT; to convey management skills in the areas of education, and business and banking; to design effective policies in the areas of social security, housing, health, and family planning. TC in a wide variety of sectors has also played an important role in increasing the stock of human intellectual capital, or the capacity for more effective use of existing factor endowment. However, to our knowledge, its effectiveness has not yet been quantitatively measured. This paper aims to bridge this gap in the literature by analyzing the role of TC in facilitating technology transfers from donors to aid recipients. We employ TFP data, which is a broad measure of a country's aggregate productivity, and evaluate overall impact of TC on closing the TFP gap between the technological leader and developing countries.

In growth theories, technological progress has been regarded as a core element in long-run growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Aghion and Howitt 1998). The

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For example, Cassen et al (1994) claims that smallpox eradication is one of the major successful achievements of worldwide technical cooperation aid. (p.149)

source of such technological progress in developing countries is multi-faceted. In addition to TC, we also examine the other three possibly important determinants of international technological transfers from developed to developing countries. First, for developing countries as latecomers, the adoption, imitation, and assimilation of the flows of technical know-how from developed countries, rather than the development of domestic R&D sectors, augment their productivity to catch-up to the technological leader.<sup>2</sup> This also suggests the importance of absorptive capacity of advanced foreign technologies in developing countries (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1973; Abramovitz, 1986; Glass and Saggi 1998; Lucas 1993; Eaton and Kortum 1996; Keller 2004). The absorptive capacity, with which the gap between the technology frontier and the current level of productivity is filled, should closely depend on the level of human capital (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Keller 2004; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005).

Second, foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) has long been considered an important channel for technological diffusion (Keller 2004). Existing case studies and cross-country regression results found that FDI contributes relatively more to economic growth than do domestic investments (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996; Borensztein et al. 1998; de Mello 1999; Eaton and Kortum 1999; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg 2001; Carkovic and Levine 2005; Li and Liu 2005). Interestingly, this positive nexus between FDI and growth is observed particularly when a sufficient absorptive capability of advanced technologies is available in the host economy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) and Ohkawa and Kohama (1989) suggest that Japan is a typical example of borrowed technology-driven industrialization. They argue that Japan's success was attributable to its rapid human capital accumulation by which absorptive capacity of foreign technology has been built.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Yet de Mello (1999) shows that FDI positively and significantly affects TFP for OECD countries, while it does not result in significant consequence for non-OECD countries. Also, Carkovic and Levine (2005) imply the consequences of FDI's positive impact on economic growth are possibly due to endogeneity bias.

(Borensztein et al. 1998). This finding suggests that FDI may be an important route of international technological spillover (Keller 2004).

Finally, international trade has been identified as an important means of transferring foreign technology (Keller 2004).<sup>4</sup> Knowledge spillovers will increase with the number of commercial interactions between domestic and foreign agents (Grossman and Helpman 1991). We also need to distinguish between imports and exports. Imports have been regarded as a significant channel of technology diffusion because, obviously, technologies move from an exporting country of intermediate inputs to another (Keller 2004). Coe and Helpman (1995) find that foreign R&D capital stocks have stronger effects on domestic productivity the larger the share of domestic imports in GDP.<sup>5</sup> Also, exports may be important because firms can learn foreign technologies through exporting experiences (Keller 2004). While in existing empirical studies we do not necessarily have firm evidence of technology diffusion through importing and learning-by-exporting effects (Keller 2004), it would be reasonable to hypothesize that the extent of international technology transfers will increase with the volume of international trade.

In this paper, we compare the relative importance of different channels in facilitating international technology transfers quantitatively. Our strategy is to extend a standard model of international technology transfer of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) by incorporating TC, FDI, and external openness, and to explore the role of TC as a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In the initial phases of development, much of the R&D undertaken in Japan was absorptive, aimed at integrating foreign technologies (Blumenthal 1976). More recently, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, India, and China view FDI by firms from technologically advanced countries as a vehicle of technology transfer (Glass and Saggi 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Their estimates also suggest that the foreign R&D capital stock may be at least as important as the domestic R&D capital stock in the smaller countries, while in the larger countries (the G7) the domestic R&D capital stock may be more important.

channel of technological diffusion through comparisons of FDI and openness.

To preview the results, two sets of robust empirical findings emerge. First, TC, FDI, and openness all contribute to facilitating international technology transfers. Yet, among these three channels, openness seems to contribute the most, followed by TC. Also, TC seems to compensate for the lack of sufficient human capital in developing countries. Second, around six to 17 countries out of 85 in our sample fail to catch up to the technological leader over the 36 years. These results suggest that as a policy instrument, TC can play an important role in the facilitating technological catch-up of developing countries.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show our theory of international technological transfers which is an augmented version of the exponential and logistic specifications of a Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) model of international technology transfers. Section 3 describes the data and econometric framework as well as the nested functional forms of specification incorporating the exponential and logistic technology diffusion. In Section 4, we present estimation results of model parameters and the computed required amount of TC for each country that is needed for catching up to the technological leader. Section 5 describes various robustness tests, which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.

# 2. A Theoretical Framework of International Technology Transfers

There must be a certain market structure under which rational agents engage in innovation in the face of international technological diffusion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997; and Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). We intend to employ a tractable empirical

model to uncover a wide variety of important dimensions of technology transfers. The pattern of international technological diffusion can be exponential, which would predict that developing nations exhibit positive catch-up with the leader nation (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). In this case, the model of technology diffusion can be formalized by the following equation:

$$\frac{1}{T} \left( \log A_{iT} - \log A_{i0} \right) = \alpha \Phi_i + \beta \Phi_i \left( \frac{A_{m0}}{A_{i0}} - 1 \right), \tag{1}$$

where the variables  $\alpha\Phi$  and  $\beta\Phi$  represent respectively the follower country's capacity to innovate own technology and to absorb foreign technologies.

On the other hand, if international technological diffusion follows a logistic pattern, the gap between the technology leader and a follower may widen over time. For this model, as is shown in equation (2.3) of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), we can postulate:

$$\frac{1}{T} (\log A_{iT} - \log A_{i0}) = \alpha \Phi_i + \beta \Phi_i \left( 1 - \frac{A_{i0}}{A_{m0}} \right) 
= \alpha \Phi_i + \beta \Phi_i \left( \frac{A_{i0}}{A_{m0}} \right) \left( \frac{A_{m0}}{A_{i0}} - 1 \right),$$
(2)

where the new part,  $A_{i0}/A_{m0}$ , indicates the difficulty of adopting distant technologies.

In this paper, we employ the Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) model of international technological transfers that is a nested model of these two possibilities. We augment the Benhabib and Spiegel (2005)'s nested technological diffusion equation by including TC, FDI, and openness in addition to human capital and postulate the following equation:

$$\frac{1}{T} \left( \log A_{iT} - \log A_{i0} \right) \\
= \left( g + \frac{c}{s} \right) \Phi(h_i, TC_i, FDI_i, OPEN_i) - \frac{c}{s} \Phi(h_i, TC_i, FDI_i, OPEN_i) \left( \frac{A_{iT}}{A_{mT}} \right)^s, \tag{3}$$

where  $A_{i0}$  is the level of total factor productivity (TFP) for country i at year t where country m is the technological leader, e.g., the US, and i is a follower country. The variable  $\Phi$  represents the follower country's capacity to innovate own technology and to absorb foreign technologies. We assume that  $\Phi$  is a function of the initial or long-term average level of human capital, h, the amount of TC received, TC, the flow of FDI, FDI, and the degree of external trade openness, OPEN. According to Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), the values of parameters, c, g, and s will determine whether a country will converge to the growth rate of the leader or whether the growth rates will diverge. Note that the specification represented in Equation (1) nests the logistic model when s = 1 and exponential model when s = -1.

In the case where  $s \in (0,1]$ , as is shown by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), the technological catch-up condition for the technological progress rate of a country to converge to the technological growth rate of the leader becomes:

$$1 + \frac{c}{sg} > \frac{\Phi_m}{\Phi_i} \,. \tag{4}$$

Note that this is a necessary condition for the catch-up. Hence, if the inequality did not hold and reversed, the country would not technologically catch-up to the leader. This situation may be called a technological poverty trap.

### 3. An Econometric Model and Data

#### 3.1 An Econometric Model

In order to empirically implement the estimation of equation (3), we postulate a linearity assumption for the capacity function  $\Phi$ . Accordingly, our estimation equation becomes the following:

$$\frac{1}{T} (\log A_{iT} - \log A_{i0}) = b_0 + b_1 (h_i + b_4 T C_i + d_1 F D I_i + e_1 O P E N_i) 
- b_2 (h_i + b_4 T C_i + d_1 F D I_i + e_1 O P E N_i) (\frac{A_{i0}}{A_{m0}})^{b_3} + u_i,$$
(5)

where  $u_i$  is a well-behaved *i.i.d.* disturbance term. Using this nested specification, we can test the logistic model and exponential model by testing whether  $b_3 = 1$  and  $b_3 = -1$ , respectively. We can also test empirically whether TC facilitates international technological diffusion by testing whether  $b_4$  takes a positive coefficient or not. Moreover, it is possible to compare the roles of TC, FDI, and external openness as a channel of technological diffusion by comparing the relative magnitude of the estimated coefficients of  $b_4$ ,  $d_1$ , and  $e_1$ .

To be consistent with the theoretical framework, we should exclude the constant term,  $b_0$ . Yet from the viewpoint of econometric analysis, an inclusion of a constant term is not necessarily an implausible idea. In fact, even from the theoretical viewpoint, Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) pointed that the constant term could be interpreted as a speed of common exogenous technological progress that is independent of any country-specific characteristics. Accordingly, we decide to show the empirical

results with and without the constant term.

We estimate equation (5) using the method of non-linear least squares (NLLS). In general, NLLS results are sensitive to a choice of initial vectors because the objective function we try to minimize is not necessarily a globally convex function. In order to mitigate the problem of local optima, we explored different sets of initial values to attain the stability of the estimated parameters. Our procedure is two-step and is described as follows. First, we use the estimated parameters reported in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) to estimate four different sets of parameters (Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4). Then the attained baseline parameters are used as the initial parameters for each model.

### 3.2 Data

A major challenge in our empirical implementation is to measure technology because technology is an intangible. There are three widely used approaches to measure technology (Keller 2004): first, to measure R&D inputs; second, to measure outputs using patent data; and finally, to measure the effect of technology in terms of productivity. In our study, we follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and take the third approach to quantify the level of technology as the level of productivity: we compute Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a measure of productivity level,  $A_{it}$ , by postulating a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. In this formulation, a technology level can be computed by the formula:  $\log A_{it} = y_{it} - \alpha k_{it} - (1 - \alpha) l_{it}$ , where y, k, and l, are the log of real GDP, the log of physical capital inputs, and the log of population, respectively. We follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and assume that  $\alpha = 1/3$ .

Since we do not have data on the physical capital stock, we also follow

Benhabib and Spiegel (2005)'s procedure to compute the initial capital stock taking the method elaborated by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). The procedure is to calculate the initial capital stock by using a formula,  $\frac{K_{1960}}{Y_{1960}} = \frac{I/Y}{\gamma + \delta + n}$ , where I/Y is the average share of physical investment in GDP in the sampling periods,  $\gamma$  represents the average rate of growth of output per capita, n represents the average rate of population growth, and  $\delta$  represents the depreciation rate of capital, which is set to 3%. After deriving the level of initial capital stock, we calculate the capital stock for each year using annual investment data. Data for GDP, investment, population, and openness were extracted from the Penn World Table version 6.1.<sup>6</sup> The estimated values of TFP growth by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) seem plausible: the high performing East Asian countries exhibit the highest TFP growth while some of the Sub-Saharan African countries including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Zambia show the negative growth rates.

As for data for human capital, we follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and employ the average years of schooling in the population above 25 years of age, which are obtained from Barro and Lee (2000), an updated version of the Barro and Lee (1993) dataset.

Data on TC is taken from the OECD/DAC's International Development Statistics.<sup>7</sup> The data set is available for both disbursement and commitment data for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In particular, the variables, *pop*, *rgdpl*, *ki*, and *openk*, in PWT 6.1 are used in the present paper.

The data is available at

<sup>&</sup>lt;a href="http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE%202A">http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE%202A</a>. We exclude countries which became OECD members before 1975. Also, Eastern European countries and the former USSR countries are eliminated from the data set because the data quality is not satisfactory (Kimura and Todo, 2007).

TC. In this paper, we confine our analysis to the disbursement data because it is supposed to reflect the actual amount given to the recipient countries. We construct five different measures of TC. The first measure (ta12) is the average amount of TC over all available years. The value is converted into the constant 2004 prices and in millions USD. The second measure (tagdp12) is computed by dividing the first measure (ta12) by the average GDP over 1960-1995. The third measure (ta111) is the initially available value of TC for each country. The fourth measure (ta80) is the average value of TC over all available observations in and before 1980. The final measure (ta90) is the average amount of TC for all available observations in and before 1990. Data on FDI are taken from UNCTAD's World Investment Report (2006).<sup>8</sup> In order to construct real FDI data, nominal FDI flows are divided by the GDP deflator of the recipient country using World Bank's World Development Indicators (2006). Specifically, we construct four FDI variables. First, FDIinflow is a mean value of FDI inflows over 1970-1995. Second, FDIinflowgdp is defined by FDIinflow divided by average GDP over 1970-1995. Third, FDlinflow80 is an average FDI inflows over Finally, FDIinflow90 is defined by an average FDI inflows over 1970-1980. 1970-1990. To check the robustness of our estimation, we also employ FDI data extracted from the OECD (2005).

Finally, three openness variables are constructed by using the total amount of international trade, i.e., a sum of total imports and exports. The first variable, open, is defined as the ratio of total international trade which is divided by GDP averaged over 1960-1995. The second variable, open80, is the average ratio over in and before 1980.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The data is available at

<sup>&</sup>lt;a href="http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-dir/docs/wir2006">http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-dir/docs/wir2006</a> inflows en.xls>.

The third variable, open90, is the average ratio in and before 1990. In order to conduct robustness tests, we also use alternative data sets such as an updated version of Sachs and Warner's (1995) Openness Index.

After compiling these variables, we constructed a cross-country data which is composed of 85 countries for the period of 1960-1995. See Appendix table for descriptive statistics of the variables.

## 4. Benchmark Results

In this section, we show the benchmark estimation results of equation (5). The first specification includes only TC and excludes FDI and openness. The results reported in Table 1 show that the estimated coefficients on TC, i.e.,  $b_4$  in equation (2) are consistently positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that TC plays an important role in facilitating domestic technological progress and international technology transfers<sup>9</sup>. Also, we cannot reject a null hypothesis that  $b_3$ =1, supporting the logistic model of international technological transfers.<sup>10</sup>

Next,, we include the three variables of our interest: TC, FDI, and openness. The results are presented in Table 2. Most of the openness variables are positive and statistically significant in 12 out of 14 specifications. On the other hand, effects of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Here, the endogeneity bias could affect the coefficients, while in the estimations which include iniTC are less likely to be affected by this bias since we employ initially available value of TC for each country. Our estimation results show that the amounts of  $b_4$  for iniTC, iniTC/GDP are positive significant. Therefore, we find out that qualitative results would remain the same.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> We also include FDI variables in addition to TC variables. The coefficients on FDI variables are largely positive. While the statistical significance depends on the choice of an FDI variable, the coefficients are significant in nine out of 14 specifications. For all the results, see our earlier version of the paper.

TC variable become less clear: there are eight and 10 positive and significant cases out of 14 specifications in TC and FDI variables, respectively. Notably, the initial TC variable generates a positive and statistically significant effect.

# 4.1 Comparing the effects of TC, FDI, and openness

While our overall estimation results reveal that TC, FDI, and openness facilitate international technological transfers, it is not necessarily clear the relative magnitude of these three factors. In order to compare the relative effectiveness of these three factors, we calculate the casual impact of one standard deviation change of each variable on the capacity variable,  $\Phi$ , by multiplying each estimated coefficient by standard deviation of each variable<sup>11</sup>, which is reported in the Appendix Table. We employ the estimated results of specifications (3.2), (3.5), (3.7), (3.9), (3.11), and (3.13) of Table 2. In most specifications, the effect of openness is the largest which is followed by TC. FDI inflows have a positive but the lowest impact on building capacity of recipient countries.

# 4.2 Testing the Catching-Up Condition

Since the estimated coefficient,  $b_3$ , is uniformly above one, our results favor the logistic diffusion model of technology transfers. Hence, there is a possibility for countries to encounter technological divergence from the leader country. In order to identify such countries quantitatively, we use the necessary condition represented by equation (4). Using estimated coefficients, the equation (4) can be rewritten as the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> As to this method, we follow Barro and Lee (2005).

following expression:<sup>12</sup>

$$TC_{i} > \frac{1}{\hat{b}_{4}} \left( \frac{h_{m} \cdot \hat{b}_{3} \hat{g}}{\hat{b}_{3} \hat{g} + \hat{c}} - h_{i} - \hat{d}_{1} FDI_{i} - \hat{e}_{1} Open_{i} \right), \tag{6}$$

where we assume that the capacity of the leader nation depends only on its human capital. Alternatively, we can derive the catch-up condition incorporating the FDI effect of the leader nation:

$$TC_{i} > \frac{1}{\hat{b}_{4}} \left( \frac{\Psi_{m} \cdot \hat{b}_{3} \hat{g}}{\hat{b}_{3} \hat{g} + \hat{c}} - h_{i} - \hat{d}_{1} FDI_{i} - \hat{e}_{1} Open_{i} \right),$$
 (7)

where  $\Psi_m = h_m + \hat{b}_4 T A_m + \hat{d}_1 F D I_m + \hat{e}_1 O p e n_m$ 

The test results of the catching-up condition are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. In both cases, if we use specification (3.2) in Table 2, our results identify six countries that do not comply with equation (4); Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nepal, and Togo. Alternatively, using specification (3.5) in Table 2 gives 10 technologically trapped countries: Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, Iran, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nepal, Pakistan, Togo, and Democratic Republic of Congo. In contrast, 68 out of 85 countries always satisfy the catch-up condition (Tables 3 and 4).

The countries, which do not satisfy the catch-up condition of equations (6) and (7), would not converge to the leader's technological progress. In such countries, we can employ equation (7) with the estimated parameters of equation (5) and compute the minimum required amount of TC to catch-up with the leader technologically. For

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> By taking mean over 36 years, we implicitly convert TC and FDI into stock variable with depreciation rate of 0. It is also possible to construct these stock variables with more plausible depreciation rate, however, our method is thought to be reasonable considering that initially available TC and FDI are different among our sampling countries.

example, the predicted necessary amounts of TC for the Central African Republic and for Pakistan are 68.49 million USD and 337.09 million USD in 2004 price, respectively.<sup>13</sup> The actual average amounts of TC over 1960-1995 are 54.02 million USD for the Central African Republic and 223.91 million USD for Pakistan. The actual amounts of TC in 2004 are 34.72 million USD and 124.4 million USD for the Central African Republic and Pakistan, respectively.

#### 5. **Robustness Tests**

#### Relaxing the Function Form of Capacity Function 14 5.1

The second robustness check is to relax further the function form of the capacity function,  $\Phi$ , in equation (3) and (4). Particularly, we are interested in interplay between TC and human capital. In this aim, we add an interaction term of TC with the human capital variable. The resulting empirical model becomes:

$$\frac{1}{T} (\log A_{iT} - \log A_{i0}) = b_0 + b_1 (X\beta) - b_2 (X\beta) \left( \frac{A_{it}}{A_{mt}} \right)^{b_3} + u_i, \tag{8}$$

where X=[h, TC, TC\*h, FDI, Open] and  $\beta$  is its coefficient vector.

In Tables 5, we show estimation results of a wide variety of specifications with

<sup>13</sup> These results are based on the results of specification (3.2) and (3.5), respectively, of Table 3. We also perform four sets of robustness tests of the benchmark results to examine regional specificity. In order to check it, we construct an East Asia and Pacific dummy variable (hereafter,

Asian dummy) which takes one if a country is categorized within the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific region and zero otherwise. The Asian dummy variable is incorporated independently into the  $\Phi$  function. We also include the interaction variable of TC, FDI, and openness with the Asian dummy variable. According to our estimation results reported in Sawada, Matsuda, and Kimura (2007), only the Asian dummy incorporated independently takes a statistically significant coefficient. The direction of the coefficient is positive, suggesting that Asian countries have systematically higher capacity to catch-up with the technology leader nation.

various interaction terms. As for the level coefficients on TC, FDI, and openness variables, they are consistently positive and largely significant. Yet, as for the interaction terms, the estimated coefficients of TC and human capital interaction terms are mostly negative and statistically significant, suggesting that when a country's human capital level is low, the total technology transfer facilitation effect of TC becomes larger (Tables 5). According to descriptive statistics, low income countries with low levels of human capital tend to receive a larger amount of TC.<sup>15</sup> Hence, the negative coefficient on TC and human capital interaction term suggests that TC effectively compensates the lack of sufficient human capital in developing countries, facilitating international technological transfers. Another interpretation, however, is that TC is not necessarily allocated to countries with a larger amount of human capital and thus high absorptive capacity of technologies.<sup>16</sup>

## 5.2 Alternative Data

Third, we employ alternative datasets for FDI and openness to check further robustness. As for FDI, we use OECD's International Direct Investment Statistics

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> A simple correlation between average per capita GDP for 1960-1995 and years of schooling in 1960 is 0.648. The figure between average per capita GDP for 1960-1995 and average per capita TC for 1960-1995 is -0.162.

We also estimate coefficients of FDI and human capital interaction variables. See the full version of this paper for the results (Sawada, Matsuda, and Kimura, 2007). The magnitude of these coefficients is generally small and their direction seems to be inconclusive, while these coefficients are mostly negative. As to the interaction term of openness and human capital variable, the coefficients are largely negative and significant This finding suggests that even when a country's human capital level is low, external openness will significantly facilitate international technological diffusion. Another possible hypothesis is that the TC, FDI and external trade openness might not affect the recipient's capacity to innovate its own technology (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). However, we find that the specifications which reflect this hypothesis produce nonnegligible omitted variable biases. In addition, note that our theoretical framework imposes the constraint that relative degrees of contribution of the three channels are the same between the capacities to innovate own technology and to absorb foreign technologies. Since relaxing this constraint makes our estimations hard to converge, we find out that our equation of (5) is appropriate.

(IDIS) data. As we can see from Tables 6, qualitative results are the same as before.

We also employ two alternative indicators of openness: the ratio of imports to GDP, based on the World Bank's World Development Indicator, and the Sachs-Warner Index of Openness (Sachs and Warner 1995). The latter variable takes zero (closed) if a country satisfies one of the following five criteria: (1) its average tariff rate exceeded 40%; (2) its non-tariff barriers covered more than 40% of imports; (3) it had a socialist economic system; (4) it had a state monopoly of major exports; or (5) its black-market premium exceeded 20% during either 1970s or 1980s. Results based on import data are summarize in Tables 7. Tables 8 show the results using Sachs and Warner (1995) Openness Index. Qualitative results are comparable to those based on the benchmark results

# 5.3 Missing observations

Since the human capital data for the year 1960 is available only for 85 countries, we confine our analysis to this sample size. This implies that we did not necessarily utilize other available information to the full extent. In order to increase the number of countries in our analysis, we employ modified zero-order regression (Greene 2003, page.60). In this method, we fill the missing variable with zeros and add a dummy variable that takes the value one for missing observations and zero for complete ones.

In fact, introduction of missing dummies for initial human capital variable, denoted as *lhc60miss*, allows us to expand the sampling countries to 110. The estimation results are shown in Tables 9. While qualitative results of all the estimations are the same, the coefficients of FDI variables are now more likely to be

significant. The estimated coefficients of *lhc60miss*, *h*, are mostly negative but insignificant.

## 6. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we investigate whether and how TC facilitates international technological transfers from developed to developing countries and we compare its effect with those of FDI and external openness. Augmenting the model of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) that nests exponential and logistic models of technology diffusion, two sets of robust findings emerge. First, our results represent that TC, FDI, and openness all contribute to the facilitation of international technology transfers. Among these three channels, openness seems to contribute the most and its contribution is followed by TC. Also, we found that TC complements the lack of human capital in facilitating international technological transfers. Second, six to 17 countries out of 85 in our sample do not satisfy the necessary condition of technological catch-up. These results suggest that, as a policy instrument, TC can play an important role in enhancing absorptive capacities to facilitate technological catch-up of developing countries.

Technology involves non-codified tacit knowledge which can be transferred only through face-to-face interaction (Keller 2004). TC, which is composed of technological training by experts sent by developed countries to developing countries and trainees sent by the latter to the former, can facilitate person-to-person interactions in international transfers of non-codified tacit knowledge and technologies.

Cassen et al. (1994) stated that "[m]any factors make it impossible to produce a single measure of the overall effectiveness of TC, among them, the difficulties of setting

verifiable objectives and the great variety of TC activities. However, it is probably the case that the attempts to evaluate TC have understated its effectiveness. This is because the evaluation literature concentrates disproportionately on 'soft' TC activities (where success is harder to achieve) and the tendency of evaluators to look for failure so as to improve their institution's performance (p. 167)." We believe the use of the TFP concept, which is the broad measure of a country's aggregate productivity including institutional and intangible elements, is suitable in order to evaluate overall unbiased effectiveness of TC, involving both soft and hard TC activities. By quantifying the role of TC in bridging the gap between TFPs of the leader and developing countries, we believe that we make an important contribution to the literature on foreign aid.

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
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Figure 1

ODA Decomposition

(All donors total, Gross Disbursements, 2005 USD million)



Note: Numbers in parentheses are DAC codes. Bilateral grants, total (020) is the sum of investment project aid (046) including Technical co-operation (050), programme aid (047) and other (080). The bilateral grants in the figure represent the amount without TC. Technical co-operation (050) is grants for the provision of training, research and associated costs. Non-grant bilateral ODA (110) is the sum of all ODA lending activities, i.e. loans by government or official agencies (131), acquisition of equity (170), other lending (175) and offsetting entries for debt forgiveness (101). Basically, this represents the amount of loans. Finally, Multilateral Official Development Assistance (180) is the sum of grants and capital subscriptions (code 186) and concessional lending (210) to multilateral agencies.

Source: DAC1 "Official and Private Flows, Main Aggregates" International Development Statistics Online

Table 1 (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)

	(1-1)	(1-2)	(1-3)	(1-4)	(1-5)	(1-6)	(1-7)	(1-8)	(1-9)	(1-10)	(1-11)	(1-12)	(1-13)	(1-14)	(1-15)	(1-16)	(1-17)	(1-18)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4								
b <sub>0</sub> (=C)	0.02		0.02															
	(0.004)***		(0.004)***															
$b_1$	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.022	0.021	0.023	0.017	0.02	0.018	0.022	0.018	0.021	0.02	0.024	0.018	0.022	0.021	0.025
	(0.011)	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)***	(0.004)***
$b_2$	0.019	0.015	0.02	0.017	0.018	0.017	0.012	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.016	0.018	0.014	0.016	0.018	0.02
	(0.009)*	(0.006)**	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.007)***	(0.009)*	(0.006)**	(0.007)*	(0.007)**	(0.008)*	(0.006)**	(0.007)**	(0.006)**	(0.007)**	(0.006)**	(0.007)**	(0.007)**	(0.008)**
b <sub>3</sub> (=s)	1.149	1.649	1	1	1.426	1	2.219	1	2.387	1	2.11	1	1.872	1	2.03	1	1.703	1
	(1.44)	(1.589)			(1.386)		(2.789)		(2.898)		(2.19)		(1.872)		(2.244)		(1.905)	
b <sub>4</sub> TC	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.007														
	(0.002)	(0.002)***	(0.002)	(0.002)***														
TC/GDP					25.978	25.769												
					(7.733)***	(7.614)***												
iniTC							0.018	0.017										
							(0.006)***	(0.005)***										
iniTC/iniGDP									94.282	86.343								
									(37.917)**	(34.946)**								
TC80											0.01	0.009						
											(0.003)***	(0.002)***						
TC80/GDP80													60.315	58.915				
maa.													(19.078)***	(18.646)***				
TC90															0.008	0.007		
TC00/CDP00															(0.002)***	(0.002)***	50 (70	51 007
TC90/GDP90																	52.672 (17.197)***	51.807
Observation	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5		(16.858)***
Observation	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
R-squared	0.25		0.25		1												1	

Coefficients of missing dummies for TCs are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

In Model 3 and 4, we impose the restriction of s=1.

iniTC and iniGDP denotes for the amount of TC the earliest year available and GDP of the corresponding year.

obustness tests of all 4 models are conducted for allvariations of TC.

ince the specifications of Model 2 and 4 exclude a constant term, a conventional R2 is not computed

Table 2 (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)

		(3-1)	(3-2)	(3-3)	(3-4)	(3-5)	(3-6)	(3-7)	(3-8)	(3-9)	(3-10)	(3-11)	(3-12)	(3-13)	(3-14)
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4
$b_0 (=C_1)$	)	0.016		0.013											
		(0.003)***		(0.004)***											
$b_1$		0.333	0.012	0.013	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.01	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.014	0.014	0.016
		(0.001)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
$b_2$		0.333	0.01	0.013		0.01	0.011	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.009	0.01	0.01	0.009
		•	(0.004)***	(0.003)***		(0.004)**	(0.005)**	(0.003)***	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)**	(0.005)**	(0.006)*	-0.007
$b_3$ (= $s$ )		0.023	1.701		0.014	1.662	1	2.802	1	2.803	1	2.195	1	2.67	1
( ~)		(0.006)***	(1.008)*		(0.003)***	(1.591)		(1.819)		(4.105)		(2.272)		(3.039)	
b <sub>4</sub>	TC	0.002	0.008	0.003	0.007										
		(0.002)	(0.003)***	(0.003)	(0.002)***										
	TC/GDP					20.073	20.249								
						(9.990)**	(9.862)**								
	iniTC							0.019	0.018						
								(0.008)**	(0.007)**						
	iniTC/iniGDP									46.058	44.681				
										(42.457)	(42.595)				
	TC80											0.009	0.009		
	######################################											(0.004)***	(0.003)***		
	TC80/GDP80													27.548	26.395
,	EDL 4	0.001	0.0002	0.0004	0.0004			0.0002	0.0004					(26.775)	(26.424)
$d_1$	FDIinflow	0.001	0.0003	0.0004	0.0004			0.0003	0.0004						
	EDI: A /CDD	(0.000)**	(0.0002)	(0.0002)*	(0.0002)*	5 422	5.700	(0.0002)*	(0.0002)	4.021	4.200				
	FDIinflow/GDP					5.423 (2.538)**	5.708 (2.523)**			4.031 (2.247)*	4.309 (2.305)*				
	FDIinflow80					(2.538)**	(2.523)**			(2.247)**	(2.303)**	0.069	0.076		
	FD11nji0wo0											(0.041)*	(0.042)*		
	FDIinflow80/GDP80											(0.041)	(0.042)	6.88	8.063
	1 Bingiowoo, GB1 00													(24.832)	(24.656)
e <sub>1</sub>	Open	0.003	0.014	0.006	0.012	0.011	0.01	0.017	0.017	0.013	0.013			(==)	(= )
- 1		(0.004)	(0.005)***	(0.005)	(0.004)***	(0.005)**	(0.005)**	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)**	(0.005)**				
	Open80	()	····/	()	,,	(,	(/	()	····/	()	(/	0.007	0.006	0.011	0.01
	•											(0.004)*	(0.004)*	(0.005)**	(0.004)**
Observ	vation	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
R-squa	red	0.35		0.4											

Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

<sup>•</sup> denotes that the standard error is not computed.

Table 3: Does a country satisfy catch-up condition?

(The case where the capacity of the leader nation depends on its human capital only)

Name of specification		(3-2)	(3-5)	(3-7)	(3-9)	(3-11)	(3-13)
Variables		ta12 FDIinflow Open	tagdp12 FDIinflowgdp Open	ta111 FDIinflow Open	tagdp111 FDIinflowgdp Open	ta80 FDIinflow80 Open80	tagdp80 FDIinflowgdp80 Open80
Algeria	DZA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Argentina	ARG	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Australia	AUS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Austria	AUT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Barbados	BRB	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Belgium	BEL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bolivia	BOL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Botswana	BWA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Brazil	BRA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	CAN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chile	CHL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colombia	COL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	CRI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	CYP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Denmark	DNK	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	DOM	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	ECU	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	SLV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fiji	FJI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Finland	FIN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
France	FRA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ghana	GHA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Greece	GRC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guyana	GUY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Honduras	HND	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hong Kong	HKG	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iceland	ISL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ireland	IRL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel	ISR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Italy	ITA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jamaica	JAM	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Japan	JPN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jordan	JOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kenya	KEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Korea, Republic of	KOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lesotho	LSO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malawi	MWI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malaysia	MYS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mauritius	MUS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	MEX	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Netherlands	NLD	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
New Zealand	NZL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	NIC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norway	NOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panama	PAN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Papua New Guinea	PNG	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	PRY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	PER	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Philippines	PEK PHL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes
• •	PHL	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Portugal Romania	ROM	Yes	1 68	1 68	ies	168	1 68

Name of specification		(3-2)	(3-5)	(3-7)	(3-9)	(3-11)	(3-13)
Variables		ta12 FDIinflow Open	tagdp12 FDIinflowgdp Open	ta111 FDIinflow Open	tagdp111 FDIinflowgdp Open	ta80 FDIinflow80 Open80	tagdp80 FDIinflowgdp80 Open80
	G.E.)	••				••	
Senegal	SEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Seychelles	SYC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Singapore	SGP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Africa	ZAF	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spain	ESP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sweden	SWE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Switzerland	CHE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Syria	SYR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taiwan	TWN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Thailand	THA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Trinidad &Tobago	TTO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
United Kingdom	GBR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	URY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	VEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zambia	ZMB	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zimbabwe	ZWE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	BGD	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Cameroon	CMR	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Central African Republic	CAF	No	No	No	No	No	No
Congo, Dem. Rep.	ZAR	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Guatemala	GTM	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
India	IND	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Indonesia	IDN	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Iran	IRN	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Mali	MLI	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mozambique	MOZ	No	No	No	No	No	No
Nepal	NPL	No	No	No	No	No	No
Niger	NER	No	No	No	No	No	No
Pakistan	PAK	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Sri Lanka	LKA	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Togo	TGO	No	No	No	No	No	No
Turkey	TUR	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Uganda	UGA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
# of countries which is "No"		6	10	7	16	6	12

Table 4: Does a country satisfy catch-up condition?

(The case where the capacity of the leader nation depends on its human capital, FDI and openness)

Name of specification		(3-2)	(3-5)	(3-7)	(3-9)	(3-11)	(3-13)
Variables		ta12 FDIinflow	tagdp12 FDIinflowgdp	ta111 FDIinflow	tagdp111 FDIinflowgdp	ta80 FDIinflow80	tagdp80 FDIinflowgdp80
		Open	Open	Open	Open	Open80	Open80
		·	*	•	Î	Î	•
Algeria	DZA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Argentina	ARG	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Australia	AUS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Austria	AUT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Barbados	BRB	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Belgium	BEL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bolivia	BOL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Botswana	BWA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Brazil	BRA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	CAN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chile	CHL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colombia	COL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	CRI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	CYP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Denmark	DNK	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	DOM	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	ECU	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fiji	FJI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Finland	FIN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
France	FRA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ghana	GHA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Greece	GRC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guyana	GUY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Honduras	HND	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hong Kong	HKG	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iceland	ISL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ireland	IRL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel	ISR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Italy	ITA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jamaica	JAM JPN	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Japan Jordan			Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
	JOR	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes
Kenya Korea, Republic of	KEN KOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes Yes
Lesotho	LSO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malawi	MWI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malaysia	MYS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mauritius	MUS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	MEX	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Netherlands	NLD	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
New Zealand	NZL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	NIC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norway	NOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panama	PAN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Papua New Guinea	PNG	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	PRY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	PER	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Philippines	PHL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Portugal	PRT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Romania	ROM	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Komama	KUM	i es	1 68	1 68	1 68	1 68	1 68

Name of specification		(3-2)	(3-5)	(3-7)	(3-9)	(3-11)	(3-13)
Variables		ta12 FDIinflow Open	tagdp12 FDIinflowgdp Open	ta111 FDIinflow Open	tagdp111 FDIinflowgdp Open	ta80 FDIinflow80 Open80	tagdp80 FDIinflowgdp80 Open80
Senegal	SEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Seychelles	SYC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Singapore	SGP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Africa	ZAF	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spain	ESP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sri Lanka	LKA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sweden	SWE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Switzerland	CHE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Syria	SYR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taiwan	TWN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Thailand	THA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Trinidad &Tobago	TTO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
United Kingdom	GBR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	URY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	VEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zambia	ZMB	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zimbabwe	ZWE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	BGD	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Cameroon	CMR	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Central African Republic	CAF	No	No	No	No	No	No
Congo, Dem. Rep.	ZAR	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
El Salvador	SLV	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	GTM	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
India	IND	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Indonesia	IDN	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Iran	IRN	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Mali	MLI	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mozambique	MOZ	No	No	No	No	No	No
Nepal	NPL	No	No	No	No	No	No
Niger	NER	No	No	No	No	No	No
Pakistan	PAK	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Togo	TGO	No	No	No	No	No	No
Turkey	TUR	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Uganda	UGA	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
# of countries which is "No"		6	10	7	17	6	12

**Table 5 (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)** 

		(8-1)	(8-2)	(8-3)	(8-4)	(8-5)	(8-6)	(8-7)	(8-8)	(8-9)	(8-10)
1 ( 0)		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4
$b_0 (=C)$		0.016 (0.003)***		0.013 (0.004)***		0.018 (0.006)***	0.021 (0.005)***				
b <sub>1</sub>		0.369	0.013	0.004)****	0.017	0.015	0.017	0.01	0.013	0.023	0.029
UĮ		(0.001)***	(0.005)**	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)**	(0.006)***	(0.006)*	(0.006)**	(0.008)***	(0.006)***
b <sub>2</sub>		0.369	0.012	0.014	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.007	0.008	0.02	0.024
_		(0.000)	(0.005)**	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)**	(0.006)***	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)**	(0.009)***
b <sub>3</sub> (=s)		0.023	1.621	1	1	1.543	1	2.304	1	1.837	1
		(0.008)***	(1.000)			(1.364)		(2.564)		(1.792)	
$b_4$	TC	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.007						
		(0.002)	(0.002)***	(0.003)	(0.002)***						
	TC/GDP					27.743	27.639				
						(8.097)***	(7.910)***				
	TC80							0.01	0.01		
								(0.005)**	(0.004)**		
	TC80/GDP80									32.459	31.051
										(16.464)*	(15.463)**
$\mathbf{f}_1$	$TC*log(HC_{1960})$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.0004	-0.002						
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)						
	$(TC/GDP)*log(HC_{1960})$					-26.176	-26.301				
						(9.458)***	(9.316)***				
	$TC80*log(HC_{1960})$							0.003	0.002		
								(0.008)	(0.007)		
	$(TC80/GDP80)*log(HC_{1960})$									-63.951	-65.793
										(16.180)***	(15.335)***
$d_1$	FDIinflow	0.001	0.0003	0.0004	0.0003						
		(0.000)*	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)*	4.220	4.415				
	FDIinflow/GDP					4.238 (1.807)**	4.415 (1.781)**				
	FDIinflow80					(1.607)**	(1.761)	0.083	0.087		
	1 Dingiowoo							(0.064)	(0.063)		
	FDIinflow80/GDP80							(*****)	(*****)	25.563	28.267
	3									(18.298)	(18.146)
e <sub>1</sub>	Open	0.002	0.012	0.006	0.01	0.006	0.006				
		(0.004)	(0.006)**	(0.005)	(0.005)**	(0.004)*	(0.003)*				
	Open80							0.009	0.008	0.006	0.005
Ohaamadii		9.5	0.5	85	0.5	0.5	85	(0.007) 85	(0.006) 85	(0.003)**	(0.002)** 85
Observation	1	85 0.35	85	85 0.34	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
R-squared		0.33		0.34							

Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

In Model 3 and 4, we impose the restriction of s=1. Robustness tests of all 4 models are conducted for all variations of TC and FDI. Since the specifications of Model 2 and 4 exclude a constant term, a conventional R2 is not computed

Table 6 (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)

<u>.</u>		(12-1)	(12-2)	(12-3)	(12-4)	(12-5)	(12-6)	(12-7)	(12-8)	(12-9)	(12-10)	(12-11)	(12-12)	(12-13)	(12-14)
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4
$b_0 (=C)$		0.025 (0.005)***		0.023 (0.005)***											
$b_1$		0.008 (0.003)**	0.011 (0.003)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.014 (0.004)***	0.017 (0.006)**	0.019 (0.004)***	0.011 (0.003)***	0.009 (0.004)**	0.016 (0.006)***	0.02 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.016 (0.004)***	0.015 (0.004)***	0.018 (0.004)***
$b_2$		0.02 (0.014)	0.009 (0.004)**	0.016 (0.006)***	0.009 (0.005)*	0.016 (0.006)***	0.018 (0.005)***	0.006 (0.004)	(0.005)	0.015 (0.006)***	0.017 (0.006)***	0.01 (0.005)*	0.009 (0.007)	0.012 (0.006)**	0.012 (0.007)*
$b_3 (=s)$		3.174 (2.894)	2.416 (2.054)	1	1	1.359 (1.072)	1	3.48 (3.907)	1	1.632 (1.477)	1	2.606 (2.608)	1	2.263 (2.270)	1
b <sub>4</sub> TC		0.004 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)***	0.004 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)***										
TC/GDP						11.315 (9.018)	10.944 (8.820)								
iniTC								0.019 (0.008)**	0.022 (0.010)**						
iniTC/iniGDP	•									6.47 (36.569)	-0.063 (33.350)				
TC80											, ,	0.008 (0.003)**	0.008 (0.003)**		
TC80/GDP80												, ,	, ,	12.413 (26.043)	9.497 (25.301)
d <sub>1</sub> IDISFDIinflow	w	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.00008)	-0.00001 (0.00015)	0.00003 (0.00008)			0.0001 (0.00008)	0.00003 (0.00006)						
IDISFDIinflow	w/GDP					34.535 (13.431)**	36.608 (13.214)***			31.196 (12.304)**	33.832 (12.135)***				
IDISFDIinflow	w80											0.00004 (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)		
IDISinflow80/	GDP80													16.412 (35.265)	17.659 (35.148)
e <sub>1</sub> Open		0.013 (0.008)*	0.015 (0.006)**	0.011 (0.007)	0.014 (0.006)**	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.017 (0.007)**	0.02 (0.008)**	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)				
Open80												0.008 (0.004)*	0.007 (0.004)*	0.007 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Observation R-squared		85 0.34	85	85 0.33	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85

Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 7 (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)

	<u> </u>	(14-1) Model 1	(14-2) Model 2	(14-3) Model 3	(14-4) Model 4	(14-5) Model 2	(14-6) Model 4	(14-7) Model 2	(14-8) Model 4	(14-9) Model 2	(14-10) Model 4	(14-11) Model 2	(14-12) Model 4	(14-13) Model 2	(14-14) Model 4
b <sub>0</sub> (=C)		0.015 (0.003)***		0.015 (0.004)***											
b <sub>1</sub>		0.413 (0.001)***	0.03 (0.024)	0.016 (0.003)***	0.022 (0.003)***	0.012 (0.005)**	0.013 (0.003)***	0.021 (0.010)**	0.022 (0.003)***	0.012 (0.005)**	0.013 (0.003)***	0.017 (0.005)***	0.021 (0.003)***	0.01 (0.005)*	0.011 (0.004)***
b <sub>2</sub>		0.413 (0.000)	0.029 (0.023)	0.016 (0.004)***	0.018 (0.003)***	0.009 (0.005)**	0.01 (0.004)**	0.019 (0.010)*	0.02 (0.004)***	0.007 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.014 (0.005)**	0.017 (0.005)***	0.007 (0.004)*	0.008 (0.004)*
$b_3$ (= $s$ )		0.021 (0.005)***	0.567 (0.640)	1	1	1.233 (1.367)	1	1.075 (0.978)	1	1.563 (2.548)	1	1.692 (1.398)	1	1.302 (1.714)	1
b <sub>4</sub>	TC  TC/GDP  iniTC  iniTC/iniGDP  TC80  TC80/GDP80	0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.002)***	0.003 (0.002)	0.006 (0.002)***	7.904 (11.602)	7.772 (11.499)	0.014 (0.005)***	0.014 (0.004)***	8.387 (45.164)	5.179 (43.087)	0.009 (0.003)***	0.008 (0.002)***	-39.99 (50.695)	-43.172 (49.654)
d <sub>1</sub>	FDlinflow  FDlinflow/GDP  FDlinflow80  FDlinflow80/GDP80	0.0004 [0.0003]	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.00014)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000001 (0.0002)	0.00001 (0.0002)	-1.167 (37.544)	0.073 (37.776)
e <sub>1</sub>	IM IM/GDP IM80 IM80/GDP80	1.99E-11 (1.36E-11)	1.08E-11 (8.68E-12)	1.23E-11 (1.10E-11)	8.92E-12 (7.86E-12)	4.149 (1.665)**	4.155 (1.659)**	1.68E-11 (8.30E-12)**	1.71E-11 (7.93E-12)**	4.119 (1.363)***	4.173 (1.367)***	1.79E-11 (1.15E-11)	1.95E-11 (1.18E-11)	6.936 (3.110)**	7.08 (3.139)**
Observa R-squar		85 0.38	85	85 0.35	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85

Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 8 (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)

	•		-	•	=	r	•	r		r		r	-	r	
		(16-1)	(16-2)	(16-3)	(16-4)	(16-5)	(16-6)	(16-7)	(16-8)	(16-9)	(16-10)	(16-11)	(16-12)	(16-13)	(16-14)
1 ( 0	`	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4
$b_0 (=C$	)	0.014 (0.003)***		0.014 (0.003)***											
b <sub>1</sub>		0.245	0.025	0.009	0.013	0.034	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.01	0.013	0.014
O <sub>1</sub>		(0.0005)***	(0.035)	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.113)	(0.003)***	(0.006)*	(0.003)***	(0.007)	(0.003)***	(0.004)**	(0.003)***	(0.007)*	(0.004)***
b <sub>2</sub>		0.245	0.024	0.009	0.012	0.032	0.011	0.01	0.01	0.009	0.009	0.006	0.007	0.01	0.011
		•	(0.035)	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.112)	(0.004)***	(0.006)*	(0.003)***	(0.006)	(0.004)**	(0.003)*	(0.004)*	(0.006)*	(0.005)**
$b_3$ (= $s$ )		0.021	0.346	1	1	0.193	1	1.028	1	1.027	1	1.692	1	1.246	1
( -)		(0.007)***	(0.628)			(0.795)		(0.952)		(1.378)		(1.928)		(1.616)	
b <sub>4</sub>	TC	0.002	0.009	0.003	0.009										
		(0.003)	(0.003)***	(0.003	(0.003)***										
	TC/GDP					38.634	39.209								
	iniTC					(14.864)**	(14.417)***	0.023	0.023						
	iniTC							(0.010)**	(0.009)**						
	iniTC/iniGDP							(0.010)	(0.00)	136.632	136.084				
										(67.205)**	(62.745)**				
	TC80											0.013	0.013		
												(0.006)**	(0.005)**		
	TC80/GDP80													72.714	72.18
$d_1$	FDIinflow	0.001	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002			0.0002	0.0002					(31.571)**	(31.029)**
uı	1 Dingtow	(0.0004)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)			(0.0002)	(0.0002)						
	FDIinflow/GDP	,	, ,	,	, ,	7.643	7.061		,	7.17	7.173				
						(3.534)**	(3.203)**			(3.340)**	(3.320)**				
	FDIinflow80											0.089	0.093		
	EDI:400/CDB00											(0.055)	(0.056)	1.402	2.606
	FDIinflow80/GDP80													1.402 (34.044)	(33.95)
e <sub>1</sub>	SW	4.161	3.286	3.871	3.074	3.683	3.354	3.964	3.967	3.778	3.783			(31.011)	(33.73)
•		(1.961)**	(1.240)***	(1.811)**	(1.148)***	(1.442)**	(1.296)**	(1.521)**	(1.511)**	(1.468)**	(1.458)**				
	SW80											3.235	3.28	3.087	3.138
												(1.434)**	(1.459)**	(1.203)**	(1.219)**
Observ		85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
R-squa	nrea	0.48	_	0.46	-						_		_		-

Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 9 Robustness tests (Dependent variable: average growth rate of TFP)

				ibic / Ito	oustiless t	coto (Dep	chacht ve	ii iabic. a	verage gr	owin race	<b>OI III</b> )				
		(18-1)	(18-2)	(18-3)	(18-4)	(18-5)	(18-6)	(18-7)	(18-8)	(18-9)	(18-10)	(18-11)	(18-12)	(18-13)	(18-14)
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4	Model 2	Model 4
b <sub>0</sub> (=	=C)	0.009		0.009											
		(0.004)**		(0.004)**											
h		-0.657	-0.401	-0.657	-0.374	-2.672	-2.737	-0.263	-0.203	-1.735	-1.792	0.055	0.071	0.625	0.782
		(0.474)	(0.392)	(0.47)	(0.371)	(1.476)*	(1.475)*	(0.396)	(0.352)	(1.243)	(1.241)	(0.406)	(0.39)	(1.16)	(1.114)
$b_1$		0.013	0.012	0.013	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.011	0.015	0.013	0.014	0.012	0.014	0.014	0.016
		(0.006)**	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
$b_2$		0.012	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.01	0.011	0.009	0.012	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.01	0.01
		(0.006)**	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)**	(0.004)*	(0.005)**	(0.006)*
b <sub>3</sub> (=	=s)	1.017	1.488	1	1	1.503	1	2.261	1	1.973	1	2.183	1	2.419	1
		(0.775)	(0.718)**			(1.197)		(1.096)**		(2.896)		(2.032)		(2.518)	
$b_4$	TC	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.006										
		(0.002)*	(0.002)***	(0.002)**	(0.002)***										
	TC/GDP					14.522	13.444								
						(7.079)**	(6.509)**								
	iniTC							0.017	0.013						
								(0.006)***	(0.005)***						
	iniTC/iniGDP									10.608	9.709				
										(28.491)	(27.946)				
	TC80											0.009	0.009		
	TCOO/CD DOO											(0.003)***	(0.003)***	17.007	12.661
	TC80/GDP80													17.087	13.661
	EDI: A	0.0004	0.0002	0.0004	0.0002			0.0004	0.0002					(19.225)	(18.437)
$\mathbf{d}_1$	FDIinflow	0.0004	0.0003	0.0004	0.0003			0.0004	0.0003						
	EDI:d/CDD	(0.0002)**	(0.0001)**	(0.0002)**	(0.0001)**	5.842	6.055	(0.0001)**	(0.0001)***	3.762	3.974				
	FDIinflow/GDP														
	FDIinflow80					(2.560)**	(2.555)**			(2.152)*	(2.141)*	0.06	0.063		
	r Diinjiowoo											(0.036)*	(0.035)*		
	FDIinflow80/GDP80											(0.030)	(0.033)	12.645	15.281
	rDingiow80/GDF80													(23.75)	(23.648)
$e_1$	Open	0.011	0.015	0.011	0.014	0.011	0.011	0.018	0.016	0.014	0.014			(23.13)	(23.070)
CI	Орен	(0.005)**	(0.005)***	(0.005)**	(0.004)***	(0.005)**	(0.004)**	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***				
	Open80	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.00-1)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	0.009	0.008	0.011	0.011
	Openov											(0.004)**	(0.004)**	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Obs	ervation	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110
	juared	0.39		0.39	110	110	-10	110	.10	110	-10	110	.10	110	.10
N-4		0.57	•	- 0.57		Ļ	-	<u> </u>	-	J		<u>l</u>		L	•

Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

In Model 3 and 4, we impose the restriction of s=1. Robustness tests of all 4 models are conducted for all variations of TC and FDI. Since the specifications of Model 2 and 4 exclude a constant term, a conventional R2 is not computed

Appendix Table

Descriptive Statistics of Variable Used in this Paper

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
rgdp60	$7.95*10^{10}$	$2.57*10^{11}$
pop60	19887.75	52605.64
lhc60	0.90	0.99
avgtfpgrowth	0.03	0.02
TA	63.56	75.52
TA/GDP	0.01	0.02
iniTA	20.59	32.34
iniTA/iniGDP	0.00	0.00
ta80	47.03	55.78
ta80/gdp80	0.00	0.01
FDIinflow	1264.12	3955.34
FDIinflow/GDP	31.82	89.48
FDIinflow80	676.46	1888.56
FDIinflow80/GDP80	0.00	0.01
open	62.03	43.28
open80	60.22	50.30
import	$2.21*10^{10}$	$4.82*10^{10}$
import/gdp	0.320	0.192
import80	$1.38*10^{10}$	$3.03*10^{10}$
import80/gdp80	0.302	0.195